

# ROAD MAP FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

ADDENDUM ON  
STRUCTURE AND  
PROCESS ANALYSES



Volume IV - Department  
of Defense

**United States Commission  
on  
National Security/21<sup>st</sup> Century**

**April 15, 2001**

**National Security Study Group**

**assisted by**

**Booz·Allen & Hamilton**

## **PREFACE**

### **DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

The chapters in this volume provide information concerning organizations in the Department of Defense, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary for Acquisition and Technology, the Under Secretary for Policy, Program Analysis and Evaluation, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U.S. Joint Forces Command, the Unified Commands, the Military Departments and Services, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and the Defense Logistics Agency.

Each chapter is designed to serve as a stand-alone reference for a specific organization and its role in national security processes. Chapters are presented in standard format to permit comparisons and facilitate research. That format is:

- An executive summary that provides an organizational overview and observations.
- Section 1 identifies the legal basis for the organization and significant organization and interagency directives.
- Section 2 notes the major responsibilities of the organization, identifies subordinate organizations, and delineates the organization's major products.
- Sections 3 and 4 deal with the vision, strategy, values, culture, leadership, staff attributes, and structure of the organization.
- Section 5 discusses the organization's formal role seven key processes.
- Section 6 provides information on the organization's roles in informal processes.
- Section 7 outlines the responsible Congressional committees, the budget, and the personnel strength of the organization.
- Section 8 provides observations on ways in which the organization contributes to national security.

Descriptions of organizations deemed most significant in terms of the current national security apparatus include matrices that relate products and roles to processes. Process maps have been added as appendices for these organizations. Where it may be helpful for readers to consult other chapters to gain a more complete understanding of particular concepts or issues, the appropriate references are included in the text or in footnotes. An acronym glossary is included at the end of Volume VII.

The entire series consists of seven volumes:

- Volume I contains descriptions of the overarching interagency and inter branch processes as well as key observations on organizations and processes;
- Volume II contains chapters on the Executive Office of the President.
- Volume III contains chapters on key Congressional Committees.
- Volume IV provides descriptions of key Department of State Organizations.
- Volume V discusses Department of Defense organizations.
- Volume VI covers intelligence community organizations and activities.
- Volumes VIIa and VIIb describe Executive Branch organizations not covered elsewhere.

These volumes are based on comprehensive searches of available literature, laws, and directives and extensive interviews with current and former practitioners. Research included both formal and informal processes. There is sufficient information on each organization to fill several volumes, thus the synthesis of this information focuses on national security processes as defined by the U.S. Commission on National Security/21<sup>st</sup> Century.

# Volume IV – Department of Defense

- Chapter 1**      Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
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**ORGANIZATIONAL DESCRIPTION**  
**OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**



*Prepared for the U.S. Commission on National Security/21<sup>st</sup> Century*

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Office of the Secretary of Defense

#### Overview

The Constitution appoints the President as the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. To assist the President in discharging his duties as Commander-in-Chief and to bolster the principle of civilian control of the military, Congress established the position of Secretary of Defense (SecDef) in 1947 and made it a cabinet level position. In fulfilling his responsibilities, the Secretary of Defense:

- Acts as the President's principal assistant for matters pertaining to the Department of Defense;
- Establishes policies, strategies, regulations, and programs for the Department;
- Directs, guides, and controls the Armed Forces under all circumstances;
- Evaluates the effectiveness of programs and the readiness of forces;
- Plans, programs, budgets and oversees budget execution;
- Meets with officials of foreign governments on matters of national security; and
- Allocates resources consistent with Congressional intent and Department priorities.

The SecDef is a statutory member of the National Security Council and, by direction of the president, participates in deliberations of the National Security Council Principals Committee (NSC/PC).<sup>1</sup>

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) provides advice and staff assistance to the SecDef to assist him in fulfilling his responsibilities. OSD's core competencies include policy and strategy formulation, management, decision-making, and crisis management.

#### Organization

OSD includes the SecDef, the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DepSecDef), an Executive Secretariat, and special and military assistants. It also includes the Department of Defense Inspector General, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight), the General Counsel, and the Director of Administration and Management.

In addition to this immediate staff, OSD consists of the four Under Secretaries of Defense: the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer), the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness); and the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology). The Under

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<sup>1</sup> Section 113, Title 10, U.S.C.; Section 101, Volume 61, Part 1, Public Laws, Reorganization Plans, Proposed Amendment to the Constitution; Presidential Decision Directive 2, The Interagency Process.

Secretaries oversee eight Assistant Secretaries of Defense (ASD), while three ASDs report to the SecDef (Legislative Affairs; Public Affairs; and Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence).

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Chiefs are responsible to the SecDef. The Joint Chiefs (but not the Chairman) are enjoined to keep their respective Service Secretaries apprised of the advice they give the SecDef.<sup>2</sup>

### **Organizational Products**

OSD's major products include policy and military advice for the President and guidance to the organizations that comprise OSD. That guidance takes a number of forms:

- Strategy and policy documents;
- Operational orders for military forces;
- Annual budget preparation guidance;
- Program and acquisition guidance;
- Resource allocation decisions;
- Defense reform initiatives, guidance, and directives; and
- Required Congressional reports.

OSD elements also prepare testimony for the SecDef and DepSecDef and review the testimony of other senior officials; write speeches and addresses for senior officials to explain national security policy in a variety of forums; maintain official liaison with Congressional leaders and applicable committees and subcommittees; and prepare press releases as appropriate.

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<sup>2</sup> DoD Directive (DODD) Number 5100.1, Subject: Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components, September 25, 1987.

## Role in Formal and Informal Processes

		Strategy Development	Policy, Guidance, and Regulations	Planning	Mission Execution	Observation, Orientation, and Oversight	Preparation	Resourcing
<b>OSD Products</b>	National Security Strategy	✓						
	National Military Strategy	✓						
	Defense Planning Guidance	✓	✓	✓				✓
	Contingency Planning			✓				
	Review Plans			✓		✓		
	Resource Allocation		✓					✓
	DoD Budget					✓		✓
	Budget Appeals							✓
	Consultations w/ Foreign Military Leaders						✓	
	Congressional Testimony		✓					✓
	Annual Reports					✓		
	Speeches & Interviews		✓					
	Foreign Policy lunches	✓						
	ABC Breakfasts & Lunches	✓						
<b>SecDef Roles</b>	Advisor to the President	✓	✓		✓			
	Direction of Armed Forces				✓	✓	✓	
	Member of the NSC/PC	✓	✓	✓	✓			

**Strategy Development.** SecDef reviews and approves the Department's input to the National Security Strategy. He reviews and approves strategies developed by the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). In informal meetings with other senior Executive Branch officials, the SecDef participates in high-level strategy meetings. As the President's senior national security advisor, he participates in both formal and informal strategy development sessions held by the President, the National Security Council, and the NSC/PC.

**Policy, Guidance, Regulation.** The SecDef provides policy and guidance to the Department in all matters through a number of different venues including DoD Directives (DODD), DoD Instructions (DODDI), and approval of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) (prepared by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Director of PA&E).<sup>3</sup> The DepSecDef provides guidance and regulation in resource allocation decisions made through the Defense Resource Board process. Through the actions of the DoD Inspector General and the Under Secretary of

<sup>3</sup> See sections of this volume entitled Under Secretary for Policy and Programs, Analysis, and Evaluation directorate for a detailed description of DPG preparation and effects.

Defense (Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer), OSD regulates adherence to regulations and policies. In speeches, testimony, advice to the President, and Principal Committee consultations the SecDef develops and promulgates policy.

**Planning.** The SecDef approves the DPG, which is part of the planning phase of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) used to prepare the Department's portion of the President's annual budget submission. Although approved by the President, OSD develops and coordinates the Contingency Planning Guidance, which constitutes the authority for development of contingency and other operational plans. In fulfilling his statutory responsibilities to review operational plans prepared by the Unified Commands, the SecDef (through the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy) influences contingency planning. In NSC/PC deliberations, the SecDef approves political-military plans prepared as part of the process for managing complex contingencies.

**Mission Execution.** The SecDef directs the activities of armed forces engaged in military operations, acting in his own name or for the President. Although the SecDef may issue orders directly to operating forces, he traditionally places the CJCS in the chain and requires all OSD offices to deal with military forces through the CJCS. When the CJCS issues orders (such as Warning or Deployment Orders), the SecDef approves them. As a member of the NSC/PC the SecDef is involved in interagency oversight of ongoing operations and thus can influence the course of ongoing operations.

**Observation, Orientation, Oversight.** OSD exercises oversight in the process for preparing the annual Department budget. The review of operational plans required by law also provides oversight of an important function. At weekly informal meetings with other senior officials, the SecDef helps to orient approaches to national security problems. Through annual reports to Congress as required by law, OSD exercises observation and oversight of activities such as an annual net assessment of U.S. defense capabilities compared to allied capabilities and those of adversaries (or potential adversaries), and the costs of stationing forces outside of the United States. The Department's Inspector General also is an active participant in oversight activities. And, in providing direction to the armed forces, the SecDef exercises orientation and oversight authority.

**Preparation.** The SecDef establishes overall DoD preparation priorities in the DPG and other documents, which provide priorities to DoD components. In his role of directing the armed forces, the SecDef encourages broad preparation strategies. OSD is involved in preparation through frequent meetings with foreign military leaders that provide information about their capabilities and intents, strengthen alliances, and pave the way for future coalitions.

**Resourcing.** OSD participates in the internal DoD resourcing process by approving the DPG, providing resource allocation decisions for difficult issues, budget preparation guidance, and budget approval. In cases in which the Office of Management and Budget rejects a DoD budget request, OSD is involved in the appeals process, which may involve the President.

## Observations

OSD is organized to deal with those national security matters that require a military response and to manage the Department's business affairs. Adequate processes exist to develop strategy, issue policy and guidance, plan, oversee ongoing operations, prepare for the future, and manage budget preparation and execution.

There is a "seam" in how it is staffed, however, because all senior members of OSD change when Administrations change. Because all of the leadership departs nearly simultaneously, decision making to deal with an unexpected crisis may be hampered if that crisis occurs during the change-of-administrations transition. This lack of long-term continuity may be deleterious in the future when response times may be shorter and issues more complex.

Similarly, there is no effective chief of staff's office for OSD. This can affect the speed at which responses occur and how well integrated they are. While most Secretaries have chiefs of staff, their chiefs do not have the resources or organizational experience within DoD to act as chiefs in the same way that the White House Chief of Staff or the chiefs of military staffs do. And, because they are political appointees, their tenures are relatively brief. Thus, there is no central office to manage information flow within OSD similar to the Director of the Joint Staff, or to anticipate the Secretary's requirements and task OSD staff elements accordingly. Other functions hampered by lack of an OSD chief of staff is the ability to orchestrate responses and hold OSD elements accountable for results, to synthesize the inputs of various activities into a coherent whole, or to supervise implementation in the Secretary's name.

Creation of a properly resourced OSD chief of staff's office, staffed with career civil servants and augmented by military officers, could improve effectiveness and accountability. The chief of staff could continue to be appointed by the SecDef; however, the office would include deputy chiefs of staff who are capable of translating requirements and initiatives into action within DoD's complex bureaucracy.

## ORGANIZATIONAL DESCRIPTION

### OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

#### 1. Legal Specifications, Authorizations and Responsibilities.

A. The Constitution appoints the President as the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, thus establishing the Constitutional principle of civilian control of the military. To assist the President in discharging his duties as Commander-in-Chief, Congress established the position of Secretary of Defense (SecDef) in 1947<sup>4</sup> and made it a cabinet level position. The duties of the SecDef were modified slightly in 1949<sup>5</sup> and bolstered by the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958.<sup>6</sup> Over the years, there have been other modifications, and today, provisions of the public law that apply to the SecDef are contained in Chapter 2, Title 10 United States Code (U.S.C.), Armed Forces. To assist him in the performance of his duties, the SecDef is authorized an office that includes special assistants, Under Secretaries, and Assistant Secretaries.

**B. Department Directives:** The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) responsibilities are prescribed in a number of Department of Defense Directives (DODD) including:

(1) **DODD 5100.1**—Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components;

(2) **DODD 5100.73**—Major Department of Defense Headquarters Activities;

(3) **DODD 5105.2**—Delegation of Authority to the Deputy Secretary of Defense;

(4) **DODD 5105.53**—Director of Administration and Management;

(5) **DODD 5105.54**—Executive Committee of the Department of Defense;

(6) **DODD 5106.1**—Inspector General of the Department of Defense;

(7) **DODD 5111.1**—Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD (P));

(8) **DODD 5118.3**—Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (USD(C)/Chief Financial Officer (CFO), Department of Defense;

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<sup>4</sup> Section 101, Volume 61, Part 1, Public Laws, Reorganization Plans, Proposed Amendment to the Constitution; Presidential Decision Directive 2, The Interagency Process.

<sup>5</sup> Sections 5 and 6, Volume 63, Part 1, Public laws, Reorganization Plans, Private Laws, Concurrent Resolutions, and Proclamations.

<sup>6</sup> Section 3, Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, PL 85-599; 72 STAT. 514.

- (9) **DODD 5122.5**—Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ASD(PA));
- (10) **DODD 5124.2**—Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R));
- (11) **DODD 5129.22**—Defense Science Board;
- (12) **DODD 5134.1**—Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (USD(A&T));
- (13) **DODD 5134.5**—Defense Technology Board (DTB);
- (14) **DODD 5134.8**—Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense programs (ATSD(NCB));
- (15) **DODD 5137.1**—Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (ASD(C3I));
- (16) **DODD 5142.1**—Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs);
- (17) **DODD 5141.2**—Director of Operational Test and Evaluation;
- (18) **DODD 5145.1**—General Counsel of the Department of Defense;
- (19) **DODD 5148.11**—Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight;
- (20) **DODD 5149.2**—Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC);
- (21) **DODD 5158.1**—Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Relationships with the Office of the Secretary of Defense; and
- (22) **DODD 5160.69**—Defense Management Council.

**C. Interagency Directives:** Although there are a number of directives that affect OSD and its role in the interagency process, two are the most significant.

**(1) Presidential Decision Directive 2 (PDD 2), Organization of the National Security Council:** Establishes the Clinton Administration's interagency process and prescribes that the Secretary of Defense will be a member of the National Security Council Principals Committee (NSC/PC). The NSC/PC is charged with reviewing, coordinating, and monitoring national security policy making and implementation. Additional information regarding PDD 2 is included in the section of this report dealing with overarching processes.

**(2) PDD 39, U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism [sic]:** Requires the SecDef to develop and ensure proper funding and management of DoD counterterrorism capabilities. It also requires the Department to respond to requests for assistance from the Department of State

to assist foreign populations affected by terrorist activities. PDD 39 requires DoD to cooperate with Department of Justice efforts to resolve terrorist highjackings.

**(3) PDD 49, National Space Policy:** Requires DoD (in conjunction with the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence) to conduct "space activities necessary for national security." Cooperation includes coordinating integrated space architectures and modernizing existing capabilities. Specific provisions include use of space to warn of and deter attacks; countering space systems that can be used for hostile purposes; assuring that hostile forces cannot prevent U.S. use of space; and using space for intelligence gathering purposes. DoD is also directed to coordinate with the Department of Energy to develop capabilities necessary to monitor "international agreements to control special nuclear materials and nuclear weapons" in space.

**(4) PDD 56, Managing Complex Contingency Operations:** Gives the NSC/PC specific responsibilities in crisis management, including oversight of the actions of the NSC Deputies Committee.

**(5) PDD 62, Combating Terrorism:** Prescribes Executive Branch Departments and Agencies general responsibilities for combating terrorism and codifies and clarifies their roles across the spectrum of counter terrorism programs. This PDD establishes the Office of the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-Terrorism [sic].

**(6) PDD 63, Protecting America's Critical Infrastructures:** prescribes OSD's interagency responsibilities with respect to the National Infrastructure Protection Center which is designed to facilitate interagency coordination for consequence management, responses to terrorist actions, and reconstitution.

## **2. Mission/Functions/ Purposes**

**A. Major Responsibilities:** The duties and responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense include:

**(1)** Serving as one of the President's principal advisers on national security matters and on all matters pertaining to the Department of Defense [Key Process Relation: Potentially All];

**(2)** Assisting the President in his role as Commander-in-Chief by providing control and oversight of military forces [Key Process Relation: Policy, Guidance, and Regulation; Mission Execution; Observation, Orientation, and Oversight; Preparation];

**(3)** Reviewing and evaluating the performance of DoD programs and forces [Key Process Relation: Policy, Guidance, and Regulation; Observation, Orientation, and Oversight];

**(4)** Engaging in mid- and long-range planning, programming, and budgeting [Key Process Relation: Planning; Resourcing];

**(5)** Establishing and promulgating policies, regulations, and programs for the Department [Key Process Relation: Policy, Guidance, and Regulation; Resourcing];

(6) Overseeing preparation of DoD's portion of the President's budget [Key Process Relation: Resourcing];

(7) In coordination with the Office of the Secretary of State, meeting with senior foreign officials including the heads of state and ministers of defense [Key Process Relation: Mission Execution; Preparation]; and

(8) Allocating resources consistent with Congressional intent and Department priorities [Key Process Relation: Resourcing].

**B. Subordinate Agencies and Activities:** OSD exercises oversight over the following Defense Agencies and activities:<sup>7</sup>

- (1) The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO);
- (2) The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA);<sup>8</sup>
- (3) The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA)\*;
- (4) The Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA);
- (5) The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA);\*<sup>9</sup>
- (6) The Defense Security Service (DSS);
- (7) The Defense Legal Services Agency (DLSA);
- (8) The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA);\*<sup>10</sup>
- (9) The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)\*;
- (10) Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA);
- (11) Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS);
- (12) Defense Security and Cooperation Agency (DSCA);<sup>11</sup>
- (13) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA)\*; and
- (14) The National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS).<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> DODD 5100.73, Subject: Major Department of Defense Headquarters Activities, dated May 13, 1999. (Hereafter DODD 5100.73). These activities do not report directly to the SecDef, but elements of his office have oversight responsibility for them. For example, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence is responsible for DIA, NIMA, and DISA.

<sup>8</sup> Addressed in a separate section of this volume.

<sup>9</sup> Addressed in the Intelligence volume.

<sup>10</sup> Addressed in a separate section of this volume.

<sup>11</sup> Formerly known as the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA).

Those agencies marked with an (\*) have been designated by the Congress or the SecDef as combat support agencies. While they report to OSD, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) is required to conduct a biennial review of the readiness and responsiveness of these agencies to support operating forces during time of national emergency.<sup>13</sup> The Joint Staff Directorate for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessments (J-8) conducts these reviews, and reports are sent from J-8 to the CJCS to the SecDef. The process ensures that the uniformed services have a certain amount of oversight over the activities of agencies that are crucial to warfighting effectiveness.

**C. Major Products:** OSD's major products include:

(1) Top-level strategy documents including coordination of the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Military Strategy (NMS);<sup>14</sup>

(2) Internal planning documents such as the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) which provides policy, strategy, and programming direction;

(3) Preparation of the Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG), which is signed by the President and provides the authority for the military to develop operational plans;

(4) Reviews of operational plans prepared by the military;

(5) Resource allocation and budgeting decisions through the Defense Resources Board (DRB), chaired by the DepSecDef as part of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS);

(6) Appeals to decisions made by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget during the preparation cycle for the President's annual budget;<sup>15</sup>

(7) Substantive meetings with senior officials of foreign governments including heads of state and ministers of defense;

(8) Congressional testimony in support of Administration policies, programs, and priorities;

(9) Annual reports required by Congress, including the DoD Annual Report;

(10) Speeches, interviews, and other public affairs activities that spotlight significant issues and explain DoD policy and actions;

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<sup>12</sup> NSA/CSS is more commonly referred to as NSA. It is discussed in the Intelligence volume of this report.

<sup>13</sup> Section 193, title 10, U.S.C.

<sup>14</sup> The NSS is prepared by the National Security Council Staff (see the section entitled National Security Council in Volume II). The NMS is prepared by the Joint Staff (see the section in this volume entitled Joint Staff). OSD coordinates on both documents.

<sup>15</sup> See the section entitled Office of Management and Budget in Volume II for a description of the President's Budget preparation process.

(11) Participation in formal interagency processes to develop strategy, manage operations, and/or resolve issues; and

(12) Participation in informal processes that bring senior officials from several Departments and the NSC together to discuss and resolve issues.

### 3. Vision and Core Competencies

**A. Vision:** In his introduction to the Defense Reform Initiative in November 1997, the SecDef offered his vision of OSD as the corporate headquarters for the Department of Defense with a new management focus. This vision implies that OSD will limit its involvement in the day-to-day management of Department activities in order to focus on policy, strategy, and planning. The SecDef elaborated by noting that this vision included:

- (1) Shaping, responding, and preparing forces to meet 21<sup>st</sup> Century challenges;
- (2) "Leading a world of accelerating change;
- (3) Advanced technology . . . operational innovation . . . organizational change;
- (4) Harness the Revolution in Military Affairs."<sup>16</sup>

In the Defense Department Department-wide Strategic Plan, the vision is stated as ". . . the Clinton Administration intends to leave as its legacy a defense strategy, a military, and a Defense Department that have been transformed to meet new challenges of a new century."<sup>17</sup>

**B. Core Competencies:** Although there is no single list of OSD core competencies, a review of those organizations examined in detail in this volume and of documents (such as the Department's Annual Report) indicate that they center around management and include:

- (1) Policy and strategy development;
- (2) Program management;
- (3) Deliberate planning;
- (4) Crisis action planning;
- (5) Crisis management; and
- (6) General administration and management.

### 4. Organizational Culture

**A. Values:** OSD values include patriotism; commitment to mission accomplishment; objectivity; political neutrality in duty performance; and willingness to work long hours, often

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<sup>16</sup> OSD presentation entitled "Defense Reform Initiative," undated Slide 11.

<sup>17</sup> DoD Department-wide Strategic Plan available at <http://server.conginst.org>.

under difficult conditions. In his presentation to the press at the time of the release of the Defense Reform Initiative Report, the SecDef highlighted the following values:

- (1) Focus on Core Competencies;
- (2) Invest in people;
- (3) Exploit information technology; and
- (4) Break down organizational barriers.<sup>18</sup>

**B. Leadership Traditions:** The Secretary of Defense is a political appointee who is nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate under the advice and consent provisions of the Constitution (see the section entitled “Senate Armed Services Committee” in the Volume III for a description of the confirmation process). He is a senior Cabinet member, a member of the NSC, and exercises a great deal of authority over national security policy and strategy formulation. The SecDef has traditionally been a member of an informal triumvirate composed of himself, the Secretary of State, and the president's National Security Advisor. This group usually drives national security issues in accordance with the President's policies and priorities.

Different Secretaries have used the OSD bureaucracy differently. Some have inclined toward inclusiveness in which most elements of OSD were involved in deliberations of important issues. Secretary Aspin represented this approach. Others have used the broader OSD organization to manage the Department, but restricted discussions of important matters of policy and strategy to a small inner circle of advisors. Secretary Cheney often operated in this fashion.

Generally, the SecDef retains responsibility for overall policy, strategy, and mission execution matters, while relying on the DepSecDef to manage the Department on a day-to-day basis. This arrangement is not iron clad, however, and Deputy Secretary Deutch often participated in policy and strategy sessions. Secretary Cohen has empowered the DepSecDef to act for him in all matters.<sup>19</sup>

**C. Staff Attributes:** The OSD staff is composed primarily of career civil servants augmented by civilian political appointees (Schedule C appointments); civilian experts hired under Schedule B arrangements; and military personnel seconded to the office.<sup>20</sup> The staff will typically include a number of interns, including Presidential Management Interns (PMI). Some interns will return as fulltime employees. A few senior and middle grade civil servants began their careers as interns.

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<sup>18</sup> OSD presentation entitled "Defense Reform Initiative" undated, slide 3.

<sup>19</sup> DODD 5105.2, Subject: Delegation of Authority to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated July 30, 1997.

<sup>20</sup> Schedule C appointees are those who are added to the payroll with the approval of political authority, often the White House. They may require Senate confirmation, although the bulk of them do not. They range from senior officials down to administrative assistants and secretaries. Traditionally, when administrations change, their period of employment terminates, although there are exceptions. Schedule B appointments allow OSD to bring in fulltime subject matter experts to assist the staff. These appointments are not subject to all of the same rules that apply to career civil servants and they can be made relatively expeditiously, though almost never immediately. Some military personnel receive Joint duty credit for OSD service. As a rule, within the military culture, service on the OSD staff is often viewed as a level down from service on the Joint Staff. On the other hand, some Services have been able to leverage the positions held by their officers to advance Service interests.

The staff includes highly educated, broadly experienced, and subject matter expert personnel. It is difficult to type cast credentials and attributes because OSD contains a number of different functions, each of which require different skills. The financial managers found in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer) have different backgrounds and expertise than do the personnel who review operational plans in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy). Integration of expertise usually occurs through internal systems such as the formal procedures used in the PPBS process, or the informal systems that often develop around major reviews.<sup>21</sup>

**D. Strategy:** No organizational strategy is published *per se*; however, the Defense Reform Initiative Report is sometimes cited as the authoritative OSD strategy. Its primary tenets are:

(1) Reengineer existing processes to adopt modern business practices that will improve effectiveness and efficiency;

(2) Consolidate organizations to eliminate excess capacity and leverage cooperative opportunities;

(3) Compete those organizations and functions that have a commercial counterpart to improve efficiency and responsiveness; and


(4) Eliminate unneeded infrastructure and other support structures in order to sharpen the Department's focus on core competencies.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> In the early 1990s, for example, the Department conducted a major aircraft review that was independent of more formal systems and brought together members of the acquisition, financial, and policy communities in weekly meetings and conferences.

<sup>22</sup> OSD, Defense Reform Initiative Report, November 1997, p.iii.

**E. Organizational Structure:** Figure 1 describes the organization of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.<sup>23</sup>



**Figure 1: Office of the Secretary of Defense**

(Legend: U/S = Under Secretary; ASD = Assistant Secretary; ATSD = Assistant to the Secretary of Defense.)

**(1) Office of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary:** The immediate office of the Secretary of Defense is composed of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Secretary's Chief of Staff.

The Chief of Staff to the Secretary of Defense directs the efforts of the personal staff, tasks requirements to them, reviews incoming staff products, anticipates future requirements, and performs other duties as prescribed by the SecDef. The SecDef's office also includes several assistant chiefs of staff; a senior military assistant who is a general/flag officer; a military assistant; and a senior enlisted advisor, as well as secretarial support.

The DepSecDef's immediate office includes a senior military assistant of general/flag officer rank, a military assistant, a confidential assistant and secretarial support.

Both offices are supported by an Executive Secretariat that manages correspondence and actions, maintains records, manages special projects and interagency coordination, and oversees

<sup>23</sup> [www.defenselink.mil/pub/almanac/organization/osd\\_org\\_chart.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/pub/almanac/organization/osd_org_chart.html)

general administrative support. The Executive Secretary is a military officer below general officer/flag rank.

Within this immediate cluster there are several special offices including:

- (a) The Director of the Defense Reform Initiative who oversees the SecDef's management reforms programs;
- (b) The Special Assistant for White House liaison;
- (c) The assistant for protocol;
- (d) The Special Assistant for Gulf War Illness (located outside of the Pentagon); and,
- (e) A personal security detail.

**(2) The Under Secretary for Policy (USD(P)):** The Under Secretary for Policy assists the SecDef and the DepSecDef in defense policy formulation as it relates to national security. USD(P) also exercises oversight for the SecDef with respect to implementation of policy and plans and reviews military plans to ensure they are viable, in line with the strategy, and support policy objectives. A complete description of the USD(P) and that office's role in national security is contained in the section of this volume entitled Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.<sup>24</sup>

**(3) The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller and Chief Financial Officer) (USD(C)):** As the position title suggests, the USD(C) is responsible for budgetary, fiscal, and program matters. His/her specific responsibilities include:

- (a) Oversight and management of PPBS;
- (b) Preparing the Department's annual budget and supervision of the execution of that budget once it is approved by Congress (including monitoring actual expenditures and costs);
- (c) Coordinating and interfacing with Congress on fiscal and budgetary matters including passage of the budget, reprogramming, and supplemental requests;
- (d) Establishing and overseeing the implementation of policy for budget preparation and execution, accounting and disbursement systems, cash and credit management, debt collection, financial reporting, contract auditing, relationships with commercial financial institutions, international financial issues and agreements, career development of USD(C) personnel, prices of goods sold to foreign nations;
- (e) Designing, developing, and installing DoD management improvement systems and programs;

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<sup>24</sup> DODD 5111.1, Subject: Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), dated March 22, 1995.

- (f)** Assisting the SecDef in implementing the provisions of the Government Performance and Results Act;
- (g)** Developing, implementing, and maintaining anti-fraud, waste, abuse, mismanagement and inefficiency and programs;
- (h)** Improving accounting and operating data accuracy and reliability;
- (i)** Overseeing all DoD financial management activities and programs;
- (j)** Implementing and maintaining an integrated finance and accounting management system;
- (l)** Acting as the Chair of the Defense Business Operations Fund Corporate Board;
- (m)** Providing direction, management, oversight of, and policy for, all DoD financial management activities and personnel;
- (n)** Biennially reviewing fees and other charges imposed by the Department and recommending adjustments as appropriate;
- (o)** Analyzing and evaluating programs, policies, and plans;<sup>25</sup>
- (p)** Overseeing the DoD contract audit system;
- (q)** Advising on the Department's financial management and accounting organizations and activities;
- (r)** Serving as the Executive Secretary for the Department's Senior Financial Management Oversight Council; and,
- (s)** Developing, integrating, managing, and maintaining financial strategic plans; plans for reengineering DoD business practices; and financial information systems and architectures.

In performing these functions, the USD(C) has direct authority over the Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate; the Defense Contract Audit Agency; and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service. The office is empowered to maintain an effective working relationship with the appropriate Congressional activities, including Appropriations Committees and Subcommittees. Finally, the USD(C) provides his/her opinion on the qualifications of candidates for comptrollers of Defense Agency and Field Activities.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> See section of this volume entitled Programs Analysis and Evaluation Directorate for a description of how this function is performed.

<sup>26</sup> DODD 5118.3, Subject: Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (USD(C)/Chief Financial Officer (CFO), Department of Defense, dated January 6, 1997.

**(4) The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness**

**(USD(P&R)):** The USD(P&R) provides advice and assistance to the SecDef and the DepSecDef for Total Force management as it relates to readiness; National Guard and Reserve component affairs; health affairs; training; and personnel requirements and management."<sup>27</sup> The office has responsibility for:

**(a)** Analyzing the Total Force structure and personnel between the Active and Reserve Components (RC) in both war and peace;

**(b)** Effective integration of the RC;

**(c)** Health and medical support;

**(d)** Special interest items affecting military and civilian personnel including recruiting, training, compensation, equal opportunity, awards and recognition; discipline and discharges;

**(e)** Non-DoD activities that require DoD personnel resources, including interagency activities and intergovernmental activities;

**(f)** Developing policies and processes to ensure personnel readiness for contingency operations, including personnel readiness and medical readiness;

**(g)** Coordinating with the Joint Staff and the Services on readiness issues;

**(h)** Evaluating Defense Acquisition Board decisions and programs to determine their impact on personnel, training, and readiness;

**(i)** Developing policy for and coordinating DoD Noncombatant Evacuation Operations;

**(j)** PPBS processes that involve personnel and readiness;

**(k)** Serving on boards dealing with matters that lie within the scope of its responsibilities; and

**(l)** Representing the SecDef at external DoD activities that lie within the scope of its responsibilities.

USD(P&R) exercises authority over the ASD (Force Management); the ASD (Health Affairs); the ASD (Reserve Affairs); the Directors of the Defense Manpower Data Center, the Defense Commissary Agency, the DoD Education Activity, DoD Civilian Personnel Management Services, Defense Medical Programs Activity, and Office of Civilian Health and Medical Programs; and the President of the Uniformed Services University of Health Services. In addition, USD(P&R) allocates civilian personnel authorizations and approves military and civilian personnel authorization changes.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> DODD 5124.2, Subject: Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)), dated October 31, 1994.

<sup>28</sup> DODD 5124.2, Subject: Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)), dated October 31, 1994.

**(5) The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology**

**(USD(A&T)):** The USD(A&T) and his staff manage the DoD acquisition system including research and development, developmental test and evaluation, production and procurement, logistics, installation management, military construction, environmental security, and atomic energy. The USD(A&T) is the DoD Acquisition Executive, chairs the Defense Acquisition board, and is the DoD Procurement Executive. A full description of this office is contained in the section of this volume entitled The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology.<sup>29</sup>

**(6) The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control,**

**Communications, and Intelligence) ASD(C3I):** The ASD(C3I) is one of three ASDs that report directly to the SecDef and DepSecDef; the other ASDs all report to Under Secretaries. ASD(C3I) provides advice and assistance to the SecDef with respect to C3I matters, information management (IM), counter intelligence (CI), and security counter measures (SCM). The ASD(C3I) also serves as DoD's Chief Information Officer.<sup>30</sup> In addition, he/she:

(a) Serves as the senior information management and information security officer;

(b) Is responsible for software policies and practices;

(c) Develops and implements information management policies, processes; and programs and develops standards for developing, acquiring, and operating automatic data processing systems (except those that are part of a weapons system, those that provide test support for weapons systems, and those used for basic research and development);

(d) Chairs the Major Automated Information System Review Council;

(e) Manages the General Defense Intelligence, the Foreign Counterintelligence, and the Security and Investigative Activities programs;

(f) Is responsible for defending DoD programs with in his/her area of responsibility before Congress;

(g) Reviews all DoD C3I, CI, SCM, and IM plans and programs;

(h) Reviews and recommends requirements and priorities for matters with in his/her area of responsibility;

(i) Evaluates DoD-component programs to ensure they satisfy requirements;

(j) Provides technical oversight and management for C3I, CI, SCM, and IM programs and systems during the acquisition process;

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<sup>29</sup> DODD 5134.1, Subject: Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (UDS(A&T)), dated September 17, 1999.

<sup>30</sup> OSD, Defense Reform Initiative Report, Appendix C-2, dated November 1997.

(k) Provides oversight for training and career development programs for C3I, CI, SCM, and IM personnel;

(l) Provides assistance to other OSD staff elements on C3I matters;

(m) Assesses the ability of intelligence products to satisfy DoD requirements;

(n) Coordinates cross-Service management of C3I, CI, SCM, and IM programs to assure interoperability;

(o) Participates in PPBS processes for matters within the Office of the ASD(C3I)'s areas of responsibility; and

(p) Provides policy and direction to all DoD organizations on 26 functional areas.<sup>31</sup>

Additionally, ASD(C3I) coordinates intelligence programming with the Director of Central Intelligence in the Intelligence Program Review Group (IPRG).<sup>32</sup>

In accomplishing these responsibilities, ASD(C3I) exercises direction and control over DISA, DIA, NIMA, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and the Defense Security Service.<sup>33</sup> The office has staff supervision responsibilities for NSA/CSS, the Air Force and Navy Special Intelligence Programs, the Electromagnetic Compatibility Analysis Center, and the Defense Courier Service. As appropriate, the office works closely with the Director of Central Intelligence.<sup>34</sup>

**(7) The Office of the Inspector General (OIG):** The OIG is an independent office reporting to the SecDef and DepSecDef and is responsible for audits and investigations; promotion of administrative effectiveness and efficiency; prevention of operational and programmatic fraud, waste, and abuse; and informing the SecDef, DepSecDef and Congressional oversight committees of problems and deficiencies. The office plays a significant role in oversight of Department activities and programs to ensure they observe laws and regulations, especially with respect to waste, fraud, and abuse and abuse of authority. In addition to other duties prescribed by the SecDef, the OIG:

(a) Serves as the SecDef's principal adviser for audits, criminal investigations, and the prevention of waste, fraud and abuse;

(b) Audits and investigates all elements of the Department as appropriate;

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<sup>31</sup> DODD 5137.1, Subject: Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (ASD(C3I)) dated February 12, 1992.

<sup>32</sup> See Section entitled Office of the Director of Central Intelligence in the volume entitled Intelligence Community.

<sup>33</sup> OSD. Defense Reform Initiative Report, Appendix C-2, dated November 1997.

<sup>34</sup> See the section entitled Director of Central Intelligence in the volume of this report entitled Intelligence Community.

- (c) Develops policy for audits and investigations (including criminal investigation programs);
- (d) Evaluates audits and investigations conducted by other DoD activities (including contract audits);
- (e) Investigates irregularities discovered in audits conducted by other DoD activities as appropriate;
- (f) Develops policy and evaluates actions take in response to internal DoD audits and audits performed by the Comptroller General of the United States;
- (g) Ensures that DoD auditing and investigating activities are not duplicative and cooperate effectively;
- (h) Reviews existing and proposed regulations and legislative proposals to determine impact on effectiveness and efficiency and makes appropriate recommendations;
- (i) Recommends policies and coordinates DoD-sponsored activities to improve administrative efficiency and effectiveness and prevent waste, fraud, and abuse;
- (j) Recommends policies and oversees relationships between DoD, the interagency system, State and local governments, and private entities aimed at preventing waste, fraud, and abuse;
- (k) Investigates potential infractions of laws and regulations related to waste, fraud, and abuse of funds; and, abuse of authority; and health and safety.

In carrying out his duties, the DoD IG may issue subpoenas and is entitled to necessary records, reports and other documents and information deemed germane to the investigation or audit. However, in the case of audits and investigations that involve operational plans, intelligence issues or activities, counterintelligence issues and activities, and other criminal investigations that have an impact on national security, the OIG is subject to the direction of the SecDef. When the OIG believes that a federal law has been violated, the office is required to provide that information to the U.S. Attorney General, or, in cases of violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, to the Service Secretary.<sup>35</sup> A significant portion of OIG time and resources are dedicated to coordination and follow up on reports produced for Congress by the General Accounting Office.

**(8) The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ASD(PA)):** This office (together with the ASD (C3I) and the ASD (Legislative Affairs) report directly to the SecDef and DepSecDef, not to an Under Secretary of Defense. In addition to advising DoD's senior leaders on public affairs matters, the ASD(PA) prepares and issues press releases. The office issues credentials to members of the press, and, in times of crisis, it establishes policy for providing information to the press. In addition, ASD(PA):<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> DODD 5106.1, Subject: Inspector General of the Department of Defense, dated March 14, 1983. Although this directive is 16 years old, its provisions remain applicable.

<sup>36</sup> DODD 5122.5, Subject: Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, dated March 29, 1996.

**(a)** Maintains a free flow of information to external and internal DoD consumers consistent with national security considerations;

**(b)** Serves as the spokesperson for the Department;

**(c)** Evaluates requests for information and releases materials as appropriate;

**(d)** Determines and/or approves the level of DoD participation in public events (in response to requests from local authorities and Members of Congress);

**(e)** Develops and issues public affairs policy to DoD components;

**(f)** Provides security reviews of all testimony, material slated for public release by other elements of the Department, articles and other documents prepared for public consumption by employees of the Department, information submitted by other Executive Branch agencies and activities, and information forwarded by non-DoD individuals or activities;

**(g)** Supervises preparation of news analysis and news summaries for DoD activities;

**(h)** Prepares speeches, Congressional testimony, articles, and other materials for senior DoD and White House officials when required;<sup>37</sup>

**(i)** Develops and promulgates policy concerning DoD compliance with Freedom of Information Act provisions and oversees implementation of the Freedom of Information Act program;

**(j)** Administers DoD's Mandatory Declassification Review Program; and

**(k)** Serves as the DoD point of contact for requests for speakers and Department cooperation in documentary and film making.

ASD(PA) also directs and controls the Armed Forces Information Network that provides information to U.S. Forces here and abroad. The office is a key point for liaison with the general public, the press, and other governmental and private entities seeking information concerning the Department and its activities. In carrying out these responsibilities, ASD(PA) has the authority to communicate directly with requestors and with all elements of DoD. However, in cases in which information may have an impact on operational matters, information must be coordinated with the CJCS prior to release.

Current ASD(PA) policies encourage openness with the press and public. Principals include the full and ready release of information "unless its release is precluded by current and

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<sup>37</sup> In accordance with Administration policy, all Congressional testimony is reviewed for consistency with Administration policies and priorities by the Office of Management and Budget. See section entitled Office of Management and Budget in the volume entitled Executive Office of the President.

valid security classification."<sup>38</sup> Policies also place restraints on unnecessary classification of information and state that "propaganda has no place in the Department of Defense public affairs programs."<sup>39</sup> The same spirit of openness and cooperation applies to media coverage of military operations. In these events, policies indicate that pools (vehemently objected to by the press during the 1990-91 Persian Gulf Crisis) will not be the norm; that journalists will be given the widest possible access consistent with security considerations; that military public affairs officers will not interfere with reporting processes; that journalists will be provided transportation by military forces; and will make transmission facilities available to journalists whenever possible.<sup>40</sup>

**(9) The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs (ASD(LA)):**

The ASD(LA) is one of three ASDs who report directly to the SecDef and DepSecDef. The office is responsible for the Department's relationship with Congress.<sup>41</sup> In addition to coordinating the preparation of SecDef and DepSecDef Congressional testimony (which is reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget), ASD(LA):

(a) Coordinates Department activities designed to ensure favorable Congressional consideration of the legislative program;

(b) Assigns responsibility for and tracks preparation of replies to Congressional enquiries;

(c) Designates witnesses for hearings and provides information to Congressional staff, including written testimony;

(f) Coordinates preparation of back up material for Congressional hearings;

(e) Coordinates and arranges DoD support for Congressional travel;

(f) Maintains appropriate legislative files and reference materials; and

(g) Oversees expeditious processing of security clearances for Congressional staff.<sup>42</sup>

In fulfilling its responsibilities, ASD(LA) maintains close liaison with the Congressional affairs offices of the Military Services and with the CJCS's legislative affairs office. As is the case with most subordinate OSD offices, ASD(LA) can issue policy directives concerning matters within its area of responsibility, although it must abide by rules governing direct contact with components of the Military Departments and the Unified Commands. It also has broad authority to coordinate throughout the Executive Branch as required to satisfy ASD(LA) obligations.

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<sup>38</sup> DODD 5122.5, Subject: Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, dated March 29, 1996.

<sup>39</sup> DODD 5122.5, Subject: Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, dated March 29, 1996 (enclosure 2).

<sup>40</sup> DODD 5122.5, Subject: Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, dated March 29, 1996 (enclosure 3).

<sup>41</sup> For the Congressional side of the equation, see the Volume entitled Congress.

<sup>42</sup> DODD 5142.1, Subject: Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs), dated July 2, 1982.

**(10) Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (Director, OT&E):** This office is charged with ensuring the objectivity and realism of operational field tests conducted by the Military Services. It serves as an honest broker to ensure that tests are designed and conducted to evaluate programs objectively, not showcase them. To this end, it ensures that testing examines the "operational effectiveness and sustainability of weapon systems, equipment, munitions, or their components."<sup>43</sup> As materiel moves through the normal series of tests from concept to production, OT&E ensures that items perform as required by mission needs statements and contract specifications. (See section entitled Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition elsewhere in this volume. For other types of program reviews, see the section entitled Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate.) In accomplishing his/her responsibilities, the Director, OT&E:<sup>44</sup>

- (a) Establishes DoD-wide policies for test and evaluation;
- (b) Consults with the Military Departments on OT&E matters both generally and for specific programs;
- (c) Develops OT&E systems and standards for major DoD acquisition programs as designated by the Director, OT&E, and oversees all DoD OT&E to ensure adherence;
- (d) Analyzes OT&E results for all major acquisition programs;
- (e) Coordinates joint OT&E events between the Services;
- (f) Promotes cooperation on OT&E matters within DoD and between DoD and other federal, state, and local government entities as appropriate;
- (g) Approves OT&E portions of Test and Evaluation Master Plans;
- (h) Enhances OT&E realism; and
- (i) Maintains the OT&E database.

The Director, OT&E, serves on various boards and councils, including the Defense Resources Board (see section entitled Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate in this volume). Other DoD officials are enjoined to coordinate with OT&E on testing and evaluation matters, and members of the Director, OT&E's, staff may be present during preparation for tests and actual testing.

Additionally, Director, OT&E, is required to submit detailed reports to the SecDef, the House Armed Services Committee, the Senate Armed Services Committee, and Appropriations Subcommittees. These reports provide information on the validity of the test and the results.

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<sup>43</sup> DODD 5141.2, Subject: Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, dated April 2, 1984 (as changed on January 17, 1989).

<sup>44</sup> DODD 5141.2, Subject: Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, dated April 2, 1984 (as changed on January 17, 1989).

**(11) The General Counsel (GC):** The GC is the DoD chief legal officer. He/she provides legal advice and counsel to the SecDef and DepSecDef, other OSD offices, and other DoD components as appropriate. The GC also:

- (a) Oversees the professional standards of DoD attorneys and their adherence to them;
- (b) Oversees legal services provided by DoD attorneys;
- (c) Provides standards of conduct advice;
- (d) Develops the Department's legislative program and coordinates on legislation and executive orders;
- (e) Coordinates with the Department of Justice on legal issues involving DoD, including litigation;
- (f) Promulgates DoD policy on legal issues and resolves internal legal disagreements between DoD entities;
- (g) Serves as the lead counsel for international negotiations undertaken by OSD's subordinate offices and maintains the repository for all concluded and in-process agreements; and
- (h) Acts as the Director of the Defense Legal Services Agency, *inter alia*.<sup>45</sup>

The GC is also involved in operational matters and determines the legality of operations or portions of operations and campaigns (e.g., information operations).

**(12) Director of Administration and Management (DA&M):**<sup>46</sup> Sometimes called the Mayor of the Pentagon, the DA&M is responsible for DoD-wide administration and management organization matters. His/her responsibilities include:

- (a) Developing and coordinating DoD administrative and organizational policy;
- (b) Developing, reviewing, and evaluating initiatives to improve management and administration functions;
- (c) Analyzing and controlling OSD personnel requirements, including those personnel on detail outside of the Department (e.g., at the Department of State, the National Security Council Staff, or on Congressional staffs).

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<sup>45</sup> DODD 5145.1, Subject: General Counsel of the Department of Defense, dated December 15, 1989.

<sup>46</sup> The position of DA&M has been held by David O. (Doc) Cooke for a number of years. Unlike most other OSD senior-level positions, DA&M is traditionally a career civil service position, thus Doc Cooke is the most senior OSD official in terms of longevity.

(d) Developing and maintaining OSD, Defense Agency and Field Activity, and other DoD activity charters;

(e) Overseeing administration and policy for the Committee Management Program, the Federal Advisory Committee Management Program, the Management Headquarters program, the Quality Management Program, the OSD Historical program, and the OSD Management Control program;

(f) Developing and coordinating Freedom of Information Act programs and providing oversight of the Privacy program;

(h) Coordinating DA&M charter matters with other elements of DoD and the Executive Branch to promote cooperation and improve understanding;

(i) Serving on boards, panels, committees, and other groups and representing the SecDef and DepSecDef as required outside of the Department, including the Joint Committee on Printing, the Public Printer, and the Office of Management and Budget; and

(j) Serving as Director of Washington Headquarters Services.

In performing these functions, DA&M has broad authority to coordinate and communicate directly throughout DoD and with other agencies of the federal government.<sup>47</sup>

**(13) Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight (ATSD(IO)):** The ATSD(IO) develops policies for and provides independent oversight of DoD intelligence activities. Requirements include ensuring that all intelligence activities are conducted in accordance with federal law, Presidential directives, and DoD regulations, regardless of which DoD activity conducts them. The ATSD(IO) develops oversight guidance for intelligence activities and:

(a) Reviews and investigates allegation of illegal or improper activities;

(b) Inspects intelligence units to ensure personnel understand requirements and comply with them (he/she may also evaluate overall organizational effectiveness during these inspections);

(c) Monitors investigations of intelligence activities conducted by other DoD activities (such as those conducted by the OIG);

(d) Provides quarterly reports to the SecDef, DepSecDef, and the President's Foreign Intelligence Oversight Board;<sup>48</sup>

(e) Serves as a member of the DoD Counterintelligence Board;

(f) Conducts annual audits of funds generated by DoD intelligence activities;

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<sup>47</sup> DODD 5105.53, Subject: Director of Administration and Management (DA&M), dated November 23, 1998.

<sup>48</sup> See also section entitled President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board in the volume entitled Intelligence Community.

- (g) Reviews the conduct of clandestine intelligence operations;
- (h) Evaluates measures to protect Human Intelligence (HUMINT) sources;
- (i) Participates in the process to approve sensitive reconnaissance

operations; and

- (j) Serves as the liaison between DoD and the CIA, FBI, and DEA to ensure that DoD adequately supports these organizations in terms of intelligence products and intelligence assets.

In performing these duties, ATSD(IO) is empowered by the SecDef to obtain reports and assistance as required, communicate directly with all DoD components, and communicate directly with the Intelligence Oversight Board of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the Director of Central Intelligence, other government officials, members of Congress and their staffs, and members of the public. He/she is also empowered to have "complete and unrestricted access to all intelligence-related information, regardless of classification."<sup>49</sup>

**(14) Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense:** Typically, Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries use special assistants to help them manage a variety of issues and concerns ranging from personnel appointments to international negotiations. Those who have occupied these positions tend to be mature, experienced individuals who are capable of dealing with a number of diverse actions simultaneously. Because their portfolios change according to the needs of the SecDef and DepSecDef, they have no fixed set of responsibilities. Their power and authority derive from their access to the SecDef and DepSecDef.

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<sup>49</sup> DODD 5148.11, Subject: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight(ATSD(IO)), dated July 1, 1994.

**5. Formal National Security Process Involvement.**

		Strategy Development	Policy, Guidance, and Regulations	Planning	Mission Execution	Observation, Orientation, and Oversight	Preparation	Resourcing
<b>OSD Products</b>	National Security Strategy	✓						
	National Military Strategy	✓						
	Defense Planning Guidance	✓	✓	✓				✓
	Contingency Planning			✓				
	Review Plans			✓		✓		
	Resource Allocation		✓					✓
	DoD Budget					✓		✓
	Budget Appeals							✓
	Consultations w/ Foreign Military Leaders						✓	
	Congressional Testimony		✓					✓
	Annual Reports					✓		
	Speeches & Interviews		✓					
	Foreign Policy lunches	✓						
	ABC Breakfasts & Lunches	✓						
<b>SecDef Roles</b>	Advisor to the President	✓	✓		✓			
	Direction of Armed Forces				✓	✓	✓	
	Member of the NSC/PC	✓	✓	✓	✓			

**A. Strategy Development:**

**(1) Major Activities:** The SecDef provides guidance to those in OSD and on the Joint Staff who develop strategy through personal interface and occasionally memorandum that set forth his broad strategic views. In informal meetings with other senior Executive Branch officials, the SecDef participates in high-level strategy meetings. The SecDef also:

(a) Approves DoD comments on the National Security Strategy (NSS), which is prepared by the National Security Council staff;

(b) Approves the National Military Strategy (NMS) developed by the Joint Staff in accordance with OSD and NSS policy and strategy concepts; and

(c) Approves the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) prepared jointly by the USD(P) and the Director, PA&E, pursuant to SecDef guidance. (The SecDef is required by

law to provide this guidance annually with the "advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.")<sup>50</sup>

**(2) Major Stakeholders:** The National Security Council staff; the Under Secretary for Policy; the Director of PA&E; the Joint Staff, and the Military Departments.

**(3) Key OSD Processes:** NMS and DPG preparation. (In this volume, see the section entitled the Joint Staff for a description of NMS preparation process; see the section entitled Under Secretary of Defense for Policy for a discussion of DPG preparation processes.)

**(4) Associated Lower-Level Processes:** Planning and budget preparation as part of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS).<sup>51</sup>

**(5) Associated Higher-Level Processes:** The annual President's Budget formulation; NSS preparation. (In Volume II, see the section entitled The National Security Council for a description of NSS preparation; see the section entitled Office of Management and Budget for a description of the process for preparing the President's Budget.)

## **B. Policy, Guidance, and Regulation:**

**(1) Major Activities:** The SecDef establishes policy and guidance by means of the DPG; resource allocation decisions made by the DRB; Congressional testimony, especially annual posture statements; and major speeches and interviews. The DepSecDef, assisted by the OSD staff, promulgates DoD policy and guidance by the same means as the SecDef. As an advisor to the President and a member of the NSC/PC, the SecDef also makes policy through the interagency process described in PDD 2.

A former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy once likened policy making to sausage making.<sup>52</sup> The process is not pretty, but the results are generally palatable. By this he meant that, at the levels immediately below the Under Secretaries, there is considerable debate and internal maneuvering to include or exclude issues and requirements. The form this deliberation takes varies, depending on the issue, who has responsibility for it, and who is interested in it. It can occur in formal groups, such as the Defense Planning Advisory Group described in the sections of this volume entitled Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Programs Analysis and Evaluation Directorate, or it can be done in more informal sessions. Often, deliberations include members of the Joint Staff as well as OSD officials. Once policy development reaches the Under Secretary level, most disagreements have been reconciled and only the most difficult issues remain to be decided. When these decisions have been made, the policy is presented to the SecDef and/or DepSecDef, often in a briefing accompanied by explanatory text. When approved, the policy and/or guidance are official DoD positions.

Regulations are promulgated in much the same way, except that regulations often do not receive SecDef consideration, although the DepSecDef may review the most important regulations. DODDs that govern OSD prescribe regulation responsibilities and usually offer

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<sup>50</sup> Section 113(g)(1), Title 10 U.S.C.

<sup>51</sup> Planning in this sense is not operational military planning, but planning that informs Military Service and Defense Agency programming decision. Military planning is informed by the Contingency Planning Guidance discussed in paragraph 5.C.

<sup>52</sup> Interview; notes in authors' possession.

authority for broad coordination, including the GC. Unless there are specific legislative requirements, most regulations, like most policy and guidance, are compromise solutions.

**(2) Major Stakeholders:** All DoD elements and organizations.

**(3) Key Internal Processes:** DPG and Budget preparation processes described in the appropriate sections of this volume.

**(4) Associated Lower-Level Processes:** Because DoD activities are usually subject to formal policy, guidance or regulations, nearly all processes are associated from strategy development, to personnel assignments, to acquisition decisions.

**(5) Associated Higher-Level Processes:** Development of President's Budget and advice to the President and other NSC members.

### **C. Planning:**

**(1) Major Activities:** As noted in the section in this volume entitled the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, planning is a core competency for DoD. The Department prepares a multitude of plans, but the most significant from the OSD perspective are the DPG (discussed above and in the sections entitled the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate); the Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG); the Secretary's review of operational plans; and the SecDef's involvement in development of the political-military plan in the interagency process.

The CPG is the authority for the military to prepare operational plans, and the SecDef is directed by law to provide it annually.<sup>53</sup> Technically, without this guidance, the military cannot develop these plans. The CPG is prepared by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in conjunction with the CJCS, approved by the SecDef, and forwarded to the White House for the President's signature. Once signed, the document (which is classified at the highest levels) is provided to the Joint Staff and the Unified Commanders for plan development. The CPG includes planning guidance and guidance on force levels and other resources that military planners must take into consideration when developing plans. Developed plans are returned to OSD for review.

The SecDef is required by law to review military operations plans periodically. This is done through the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Plans are reviewed to ensure they are in line with Administration policy and strategy and that objectives are prioritized properly. They are also reviewed for feasibility. The number of OSD staff who actually review the plans is very limited to maintain operational security. Once the review at the Under Secretary level is complete, the results are briefed to the SecDef together with recommendations for further action. Although many plans are approved, a few are returned to Unified Commanders through the Joint Staff for revision.

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<sup>53</sup> Section 113(g)(2), Title 10 U.S.C.

Under the provisions of PDDs 2 and 56, the SecDef is involved as a member of the NSC/PC in managing complex contingency operations.<sup>54</sup> PDD 56 stipulates that once a complex contingency operation has been approved by the NSC/PC, it will instruct the NSC/Deputies Committee (NSC/DC) to prepare a political military plan. After preparation, this plan is briefed to the NSC/DC and then to the NSC/PC. Approval by both committees is necessary for implementation, although presumably the parts of the plan would be implemented while others were revised.

**(2) Major Stakeholders:** The Unified Commands, the Military Service Components of the Unified Commands, the Joint Staff, participants in the interagency process.

**(3) Key Internal Processes:** CPG preparation and military planning processes.

**(4) Associated Lower-Level Processes:** Development of operational plans.

**(5) Associated Higher-Level Processes:** Development of political military plans by the interagency process.

#### **D. Mission Execution:**

**(1) Major Activities:** OSD is involved in mission execution primarily through the SecDef's involvement in providing direction to operational forces through the CJCS; approving Joint Staff drafted orders (e.g., warning orders, deployment orders); and his/her role as an advisor to the President and as a member of the NSC/PC.

Section 113 of Title 10 U.S.C. and the National Security Act of 1947<sup>55</sup> empower the SecDef to direct the armed forces, either on his own initiative or as a conduit for orders from the President. Although he is not legally required to pass these orders through the CJCS, by custom all OSD communications with operational military forces are conducted through the Chairman. Upon receipt of instructions from the SecDef, the CJCS may either relay them directly to the Unified Command Commander-in-Chief, or he may have one of the Joint Staff directorates relay them. How they are relayed depends on the nature of the instructions, their urgency, and whether converting them into terms that make sense to military planners requires additional staff action. (See the section of this volume entitled the Joint Staff for a more detailed description.)

As noted in paragraph 5.C., the SecDef influences mission execution in his role as Presidential advisor and member of the NSC/PC. In both roles, SecDef can affect mission execution by advocating changes or maintaining the course. The Under Secretary for Policy, a member of the NSC/DC, plays a similar role at that level. As a result, OSD is represented at both levels in the senior interagency system.

**(2) Major Stakeholders:** The Joint Staff, the Unified Commands, the Service components of the Unified Commands, and participants in the interagency process.

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<sup>54</sup> See Chapter 2 of Volume I for a description of the interagency process. Note that membership on the NSC/PC is essentially the same as the NSC, less the President and Vice President. However, in the Clinton Administration, the NSC rarely meets and most senior level business is conducted through the NSC/PC and especially the NSC/DC.

<sup>55</sup> Section 401, Title 50 U.S.C.

**(3) Key Internal Processes:** Operation of the National Military Command Center and military operational procedures.

**(4) Associated Lower-Level Processes:** Deployment and employment of the armed forces.

**(5) Associated Higher-Level Processes.** NSC/PC and NSC/DC meetings; NSC meetings when they occur.

#### **E. Observation, Orientation, and Oversight:**

**(1) Major Activities:** As discussed in Paragraph 5.C., OSD exercises oversight over military planning by periodically reviewing plans to ensure they are consistent with policy, strategy, and available resources. Through the Office of the USD(C), OSD maintains oversight of the DoD budget during preparation and execution.<sup>56</sup> In preparing required reports for Congress, OSD exercises oversight by reviewing the input of other DoD entities.<sup>57</sup> Finally, in his role of providing direction to the armed forces, the SecDef provides orientation to those forces and exercises oversight in reviewing reports submitted by operational forces and the Military Services.

**(2) Major Stakeholders:** All DoD entities.

**(3) Key Internal Processes:** Plans review; budget preparation and execution; intelligence oversight.

**(4) Associated Lower-Level Processes:** Service budget preparation and execution; command and control of the armed forces

**(5) Associated Higher-Level Processes:** President's Budget preparation; Congressional Authorization and Appropriations.

#### **F. Preparation:**

**(1) Major Activities:** OSD's major preparation activities apart from the guidance in the DPG center on contacts with foreign governments. These contacts range from lower level conferences to ministerial meetings. Typically, they involve both civilians from OSD and military representatives from the Joint Staff and may occur in the United States or abroad. While these meetings often lead to issue resolution, they also offer the opportunity to develop potential coalitions or reaffirm alliances. Generally, they are preceded by an informal enquiry as to whether a meeting would be productive, followed by a formal invitation (after consultation with the Department of State and the White House) and development of issues. When senior leaders are involved, issue books similar to those prepared prior to Congressional testimony are assembled and the roster of attendees is proposed and approved. During this same period, both

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<sup>56</sup> See the section entitled Program Analysis and Evaluation in this volume for a discussion of the DoD budget preparation process.

<sup>57</sup> Reports required by Title 10 U.S.C. include the DoD Annual Report, quarterly reports on intelligence oversight as noted in the description of the duties of the ATSD(IO) in Paragraph 4.E., and a "comprehensive net assessment of [U.S.] defense capabilities and programs. . .and its allies as compared with those of their potential adversaries." Section 113, (I)(1).

parties (or all parties if the meeting is multilateral) coordinate the agendas. Following the meeting, reports are prepared and agreements that arise from the meetings are vetted through the GC and Department of State if necessary.

**(2) Major Stakeholders:** OSD, Department of State, White House, formal alliance membership, members of *ad hoc* coalitions.

**(3) Key Internal Processes:** Preparation of briefing books and itineraries

**(4) Associated Lower-Level Processes:** None.

**(5) Associated Higher-Level Processes:** None.

## **G. Resourcing:**

**(1) Major Activities:** OSD prepares the DPG for the Secretary's approval. The DPG provides programming instructions to all DoD entities. In the DoD budget preparation process (and at other times), the SecDef and DepSecDef make resource allocation decisions. When the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) rules against DoD budget items, OSD is involved in appeal preparation (appeals from OMB Director's decisions are made to the President). In testimony in support of the President's Budget, OSD officials explain and defend their resource requests. (For more complete discussions of these activities see: the sections in this volume entitled The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Programs Analysis and Evaluation directorate; the section entitled Office of Management and Budget in the Volume II; the sections on the SASC and HASC in the Volume III.)

**(2) Major Stakeholders:** All DoD entities that have resourcing requirements; OMB; Congress.

**(3) Key Processes:** PPBS.

**(4) Associated Lower-Level Processes:** Military Department POM development.

**(5) Associated Higher-Level Processes:** Preparation of the President's Budget and moving the Budget through Congress.

## **6. Informal National Security Process Involvement.**

**A. The Albright-Berger-Cohen (ABC) Breakfasts/Lunches:** (See Appendix 1 for process map.) The Secretary of Defense participates in weekly meetings with the National Security Advisor and the Secretary of State to address emerging national security issues, resolve interagency matters, and coordinate. The NSC staff prepares and distributes the agenda for these meetings. Because only the principals attend these meetings, the principals are responsible for relaying any information and taskings from the meetings to their staff.

**B. Foreign Policy Breakfasts:** (See Appendix 2 for process map.) The Breakfasts involve the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U.S. Representative to the United Nations, and the Director of Central Intelligence. These meetings are more informal than the ABC meetings: there is no agenda and no staff

attend. The SecDef may receive background memoranda from OSD and/or the Joint Staff in preparation for these meetings. These memos outline the issue and the positions of the other agencies represented. Occasionally, issues addressed at the breakfasts will result in taskings for the staffs of the principals involved. The primary objective of the meetings, however, is to provide a forum for coordination of sensitive and important issues.

## **7. Funding and Personnel.**

**A. Authorizations and Appropriations:** The House Armed Services Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee are the authorizing committees for the Department of Defense and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Relevant appropriating committees are the House and Senate Subcommittees on Defense.

**B. Funding Sources:** OSD is funded from Defense-wide Appropriations.

**C. Budget:** The budget is not specifically broken out for OSD.

**D. Manpower:** The immediate offices of the SecDef and the DepSecDef (including security, protocol, and White House liaison) consist of 39 civilians and 34 military. Overall, OSD includes 1,481 civilians and 470 military for a total of 1,951 personnel.<sup>58</sup>

## **8. Observations.**

OSD is organized to deal with those national security matters that require a military response. There is a "seam" in how it is staffed, however, because all senior members of OSD change when Administrations change. Because all of the leadership departs nearly simultaneously, decision making to deal with an unexpected crisis may be hampered if that crisis occurs during the change-of-administrations transition. This lack of long-term continuity may be deleterious in the future when response times may be shorter and issues more complex.

Similarly, there is no effective chief of staff's office for OSD. While most Secretaries have chiefs of staff, their chiefs do not have the resources or organizational experience within DoD to act as chiefs in the same way that the White House Chief of Staff, the Director of the Joint Staff, or the chiefs of military staffs do. And, because they are political appointees, their tenures are relatively brief. Thus, there is no central office to manage information flow, to anticipate the Secretary's requirements and task OSD staff elements accordingly, to hold those elements accountable for results, to synthesize the inputs of various activities into a coherent whole, or to supervise implementation in the Secretary's name.


Creation of a properly resourced OSD chief of staff's office, staffed with career civil servants augmented by military officers, could improve effectiveness and accountability. The chief of staff could continue to be appointed by the SecDef; however the office would include deputy chiefs of staff who are capable of translating requirements and initiatives into action within DoD's complex bureaucracy.

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<sup>58</sup> Information provided by Washington Headquarters Services, November 29, 1999.


**APPENDICES**

OSD – Key Process – (Informal) – The Albright-Berger-Cohen (A-B-C) Breakfast/Lunch



A-B-C - Albright-Berger-Cohen  
 PC - Principals Committee  
 POC - Point of Contact

**OSD - Key Process - (Informal) - Foreign Policy Breakfast**



**ORGANIZATIONAL DESCRIPTION**

**UNDER SECRETARY FOR ACQUISITION AND  
TECHNOLOGY (ASD(A&T))**



*Prepared for the U.S. Commission on National Security/21<sup>st</sup> Century*

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition & Technology, (USD (A&T))<sup>1</sup>

#### Overview

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (USD (A&T)) is a statutory position responsible for establishing U.S. defense acquisition policies and supervising the Services' and Department of Defense (DoD) Agencies' acquisition programs. USD (A&T) is also charged with maintaining a strong domestic defense industrial base through the development of appropriate policies. Departmental directives assign USD (A&T) authority over the Services and Agencies in all acquisition matters and designate USD (A&T) as principal advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense on acquisition, research and development, test and evaluation, and logistics. USD (A&T) also has oversight over the Department's environmental activities. USD (A&T) chairs the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB), a body that assists him in making acquisition-related decisions, and is a member of the Defense Resources Board, which advises the Secretary and Deputy Secretary on resource allocations matters.<sup>2</sup> USD (A&T) also oversees the defense acquisition reform effort within DoD. USD (A&T)'s influence with the Department of Defense derives primarily from its role in overseeing that the execution of defense acquisition programs reflect Departmental priorities—the "how to" of defense acquisition. Depending on USD (A&T)'s interests and personal influence with the Secretary, USD (A&T) may also have significant impact over Departmental program priorities—the "what" of defense acquisition. USD (A&T)'s core competencies are policy and oversight of Service and Defense Agency acquisition programs. Although observers note the organization lacks a specific culture, they described it as having more "corporate" values than the Services, who tend to relate more directly to the needs of the warfighter.

#### Organization

USD (A&T) reports directly to the Deputy Secretary and Secretary of Defense. USD (A&T) is assisted in his duties by a Principal Deputy Under Secretary (PDUSD (A&T)), to whom report 9 offices headed by Deputy Under Secretaries or Directors, on issues such as logistics, acquisition reform, industrial affairs, environmental security, acquisition program integration, international programs, defense installations, defense procurement, small and disadvantaged business utilization, and administration. The Defense Logistics Agency and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency also report to PDUSD (A&T). USD (A&T) also includes a Directorate for Research and Engineering, which oversees defense research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) programs through the work of five directorates. Finally, the Defense Reform Initiative (DRI) placed the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (ASD(C3I)) under the control of USD (A&T) on acquisition matters, retaining this office's direct link to the Secretary of Defense on intelligence matters. USD (A&T) appoints Senior Acquisition Executives (SAE) from each of the Services and coordinates with them on Service acquisition matters.

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<sup>1</sup> Note, since this chapter was originally drafted, the USD (A&T)'s title was changed to USD Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, becoming USD (A,T, & L).

<sup>2</sup> The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) is the Vice Chairman of the DAB. According to sources, USD (A&T) and VCJCS work together closely in leading the DAB in a way that reinforces the influence of the organization.

The position of USD (A&T) is filled by a political appointee. USD (A&T) staff is composed of civilian officials, including political appointees and career civil servants, and military officers. Sources indicate that the number of officials with science and technology background is lower now than in the past.

### Major Organizational Products

USD (A&T) prepares, with the advice of the DAB, and releases Acquisition Decision Memoranda (ADMs) to authorize the initiation of each new phase of development, from requirement definition, to R&D, to testing and evaluation, to full production. Once a program is in full development, USD (A&T) monitors progress via a periodic review process and the release of Defense Acquisition Executive Summaries (DAES).

USD (A&T) participates in drafting the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) and in the review of defense Program Objective Memoranda (POMs) during the Planning, Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS) cycle. USD (A&T) is also a key advisor to the Secretary in the formulation of Program Decision Memoranda (PDMs). PDUSD (A&T) participates in the Program Review Group (PRG), and as such is involved in reviewing alternatives to Services' POMs during the PPBS.

### Role in Formal and Informal National Security Process

		Strategy Development	Policy, Guidance, and Regulations	Planning	Mission Execution	Observation, Orientation, and Oversight	Preparation	Resourcing
Products	DPG		✓	✓				✓
	POM Review		✓					✓
	Alternatives Review		✓					✓
	PDM		✓					✓
	ADM					✓	✓	
	DAES					✓	✓	
Roles	DRB member		✓					✓
	PRG member		✓					✓
	Defense Acquisition Executive					✓	✓	
	DAB Chairman					✓		

The table above summarizes the means by which USD (A&T) participates in the seven key national security processes.

**Strategy Development.** USD (A&T) is not formally involved in strategy development.

**Policy, Guidance, and Regulation.** USD (A&T) is involved in developing acquisition policy in its contribution to the DPG. It provides programmatic guidance to Services through its review of

POMs, alternatives, in its participation in the formulation of Program Decision Memoranda, and membership on the PRG and DRB.

**Planning.** USD (A&T) writes the programmatic section of the DPG.

**Mission Execution.** USD (A&T) is not involved in mission execution.

**Observation, Orientation, and Oversight.** USD (A&T) is most directly involved in the oversight and management of Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs), whose R&D and testing is likely to exceed \$355 million, while it delegates day-to-day management of lesser acquisition programs to Service Acquisition Executives. Oversight and management of defense acquisition programs is conducted through DAB reviews occurring at the beginning of each new phase in the life-cycle of a program, which begins with concept exploration, and progresses through program definition and risk reduction, engineering and manufacturing development, and production, fielding, deployment, and operational support. Each program progresses through each phase at a pace determined by the program manager, based on programmatic and cost consideration. Once a program has entered full production, USD (A&T) monitors its development through periodic reviews.

**Preparation.** USD (A&T) is primarily involved in preparation through its role as the Department's Defense Acquisition Executive.

**Resourcing.** USD (A&T) has an influential role in determining defense resource allocation through its participation in the PPBS process, and informally as an advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense in their preparation of PDMs.

## **Observations**

The defense acquisition process is designed to ensure that a program proceeds according to pre-established performance parameters and within cost, but is not designed to evaluate whether and how the program meets joint operational requirements. This evaluation occurs prior to the defense acquisition process, during the concept exploration phase, when the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) evaluates the Mission Need Statement prepared by the Services to justify their request for a new program. To the extent that the JROC develops its capability to evaluate Service program requests in a broader warfighting context and validates MNS accordingly, the defense acquisition process should reflect greater conformity with joint operational needs.

The defense acquisition process would also benefit from greater funding stability. Sources indicated that for every \$1 Congress eliminates from a program in the early acquisition stages, \$3-\$4 must be added in later stages to make up for the disruption.

## ORGANIZATIONAL DESCRIPTION

### UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION AND TECHNOLOGY (USD (A&T))

#### 1. Legal Specifications, Authorizations, and Responsibilities.

**A. Authorizing Statute:** The position of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (USD (A&T)) is established by Section 133 of Title 10 of the U.S. Code. By law, the Under Secretary has responsibility for: 1) supervising Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition; 2) establishing policies for acquisition; and 3) establishing policies to maintain the U.S. defense industrial base. Section 133 also gives USD (A&T) the authority "to direct the Secretaries of the military departments and the heads of all other elements of the Department of Defense with regard to matters for which the Under Secretary has responsibility," in addition to other duties to be specified by the Secretary of Defense.<sup>3</sup>

Title 10 designates the USD (A&T) as the senior procurement executive of the Department of Defense and gives it authority to promulgate regulations and procedures relating to defense acquisition, in cooperation with the DoD Inspector General and Comptroller. Finally, the statute directs that USD (A&T) coordinate the audit and oversight of defense contractors in the area of acquisition so as to prevent duplication of efforts by different DoD elements.

**B. Department Directives:** DoD Directive (DODD) 5134.1 designates USD (A&T) as "the senior acquisition executive of the Department of Defense[,] ... the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for all matters relating to the DoD Acquisition System, research and development, advanced technology, test and evaluation, production, logistics, military construction, procurement, economic security, environmental security, and atomic energy."<sup>4</sup> The Directive establishes USD (A&T)'s authority over the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the heads of all other DoD Components on all acquisition matters. The Directive further describes specific roles and responsibilities for USD (A&T) and functional areas over which USD (A&T) has control (outlined below).

**C. Interagency Directives:** There are no interagency directives that apply to USD (A&T).

#### 2. Mission/Functions/Purposes.

**A. Major Responsibilities:** DoD Directive 5134.1 outlines 21 specific roles and responsibilities for USD (A&T):

(1) Serve as the Defense Acquisition Executive supervising the acquisition of defense systems [Key Processes Relation: Preparation];

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<sup>3</sup> The United States Code, Title 10, Section 133, p. 44, Office of the Law Revision Counsel, U.S. House of Representatives, 1994.

<sup>4</sup> Department of Defense Directive Number 5134.1, June 8, 1994 (henceforth DODD 5134.1), p. 2.

- (2)** Chair the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) [Key Processes Relation: Preparation];
- (3)** Serve as the DoD Procurement Executive [Key Processes Relation: Preparation];
- (4)** Serve as the U.S. representative at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) [Key Processes Relation: Preparation];
- (5)** Establish and publish policies and procedures governing DoD acquisition and administrative oversight of defense contractors [Key Processes Relation: Policy, Guidance, Regulation];
- (6)** Prescribe the test and evaluation program through the formulation and implementation of policies and plans for ranges and test facilities; exercise responsibility for the acquisition-related functions of weapons programs [Key Processes Relation: Policy, Guidance and Regulation];
- (7)** Establish policies, in coordination with the DoD Inspector General and Comptroller, to ensure that different DoD elements coordinate the audit and oversight of defense contractors [Key Processes Relation: Observation, Orientation, Oversight];
- (8)** Coordinate research and development programs within DoD to eliminate duplication of effort and maximize available resources [Key Processes Relation: Observation, Orientation, Oversight];
- (9)** Establish policies to strengthen DoD component technology development programs, encourage technical competition and technology-driven prototyping that promise increased military capabilities, and exploit the cost-reduction potential of innovative or commercially developed technologies [Key Processes Relation: Policy, Guidance, Regulation];
- (10)** Develop acquisition plans, strategies, guidance, and assessments in support of the program acquisition process's Milestone review and the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) [Key Processes Relation: Resourcing];
- (11)** Categorize major defense acquisition programs as programs to be reviewed either by the DAB or by a DoD component; sign congressional certification and reports; and exercise other responsibilities related to the administration of defense acquisition delegated by the Secretary of Defense [Key Processes Relation: Preparation];
- (12)** Develop, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) acquisition-related agreements with allies and friends [Key Processes Relation: Preparation];
- (13)** Assess and develop policies to maintain the capabilities of the U.S. defense industrial base [Key Processes Relation: Policy, Guidance, and Regulation];

(14) Supervise the management and performance of the Strategic and Critical Materials Program [Key Processes Relation: Preparation];

(15) Establish policies and procedures for the management of the defense acquisition workforce, including training and development, with the coordination of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness [Key Processes Relation: Policy, Guidance, Regulation, and Preparation];

(16) Advise the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense on technical and programmatic issues arising from Defense Resources Board matters [Key Processes Relation: Resourcing];

(17) Establish and manage the cooperative research and development program [Key Processes Relation: Preparation];

(18) Manage the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Study Program [Key Processes Relation: Preparation];

(19) Establish policies and procedures for the management of the DoD environmental security strategy [Key Processes Relation: Policy, Guidance, and Regulation];

(20) Supervise the Defense Science Board [Key Processes Relation: Preparation];

(21) Chair the Nuclear Weapons Council [Key Processes Relation: Preparation].

**B. Functional Areas of Responsibility:** DODD 5134.1 also specifies the functional areas of responsibility for USD (A&T) as:

(1) Acquisition management;

(2) Science, technology and the defense technology base;

(3) Design and engineering and the development of weapon systems;

(4) Logistics acquisition and management;

(5) Procurement;

(6) Scientific and technical information;

(7) Production and manufacturing;

(8) Industrial base resources and productivity;

(9) Force modernization and sustainability and the availability of fielded major weapons systems;

(10) Developmental test and evaluation;

(11) Environmental policy, services, and related actions;

(12) Assignment and reassignment of research and engineering and acquisition responsibility for programs, systems, and activities;

(13) Co-development, co-production, co-procurement, logistics support, wartime host-nation support, and research interchange with friendly and allied nations;

(14) Installation management and base closures;

(15) Construction;

(16) Strategic and critical materials;

(17) Acquisition matters that relate to special operations and low-intensity conflict programs;

(18) Protection measures and counterintelligence for defense acquisition programs;

(19) Economic adjustment;

(20) Defense atomic energy, chemical warfare, and biological defense plans and programs.

### 3. Vision and Core Competencies.

**A. Vision:** "Our vision for the 21st century is a warfighter who is fast, lean, mobile, and prepared for battle with total battlespace situation awareness and information assurance."<sup>5</sup>

**B. Core Competencies:** The core competencies of USD (A&T) are policy and oversight of Service and Agency acquisition program.<sup>6</sup>

**4. Organizational Culture.** This assessment of the culture of USD (A&T) is based on interviews with a relatively small number of senior officials.

**A. Values:** One observer described the organization as lacking a specific culture. This observer noted that USD (A&T) and OSD in general have a more "corporate" culture than the Services, who tend to relate more directly to the warfighter. This observer noted that USD (A&T) and OSD in general would benefit from developing a stronger link to the Service community, for example by rotating personnel into Service slots every few years. In the opinion of this observer, such rotations would create greater confluence between the programmatic community and the users of the programs.

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<sup>5</sup> Statement of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, Honorable Jacques S. Gansler, Before the Subcommittee on Acquisition and Technology Committee on Armed Services U.S. Senate, March 12, 1998. (Hereafter, Gansler statement.)

<sup>6</sup> Gansler statement, p. 3.

**B. Leadership Traditions:** Sources noted that the objectives, interests, and style of the USD (A&T) leadership have traditionally shaped the breadth of involvement by USD (A&T) in defense matters. Sources identified two distinct traditions of leadership: those who were interested primarily in shaping USD (A&T) into an organization focused on managing defense acquisition (the "how to" of defense acquisition); and those concerned with exercising influence over the choice of defense systems to be acquired (the "what" of defense acquisition) as well as the management of the acquisition process. These sources indicated the current leadership falls in the latter category, having established certain priorities for the defense acquisition program, including facilitating interoperability among Services.

**C. Staff Attributes:** Interviewees did not provide specific information regarding staff attributes. One senior official interviewed described the staff as including career civil servants, political appointees, and military officers, and noted that only a minority of senior staff have scientific background.

**D. Strategy:** In testimony to Congress on March 12, 1998, Under Secretary Jacques Gansler outlined the elements of an acquisition strategy to meet the goals established by the Quadrennial Defense Review and Joint Vision 2010. These include modernizing weapon systems; developing and deploying major new systems and subsystems for 21<sup>st</sup> century operations; and supporting those systems "efficiently, effectively, and securely" at reduced cost and cycle times.<sup>7</sup> He also described the "building blocks" of that strategy:

(1) Achieving an interoperable and integrated, secure and "smart" command, control communications, computers, intelligence, and surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) infrastructure.

(2) Developing and deploying long-range, all-weather, low-cost, precise, and "brilliant" weapons.


(3) Achieving rapid force projection and global reach.

(4) Achieving interoperability with U.S. Allies.

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<sup>7</sup> Gansler statement, p. 2.

**E. Organization Chart:** An organization chart for USD (A &T) is depicted below.



## 5. Formal National Security Process Involvement.

		Strategy Development	Policy, Guidance, and Regulations	Planning	Mission Execution	Observation, Orientation, and Oversight	Preparation	Resourcing
Products	DPG		✓	✓				✓
	POM Review		✓					✓
	Alternatives Review		✓					✓
	PDM		✓					✓
	ADM					✓	✓	
	DAES					✓	✓	
Roles	DRB member		✓					✓
	PRG member		✓					✓
	Defense Acquisition Executive					✓	✓	
	DAB Chairman					✓		

**Notes:** DAB = Defense Acquisition Board; DRM = DAB Review Meeting; ADM = Acquisition Decision Memorandum; DAES = Defense Acquisition Executive Summary; DPG = Defense Planning Guidance; POM = Program Objective Memorandum; PRG = Program Review Group; DRB = Defense Resources Board; PDM = Program Decision Memorandum.

**A. Overview:** USD (A&T) is involved in national security primarily through its management of the defense acquisition system and its participation in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System.

In the defense acquisition area, USD (A&T) has developed a number of supporting formal processes, described below, for providing guidance to and exercising oversight over the Services and Agencies on acquisition matters. It is, however, involved most directly in the management and oversight of Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs)—programs whose total RDT&E expenditure is estimated to exceed \$355 million, for which total procurement cost is estimated to exceed \$2.1 billion, or which USD (A&T) otherwise chooses to classify as MDAP. MDAPs and other acquisition programs are further prioritized as Acquisition Category (ACAT) I, II, or III. ***USD (A&T) functions as the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) for all ACAT I programs (i.e., it has decision authority over such programs at each milestone decision point).*** It performs this function with the advice of the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB). For programs of lower priority, USD (A&T) provides general oversight, but designates a Service Acquisition Executive (SAE) for each Service of DoD Component to manage that Service or Component's execution of acquisition programs.

In the context of the PPBS, USD (A&T) participates in the drafting of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), reviews Service Program Objective Memoranda (POMs), and is represented in the Defense Resources Board (DRB) and in the Program Review Group (PRG). Additional information on these functions is provided in the following paragraphs. The picture above describes USD (A&T)'s interaction with key national security processes.


**B. Strategy Development:** USD (A&T) is not involved in strategy development.

**C. Policy, Guidance, and Regulation:**

**(1) Major Activities:** USD (A&T) works with Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate (PA&E) and with the office of the Under Secretary for Policy to produce the planning and programmatic section of the DPG that informs the Services and Agencies of programming requirements as they produce their POMs. USD (A&T) also establishes policies for the management of Defense acquisition and oversees the Services' execution of MDAPs through DAB Milestone Review process, DAB Readiness Meeting (DRM) sessions, and DAB periodic reviews. USD (A&T) guidance to the Services on Defense acquisition matters takes the form of Acquisition Decision Memoranda (ADM) and Defense Acquisition Executive Summaries (DAES).

**(a) DPG:** USD (A&T) provides input to the DPG's planning and programmatic sections on modernization and logistics and other issues of USD (A&T)'s competence, including issues that pertain to environmental security. Within USD (A&T), the Directorate for Acquisition and Program Integration coordinates A&T input to the DPG.

**(b) DAB Milestone Reviews:** (See Appendix 1 for process map.) DAB review of MDAPs is one of the processes by which USD (A&T) provides guidance to and oversight of the Services in acquisition matters for programs classified as MDAPs. A DAB milestone review occurs at the beginning of each phase in the life-cycle of an acquisition program: Phase 0, concept exploration; Phase I, program definition and risk reduction; Phase II, engineering and manufacturing development; and Phase III, production, fielding, deployment and operational support. There is no specific timeline for the DAB Milestone Reviews, as each program enters the next phase according to a schedule determined by the Program Manager based on the program's characteristics and cost considerations.



DAB reviews are prompted by the generation of an Integrated Program Summary (IPS), a document prepared by the Service or Agency executing the acquisition program, that informs the DAB of what has been accomplished in the previous phase. At the Milestone Review, the interested Service summarizes the program's development. The DAB then recommends to USD (A&T) whether the program should be allowed to enter the next phase. The Under Secretary's decision regarding a program is then released in the form of an Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM), which directs the relevant DoD Component to prepare a Program Management Directive (PMD) specifying what is to be done in the next acquisition phase.

This process is repeated at the beginning of each phase with variations only at the beginning of Phase I and Phase III. At the beginning of Phase I, the DAB and USD (A&T) must review alternatives to the program in question. To this end, the DoD Component requesting the program conducts an analysis of alternatives based on operational and cost considerations. The DoD Component bases its alternatives analysis on guidance prepared by PA&E and released by USD (A&T). Based on the study of alternatives, the Component prepares an Operational Requirements Document (ORD), which is submitted to the JROC within the Joint Staff for approval. If the JROC approves the alternatives analysis and the ORD, the latter is submitted to the DAB and USD (A&T) for their review and approval of Milestone I.

An additional requirement exists at the beginning of Phase III as well. At this stage, the Secretary of Defense, with the advice of the DAB and USD (A&T), must determine whether a major defense acquisition program may proceed to full development.

**(c) DRM:** Approximately a week before each DAB meeting, USD (A&T) is briefed by his staff about the program's development in a DAB Readiness Meeting. If no problems are identified during a DRM session, USD (A&T) may make a decision to proceed to the next phase of acquisition without convening the DAB. In this case, USD (A&T) issues the ADM following the DRM. USD (A&T) staff interviewed indicated that DRMs have evolved

into frequent decision-making venues. As the DRM's importance has increased, its attendance has increased as well, so that all interested stakeholders are generally represented.

**(d) Periodic Reviews:** (See Appendix 2 for process map.) In addition to the process of reviewing the evolution of Defense acquisition programs at specific milestones, USD (A&T) also engages in periodic reviews of major Service programs from Milestone I through full production phase. Such reviews occur every three months and typically involve one-third of the major programs on which the Services report. These periodic reviews begin with the Services' submission to USD (A&T) of reports on their acquisition programs known as Defense Acquisition Executive Summaries. At its discretion, USD (A&T) staff typically reviews one third of these reports every quarter. If significant problems are identified in the evolution of the program, USD (A&T) staff will brief the Under Secretary and Principal Deputy Under Secretary. The Under Secretary may request additional information on these programs and, if problems are not clarified, request that the programs be followed more closely by USD (A&T). Typically, programs are not modified or cancelled as a result of periodic reviews.

**(2) Major Stakeholders:** USD (A&T), DAB, Services and Agencies, PA&E, JROC, and the Secretary of Defense.

**(3) Key USD (A&T) Processes:** Acquisition management.

**(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes:** PPBS, National Security Strategy (NSS) preparation, National Military Strategy (NMS) preparation.

**(5) Associated Lower-Level Processes:** Requirements Generation Process, Mission Need Statement (MNS) development.

**(a) Requirements Generation Process:** (See Appendix 3 for process map.) The defense acquisition process is closely linked to and supported by the Requirements Generation Process, which determines whether a Service component has a mission need that can only be fulfilled by the acquisition of materiel, rather than by a change in doctrine, policy, or procedures. There is no specific timeline for the Requirements Generation Process, as Service components continuously analyze their current and projected capabilities. The Requirements Generation Process leads to the development of a Mission Need Statement (MNS), a document developed by the Service component to justify a new acquisition program.

**(b) MNS:** Typically, a Service Component reviews its mission area statements and determines whether it can fulfill those missions with the available resources. If it finds it cannot, it must determine whether a change in doctrine, policy, or procedure can help it fulfill the mission short of a materiel fix. If this is not the case, the Service component drafts the MNS, linking its mission need to requirements identified in the DPG. The MNS is then submitted to the JROC for validation. If the JROC validates the MNS, it forwards it to USD (A&T), which forwards it to the DAB for review. Approval of the MNS by the DAB constitutes Milestone 0 of the defense acquisition process and initiates the concept exploration phase.

### **C. Planning:**

**(1) Major Activities:** USD (A&T) is involved in planning to the extent that it contributes to the preparation of the programmatic section of the DPG. (See paragraph 5.C.(1)(a) above.)

**D. Mission Execution:** USD (A&T) is not involved in mission execution.

### **E. Observation, Orientation, and Oversight:**

**(1) Activities:** USD (A&T) manages the defense acquisition system and oversees the Services' acquisition programs through the reviews of the DAB and the DRM. It also has instituted financial tools to control the Services' spending: the withholding process and the program stability wedge. Although USD (A&T) also establishes policies to coordinate the audit and oversight of defense contractors, actual oversight is conducted by the Services and DoD Agencies.

**(a) DAB Milestone Review:** (See paragraph 5.C.(1)(b) above).

**(b) DRM:** (See paragraph 5.C.(1)(c) above).

**(c) DAB Periodic Review:** (See paragraph 5.C.(1)(d) above).

**(d) "Withholding":** "Withholding" is a tool USD (A&T) uses in conjunction with the DoD Comptroller to ensure the Services conform to Congress' directions in their management of acquisition programs. There are two types of withholding. An "administrative withholding" is used to hold a portion of appropriated R&D and procurement funds from a Service until that Service demonstrates that it has met specific Congressional acquisition requirements. A second type of withholding occurs when Congress provides additional funding to fix a problem in an existing acquisition program. USD (A&T) and Comptroller release the appropriated funds once the Service demonstrates it has addressed the problem. Withholding is rarely used, as USD (A&T) prefers to work out problems cooperatively with the Services.

**(e) Program Stability Wedge:** The program stability wedge is a USD (A&T) initiative established by the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) to limit disruption in acquisition programs brought about by unexpected cost increases in a particular program or new program demands that migrated funds from healthy programs, thereby affecting overall modernization plans. The stability wedge is a percentage of each Service's R&D and procurement plans in the out years that is set aside by each Service as a fund to address unexpected problems in a program in the current year. USD (A&T) works with the Services to help them determine how large their stability wedges should be and reviews and approves the Services' request to draw from the stability wedge.

**(2) Major Stakeholders:** USD (A&T), DoD Comptroller, Services and Agencies, defense contractors.

**(3) Key USD (A&T) Processes:** Defense acquisition management.

**(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes:** NSS preparation, NMS preparation, PPBS.

**(5) Associated Lower-Level Processes:** Requirements Generation Process, MNS development.

#### **F. Preparation:**

**(1) Activities:** USD (A&T) supervises and administers the defense acquisition system.

**(a) DAB Milestone Review:** (See paragraph 5.C.(1)(b) above).

**(b) DRM:** (See paragraph 5.C.(1)(c) above).

**(c) DAB Periodic Review:** (See paragraph 5.C.(1)(d) above).

**(2) Major Stakeholders:** USD (A&T), DoD Comptroller, Services and Agencies, defense contractors.

**(3) Key USD (A&T) Processes:** Defense acquisition management.

**(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes:** NSS preparation, NMS preparation, PPBS.

**(5) Associated Lower-Level Processes:** Requirements Generation Process, MNS development.

#### **G. Resourcing:**

**(1) Major Activities:** USD (A&T) advises the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense on technical and programmatic issues arising from DRB matters and develops acquisition strategies and plans in supports of the PPBS. The PPBS is a key process for USD (A&T) and its role is threefold: it reviews Services POMs; it sits on the Defense Resources Board (DRB); and it participates in the Program Review Group. USD (A&T)'s involvement in the PPBS starts in the summer, after the Services have developed their POMs, and concludes the following winter when the Secretary of Defense approves the DoD-wide POM.

**(a) POM Review:** (See Appendix 4 for process map.) USD (A&T) reviews Services POMs in the summer and raises issues about what and how to buy (See section entitled Program Analysis and Evaluation for a more robust description.)

**(b) PRG:** USD (A&T) is represented on the PRG by the Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Acquisition & Technology (PDUSD (A&T)). PDUSD (A&T) participates in the PRGS's review of alternatives to the Services' POMs, prepared by PA&E. The PRG review results in the finalization of the Services' POM and the development of the DoD-wide POM. (See section entitled Program Analysis and Evaluation for a more robust description.)

(c) **DRB:** USD (A&T) is represented on the DRB by the Under Secretary. The DRB's role is to review the DoD-wide POM, debate Major Budget Issues (MBIs), and make recommendations to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for the development of Program Decision Memoranda (PDMs), which instruct the Services on programmatic matters. Specifically, the role of USD (A&T) is to evaluate program issues from a "smart business" perspective, determining whether and how to minimize the cost of program development. (See section entitled Program Analysis and Evaluation for a more robust description.)

(2) **Major Stakeholders:** USD (A&T), the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, DRB, and the Services.

(3) **Key USD (A&T) Processes:** Defense Acquisition Management.

(4) **Associated Higher-Level Processes:** PPBS, NMS, NSS preparation.

(5) **Associated Lower-Level Processes:** NMS preparation, Requirements Generation Process.

## 6. Informal National Security Process Involvement.

**A. USD (A&T)-SAE Lunches:** A former senior USD (A&T) official noted that, in the first Clinton Administration, the Under Secretary, in his capacity as DAE, held periodic lunch meetings with the Services' Acquisition Executives. The source indicated these meetings were useful means to coordinate programmatic information and to signal unity of purpose to the USD (A&T) and Service communities.

**B. USD (A&T), ASD(S&R), JROC, Comptroller, PA&E, Lunch:** Another informal means of communication and coordination during the first Clinton Administration were monthly lunches between representatives of USD (A&T), Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Requirements (ASD(S&R)),<sup>8</sup> USD (A&T), the JROC, the Comptroller, and PA&E. An advantage of this group is that it integrates the views of the policy, programmatic, acquisition, operation, and budgetary communities, and thus can address issues in a holistic way.

**C. PDM Formulation:** Although the DRB's role is to develop the PDMs, our sources indicated that the final decision regarding what will be contained in a PDM is made by the Deputy Secretary of Defense with the assistance of a small group of advisors, who prioritize the issues presented in the DRB. The Under Secretary for Acquisition and Technology is among this small group of advisors.

## 7. Funding and Personnel.

**A. Authorization and Appropriations:** Primary legislative committees include the House Armed Services Committee, the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, and the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee.

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<sup>8</sup> The Defense Reform Initiative redesignated this office as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction (ASD(S&TR)). Defense Reform Initiative Report, William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, November 1997.

**B. Funding Sources:** USD (A&T) is funded from Operations & Maintenance, Defense-Wide appropriations, which funds the overall management of the Department of Defense, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense.<sup>9</sup> Additional funds flow to USD (A&T) through appropriations for civilian and military personnel full-time equivalents (FTEs).

**C. Budget:** As described above, USD(A&T) budget information is aggregated under the Defense-Wide category in the DoD budget. USD (A&T) did not provide specific budget information.

**D. Manpower:** USD (A&T) manpower totaled 473 as of December 1, 1999.<sup>10</sup>

## 8. Observations.

**A. Integrated Product Teams:** Interviews revealed that the defense acquisition process has benefited from the introduction of Overarching Integrated Product Teams (OIPs), Working-level Integrated Product Teams (WIPTs), and Program IPTs. These groups, composed of USD (A&T), other OSD, and Service staffs, perform continuous assessments of the program as it develops within each phase, with the objective of identifying problems early on and providing recommendations for solutions. OIPs focus primarily on providing strategic guidance, program assessment, and issue resolution; WIPTs focus on program issues and identify opportunities for acquisition reforms; and IPTs, which after contract award include defense contractor representatives, focus on program execution. Sources characterized this system as working so well that a program is usually approved for the next phase during a DRM, obviating the need for some DAB meetings. Additionally, according to our sources, the integrated teams also serve to balance the influence of the Services with that of OSD in the development of the program. The General Accounting Office (GAO) has concluded that the integrated product team approach constitutes a "fundamental" change in the oversight of defense acquisition programs in that it emphasizes early identification of problems.<sup>11</sup> On the other hand, the major problem with the OIPs, WIPTs, and IPTs is that they are great at providing advice and oversight, but lack authority to implement anything.

**B. Cost as an Independent Variable:** A new development in the acquisition process is cost as an independent variable. Cost must now be considered as an issue separate from performance in determining whether a program should go forward. The influence of cost in a program's development is highlighted by the participation of the Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) in the milestone review process. The role of the CAIG is to provide estimates to the DAB of the total life-cycle costs of the program at Milestones I and II. The CAIG is chaired by the Director for Resource Analysis, in the office of the Director of PA&E. The process by which the CAIG performs its estimates is discussed in the PA&E section of this volume.

**C. Program Stability:** Interviews indicated the defense acquisition process works fairly well but could be improved by ensuring greater stability in the funding stream for defense acquisition programs. Sources estimated that for each \$1 Congress cuts from a program at the

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<sup>9</sup> Office of the Secretary of Defense. FY 2000/2001 Biennial Budget Estimate. February 1999, pp. 36-46.

<sup>10</sup> This information was provided by Washington Headquarters Services (WHS). The total figure for USD (A&T) only refers to personnel directly under USD (A&T). It does not include the entire defense acquisition force, which is much larger, and includes personnel from the Defense Logistics Agency and the Service who manage acquisition contracts.

<sup>11</sup> GAO, Defense Weapon System Acquisition (GAO/HR-97-6), February 1997, pg. 31.

beginning of the acquisition process, \$3-\$4 must be added at a later stage to make up for the earlier disruption. Sources indicated the program stability wedge is promising in terms of injecting greater stability into the acquisition process, having apparently overcome some initial resistance by the Services.

**D. Periodic Reviews:** USD (A&T) staff indicated Periodic Reviews of defense programs serve a useful function in identifying problems in defense acquisition programs early on—they were characterized as an "early warning system." They also indicated that the periodic reviews serve to engender a feeling of cooperation among all parties so that when a problem is identified all parties involved can work to resolve it. Finally, DAES provide visibility on programs that have already entered the full production phase and are thus not subject to DAB milestone reviews.

**E. Connectivity to Planning and Programming:** The MNS appears to be the principal means of connecting the defense acquisition process to defense planning, although the informal communications that occur between USD (A&T), ASD(S&TR), PA&E, Comptroller, and the JROC representatives in the monthly lunch meetings described above, also provide a means of coordination. An additional link between planning and acquisition is provided informally through the expertise of key OIPT members, who include members of the USD(P) staff and Comptroller staff who develop sections of the DPG.

Sources indicated that USD (A&T) is an influential voice in the PPBS process, particularly during the development of Program Budget Decisions (PBDs). At this stage, USD (A&T) influences the development of programs by recommending how funds are to be allocated, occasionally overriding a Service's preferences.


The acquisition process appears to focus primarily on balancing each individual program's cost and performance, but is not designed to evaluate one program's merits against another. This integration is designed to occur primarily at the JROC level, although the JROC has not yet fully developed this role with respect to the Services. As the JROC further develops its capability to evaluate Service program requests in a broader warfighting context and validates MNS accordingly, the defense acquisition process should also reflect greater integration. GAO indicates that part of the problem resides with the way the Services perform their analysis of alternatives. GAO argues this analysis is too focused and does not take into consideration the joint acquisition of systems with other services.<sup>12</sup>

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
<sup>12</sup> GAO, Defense Weapon System Acquisition, p. 13.

**APPENDICES**

## USD(A & T) - Key Process - (Formal) - Policy, Guidance, and Regulation - DAB Milestone Reviews




## USD(A & T) - Key Process - (Formal) - Policy, Guidance, and Regulation - DAB Milestone Reviews (continued)




ADM - Acquisition Decision Memorandum  
 COEA - Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis  
 DAB - Defense Acquisition Board  
 DRM - Defense Readiness Meeting  
 IPS - Integrated Program Summary  
 IPT - Integrated Process Teams  
 MNS - Mission Needs Statement  
 ORD - Operational Requirements Document  
 PA&E - Program, Analysis & Evaluation  
 PMD - Program Management Directive

USD(A & T) - Key Process - (Formal) - Policy, Guidance, and Regulation - Defense Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES) - Periodic Reviews




USD(A & T) - Associated Process - (Formal) Policy, Guidance, and Regulation - Requirements Generation Process




ACAT 1 - Acquisition Category 1  
 CRD - Capstone Requirements Document  
 DAB - Defense Acquisition Board  
 JROC - Joint Requirements Oversight Council  
 MNS - Mission Needs Statement  
 ORD - Operational Requirements Document  
 POM - Program Objective Memorandum

USD(A & T) - Associated Process - (Formal) - Policy, Guidance, and Regulation - Requirements Generation Process (continued)



ACAT 1 - Acquisition Category 1  
 CRD - Capstone Requirements Document  
 DAB - Defense Acquisition Board  
 JROC - Joint Requirements Oversight Council  
 MNS - Mission Needs Statement  
 ORD - Operational Requirements Document  
 POM - Program Objective Memorandum

USD(A & T) - Key Process - (Formal) - Resourcing



**ORGANIZATIONAL DESCRIPTION**  
**UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY**



*Prepared for the U.S. Commission on National Security/21<sup>st</sup> Century*

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

### Overview

How forces are structured, trained, equipped, and used depends on policy and strategy decisions made at the highest levels. Similarly, the kinds of operations for which military planners develop plans and the modernization initiatives to which the Department commits resources are based on policy guidance. Within the Department of Defense (DoD), the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) is responsible for developing and promulgating this guidance and for overseeing its implementation, including review of military operational plans.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is a statutory position with internal DoD responsibilities as well as responsibilities as part of the interagency processes described in Presidential Decision Directives (PDD) 2 (the Interagency process) and 56 (Managing Complex Contingency Operations). By Department directive, the USD(P) is the principal assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense for policy formulation and the integration of policy and plans.

In fulfillment of these responsibilities, the USD(P):

- Develops and coordinates policy;
- Develops strategy;
- Reviews operational plans;
- Oversees technology transfers; and,
- Advises on resource allocation priorities and decisions.

USD(P)'s core competencies include planning and crisis management. Key values emphasize success, a desire to make a difference, and a reluctance to be bound by traditional processes and procedures. The latter helps explain why much of the substantive work is accomplished through informal processes that hinge on personal relationships.

### Organization

The Office of the USD(P) includes a principal deputy, a deputy for policy support, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for International Security Affairs (ISA), the ASD for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC), and the ASD for Strategy and Threat Reduction (S&TR). Additionally, USD(P) exercises authority over the Defense Security Cooperation Agency,<sup>1</sup> the Defense Technology Security Administration, and the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Office.

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<sup>1</sup> Formerly the Defense Security Assistance Agency.

USD(P) staff includes approximately 350 civilians and military officers, with civilians (both career civil servants and political appointees) constituting the majority. Interviews indicate that the staff is professional and competent. However, depending on the subject, it sometimes does not move issues through the system as quickly as the Joint Staff, primarily because it lacks the same problem solving procedures and structured staff processes.

The USD(P) and all of his assistant secretaries are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate. As a result, incumbents change with Administrations. However, in the second Clinton Administration, many of the second tier leadership positions (Deputy Assistant Secretary) have been filled by career civil servants.

### Role in Formal and Informal National Security Processes

The following chart depicts the relationship of USD(P)'s products to the key national security processes identified by the U.S. Commission on National Security/21<sup>st</sup> Century.

		Strategy Development	Policy, Guidance, and Regulations	Planning	Mission Execution	Observation, Orientation, and Oversight	Preparation	Resourcing
<b>Products</b>	Coordinate National Military Strategy	✓						
	Defense Planning Guidance (DPG)	✓	✓	✓				
	Contingency Planning Guidance	✓		✓			✓	
	Operational Plans Review			✓		✓	✓	
	Deputies Committee Actions	✓		✓	✓			
	Defense Resources Board (DRB)					✓	✓	✓
<b>Roles</b>	USD(P)	Deputies Committee	✓	✓	✓	✓		
		DRB					✓	✓

**Strategy Development.** USD(P) uses formal processes to coordinate on the National Military Strategy produced by the Joint Staff for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The office of the USD(P) produces major portions of the Defense Planning guidance (DPG) and the Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG), which impact both strategy development and planning. The USD(P) also participates in strategy development as a member of the National Security Council Deputies.

**Policy, Guidance, and Regulation.** The DPG, which initiates the Department's Planning, Programming and Budget System (PPBS), is jointly produced by the USD(P) and the Directorate for Programs Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E). PPBS produces the Department's input for the President's Budget. The NSC Deputies Committee establishes both policy and guidance through the interagency processes described in PDD 2 and PDD 56.

**Planning.** As noted, the USD(P) is involved in both DPG and CPG development. The DPG influences programming and budgeting decisions, while the CPG is the authority for military

commanders to develop operational plans. The USD(P) also fulfills the Secretary of Defense' statutory responsibility to review military plans to ensure they are in line with policy and strategy guidance.

**Mission Execution.** As a member of the NSC Deputies Committee, the USD(P) is active in the interagency forum that oversees ongoing operations and directs changes as appropriate.

**Observation, Orientation, and Oversight.** The USD(P) exercises oversight as a member of the NSC Deputies Committee and as a member of the Defense Resources Board (DRB). The DRB meets to examine resource allocation issues and priorities and advises the Deputy Secretary of Defense concerning allocation decisions.

**Preparation.** CPG, operational plans review, and membership on the DRB provide the USD(P) with the opportunity to influence DoD preparations for future challenges.

**Resourcing.** The USD(P), as a member of the DRB, examines issues sent forward from issue review groups during the programming phase of the PPBS.

Informal processes invariably supplement formal processes. For example, USD(P) plays a role in informal national security deliberations by preparing the Secretary of Defense for regular but informal meetings with the Secretary of State and the President's National Security Advisor, and by attendance at (or preparing the Deputy Secretary for) similar events. According to those interviewed, the USD(P) also engages in frequent personal consultations with other senior DoD leaders, leaders in the other Executive Branch Departments, and, when authorized to do so, with leaders of foreign nations.

## **Observations**

Deliberate planning is both a core competency and a key process for USD(P). Deliberate planning cycles are forcing functions for the Department, and the DoD planning processes works well. The USD(P) influences DoD planning through preparation of the DPG, the CPG, and the review of military plans. However, other interagency players do not view planning with the same priority as DoD. As a result, much of the responsibility for interagency planning resides in DoD, with USD(P) and the Joint Staff assuming predominant roles. (See report sections on the Joint Staff, the Department of State, the National Security Council and Presidential Decision Directives (PDD) 2 and 56.)

Crisis management is also a core competency. Although there are frequent meetings of the NSC Deputies Committee, the USD(P) staff is not always involved in refining and framing the issues. This is often the case because of the short notice that precedes many meetings and the personal role of the USD(P), both of which can act as barriers to effective staff support. While this sometimes precludes staff input, it may speed up the overall process somewhat, at least prior to implementation. Still, the formal crisis management process as described in PDD 56 has not been used in its entirety since Haiti (1994). Instead there is increasing reliance on less formal approaches.

USD(P) involvement in DoD resourcing through the PPBS is effective. The planning and programming cycles tend to overlap instead of occurring sequentially, although this is not

necessarily deleterious. To compensate for delays in the release of the DPG (which begins the formal PPBS cycle), the Defense Planning Advisory Group (DPAG), a pre-DPG issue identification and clarification group, helps keep programmers abreast of likely DPG requirements.

Major informal processes such as senior-level breakfasts and luncheons are effective ways to ensure national security success. While the informality of these sessions encourages coordination and aids in consensus building, the lack of staff involvement can mean that decisions made in these meetings are not translated expeditiously into action. The lack of official minutes also means that different players can return to their Departments and Agencies with different interpretations of agreed positions and responsibilities.

The Secretary of Defense and the USD(P) maintain a strong and effective informal relationship. This ensures that the Secretary is apprised of major issues requiring action by the Principals Committee, as well as in-house policy and strategy issues. Similarly, the USD(P) maintains an informal relationship with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).

## ORGANIZATIONAL DESCRIPTION

### UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY (USD(P))

#### 1. Legal Specifications, Authorizations, and Responsibilities.

**A. Authorizing Statute:** Section 134, Title 10, U.S. Code authorizes the President to appoint the USD(P), subject to Senate confirmation. The USD(P) is required to perform "such duties and exercise such powers as specified by the Secretary of Defense."<sup>2</sup> By law, the USD(P) is responsible for: 1) preparing written policy guidance for the preparation and review of contingency plans; and 2) reviewing such plans. The statute directs the Secretary of Defense to further delineate USD(P) responsibilities as required.

**B. Department Directives:** DoD Directive 5111.1 describes USD(P) as "the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for all matters concerning the formulation of national security and defense policy and the integration and oversight of DoD policy and plans to achieve national security objectives."<sup>3</sup> It further identifies 17 major USD(P) responsibilities, which are listed in paragraph 2, below.

**C. Interagency Directives:** Presidential Decision Directives (PDD) 2<sup>4</sup> and 56<sup>5</sup> outline the Clinton Administration's blueprint for the interagency process and the process for managing complex contingency operations. Both documents prescribe specific roles for USD(P).

**(1) PDD 2** appoints the USD(P) as a member of the NSC Deputies Committee (NSC/DC). This committee functions as "the senior sub cabinet interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security."<sup>6</sup> PDD-2 requires the NSC/DC to "review and monitor the work of the NSC interagency process" and "focus significant attention on policy implementation."<sup>7</sup>

**(2) PDD 56** directs the NSC/DC to establish "appropriate interagency working groups to assist in policy development, planning, and execution of complex contingency operations."<sup>8</sup> To this end, the NSC/Principals Committee (NSC/PC) may direct the NSC/DC to form an "Executive Committee (ExComm) with appropriate membership to supervise day to day

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<sup>2</sup> The United States Code. Title 10, Section 134. p.46 Office of the Law Revision Counsel, U.S. House of Representatives.1994. The Under Secretary takes precedence in the Department of Defense after the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, and the Secretaries of the military departments.

<sup>3</sup> DoD Organization and Functions Handbook. Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) USD(P). page 1. March 22, 1995. [www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ofg](http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ofg).

<sup>4</sup> Presidential Decision Directive 2 "Organization of the National Security Council." The White House. Washington, NSC/DC. Pages 1-8. January 20, 1993.

<sup>5</sup> White Paper. "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations: Presidential Decision Directive – 56." May 1997. Pages 1-7. White House, Washington, NSC/DC.

<sup>6</sup> Presidential Decision Directive 2 "Organization of the National Security Council." The White House. Washington, NSC/DC. Page 2, January 20, 1993.

<sup>7</sup> Presidential Decision Directive 2 "Organization of the National Security Council." The White House. Washington, NSC/DC. Page 2, January 20, 1993.

<sup>8</sup> White Paper. "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations: Presidential Decision Directive – 56." May 1997. Page 3. White House, Washington, NSC/DC.

management of complex contingency operations."<sup>9</sup> PDD-56 calls upon the NSC/DC to "task the development of a pol-mil plan and assign specific responsibilities to the appropriate ExComm officials."<sup>10</sup> It also gives the NSC/DC responsibility for conducting the "interagency rehearsal/review of the pol-mil plan."

## **2. Missions/Functions/Purposes.**

### **A. Major Responsibilities:** DoD Directive 5111.1 outlines 17 major duties for USD(P):

(1) Represent DoD in matters involving the NSC, the Department of State, and other Departments, Agencies, and interagency groups responsible for national security policy [Key Processes Relation: Strategy Development; Policy, Guidance, and Regulation; Planning; Mission Execution; Observation, Orientation, and Oversight];

(2) Serve on the NSC Deputies Committee (NSC/DC) and the NSC/DC for Crisis Management; advising the Secretary of Defense on crisis prevention and management, including contingency planning [Key Processes Relation: Strategy Development; Policy, Guidance, and Regulation Planning; Mission Execution; Observation, Orientation, and Oversight];

(3) Develop policy for defense-related international negotiations and representing DoD in those negotiations [Key Processes Relation: Strategy Development; Policy, Guidance, and Regulation];

(4) Develop and coordinating DoD policy for international negotiations on arms control implementation and/or compliance [Key Processes Relation: Strategy Development; Policy, Guidance and Regulation];

(5) Develop policy relating to alliances and defense relationships with foreign governments and international organizations, and integrating and overseeing any plans and programs resulting from these relationships [Key Processes Relation: Strategy Development; Policy, Guidance, and Regulation; Planning];

(6) Develop, coordinate, and oversee the implementation of international security strategy and policy; pol-mil policy on issues of DoD interest that relate to foreign governments, including status of forces [Key Processes Relation: Strategy Development; Policy, Guidance, and Regulation; Observation, Orientation, and Oversight];

(7) Develop, coordinate, and implement policy for threats posed by weapons of mass destruction and other technologies [Key Processes Relation: Strategy Development; Policy, Guidance and Regulation; Planning; Mission Execution; Observation, Orientation, and Oversight];

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<sup>9</sup> White Paper. "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations: Presidential Decision Directive – 56." May 1997. Page 3. White House, Washington, NSC/DC.

<sup>10</sup> White Paper. "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations: Presidential Decision Directive – 56." May 1997. Page 5. White House, Washington, NSC/DC.

(8) Provide oversight of DoD activities relating to international technology transfer [Key Processes Relation: Mission Execution; Observation, Orientation, and Oversight];

(9) Develop, coordinate, and oversee implementation of strategy and policy for strategic and theater nuclear forces and space systems [Key Processes Relation: Strategy Development; Policy, Guidance, and Regulation; Mission Execution; Observation, Orientation, and Oversight];

(10) Assist the Secretary of Defense in the development of national security and defense strategy; advise on the resources and forces necessary to implement that strategy; and serve as the principal advisor for the planning phase of PPBS [Key Processes Relation: Strategy Development; Planning; Preparation; Resourcing];

(11) Develop policy guidance for preparation and review of operational and contingency plans (including nuclear and conventional forces) and review such plans [Key Processes Relation: Policy, Guidance, and Regulation; Planning; Observation, Orientation, and Oversight];

(12) Plan, program, budget, and execute special operations activities (including civil affairs and psychological operations) and of low-intensity conflict activities (including counter terrorism, support to insurgency, and contingency operations) [Key Processes Relation: Planning, Mission Execution; Preparation; Resourcing];

(13) Develop defense policy related to the defense aspects of the promotion of democracy and human rights and U.S. participation in peace operations [Key Processes Relation: Strategy Development; Policy, Guidance, and Regulation];

(14) Develop defense policy related to the implementation of drug control policy [Key Processes Relation: Strategy Development; Policy, Guidance, and Regulation];

(15) Provide mid- and long-range policy planning on strategic security matters and emerging national security issues; implement a comprehensive strategy toward Russia, Ukraine, and other newly independent states of Eurasia; net assessments and policy research activities and programs [Key Processes Relation: Strategy Development; Policy, Guidance, and Regulation; Planning; Mission Execution];

(16) Develop and implement policy for international security countermeasures [Key Processes Relation: Policy, Guidance, and Regulation; Planning; Mission Execution];

(17) Develop policy for emergency planning and preparedness [Key Processes Relation: Policy, Guidance, and Regulation; Planning; Preparation];

**B. Subordinate Agencies and Activities:** USD(P) exercises authority, direction, and/or control over the following agencies:

**(1) Defense Security Cooperation Agency** (formerly the Defense Security Assistance Agency) through the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) (DoDD 5105.38 - under revision).

**(2) Defense Technology Security Administration** through the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Policy)<sup>11</sup> (DoDD 5105.51).

**(3) Defense Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Office** through the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs).

**C. Major Products:** The USD(P) is involved in producing the following national security products:

**(1)** Coordination for the National Military Strategy produced by the Joint Staff for the Chairman of the Joint Staff (CJCS);

**(2)** The Defense Planning Guidance, which initiates the PPBS, a process that ultimately produces the DoD budget;

**(3)** The Contingency Planning Guidance, which is the authority for military commanders to draft operational plans;

**(4)** Operational Plans Review, which is required by law and which ensures that military operations plans are in line with policy and strategy requirements;

**(5)** NSC Deputies Committee Actions, which include highest level policy and strategy decisions and oversight of ongoing operations; and

**(6)** Defense Resources Board recommendations, which influence resource allocation decisions made by the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DepSecDef).

### **3. Vision and Core Competencies.**

**A. Vision:** USD(P) officials report that there is no formal vision statement.

**B. Core Competencies:** USD(P) officials indicated that there is no formal list of core competencies—those things that the organizations does well, and better than other organizations. However, based on interviews and documentation, USD(P) core competencies include mid- and long-term planning, policy and strategy development, and crisis management.

**4. Organizational Culture.** Organizational culture consists of values, beliefs, and norms that signal how work is done and how employees relate to each other and to others. One senior

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<sup>11</sup> The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy (ASD/ISP) was eliminated as part of the Defense Reform Initiative. The functions of that office were re-allocated to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, which was re-designated ASD for Special Operations and Humanitarian Assistance.

official summarized the prime cultural imperative when he described it as "rooted in planning and the ability to plan."

**A. Values:** USD(P) is clearly a very influential organization within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the interagency process. One senior official described the organization as driving "about 85 percent of what goes on in DoD." This sense of importance shapes organizational values. Based on interviews with relatively senior officials, key values include: emphasis on success; desire to make meaningful contributions; willingness to work long hours; problem solving expertise; and reluctance to be bound by traditional ways of doing business. One interlocutor with more than a decade in USD(P) believed that willingness to look beyond traditions gives USD(P) an edge over its counterparts in the Department of State.


**B. Leadership Traditions:** Sources noted that leadership "traditions" reflect the personality and preferences of the Under Secretary, who is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. They indicated that, presently, a great deal of authority and responsibility are concentrated at the top among a few individuals, or with the USD(P) himself. They stated that assistant secretary-level officials are sometimes bypassed. However, other sources indicated the USD(P) relies on the support of lower-level offices within the bureaucracy, according to the issue at hand. The incumbent appears to have a great deal of contact with the Secretary of Defense and other key officials within DoD and other agencies. He uses personal contacts as well as formal processes to advance positions on policy questions.

The consensus among those interviewed (a mix of political appointees, career civil servants, and military officers) is that USD(P) leadership is effective and is in harmony with organizational values. One interlocutor believes that the increase in career civil servants in Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) positions (three of five in Strategy and Threat Reduction and three of four in International Security Affairs) will foster greater continuity and provide a reservoir of experience to balance the influence and creativity (as well as the lack of practical experience) of political appointees from academia or the legislative staff. In other words, when new ideas arrive with changing Administrations, career civil servants play a vital role because they have the know-how to ensure effective implementation and overcome bureaucratic obstacles.

**C. Staff Attributes:** Those interviewed believe the staff—which consists of both civilians and military—is more professional than it has been in the past. They noted that the staff works long hours. One interlocutor noted that the USD(P) staff is the equal of the Joint Staff in terms of quality, although there are some things that the Joint Staff can do more rapidly.

**D. Strategy.** USD(P) does not have a formal strategic plan.

**E. Organizational Structure.**



**Figure 1. Organizational Structure**

**Legend:**

DUSD = Deputy Under Secretary

DSCA = Defense Security Cooperation Agency

DASD = Deputy Assistant Secretary

FMRO = Foreign Military Rights Office

ASD = Assistant Secretary

(1) USD(P) is organized both regionally and functionally, and functional and regional Deputy Assistant Secretaries of Defense (DASDs) are mingled within and between Assistant Secretaries of Defense (ASDs). This is similar to the Department of State, except that State tends to separate the Assistant Secretaries more clearly by region or function with integration occurring at the Under Secretary level. (See Volume V of the report entitled Department of State.) In terms of the interagency process, the USD(P) is a member of the NSC/DC and the ASDs and DASDs serve on Interagency Working Groups (IWGs). (See also the description of the interagency process contained in Chapter 2, Volume I of the report.)

(2) As depicted in the organizational diagram, the organizational structure is hierarchical. ASDs, who report to the USD(P), are assisted by DASDs and Directors. DASDs and Directors may have functional responsibilities (e.g., the DASD for Threat Reduction Policy) or regional portfolios (e.g., the DASD for European & NATO Affairs). As Figure 1 illustrates, each ASD has both regional and functional responsibilities. For example, in addition to his regional responsibilities, ASD(ISA) is responsible for POW/MIA issues. And, while the ASD (S&TR) major interests are functional, he has responsibility for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia. This mix of regional and functional responsibilities was intended to allow ASDs to integrate efforts effectively within their organizations without the need to manage boundaries with other ASDs in many cases. For example, ASD for Special Operations and Humanitarian Assistance (ASD(SOHA)) has responsibility for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support. Because it also has responsibility for Inter American Affairs, it has access to experts for countries toward which drug policies may be addressed.

(3) From another perspective, however, this type of organization may restrict communications between ASDs because it creates self-contained stovepipes. While this approach works well in dealing with traditional threats and problems, it is not clear that it will be effective in dealing with the challenges postulated by the Commission for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. Many of the challenges described in *New World Coming: American Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* appear to require the ability to communicate rapidly throughout the breadth and depth of an organization. While the technology to do this is readily available, hierarchical organizational structures may inhibit technological capabilities.

(4) The organization chart reflects changes made in 1999 based on recommendations in the Defense Reform Initiative (DRI) Report that were subsequently written into law in the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (P.L. 105-21). As a result of these changes, the ASD for Strategy and Resources (ASD(S&R)), was redesignated ASD for Strategy and Threat Reduction (ASD(S&TR)), and the duties of the ASD for International Security Policy (ASD (ISP)) were transferred to ASD International Security Affairs (ASD (ISA), ASD (S&TR), and the ASD for Special Operations and Humanitarian Assistance. The ASD for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC)—instituted by Congress in 1987—was redesignated ASD for Special Operations and Humanitarian Assistance and its duties were broadened to include humanitarian affairs and peacekeeping.

(5) The 1999 Defense Reform Initiative advocated transferring the Directorate of Net Assessment from USD(P) to the National Defense University (NDU), Net Assessment continuing to receive taskings from USD(P). The DRI noted that these changes would "streamline and realign this organization to more effectively deal with the challenges of the post

Cold War period."<sup>12</sup> However, political pressure has maintained the Directorate of Net Assessment within USD(P).

**5. Formal National Security Process Involvement.** The chart on the following page depicts USD(P) products and the relationship of products to Key National Security Processes identified by the Commission staff, and the key roles played by the USD(P) beyond oversight of his organization.

#### **A. Strategy Development:**

**(1) Major Activities:** Coordinates the National Security Strategy (NSS) within OSD. Partners in the Joint Strategic Review (JSR) with the Joint Staff to produce the National Military Strategy (NMS). Prepares the strategy section of Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). Prepares the Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG).

**(a) NSS.** The National Security Council Staff drafts the NSS with input from Executive Branch Departments and Agencies. The process involves periodic working group meetings (usually chaired by NSC staff) and the circulation of drafts. USD(P) coordinates for the Office of the Secretary of Defense on these drafts and participates in working groups.

**(b) NMS.** The NMS is prepared by the Joint Staff and is based on the NSS and policy guidance provided by USD(P) formally and informally. The NMS is a companion document to the DPG. A Joint Strategy Review (JSR), which reviews strategic concepts and missions and is chaired by the Joint Staff, is one of the pillars for preparing the NMS. USD(P) participates in the JSR. (See also the section entitled The Joint Staff in this volume.)

**(c) DPG.** (See Appendix 1 for process map.) The DPG is written jointly by USD(P)—which writes strategy and policy sections—and PA&E—which writes programming sections—with input from the rest of the Department. The DPG is classified and is considered to be an Executive Branch working document. The document links policy, strategy, planning and programming at the Department level. It is not shared with Congress.

The DPG starts the PPBS cycle, which is designed to link strategic planning to programming and budgeting. Ideally, the DPG is published far enough in advance so that the Military Services and Defense Agencies can use it to develop their Program Objective Memoranda (POM), part of the programming portion of PPBS. Often, however, the DPG is not released until shortly before POMs are due. The impact of releasing the DPG after POM preparation has begun is not clear. However, the Services are involved in DPG preparation and theoretically know what guidance the final document is likely to contain before it is published.

DPG preparation begins with the Defense Planning Advisory Group (DPAG). The DPAG was conceived as a method to bring together relatively senior officials to address key issues prior to DPG preparation. DPAG members are usually 2-star (or civilian equivalent) deputies. Membership includes the Deputy Comptroller, the Deputy Director PA&E, the Deputy for Program Integration, the Deputy J-5, the Deputy J-8, and Service planners and programmers. Others are invited to attend, depending on issues under discussion (e.g., C3I, environmental

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<sup>12</sup> Defense Reform Initiative Report, William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, November 1997, pg. 54.

protection). DPAG meetings begin in September and sometimes extend into December. Typically, there will be four to seven meetings chaired by the ASD (S&TR). Succinct issue papers frame each meeting.

		Strategy Development	Policy, Guidance, and Regulations	Planning	Mission Execution	Observation, Orientation, and Oversight	Preparation	Resourcing
<b>Products</b>	Coordinate National Military Strategy	✓						
	Defense Planning Guidance (DPG)	✓	✓	✓				
	Contingency Planning Guidance	✓		✓			✓	
	Operational Plans Review			✓		✓	✓	
	Deputies Committee Actions	✓		✓	✓			
	Defense Resources Board (DRB)					✓	✓	✓
<b>Roles</b>	USD(P)	Deputies Committee	✓	✓	✓	✓		
		DRB					✓	✓

**USD(P) National Security Product and Roles in the National Security Process, and their relationship to Key Processes**

The DPAG process is designed to build common understanding (though not necessarily consensus) concerning major issues that will be addressed in the DPG. It helps identify points of contention and provides opportunities to resolve disagreements. It also provides Service planners and programmers with early insight into DPG content, which is important because the DPG is almost never published until after Services begin to build their POMs. A final product of the DPAG process is that it provides USD(P) and PA&E with knowledgeable points of contact within the Services.

During the period when DPAG meetings are in session, USD(P) and PA&E staff begin to prepare the DPG. Preparation draws on the previous DPG, intervening strategic reviews and NSS/NMS, DPAG and Secretary of Defense guidance. The Joint Staff, the Services, and other program-producing activities review drafts. The DPAG and Defense Resources Board (DRB) then review the DPG.

Once approved by the DPAG and DRB, the DPG is reviewed by the CJCS, whose comments are forwarded to the Secretary in the form of the Chairman's Program Recommendations (CPR). The CPR is based on input from the Commanders in Chiefs (CINCs), the Joint Staff, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), the Joint Requirements Board

(JRB), and the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) teams. (See also the section entitled The Joint Staff.) The DPG is then forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for approval. If the Secretary of Defense does not approve the DPG, the DPAG and DRB make adjustments to it and resubmitted it to the Secretary of Defense. This cycle continues until the Secretary of Defense approves the DPG. (See also the section entitled Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate in this volume.)

**(d) CPG.** (See Appendix 2 for process map) The CPG, which is influenced by the DPG, the NMS, NSS, and other deliberate planning documents, provides direction for the military to develop operational plans. Technically, the military cannot craft operational plans unless directed to do so by the CPG. The document is highly classified, approved by the President, and provides key information for military planning cells, beginning with the Joint Staff

The Joint Staff uses the CPG, together with the DPG, to develop the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The JSCP provides specific planning assumptions and information on apportioned forces. The Unified Commands, in turn, use the JSCP to develop strategic concepts, which the Joint Staff reviews for feasibility and integration of joint doctrine. The CJCS approves unified command concepts based on Joint Staff recommendations. Once approved, Unified Commands use the concepts as the basis for operational plans that are eventually reviewed by the Joint Staff and USD(P). After review and approval by Joint Staff and USD(P) selected plans are briefed to the SecDef. When a plan is approved by the Secretary of Defense, it is returned to the preparing command, other CINCs, and component commands. These organizations then begin their planning to support future implementation. (See section entitled The Joint Staff in this volume.)

**(e) Interagency Process (NSC Deputies Committee).** Presidential Decision Directive 2 establishes the interagency process of which the NSC/DC is part. The majority of the work in the Interagency system is done by the NSC/DC, which is the focal point of the interagency process for national security issues. PDD 2 establishes membership in the NSC beyond that required by law, provides for a Principals Committee (NSC/PC), establishes the NSC/DC, and authorizes Interagency Working Groups (NSC/IWG). The system is designed to ensure that senior decision makers (including the President) have adequate decision support and that issues, which can be dealt with at lower levels are. (For a more robust discussion of PDD 2 and process flow charts, see Chapter 2 of Volume I.)

PDD 2 appoints the USD(P) a member of the NSC/DC,<sup>13</sup> together with the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (who chairs NSC/DC meetings), the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs, and the Deputy Assistant to the President for Economic Policy. PDD 2 empowers the NSC/DC to invite representatives from other Departments and Agencies as required.

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<sup>13</sup> Although the USD(P) is the official DoD representative to the NSC/DC, the Department's Deputy Secretary has attended NSC/DC meetings on occasion.

The NSC/DC has no permanent staff. The Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs, in consultation with NSC/DC members, calls meetings, determines the agenda, and reviews information papers provided by NSC/IWGs and other sources. The NSC/DC can task the NSC/IWGs to provide information or to analyze issues as necessary. If additional staff support is needed it may come from members' organizations or from the NSC staff.

Except during periods of crisis, the NSC/DC meets at irregular intervals and deals with policy and strategy issues that require interagency deliberations and/or decisions. Usually, USD(P) staff is notified of the meetings, although notification is often "short notice" and agendas and draft issue papers are often not provided until the last minute, according to USD(P) staff. USD(P) staff identified this as a significant problem.

PDD 2 forms the basis for NSC/DC activity during crisis, too, although PDD 56 (Managing Complex Contingency Operations) amplifies committee responsibilities. PDD 2 assigns the NSC/DC responsibility for day-to-day management of crises and authorizes the NSC/DC to designate itself as the Deputies Committee/Crisis Management (CM). When acting as the DC/CM, the body reports to the NSC (unless instructed otherwise) and is authorized a small support staff. The DC/CM may be used in conjunction with PDD 56 processes, but there is no requirement to do so.

The PDD 56 process begins when the NSC staff develops an agenda for and schedules an NSC/DC meeting to deal with a crisis or complex emergency. (See Appendix 3 for process map) The agenda will usually reflect issues raised by the National Security Adviser, a senior NSC staff member, or a senior Executive Branch official.

When the USD(P) staff learns of the meeting, the staffs of relevant Assistant Secretaries of Defense coordinate the agenda and develop talking points and background papers for the USD(P). If agenda issues are resolved, the NSC/DC develops a meeting consensus document and briefs the NSC/PC. The USD(P) typically briefs the Secretary of Defense prior to his attendance at NSC/PC meetings.

The NSC/PC may accept the NSC/DC's recommendation and direct implementation; it may modify it and direct the NSC/DC to make appropriate changes; it may agree to revisit the issue; or, it may carry it forward to the President for decision.

When issues are resolved and decisions made, the NSC Staff develops a Summary of Conclusions that is used to brief the NSC, and is then released to the relevant agencies for implementation. If the NSC/PC does not resolve the issue at hand, the issue could be addressed through informal processes, such as the Albright-Berger-Cohen (ABC) Lunch (discussed below).

When recommendations are approved, the NSC/PC may direct the NSC/DC to establish an Executive Committee (ExComm) under PDD 56 to oversee implementation of the decision. ExComm responsibilities include preparation of a political-military (pol-mil) plan. The ExComm is normally composed of Assistant Secretaries of State and Defense and may include Assistant Secretaries of Defense from the USD(P) organization. ExComm members are held personally accountable to the President for plan development and execution.

The ExComm may appoint an executive agent to act for it in developing and coordinating the plan. This agent may be an Assistant Secretary or a Unified Command commander. The executive agent is charged with bringing appropriate organizations into the interagency process. These organizations draft specific portions of the pol-mil plan. Once drafts are complete and the executive agent is satisfied, the plan is provided to the ExComm for review. It is then presented to the NSC/DC in a rehearsal. (See Chapter 2 in Volume I for a more detailed description and process flow maps of Presidential Decision Directive 56.)

**(2) Major Stakeholders:** ASD (S&TR), PA&E, The Joint Staff, The Services, the Unified Commanders.

**(3) Key Organizational Processes:** DPAG.

**(4) Associated Higher-level Processes:** PPBS (see section entitled Programs Analysis and Evaluation directorate in this volume); Pol-Mil Plan Development; and preparation of the National Security Strategy by the National Security Council Staff (see Chapter 2 in Volume II).

**(5) Associated Lower-Level Processes:** Development of contingency plans (see section entitled The Joint Staff in this volume).

## **B. Policy, Guidance, and Regulation:**

**(1) Major Activities:** Provides guidance to DoD military and civilian planners through publication of the DPG and CPG. (Refer to paragraph 5A, above, for a discussion of DPG and CPG preparation.) Provides policy through the NSC/DC. (Refer to Chapter 2, Volume II for a description of NSC/DC products.)

**(2) Major Stakeholders:** NSC Staff, Joint Staff, the Unified Commands.

**(3) Key Organizational Processes:** DPAG.

**(4) Associated Higher-level Processes:** Pol-Mil Plan Development (see Chapter 2 of Volume I).

**(5) Associated Lower-Level Processes:** Development of contingency plans (see section entitled The Joint Staff in this volume).

## **C. Planning:**

**(1) Major Activities:** Reviews operational plans to ensure they are in line with policy and strategy. Directs resource and deliberate operational planning efforts through publication of the DPG and CPG. As a member of the NSC/DC, contributes to preparation of the political-military plan under PDD 56.

**(a) Review of Operational Plans.** The Secretary of Defense is required by law to review military operations plans. USD(P)'s Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Requirements, Plans, and Counterproliferation Policy) acts as the USD(P)'s agent for plans

review. Plans are received from the Joint Staff, reviewed to ensure the underlying strategy is sound and that they are in accordance with Department and Administration policy. Results of the review are presented in a series of briefings for appropriate Joint Staff officials, the ASD(S&TR), the USD(P), and the Secretary of Defense. Those interviewed indicated that reviews are stringent and plans have been returned to Unified Commands for major revisions on a number of occasions.

**(b) DPG and CPG.** See Section A, Strategy Development.

**(c) NSC/DC and PDD 56.** See Section A, Strategy Development.

**(2) Major Stakeholders:** Joint Staff, the Unified Commands, and the Services.

**(3) Key Organizational Processes:** DPAG.

**(4) Associated Higher-level Processes:** Pol-Mil Plan Development (see Chapter 2, Volume I on Presidential Decision Directive 56).

**(5) Associated Lower-Level Processes:** Development of contingency plans (see section entitled The Joint Staff in this volume).

#### **D. Mission Execution:**

**(1) Major Activities:** Influences the execution of interagency operations as a member of the NSC/DC. Appoints Assistant Secretaries of Defense to IWGs and the ExComm as prescribed by PDD 2 and PDD 56. See paragraph 5. A., Strategy Development.

**(2) Major Stakeholders:** NSC Staff, Joint Staff, the Unified Commands.

**(3) Key Organizational Processes:** None

**(4) Associated Higher-level Processes:** Pol-Mil Plan Development (see section entitled Managing Complex Contingency Operations: Presidential Decision Directive 56).

**(5) Associated Lower-Level Processes:** Development of DoD portions of the pol-mil plan (see Chapter 2 in Volume I).

#### **E. Observation, Orientation, and Oversight:**

**(1) Major Activities:** DRB participation. Review of operational plans developed by the Unified Commands.

**(a) DRB Participation.** Participates in issue groups, the Program Review Group (PRG), and serves on the DRB. These activities begin in early summer after Service POMs are finished and PA&E has developed issues. Issues are divided between those that are major and those that are not.<sup>14</sup> Major issues are sent through issue groups for refinement,

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<sup>14</sup> Interviews with PA&E officials indicate that "major" usually connotes high dollar value.

analysis, and verification of fact. The PRG reviews major issues and selects those that are passed to the DRB. The DRB deliberates on these issues and passes them with recommendations to the Deputy Secretary for decision. (See the section entitled Program Evaluation and Analysis Directorate in this volume for a more robust description and process charts of the programming portion of the PPBS.)

**(b) Plans Review.** See Section C, Planning.

**(2) Major Stakeholders:** Joint Staff, the Unified Commands, Services.

**(3) Key Organizational Processes:** None

**(4) Associated Higher-level Processes:** Preparation of the DoD budget (see sections entitled Program Evaluation and Analysis Directorate and Office of Management and Budget in this volume).

**(5) Associated Lower-Level Processes:** Service Program Objective Memorandum (POM) preparation.

#### **F. Preparation:**

**(1) Major Activities:** Prepares CPG; reviews operational plans; member of DRB.

**(a) DPG.** See paragraph 5. A., Strategy Development.

**(b) Operational Plans Review.** See paragraph 5. C., Planning.

**(c) DRB.** See paragraph 5.E., Observation, Orientation, and Oversight.

**(2) Major Stakeholders:** Services and U.S. Special Operations Command.

**(3) Key Organizational Processes:** None.

**(4) Associated Higher-level Processes:** DoD budget preparation.

**(5) Associated Lower-Level Processes:** POM preparation.

#### **G. Resourcing:**

**(1) Activities:** DRB Member. See Paragraph 5. E, Observation, Orientation, and Oversight.

**(2) Major Stakeholders:** Services, USSOCOM.

**(3) Key Organizational Processes:** None.

**(4) Associated Higher-level Processes:** DoD budget preparation.

## **(5) Associated Lower-Level Processes: POM preparation.**

**6. Informal National Security Process Involvement.** USD(P) staff are involved in at least three informal processes.

**A. The Albright-Berger-Cohen (ABC) Breakfast/Lunch:** (See Appendix 4 for process map) These meetings occur weekly, when all participants are in town. The agenda is prepared by the NSC staff (in coordination with the staffs of the other participants) and distributed ahead of time. The USD(P) staff prepares background material and talking points on those matters for which they have expertise and submit them to the Secretary of Defense through the USD(P) bureaucracy. No staff attends the breakfasts/lunches. Staffs depend on feedback from the principals. USD(P) officials believe these events serve as an important venue for surfacing and resolving issues quickly, although some acknowledged that feedback is not always timely.

**B. Weekly Foreign Policy Breakfast:** This event involves the ABC participants plus the United Nations Representative, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), all of whom are involved in the National Security Council as defined in PDD 2. No staff attends. This is an informal gathering without an agenda. Occasionally, taskers for the USD(P) staff result from these meetings.

**C. Weekly Deputies Lunches:** These are similar to the Foreign Policy Breakfasts except that participants are members of the NSC/DC. In DoD's case, the Deputy Secretary of Defense often attends instead of the USD(P), even though the Deputy Secretary is not part of the NSC/DC as defined in PDD 2.

## **7. Funding and Personnel**

**A. Authorization and Appropriations:** Primary legislative committees include the House Armed Services Committee, the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Defense Subcommittees of the House and Senate Appropriations Committee, and the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee. House and Senate foreign affairs committees also influence USD(P).

**B. Funding Sources:** USD(P) is funded from Operation & Maintenance, Defense-Wide appropriations that funds the overall management of the Department of Defense, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense.<sup>15</sup> Additional funds are available in terms of appropriations for civilian and military personnel full-time equivalents (FTEs).

**C. Budget:** As described above, USD(P) budget information is aggregated under the Defense-Wide category in the DoD budget. There are no separate figures available.

**D. Manpower:** USD(P) staff consists of 278 civilians and 128 military personnel, and 100 percent of this manpower is dedicated to national security functions.

## **8. Observations.**

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<sup>15</sup> Office of the Secretary of Defense. FY 2000/2001. Biennial Budget Estimate. Pages 36-46. February 1999. [www.dtic.mil/comptroller](http://www.dtic.mil/comptroller).

**A. Organizational Structure:** The Office of the USD(P) is structured hierarchically, and, in many respects, it is a "stovepipe" organization in the sense that each ASD is structured around its major areas of interest regionally and functionally. This type of organization may restrict communications between ASDs. While the approach works well in dealing with traditional threats and problems, it is not clear that it will be effective in dealing with the threats postulated by the Commission for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. Many of the challenges postulated in *New World Coming: American Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* require the ability to communicate rapidly throughout the breadth and depth of an organization. While the technology to do this—cellular communication, video teleconferencing with representatives in the field, and secure internet communications—are readily available, old style organizational structures may inhibit technological capabilities.

**B. Deliberate Planning:** Planning is a DoD and USD(P) core competency, and deliberate planning cycles act as forcing functions. USD(P) participates in deliberate planning in preparation of the DPG and CPG.

Interviews indicate that while planning is a core competency in DoD, from the USD(P) perspective, the processes can be improved by better interagency coordination—especially with agencies that do not view planning in the same light. An initiative is currently underway within USD(P) to facilitate interagency planning coordination. This initiative, called "Annex V," will allow DoD to share approved plans with other relevant agencies. The desired effect is to permit early notification of operational concepts and potential requirements. If brought to fruition, the Annex V initiative may improve interagency planning by making it easier to involve non-DoD players.

**C. Contingency Planning:** The Under Secretary is involved in the formal process for policy development, planning, and mission execution during contingency operations as advisor to the Secretary of Defense and as a member of the NSC/DC. Most substantive actions and day-to-day management of crises are accomplished in the NSC/DC. Assistant Secretaries of Defense within USD(P) assist the Under Secretary and may become involved directly, if an ExComm is constituted pursuant to PDD 56. There is no specific timeline for this process, as its beginning and ending points are determined by the evolution of the crisis.

Crisis management is a primary activity of the national security apparatus. During crises, NSC/DC meetings are held at least weekly. NSC/PC meetings also occur frequently, sometimes with little or no time after an NSC/DC meeting.<sup>16</sup> While this schedule reflects the rapid development of a crisis, those interviewed believe the process could benefit from greater advance planning and fewer meetings at the NSC/DC and NSC/PC levels. This approach would give NSC/IWGs time to refine issues and develop options, which would make NSC/DC meetings more productive.

Interviews also revealed that the complete PDD 56 process is seldom, if ever, used in its entirety. PDD 56 reflects the way the administration prepared for the Haiti incursion, which occurred before PDD 56 was published. While portions of the procedure are used (e.g., NSC staff agenda development and NSC/DC and NSC/PC meetings), there is significant reliance on

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<sup>16</sup> USD(P) interlocutors indicated that the interval was often a matter of a few hours.

informal processes (i.e., weekly ABC Lunches) to coordinate interagency positions and make decisions relating to crisis management. A great deal of coordination also takes place through informal, personal communications between USD(P) and his counterparts in other agencies. The Under Secretary's personal influence and experience in the interagency process appear to play an important role in promoting DoD views in interagency deliberations. These interfaces provide another layer of access to other key interagency players.

Interagency Working Groups (IWGs) also provide valuable contingency planning assistance. IWG members are regional and functional subject matter experts who bring a great deal of information to bear on problems and issues. This is the lowest level at which members of different Departments and Agencies are brought together in a structured environment to examine substantive issues. In addition to the formal IWG process of developing and vetting issue papers, IWG members use informal exchanges to refine issues and develop additional information.

Interviews indicate that the Under Secretary takes an active role within OSD in preparation for NSC/DC and NSC/PC meetings. Often, because of the brief interval between meetings, USD(P) personally provides talking points to Secretary of Defense without staff input. In other cases, support to the USD(P) for NSC/DC and NSC/PC meetings is provided by members of Task Forces that have been set up within OSD to manage specific policy issues. In some cases, because of the frequency of the meetings and short advance notice, Task Force staffs provide support directly to USD(P), bypassing the ASD-level, which is informed after the fact. While operating in this fashion can make staff input and coordination more difficult, there are no indications that the method has resulted in significant problems.

**D. The Planning to Programming Link:** The section of this report entitled Program Analysis and Evaluation directorate describes PPBS—the process by which the Department of Defense (DoD) promulgates planning guidance, determines resource allocation for programs, and prepares its budget submission for the President's Budget. The process is based upon fiscal guidance provided by PA&E, and, later, by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The Department's budget submission is reviewed and approved by OMB.

PPBS is comprised of three distinct but interrelated activities: planning, programming and budgeting. PPBS establishes a framework for policy, strategy, and resource decision making. USD(P) provides the strategy and planning portions of the DPG (which informs Department programmers), and it reviews inputs from DoD sub elements during the programming and budgeting phases to ensure they are in line with planning guidance.

USD(P) involvement in the PPBS process begins in September, a year before the fiscal year for which the budget is prepared. Initial DPAG meetings are held that lead to production of the DPG in December or early in the next year. From late spring to mid fall USD(P) staff participate in the review of the Services' program submissions, which include DRB meetings on major issues. USD(P) is also involved in the final stage of the PPBS process in late fall and early winter when it reviews the DoD defense budget before it is submitted in January. (See section entitled Program Analysis and Evaluation for a more complete description of the PPBS process.)

The PPBS process is integrative. Based on interviews and literature researches, we note that there are overlaps between the planning and programming phases—due in part to difficulties


in publishing the DPG early enough in the cycle—that could be harmful. The complexity of the DPG coordination and approval processes may be one reason for publication delays. However, all interlocutors noted that the DPAG (and more informal processes) ensure that Services and others responsible for POM preparation have sufficient information. One senior official indicated that the Services have 95 percent of DPG directions before the document is published.

**E. Significant Informal Processes:** The ABC Lunches, the Foreign Policy Breakfast, and the Deputies Lunch have evolved at the interagency level to aid in policy development, planning, and coordination, and to deal with other matters apart from the more formal processes. Stakeholders are the attendees, and proceedings are almost always closed to outsiders.

These gatherings provide an additional venue for problem solving. Their informality facilitates coordination among senior decision makers and aids in consensus-building, which is necessary for effective implementation of decisions. However, the absence of any supporting staff occasionally results in limited feedback to the relevant agencies. As a result, decisions made by attendees may not be translated into action rapidly or in the manner intended.


**APPENDICES**

## USD(P) - Key Process - Strategy Development - (Formal) - Resource Allocation




- PA & E - Planning Analysis and Evaluation
- OMB - Office of Management and Budget
- PPBS - Planning Programming Budgeting System
- DPG - Defense Planning Guidance
- DPAG - Defense Planning & Advisory Group
- DRB - Defense Resources Board
- CPR - Chairman's Program Recommendations
- PDM - Program Decision Memorandum
- BES - Budget Estimate Submission
- CPA - Chairman's Program Assessment
- PRG - Program Review Group
- PBD - Program Budget Decisions

USD(P) - Key Process - Strategy Development - (Formal) - Resource Allocation (continued)




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
USD(P) - Key Process - Strategy Development - (Formal) - Deliberate Planning (CPG)




USD(P) - Key Process - Strategy Development - (Formal) - Deliberate Planning (CPG) (continued)




### USD(P) - Key Process - Strategy Development - Crisis Management (NSC/DC)



USD(P) - Key Process - Strategy Development - Crisis Management (NSC/DC) (continued)



USD(P) – Key Process – (Informal) – The Albright-Berger-Cohen (A-B-C) Breakfast/Lunch



A-B-C - Albright-Berger-Cohen  
 PC - Principals Committee  
 POC - Point of Contact

**ORGANIZATIONAL DESCRIPTION**  
**PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION**  
**DIRECTORATE**



*Prepared for the U.S. Commission on National Security/21<sup>st</sup> Century*

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

### **Program Analysis and Evaluation**

#### **Overview**

Department of Defense decision-makers are faced with tough choices, and that is as it should be. Competition between alternatives, while making the process more complex, provides the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary with a robust menu from which to select the best options. The Directorate of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) produces and analyzes alternatives to Service and agency programs and thereby improves the quality of preparation and resourcing decisions.

PA&E is not directly chartered in law, but is authorized by the Secretary of Defense under the authority granted by Title 10, U.S.C. The directorate is a subordinate element of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). PA&E's key responsibilities may be summarized as:

- Co-preparing the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG);
- Chairing the Program Review Group (PRG);
- Conducting program reviews that feed into the PRG;
- Directing the Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG);
- Publishing the Department's Fiscal Guidance (FG);
- Preparing the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP); and,
- Preparing the Defense Program Projection (DPP).

The Director of PA&E serves as the executive secretary for the Defense Resources Board (DRB).

Core competencies and key PA&E values include objective analysis and improving DoD decision making. The majority of the staff is technically and scientifically trained. Although the Director's position has been an Assistant Secretary in the past, the current directorate status does not interfere with its ability to provide analysis and evaluation, according to senior PA&E officials.

#### **Organization**

PA&E includes the Office of the Director and Deputy Directors for General Purpose Programs, Resource Analysis, Strategic and Space Programs, and Theater Assessments and Planning. It is staffed with approximately 120 civilians and 38 military officers who receive Joint tour credit for the assignment. Members of the organization believe that it is non-

bureaucratic and relatively "flat" and that information flows well across branch boundaries and to all levels without encumbrance.

Although Directors have been appointed from outside the agency in the past, the current Director came from within PA&E. The Deputy Directors all have considerable experience in the organization, and this has been the norm over the years. The current Director and all Deputy Directors are career civil servants.

### Role in Formal and Informal National Security Processes

The following chart depicts the relationship of PA&E's products to the key national security processes identified by the U.S. Commission on National Security/21<sup>st</sup> Century.

		Strategy Development	Policy, Guidance, and Regulations	Planning	Mission Execution	Observation, Orientation, and Oversight	Preparation	Resourcing
Products	Defense Planning Guidance	✓	✓	✓				
	Program Alternatives		✓					✓
	Fiscal Guidance		✓			✓		✓
	FYDP		✓				✓	✓
	Defense Program Projection						✓	✓
	CAIG Analysis					✓		✓
Roles	Director, PA&E	Chair PRG	✓			✓	✓	✓
		DRB ExSec						✓
		Chair CAIG						✓

**Strategy Development.** In conjunction with the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), PA&E develops the annual Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). This document includes a strategy statement and initiates the Planning, Programming, and Budget System (PPBS), which prepares the Department's budget.

**Policy, Guidance, and Regulation.** The DPG also provides policy direction. PA&E also produces alternatives to programs offered by the Military Departments; provides the Fiscal Guidance (FG) that instructs the Military Departments and Agencies in programming and budgeting; and develops and maintains the Future Year Defense Program. The Director of PA&E also provides guidance in his role as chair of the Program Review Group.

**Planning.** The DPG begins the PPBS process and constitutes the major portion of the planning phase of that system.

**Mission Execution.** PA&E has no involvement in mission execution as that term is defined for this study.

**Observation, Orientation, and Oversight.** The FG provides orientation for DoD program and budget preparation. The CAIG provides oversight of selected programs through rigorous analysis that compares original requirements documents with contract specifications and with actual performance and cost data.

**Preparation.** The FYDP and the DPP both shape preparation activities conducted by the Military Departments and Defense Agencies. The Director's role as Executive Secretary for the DRB provides the opportunity to influence preparation policy and guidance.

**Resourcing.** The majority of the activity and influence exerted by PA&E focuses on resourcing. By developing and analyzing alternatives to Service and Agency programs, the directorate provides senior DoD decision-makers with resource allocation options. The FG gives DoD activities information about economic conditions and priorities that are necessary for them to prepare their Program Objective Memorandum (POM) during the PPBS process. The FYDP and DPP offer informed views of potential futures that have value for longer-term planning. Detailed analysis conducted by the CAIG are helpful for managing ongoing programs by raising red flags when products do not live up to requirements or are over budget. The Director exerts his personal influence in resourcing by chairing the PRG and the CAIG and by serving as the Executive Secretary for the DRB, which is chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Succinctly, PA&E participates in the key processes through PPBS, the process that links planning, programming, and budgeting together to ensure resource allocation reflects Department needs. PA&E also plays a critical role in formal independent cost analysis activities through the CAIG. In addition to formal process participation, PA&E maintains a series of informal relationships on a number of different levels with Service planners and programmers, the Joint Staff (especially the DJ-8), and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). These relationships stem primarily from formal processes.

## **Observations**

PA&E is often at odds with Department planners, programmers, and program managers because its mission is to question their conclusions and subject them to scrutiny. PA&E's culture encourages skepticism and debate, but it also encourages doing this as diplomatically as possible. The creative tension that exists between PA&E and other elements of the Department is beneficial and should be maintained.

PA&E provides senior decision-makers with a range of alternatives that set the stage for better resource allocation decisions. It also acts as a forcing function to ensure Services and others think through their programmatic recommendations. However the range of alternatives offered, often nibble at program margins rather than presenting stark alternatives, and the total change in Service POMs resulting from PA&E's program review rarely equals one half or one percent of funding.

Although some disagree with PA&E analysis and recommendations, it has been effective in performing its role—primarily because its staff is technically and analytically competent. However, employment market pressures and the inability of PA&E to compete with commercial firms for top-flight entry level talent may lead to a staff quality decline and commensurate declines in analytical quality.

## ORGANIZATIONAL DESCRIPTION

### PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION (PA&E) DIRECTORATE

#### 1. Legal Specifications, Authorizations, and Responsibilities.

**A. Authorizing Statute:** Authorized by the Secretary of Defense under the authority granted by Section 113, Title 10 United States Code.

**B. Department Directives:** Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 5141.1 dated March 18, 1999 identifies the Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) as the principal advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (USD(C)) for program analysis and evaluation. PA&E is subordinate to the USD(C). DoDD 5000.4 dated November 24, 1992 (with Change 1 dated November 16, 1994) prescribes PA&E's role in Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) proceedings.

**C. Interagency Directives:** There are no specific directives for PA&E participation in the interagency process; however, paragraph 3.8 of DoDD 5141.1 empowers the Director, PA&E, to represent the Department at external meetings when authorized, which may include interagency meetings. Additionally, PA&E maintains a close but informal relationship with the Office of Management and Budget.

#### 2. Missions/Functions/Purposes.

**A. Major Responsibilities:** DoDD 5141.1<sup>1</sup> assigns PA&E the following responsibilities.

(1) Provide analysis and advice, make recommendations, and participate in the development of policies for and the operation of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), including the fiscal and programmatic guidance upon which DoD program projections are based [Key Processes Relation: Policy, Guidance, and Regulation; Resourcing];

(2) Manage PPBS program reviews, including serving as the Executive Secretary of the Defense Resources Board (DRB) and Chairman of the Program Review Group (PRG)<sup>2</sup> [Key Processes Relation: Resourcing];

(3) In coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), prepare the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) and serve as co-chair of the Defense Planning Advisory Group (DPAG) [Key Processes Relation: Strategy Development; Policy, Guidance and Regulation; Planning];

(4) Analyze and evaluate alternative plans, programs, forces, personnel levels, and budget submissions in relation to projected threats, allied contributions, estimated costs, resource

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<sup>1</sup> DoDD 5141.1 dated March 18, 1999.

<sup>2</sup> DoDD 7045.7 (May 23, 1984 with Change 1 dated April 9, 1987) states that as Executive Secretary to the DRB, PA&E will coordinate DRB management of the PPBS process; manage the DRB agenda and meetings process; manage DPG preparation process; manage the POM program review issue process; oversee the annual budget review process; chair the Program Review Groups; record Deputy Secretary of Defense Decisions taken on advice of the DRB; prepare the annual PPBS calendar of events; prepare PPBS directives and instructions.

constraints, and U.S. defense objectives and priorities [Key Processes Relation: Policy, Guidance, and Regulation; Resourcing];

**(5)** Review, analyze, evaluate or initiate programs (including intelligence and classified programs), actions, and taskings to ensure adherence to DoD policies, standards, and national security objectives, and ensure that they are designed to accommodate operational requirements and promote the readiness and efficiency of the U.S. Armed Forces [Key Processes Relation: Policy, Guidance, and Regulation; Observation, Orientation, Oversight];

**(6)** Ensure that costs of DoD programs, including classified programs, are presented accurately and completely [Key Processes Relation: Observation, Orientation, and Oversight; Resourcing];

**(7)** Provide guidance for and manage the operation and improvement of the DoD Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) system, including the Program Element Structure [Key Processes Relation: Policy, Guidance, and Regulation; Preparation; Resourcing];

**(8)** Assess the effects of DoD spending on the U.S. economy and evaluate alternative policies to ensure that the DoD program can be implemented efficiently [Key Processes Relation: Resourcing];

**(9)** Provide leadership in developing and promoting improved analytic tools, data, and methods for analyzing national security planning; the effectiveness of U.S., allied, and threat forces; and the allocation of resources [Key Processes Relation: Observation, Orientation, Oversight; Planning; Resourcing];

**(10)** Serve on boards, committees, and other groups pertaining to the Director, PA&E's functional areas, and represent the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer<sup>3</sup> and the Secretary of Defense on PA&E matters outside the Department of Defense [Key Processes Relation: Policy Guidance, and Regulation; Observation, Orientation, Oversight; Preparation; Resourcing];

**(11)** In support of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) (USD(A&T)), perform critical reviews of requirements, performance, and life cycle costs of current and proposed weapon systems, including Analyses of Alternatives (AOAs) submitted within the Defense Acquisition Board review and milestone decision process. [See USD(A&T) Organizational Description]. Provide advance guidance to the Military Departments on alternatives and analytic techniques employed in weapons system AOAs [Key Processes Relation: Resourcing];

**(12)** Provide leadership and support to the Cost Analysis Improvement Group, in accordance with DoD D5000.4 [Key Processes Relation: Observation, Orientation, and Oversight; Resourcing]; and

**(13)** Perform such other duties as the USD(C)/CFO and the Secretary of Defense may prescribe [Key Processes Relation: Potentially all].

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<sup>3</sup> The USD(C) serves as the DoD Chief Financial Officer (CFO).

**B. Subordinate Agencies and Activities:** None.

**C. Major Products:**

- (1) Programming chapters of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG);
- (2) Program issue development, program alternative development, and direction of the Program Review Group (PRG);
- (3) DoD Fiscal Guidance (FG);
- (4) Future Year Defense Program (FYDP);
- (5) Defense Program Projection (DPP); and,
- (6) Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) analysis and reports.

**3. Vision and Core Competencies.**

**A. Vision:** There is no written vision statement. However, senior PA&E officials view the organization as an "honest broker" that provides objective and innovative analyses to improve DoD decision making, especially in terms of resource implications of programs, proposals, and policies. Senior leaders envision PA&E as a source of information and decision support for the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary as they make resource allocation and program decisions.

**B. Core Competencies:** PA&E defines its core competencies as the ability to conduct objective, yet innovative, analysis and evaluation using a variety of tools and approaches tailored to unique analytical and evaluative requirements. The emphasis is on objectivity, according to PA&E staff.

**4. Organizational Culture.** The organization encourages skepticism as a key norm. It views skepticism and debate as important catalysts that produce creative tensions, which are beneficial in examining alternative approaches to making better decisions. The culture also encourages openness in its dealings with other DoD organizations; members stressed that they encourage frank debate and discussions. The Director noted that he emphasizes that PA&E can take positions different from others in the Department without being obnoxious, confrontational, or blindsiding. A third key cultural description is the emphasis on nonhierarchical internal operations. From the perspective of those interviewed, PA&E is a "flat" organization in which vertical and horizontal communications is encouraged.

**A. Values:** The organization places a premium on objectivity. It stresses the need to avoid partisanship (or the appearance of partisanship), and it avoids advocating for the Services in resource debates. One senior staff member described "innovative analysis" as a second key value. This is defined as raising substantive issues, developing innovative alternatives, and rigorously analyzing those alternatives to arrive at the best approach and recommendation. A final important value is the organization's focus on decision support—which the organization

believes is its primary product. As members see it, when they propose alternatives, it is not because they dislike the initial approach, but because they want to provide decision makers with a rich menu from which to choose.

**B. Leadership Traditions:** According to those interviewed, PA&E's leadership approach supports the organization's culture and values. This is due in part to the fact that many—though not all—senior PA&E leaders have come up through the organization and understand how it operates. The fact that PA&E is small enough (approximately 160 personnel) for senior leaders to know all employees also is key. As a result, direct, unencumbered communications between senior officials and action officers is not only possible but seems to be routine. One interlocutor reported that he encourages his action officers to send e-mails directly to the Director, if they believe they need to do that. Conversely, the size of the organization makes it easier for action officers to learn and understand senior leadership views and agendas. The Director described the organization as horizontal, not hierarchical, a feature he encourages. Descriptions given by all those interviewed indicated that PA&E tries to avoid bureaucratic constructs and approaches.

**C. Staff Attributes:** PA&E staff tends to be technically and scientifically qualified. One senior official told us that in hiring decisions, scientific qualifications and analytical skills are more important than knowledge of national security. Although PA&E has been able to recruit and retain a high quality staff in the past, the current employment market has created recruiting problems. At present, PA&E has difficulty recruiting technically qualified staff because the entry-level salaries they are able to offer are \$10-\$20,000 below commercial levels. One senior official remarked that some top-tier colleges and universities will no longer help them recruit because they believe the salary PA&E offers is unrealistic. As another senior official noted, if this continues for a lengthy period, the next generation of PA&E analysts may not be of the same quality as the last.<sup>4</sup>


On the other hand, officials with long service in PA&E note that the quality of the military staff is excellent. This may be result from the military billets in PA&E being joint billets, and joint billets tend to attract better-qualified officers, according to those we interviewed. Additionally, senior staff felt that the Services sent only those officers who had demonstrated analytic capabilities and were among the top tier of officers in their grade. All those we spoke with stated that parochialism was not a problem.

**D. Strategy:** PA&E has no published strategy. Interviews indicate that its strategic approach is in line with its vision and values.

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<sup>4</sup> In addition to low salary levels, one of our interlocutors noted that part of the recruiting problem could be traced to the negative view most recent college graduates have of civil servants.

## E. Organizational Structure:



**Figure 1. Organizational Structure of PA&E**

(1) PA&E is organized into four functional Deputy Directorships. Each Deputy Director is responsible for several subordinate divisions. The divisions tend to be relatively small—fewer than a dozen employees. Most divisions include both civilian and military personnel.

(2) The Deputy Directors for Strategic and Space Programs, Theater Assessments and Planning, and General Purpose Programs, review Service and Agency programs within their areas of expertise. For example, the office of the Deputy Director for Strategic and Space Programs includes the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Programs Division that reviews ISR programs, develops issues, and presents recommendations. Each division uses existing studies as well as new analysis to prepare their positions. Divisions may consider programs across the Department or by Service in stovepipe fashion. Both approaches have been used in the past, although examining programs by Service is the method currently used most frequently.

(3) The Deputy Director for Resource Analysis is responsible for CAIG and for economic analysis. Because of its unique cost analysis requirements, this division operates in isolation from the other divisions to ensure that its analyses are unquestionably objective.

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<sup>5</sup> Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance.

## 5. Formal National Security Process Involvement.

		Strategy Development	Policy, Guidance, and Regulations	Planning	Mission Execution	Observation, Orientation, and Oversight	Preparation	Resourcing
Products	Defense Planning Guidance	✓	✓	✓				
	Program Alternatives		✓					✓
	Fiscal Guidance		✓			✓		✓
	FYDP		✓				✓	✓
	Defense Program Projection						✓	✓
	CAIG Analysis					✓		✓
Roles	Director, PA&E		✓			✓	✓	✓
	Chair PRG		✓			✓	✓	✓
	DRB ExSec							✓
	Chair CAIG							✓

### A. Strategy Development:

**(1) Major Activities:** In coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), PA&E prepares the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) programming sections.<sup>6</sup> The DPG informs the Services and Agencies of programming requirements. The document is a classified Executive Branch working paper that is not shared outside of the Department. (See also section entitled Under Secretary of Defense (Policy).)

Typically, preparation includes top-level guidance, which is further refined by the DPAG (see 5.C., below). Drafts are then produced and circulated for comment among Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the Services. Once completed, the DPG becomes the formal mechanism on which Services and other Agencies base their POMs. (A map of the DPG preparation process is included in the discussion of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy).)

In reality, the DPG usually appears too late in the process to be of value to POM builders, who typically begin their work in November or December of the year prior. Informally, however, Service action officers are in touch with PA&E and USD(P) DPG-preparation staffs. As a result, they are informed about what the DPG will direct well in advance. Experienced PA&E officials noted that the Services know 95% of what is in the DPG before it is published.

**(2) Major Stakeholders:** USD(P), USD (A&T), Joint Staff, Military Departments.

<sup>6</sup> USD(P) prepares the policy and strategy sections and the Joint Staff prepares the National Military Strategy which is usually an annex to the DPG.

**(3) Key Organizational Processes:** PPBS (PA&E is responsible for the Department's PPBS process.)

**(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes:** Budget preparation. (See section entitled Office of Management and Budget.)

**(5) Associated Lower-level Processes:** Joint Staff preparation of the National Military Strategy; Service and Agency POM development.

## **B. Policy, Guidance, and Regulation:**

**(1) Activities:** Co-prepares the DPG. Develops alternatives and chairs the Program Review Groups (PRG) that assess Service POMs, issues, and alternatives. Prepares the Fiscal Guidance (FG) and prepares the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).

**(a) Defense Planning Guidance Preparation.** See Paragraph 5.A. The DPG is the initial phase of PPBS, and PA&E is responsible of maintaining and updating that system. From the PA&E perspective, PPBS's goal is to provide the Secretary and Deputy Secretary with alternatives to Service decisions and to evaluate Service programs.

**(b) Alternative Development and Performance Review Group Process.** (See Appendix 1 for process map) The PA&E staff develops alternatives to selected portions of the Service POMs. The alternatives are based on PA&E assessments of Service requirements and how those requirements are addressed in the POMs. PA&E alternatives suggest other ways to satisfy requirements and act as a forcing function for Services to conduct appropriate analysis and adequately defend their programs. Even if the Service solution is the most effective and efficient, alternatives developed by PA&E stimulate healthy debate and additional analysis.

The PRG is the three-star level filter that screens issues prior to presentation to the DRB.<sup>7</sup> After the FG is provided to the Services and before the DPG is published, PA&E officials begin to develop issue lists for the PRG. Issues may derive from unfinished business from the year prior, as a result of PA&E assessments of what is likely to appear in the Service POMs, or be raised by a third party such as the Joint Staff, the unified Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs), or the Services. Before reaching the PRG, issues are refined by issue groups or teams.

PA&E GS-15s or junior Senior Executive Service (SES) normally chair issue teams, although there have been occasions in which staff from other OSD activities or the Joint Staff have served as chair. Team membership is usually comprised of GS-14/15 and/or military O5/O6. The process is open, though sometimes adversarial, and all stakeholders are invited to participate.

Major issues are reviewed by issue teams and presented to the PRG in the form of briefings presented by PA&E representatives. The issue team leaders may prepare the briefings, or they may task preparation to team members. Regardless, all team members see the briefings prior to presentation. Typically, team members will then arrange the briefings in notebooks for their principals with a facing page that provides background or talking points for each slide.

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<sup>7</sup> One senior PA&E official referred to the PRG as a "murder board," implying a rigorous discussion of issues.

The PRG has several choices for dealing with issues. It can decide on an alternative and find a way to fund it through program offsets; it can eliminate issues; and, it can frame issues for DRB consideration. Some issues are dealt with at a single PRG meeting; however, several meetings are common for complicated issues. Even though each issue is viewed in isolation, the process allows the PRG to combine issues into packages for ease of deliberation and decision.

The DRB acts as a forum to consider major issues that have not been resolved by issue teams and the PRG. In current practice, all DRB members have the opportunity to comment on each issue. However, the DRB does not make final decisions. Rather the Deputy Secretary receives the DRB's recommendations and listens to the debate. He then makes the final decision (usually in private or with a small group of advisors), and the decision becomes a Program Decision Memorandum (PDM).

Less important issues are refined by issue teams and translated into issue papers, which are then sent to the Deputy Secretary for decision. A typical issue paper format is a statement of the issue, a statement of alternatives, and an analytic discussion that addresses the consequences of each alternative in terms of capabilities and risks. Sometimes issue teams do analysis themselves. However, more commonly, they use existing analyses.

Some issues may be "tabled" or omitted from further discussions. Some may be sent back to the originator (or to others) for additional information. Some may be deferred until budget review. However, all issues are tracked so that the ultimate disposition is known to all. When issues are adjudicated, written notification is provided to those concerned.

PA&E officials described the PRG process as adversarial, but beneficial. The creative tension engendered by issue team discussions elicits different viewpoints and verifies facts so that when the issue is presented to the PRG or DRB, their discussions can focus on the merits. Information papers provided to the issue teams by the Services are important for placing each issue in context and for verifying facts. Issue teams have clear rules for participation that provide stability and serve as a guide for discussions. The rules and process transparency help ensure impartiality.

**(c) Fiscal Guidance.** Often, OMB does not publish official guidance for budget preparation until autumn for the budget to be submitted by early February of the next year. To provide programmers with guidance and planning assumptions for preparing their POMs, PA&E publishes the DoD FG in mid-March. The FG is a relatively concise document that, together with the DPG, assists Services and others in preparing their POMs by providing planning assumptions. It is an internal document and is not sanctioned by OMB, although PA&E officials note that OMB is aware of it and may be informally consulted during preparation.

Unlike the DPG, preparation of the FG is not collaborative, except within a small group that, in addition to PA&E, may include personnel from USD(C) and the Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense. PA&E notes that when they prepare the FG, they are conservative and employ a zero-growth starting point and ranges of figures. However, as senior PA&E officials pointed out during interviews, there is always a danger that the assumptions may be wrong.

Those interviewed believe the FG forces better decisions by encouraging participants to make early programmatic decisions within realistic parameters.

After the FG is published, PA&E maintains informal contacts with the OMB staff, and the OMB staff participates in DoD program reviews. PA&E officials believe this has a positive affect in that OMB knows what DoD plans to do with its share of the budget before it issues formal guidance.

**(d) Future Year Defense Plan.** The FYDP looks at likely defense spending six years into the future. It is not an economic forecast, but an "educated" projection of likely program-spending trends. It also projects growth. Because OMB will not formally comment on PA&E's projections as a matter of policy, the directorate uses the most conservative assumptions in preparing the FYDP to minimize the impact if the assumptions are wrong. The FYDP is intended to identify potential pressure points and to avoid them. FYDP objectives are to determine affordability of programs; the probability of program execution; and to develop metrics to assess the health of defense programs for modernization. PA&E prepares the FYDP in collaboration with USD(C) and other DoD offices.

**(2) Major Stakeholders:** USD(P), USD (A&T), Joint Staff, Military Departments.

**(3) Key Organizational Processes:** PPBS

**(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes:** DoD budget request preparation. (See Chapter entitled Office of Management and Budget in Volume II.)

**(5) Associated Lower-level Processes:** Service and Agency POM development.

### **C. Planning:**

**(1) Major Activities:** Co-prepares the DPG and in so doing participates in the Defense Planning Advisory Group (DPAG).

**(a) Defense Planning Guidance Preparation.** See Paragraph 5.A. and the section of this report entitled The Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) in this volume.

**(b) Defense Planning Advisory Group.** (See Appendix 2 for process map) The DPAG was originated by USD(P)'s ASD (S&TR) as a method to bring together relatively senior officials to address key issues prior to DPG preparation. The Director, PA&E has co-responsibility for DPG preparation and is instrumental in framing the formal DPAG process.

DPAG members are usually two-star or civilian equivalent deputies. Membership includes the Deputy Comptroller, the Deputy Director PA&E, the Deputy for Program Integration, the Deputy J-5, the Deputy J-8, and Service planners and programmers. Others are invited to attend, depending on issues under discussion (e.g., ASD/C3I, Environmental Protection). DPAG meetings begin in September and extend into December. Typically, there

will be four to seven meetings chaired by the ASD (S&TR). Succinct issue papers frame each meeting.

The process is designed to build common understanding (though not necessarily consensus) concerning major issues that the DPG will address. It identifies points of contention and provides opportunities to resolve disagreements. It also gives Service planners and programmers with early insight into DPG content, which is important because the DPG is almost never published until after Services begin to build their POMs. Finally, the DPAG process provides USD(P) and PA&E with knowledgeable points of contact within the Services.

**(2) Major Stakeholders:** USD(P), Joint Staff, Military Departments.

**(3) Key Organizational Processes:** DPAG

**(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes:** DPG preparation.

**(5) Associated Lower-level Processes:** Service planning and programming.

**D. Mission Execution:** No involvement.

**E. Observation, Orientation, and Oversight:**

**(1) Major Activities:** Preparation of the FG. Cost Analysis Improvement Group analyses and/or assessments. PRG chair.

**(a) Fiscal Guidance preparation:** See Paragraph 5.B., Policy, Guidance and Regulation.

**(b) Cost Analysis Improvement Group.** (See Appendix 3 for process map and section entitled The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology in this volume). The Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) provides the USD(A&T) and the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) with independent cost analysis at various points during the acquisition cycle, depending on the category of acquisition.

The CAIG is chaired by the Deputy Director for Resource Analysis and governed by DoDD 5000.4, last updated in 1994. CAIG requirements make up about two-thirds of PA&E's Resource Analysis Branch workload, and, in the interest of objectivity, the branch operates independently of other PA&E branches.<sup>8</sup> In addition to the chair, DODD 5000.4 calls for one member appointed by each permanent DAB member and ad hoc members appointed by the chair. There is an executive group composed of the chair, representatives of OSD, and the representative of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Staff. Only the executive group participates in preparation of CAIG reports, the main product of the CAIG process.

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<sup>8</sup> Interlocutors described the relationship as one in which the Director, PA&E provides "cover" and helps the Resource Analysis branch gain access if program offices are uncooperative. The remaining one third of the Resource Analysis branch work is divided primarily between developing performance contracts for the Defense Agencies and FYDP.

CAIG reviews are life cycle cost reviews. CAIG estimates may include R&D costs, hardware and sub component costs, support costs, costs of spares, costs of related procurements, and operating costs. The CAIG alerts the USD(A&T) in cases where cost and effectiveness variances are significant enough to warrant a more complete review. CAIG estimates are based on "best current professional practice" for the task undergoing the assessment.<sup>9</sup>

CAIG reviews are not limited to cost data alone. They examine programs as described in the Cost Analysis Requirements Description (CARD) and assess the CARD in terms of the threat, operational, and technical requirements. They also examine all contractual documents. If inconsistencies between these documents are identified, they are reported to the USD (A&T). The CAIG also assesses life cycle cost risks in terms of programmatic assumptions, production rates, buy rates, and proposed utilization rates.

Although primarily designed to provide assessments to DoD (as tasked by the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary) the CAIG has been required by public law to conduct assessments and provide results to Congress on occasion.

According to officials interviewed in the course of this study, when making an assessment, PA&E devotes considerable time to gaining a complete understanding of the program before looking at costs. This includes examination of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) validated need, the CARD requirements, the contract requirements, and the actual capabilities of the item of equipment. Then, an independent cost assessment is completed and compared to the CARD. As described by senior participants, if a CAIG study is scheduled to take six months, the first three months will involve learning the program from inception to its present state; the next six weeks will involve cost collection; and the final six weeks will be devoted to analysis and report preparation. Results often have significant effects. In one example, PA&E assessed a radar program in which the mission needs statement and the CARD both called for 360-degree coverage. However, the assessment revealed that the device as built provided only 120 degrees coverage, although funding was for the more robust capability.

CAIG interfaces include the Overarching Integrated Product Teams (OIPT), the program offices including the Program Executive Officers (PEO) and Service Acquisition Executives (SAE), the Service Cost Centers, and other elements of the PA&E staff. PA&E personnel characterize the working relationship with the OIPTs as "close" and with very little tension. Because about 50% of the assessments are cyclical, the Resources Branch maintains a master schedule of when assessments are due.

Relations with the program offices are less cordial and were described as "adversarial." Although PA&E believes such tensions are potentially harmful and tries to minimize them, program offices naturally seek to protect their programs from what they view as unwarranted interference. Because Service program management offices sometimes seek confrontation, PA&E CAIG officials often ensure that program managers know they will not avoid a fight if one is initiated.

Service Cost Centers see the CAIG as a rival, especially since a 1992 Inspector General report that resulted in shifting substantial portions of costing responsibility that was previously

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<sup>9</sup> DODD 5000.4, p. 5.

the responsibility of the Services to the CAIG. This rivalry has intensified because PA&E has hired a number of Cost Center personnel away from the Services.<sup>10</sup>

There is no one methodology for cost estimates because each system is different. Senior PA&E officials noted that it is more important at the outset to learn about the systems than to worry about the approach to costing. Once complete, CAIG cost estimates are presented to those involved and may become part of DAB deliberations.

**(c) DRB Executive Secretary.** See Paragraph 5.B.

**(2) Major Stakeholders:** All DoD activities that have programs.

**(3) Key Organizational Processes:** CAIG

**(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes:** PPBS, DAB.

**(5) Associated Lower-level Processes:** Service planning and programming.

#### **F. Preparation:**

**(1) Major Activities:** Future Year Defense Program (FYDP) system. Defense Program Projection (DPP).

**(a) Future Year Defense Program.** See Paragraph 5.B., Planning.

**(b) Defense Program Projection.** The DPP is similar to the FYDP, but looks out about 18 years. Unlike the FYDP, which has fairly wide circulation, the DPP is an internal document. Like the FYDP, it helps identify issues for program reviews; judges the efficacy of the last Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and helps shape the next one; and helps DoD convince OMB when additional funds are needed. The DPP is the basis for the \$60 billion modernization figure that is the foundation of DoD arguments for more robust funding of procurement accounts, either through Congressional plus-ups or through savings from infrastructure reform. DPP preparation uses inputs from others, but is essentially a PA&E function. Typically, figures in the DPP will be stated in terms of a range, rather than specific dollar amounts, to provide more realistic planning figures.

**(2) Major Stakeholders:** USD(P), USD(A&T), Joint Staff, Military Departments.

**(3) Key Organizational Processes:** None.

**(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes:** Budget preparation and planning

**(5) Associated Lower-Level Processes:** Service planning and programming.

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<sup>10</sup> See the section on USD(A&T) for a more complete description of OIPTs and IPTs.

## **G. Resourcing:**

**(1) Major Activities:** Preparation and review of program alternatives through the PRG. Preparation of the FG, the FYDP, and the DPP. Preparation of CAIG analyses. Executive Secretary for the DRB.

**(a) PRG, FG, FYDP.** See paragraph 5.B.

**(b) DPP.** See paragraph 5.F.

**(c) CAIG Analyses:** See paragraph 5.E.

**(a) DRB Executive Secretary.** See paragraph 5. B.

**(2) Major Stakeholders:** USD(P), USD(A&T), USD(C), Joint Staff, Military Departments.

**(3) Key Organizational Processes:** PPBS, CAIG

**(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes:** DPG preparation.

**(5) Associated Lower-level Processes:** POM preparation, Acquisition.

## **6. Informal National Security Process Involvement.**

**A. Intra-Department:** PA&E maintains key informal relationships throughout DoD with program officials within the Services, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), and the Joint Staff. Processes by which these relationships are established and maintained primarily involve informal meetings and conversations. However, as noted in the description of the DPAG, many informal networks stem from involvement with formal processes.

One of the key relationships (according to both PA&E and the Joint Staff) is the relationship with the Director for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessments (DJ-8). DJ-8 plays a significant role in drafting the DPG and preparation of the Chairman's Program Recommendations and the Chairman's Program Assessment, as well as in the issue review process.<sup>11</sup> The Director, PA&E and the DJ-8 meet regularly—often weekly—to share information and resolve problems. The relationship provides PA&E with a window into Joint Staff processes and deliberations, which improves the quality of the Directorate's decision support.

PA&E also maintains informal working relationships with USD(P) staff, with whom it shares responsibility for the DPG.

**B. Intra-Executive Branch:** PA&E and OMB maintain a close informal relationship that improves DoD's contributions in preparing the President's Budget. Although OMB is not

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<sup>11</sup> See section on the Joint Staff.

officially involved in PA&E's preparation of the FG, it has a general understanding of the content.

For other Executive Branch Departments, OMB holds budget "hearings" in the fall. These hearings amount to a review of Department budgets and occur in a relatively compressed time frame. In these cases, OMB is not involved in the internal reviews that occur prior to the hearings.<sup>12</sup> In DoD's case, there are no formal hearings *per se*. Instead, OMB representatives are involved in the Program Reviews that occur during the summer months and are represented on the PRG. Frequently, OMB also has representatives at DRB meetings. The advantage to this system is that OMB has a clear understanding of the strategies and policies that underlie budget figures. OMB staff knows as a result of their participation what reductions will do to important programs and whether programs are in line with the President's policy. Issues that might pose problems late in the preparation process are resolved early, or never become issues at all. In those cases for which the Department plans an appeal of an OMB decision, each party knows the rationales that will be used by the other. While the relationship is not always cordial, it is professional and helps to streamline and stabilize the process. (See the chapter on the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in Volume II of this report.)

**C. Inter-Branch Relationships with Congress:** PA&E's Resources Analysis branch has been tasked in legislation to provide special program cost analyses. When these occur, PA&E limits its response to the questions asked. Officials noted that they do not have informal relationships with Congressional staff.

## 7. Funding and Personnel.

**A. Authorization and Appropriations:** Primary legislative committees are the House Armed Services Committee, the Senate Armed Services Committee; the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee; the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee.

**B. Funding Sources:** PA&E is funded from Defense-wide Appropriations.

**C. Budget:** PA&E's budget is part of the budget for the Office of the Secretary of Defense and is not broken out specifically for the directorate.

**D. Manpower:** Current authorization is 120 civilians and 38 military.

## 8. Observations.

**A. PPBS:** PA&E is the custodian of the PPBS process and makes major contributions during both the planning and programming portions. During planning, PA&E is involved in preparing the programming sections of the DPG. In doing this, it draws on its knowledge of issues as well as its participation in the DPAG. During programming, PA&E is responsible for the Program Review Group and the Director serves as the Executive Secretary for the DRB.

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<sup>12</sup> See section on OMB.

Although both planning and programming processes are sometimes adversarial, PA&E introduces what appears to be a healthy skepticism to both. It also acts as a forcing function to ensure Services and others think through their programmatic recommendations. In doing so, PA&E provides alternative views to those of the Services and Agencies, which in turn assists senior Department decision makers in selecting the best approaches and courses. However the range of alternatives offered, often nibble at program margins rather than presenting stark alternatives, and the total change in Service POMs resulting from PA&E's program review rarely equals one half or one percent of funding. All PA&E officials believe current PPBS processes are effective and ought not be changed, although several indicated that if the budget cycle were extended to two years, PPBS might benefit and planning and programming phases could be done sequentially.

**B. CAIG:** Independent program cost analysis is a critical PA&E function that is often contentious. Service program offices are protective of their programs, but that is precisely why independent assessments are necessary.

As the director of PA&E pointed out, Service estimates are generally 20 to 25 percent less than actual costs. Historical data collected by the Resources Analysis branch substantiates the fact that Services often underestimate costs at the beginning of programs, although they tend to become more accurate as the program matures. For example, Service estimates for the F/A-18E/F were about \$3 billion at the start of the program, while PA&E estimates were approximately \$5 billion. The actual cost of the program is about \$5 billion. This is not to suggest that PA&E is always right, or that the Services are always low. But it does indicate that CAIG studies ought to be given due consideration when resource allocation decisions are made.


**C. Informal Processes:** PA&E is involved in several informal processes. Key among them are its relationships with OMB and the DJ-8. In the case of OMB, close consultation and OMB participation in the PPBS process (especially program reviews and DRB deliberations) improve understanding on both sides. PA&E believes that there are a number of occasions when OMB decided to increase Defense share because they had a detailed understanding of what the money would buy and the value of the purchases vis-à-vis the President's national security processes.

The informal, personality-based relationship with DJ-8 is also important because it gives PA&E a window through which to view Joint Staff perspectives and processes, especially with respect to the CPR and the CPA. The meetings that occur between the DJ-8 (a lieutenant general or vice admiral) and the Director of PA&E set a tone for cooperation and information exchange that seems beneficial beyond the programming portion of PPBS.

**D. Organizational Culture and Personnel:** PA&E's culture emphasizes top notch, scientifically and technically trained analysts who are capable of innovative approaches to complex issues. Many have graduate degrees. The leadership and generally flat nature of the organization support this type of work force. However, given the demands for the same sort of employee in today's commercial market place and the adverse impression many graduate degree candidates have of government service, recruiting at present is difficult. Although mid-level and executive salaries are in rough parity with the commercial sphere, entry-level salaries are not. Since most senior PA&E analysts began at the entry level, unless the organization's ability to recruit high-quality entry-level applicants improves, its long-term effectiveness may decline.


**APPENDICES**

# PA&E - Key Process - (Formal) - Policy, Guidance, and Regulation - Alternative Development and Performance Review Group Process




BES - Budget Estimate Submission  
 DRB - Defense Resources Board  
 DPG - Defense Planning Guidance  
 PDM - Program Decision Memorandum  
 POM - Program Objective Memorandum  
 PRG - Program Review Board

PA&E - Key Process - (Formal) - Policy, Guidance, and Regulation - Alternative Development and Performance Review Group Process (continued)




BES - Budget Estimate Submission  
 DRB - Defense Resources Board  
 DPG - Defense Planning Guidance  
 PDM - Program Decision Memorandum  
 POM - Program Objective Memorandum  
 PRG - Program Review Board

PA&E - Key Process - (Formal) - Planning - Defense Planning Advisor Group



## PA&E - Key Process - (Formal) - Observation, Orientation, and Oversight - Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG)



ADM - Acquisition Decision Memorandum  
 CARD - Cost Analysis Requirements Description  
 JROC - Joint Requirements Oversight Council  
 OIPT - Overarching Integrated Product Team  
 PEO - Program Executive Officers  
 SAE - Service Acquisition Executives  
 SAR - Service Acquisition Report  
 SCC - Service Cost Center

# ORGANIZATIONAL DESCRIPTION

## THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF



*Prepared for the U.S. Commission on National Security/21<sup>st</sup> Century*

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)

#### Overview

The Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols) was designed to improve the military advice provided to the President. The legislation focused most of the power of the JCS in the office of the Chairman (CJCS), who was designated the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council (NSC), and the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman was also designated the conduit for communications between the National Command Authorities (NCA) and the Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) of the Unified Commands.<sup>1</sup> The Chairman is charged to assist the President and the Secretary of Defense in:

- Providing for strategic direction for the armed forces;
- Strategic and contingency planning;
- Evaluating preparedness;
- Advising the Secretary of Defense on requirements, programs, and budgets;
- Developing doctrine for joint employment;
- Formulating policies for joint training and military education.

Department of Defense (DoD) Directives further charge the JCS with 51 major responsibilities that cover the full range of national security processes.

#### Organization

The members of the JCS include the Chairman, the Vice Chairman, and the Chiefs of the four military Services. The JCS is assisted in performing its responsibilities by the Joint Staff. Goldwater-Nichols gave CJCS authority over the Joint Staff. The Joint Staff assists other members of the JCS subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Chairman. The Joint Staff is organized in eight directorates that conform to traditional military organizational structure: Manpower and Personnel Directorate (J1); Intelligence Directorate (J2); Operations Directorate (J3); Logistics Directorate (J4); Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J5); Command, Control, Communications and Computer Systems Directorate (J6); Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J7); and Force Structure, Resources and Assessment Directorate (J8). The 1,403 people who comprise the Joint Staff come from all four military

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<sup>1</sup> The NCA is defined as the U.S. President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. This does not imply that the Chairman is in the chain of command. Title 10 U.S.C. stipulates that unless otherwise directed by the President, the chain of command to a unified or specified combatant command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense; and from the Secretary of Defense to the commander of the combatant command.

Services. The Joint Staff has evolved to the point where it is now considered by many to be the world's premier military staff. This evolution can be attributed to two factors: (1) the increased responsibility given to the Chairman by Goldwater-Nichols, and (2) the quality improvement in Joint Staff manning, which was driven in large part by the joint officer management provisions of Goldwater-Nichols.

### Role in Formal and Informal National Security Processes

The following chart shows the relationship between JCS products and roles and the seven key national security processes.

		Strategy Development	Policy, Guidance, and Regulations	Planning	Mission Execution	Observation, Orientation, and Oversight	Preparation	Resourcing
<b>Products</b>	Inputs to key national and departmental documents (e.g., the National Security Strategy (NSS), the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG))	✓	✓					
	Joint Vision	✓						
	National Military Strategy (NMS)	✓						
	Joint Planning Document (JPD)	✓						
	Jt Strat Capabilities Plan (JSCP)		✓					
	Unified Command Plan (UCP)		✓					
	CJCS Instructions (CJCSIs)		✓					
	Joint Doctrine		✓					
	CJCS Plan Approval			✓				
	National Command Authority (NCA)-CINC Communications	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR) Reports					✓		
	Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) Reports					✓		
	Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress (QRRC)					✓		
	Joint After Action Reporting System (JAARS) Reports						✓	
	Joint Net Assessment (JNA)					✓		
	Universal Joint Task List (UJTL)						✓	
	Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) Decisions						✓	✓
Chairman's Program Assessment/Recommendations (CPA/CPR)							✓	
<b>Roles</b>	CJCS	Principal Mil Advisor	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
		NSC Attendee	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
		NSC PC Member	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
		DRB Member						✓
	VCJCS	Congressional Testimony	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
		NSC DC Member	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
		DAB Co-chair						✓
		JROC Chair						✓
		SROC Co-chair					✓	
	ACJCS, Joint Staff Directors	NSC IWG Participants	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

**Strategy Development.** The Chairman, supported by the Joint Staff, provides advice during the development of the National Security Strategy (NSS) and develops the National Military Strategy (NMS). The NMS articulates how the U.S. will employ the military element of power to support national security objectives, defines the national military objectives, establishes the strategy to accomplish these objectives, and addresses the military capabilities required to execute the strategy. CJCS also develops a long-range Joint Vision document that provides a

common focal point for future military planning. The Joint Staff conducts the Joint Strategy Review (JSR) to provide the basis for changes to the Joint Vision and the NMS. The JSR process continually gathers relevant information to assess national requirements and objectives in the near, mid, and long term.

**Policy, Guidance, and Regulation.** CJCS participates in the development of national security guidance as the principal military advisor to the NSC and as a member of the NSC Principals Committee. The Vice Chairman of the JCS (VCJCS) participates in the development of guidance as a member of the NSC Deputies Committee. CJCS also advises the Secretary of Defense during the preparation of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) and Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG). The Chairman prepares and submits the Joint Planning Document (JPD) and the Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR) to the Secretary of Defense to provide recommendations for consideration in publishing the DPG. CJCS also submits to the Secretary of Defense recommendations on the missions, responsibilities and force structure of the Unified and Specified Commands and provides basic guidance to the combatant commanders through the Unified Command Plan (UCP).<sup>2</sup> The JCS provide guidance to the CINCs and Services to accomplish tasks and missions based on current military capabilities through the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The JCS also develop and establish doctrine for all aspects of the joint employment of the armed forces.

**Planning.** CJCS reviews and approves the CINCs' operational plans and establishes deliberate and crisis planning policies and procedures through the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES).<sup>3</sup> Joint operational planning is a coordinated process used to determine the best method of accomplishing the mission. In peacetime, the process is called deliberate planning. In crisis situations, it is called crisis action planning. JOPES is the principal DoD system for translating policy decisions into plans and orders in support of national security objectives.

**Mission Execution.** CJCS provides advice, options, and recommendations to the NCA; conveys NCA decisions to the CINCs; and monitors the deployment and employment of forces. The Chairman also issues Warning Orders, Planning Orders, Alert Orders, Deployment Preparation Orders, Deployment Orders, and Execute Orders through JOPES to carry out the intentions of the NCA. During ongoing operations, the JCS resolve conflicts and shortfalls and adjudicate conflicting demands for forces, resources, and strategic lift during multiple contingencies.

**Observation, Orientation, and Oversight.** CJCS oversees the activities of Unified Commands and DoD Combat Support Agencies; performs net assessments to determine the capabilities of the armed forces of the United States and its allies through the Joint Net Assessment process; assess the readiness of the Unified Commands, Services, and Combat Support Agencies; and manage the Joint After Action Reporting System.

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<sup>2</sup> Unified Commands, are joint military commands that have broad continuing missions and are composed of forces from at least two or more Military Departments. The term "Specified Combatant Command" means a military command which has broad, continuing missions and which is normally composed of forces from a single military department. There are currently no Specified Commands. The term "Combatant Command" means a Unified Combatant Command or a Specified Combatant Command. The Unified Command Plan is developed by the Joint Staff and approved by the President.

<sup>3</sup> The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy also reviews certain plans for compliance with policy and the Secretary of Defense may be briefed on individual plans before they are approved.

**Preparation.** The JCS play an important role in acquisition, training, and readiness. VCJCS insures acquisition programs conform to guidance and strategy as vice chairman of the Defense Acquisition Board. VCJCS also oversees the Requirements Generation System through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). CJCS employs the JROC to help fulfill statutory responsibilities to influence programming and budget guidance and to develop joint resource recommendations (see resourcing below). In training, the Joint Staff formulates policies for coordinating the military education and training of members of the armed forces. It also established the Universal Joint Task List and the Joint Training Manual for exercising and training joint forces. The global Status of Resources and Training monitors, measures, and reports on the readiness of the armed forces.

**Resourcing.** CJCS helps set DoD resourcing priorities as a member of the Defense Resources Board (DRB). CJCS also acts as spokesman for the CINCs on operational and logistics requirements of their commands and prepares and submits to the Secretary of Defense the Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA) to provide a personal appraisal on alternate program recommendations and budget proposals. CJCS employs the JROC, supported by the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) process to analyze the common concerns across commands, influence programming and budget guidance, and develop joint resource recommendations.

In addition to these formal processes, the Chairman and Vice Chairman play important roles through their day-to-day interaction with the Secretary of Defense and his Deputy, and through their interaction with key players in the interagency process.

## **Observations**

The senior Joint Staff leadership was unanimous in describing the relationship between the Joint Staff and the OSD staff as "the best it has ever been." Some of the senior leaders commented that the relationship is on the verge of becoming too close. These interviewees felt that the competition that often results from the division of responsibilities between OSD, the Joint Staffs, and the Services was a strength of the U.S. defense structure that could be put at risk by too close a relationship.

The senior Joint Staff leaders were also unanimous in describing the evolution of Joint Staff activity in the resource allocation arena as "successful." One example given was the five-year, \$112B plus-up DoD was able to effect recently. They gave three reasons for this observation: (1) the current outstanding relationship among the key players (Joint Staff, OSD, Services, and CINCs), (2) the effectiveness of the JROC/JRB/JWCA process, and (3) the political environment.

- When asked specifically about the JROC, they commented that the JROC is a forcing function--it gets the issues on the table. Although the JROC has not eliminated cross-Service rivalry for programs, it has made progress in addressing future warfighting requirements from a joint perspective. After going through the JWCA/JRB/JROC process they believed the leadership doesn't have to argue about the facts--they can concentrate on options. There was general consensus that, although the process may not have tackled tough inter-Service issues initially, it continues to mature as a valuable joint decision mechanism.

- One of the most significant enhancements to the JROC process was the formation of the JRB, which allows the Services to frame the issues below the 4-star level, similar to the Tank.
- The senior leadership also felt that the JWCA had matured to the point where they were making value-added inputs to the process, although the effectiveness of the individual JWCA teams was said to vary. One capability that the JWCA teams provide is the ability to conduct short-notice, focused assessments very quickly. It should be noted that, because the JWCA are matrixed organizations, JWCA participation can tax staff members who have other assigned duties. To alleviate this, the amount of contractor support for the JWCA has grown since their inception.

Two observations reflect on the impact of emerging information technologies (e.g., worldwide secure communications and video teleconferences, access to near real-time information) on planing and mission execution processes. The first observation was that major exercises (e.g., Ulchi Focus Lens) should include civilian leadership participation to ensure CINC staffs and the civilian leadership become more comfortable with the technology and better understand each other's roles. The second observation was that the quick access to theater information allowed the NSC staff to work issues before they had the benefit of military advice and recommendations.

There was general consensus that the interagency process works well in developing courses of action, but does not sufficiently involve other Departments and agencies in implementation. The general feeling was that PDD 56 is a significant document but it is not yet a cohesive process. The consensus among the Joint Staff leadership appeared to be that DoD is best organized and resourced to act, and that the military culture drives DoD into a leadership position. In order to do effective interagency deliberate pol-mil planning, the military leaders we interviewed thought that the culture in the other Departments would have to change.

Although DoD's deliberate planning process accounts for interagency roles (Annex V of the CINCs' Operation Plans contains the pol-mil considerations), the process appears to be DoD-centric, with not much dedicated interagency participation in the planning process. The Annex V concept should be more fully explored as a conceptual framework for pol-mil planning as prescribed in PDD 56.

## ORGANIZATIONAL DESCRIPTION

### THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (JCS)

#### 1. Legal Specifications, Authorizations and Responsibilities.

**A. Authorizing Statute:** Sections 151-155 of Title 10 of the U.S. Code.

(1) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) is the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council (NSC), and the Secretary of Defense. The other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—including the Vice Chairman (VCJCS), the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the Commandant of the Marines Corps—are military advisors to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.<sup>4</sup>

(2) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for assisting the President and the Secretary of Defense in providing for:

- (a) Strategic direction for the armed forces;
- (b) Strategic planning;
- (c) Contingency planning and evaluating preparedness;
- (d) Advising the Secretary of Defense on requirements, programs, and budgets; and
- (e) Developing doctrine for joint employment and formulating policies for joint training and military education.<sup>5</sup>

(3) The Joint Staff assists the Chairman and other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in carrying out their responsibilities. The Joint Staff is prohibited from operating or being organized as an overall Armed Forces General Staff and has no executive authority.<sup>6</sup>

(4) The Joint Requirements Oversight Council is mandated by Title 10, U.S.C., Section 181 to:

- (a) Assist the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in identifying and assessing the priority of joint military requirements to meet the national military strategy;
- (b) Assist the Chairman in considering alternatives to any acquisition program that has been identified to meet military requirements by evaluating the cost, schedule, and performance criteria of the program and of the identified alternatives; and
- (c) Assist the Chairman in assigning joint priority among existing and future programs meeting valid requirements, ensure that the assignment of such priorities

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<sup>4</sup> The United States Code, Title 10, Section 151, Joint Chiefs of Staff: Composition; Functions.

<sup>5</sup> The United States Code, Title 10, Section 153, Chairman Functions.

<sup>6</sup> The United States Code, Title 10, Section 155, Joint Staff.

conforms to and reflects resource levels projected by the Secretary of Defense through defense planning guidance.<sup>7</sup>

**B. Department Directives:** Department of Defense (DoD) Directive (DODD) 5100.1 further defines functions of the JCS. DODD 5158.1 describes the interaction between the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).

**C. Interagency Directives:**

**(1) Presidential Decision Directive 2 (PDD 2)** directs CJCS, as the statutory advisor to the NSC, to attend NSC meetings. It also names CJCS as a member of the NSC Principals Committee and VCJCS as a member of the Deputies Committee.

**(2) Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD 56)** prescribes responsibilities of the NSC Deputies Committee, Executive Committee (ExComm) and Interagency Working Groups in the management of contingency operations. The Vice Chairman plays an important role in this process as a member of the Deputies Committee. PDD 56 also requires that a political-military plan be developed for coordinating U.S. government actions in complex contingency operations. As discussed below, the JCS plays an important role in military planning.

**2. Missions, Functions, Purposes.**

**A. Major Responsibilities:** DODD 5101.1 outlines 51 principal functions for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.<sup>8</sup> They are:

**(1)** Advise and assist the Secretary of Defense on the preparation of annual policy guidance for the heads of Department of Defense components for the preparation and review of program recommendations and budget proposals [Key National Security Process Relation: Policy, Guidance, Regulation; Resourcing];

**(2)** Advise the Secretary of Defense on the preparation of policy guidance for the preparation and review of contingency plans [Key National Security Process Relation: Policy, Guidance, Regulation; Planning];

**(3)** Assist the President and the Secretary of Defense in providing for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces, including the direction of operations conducted by the Commanders of Unified and Specified Combatant Commands [Key National Security Process Relation: Strategy Development; Policy, Guidance, Regulation; Mission Execution];

**(4)** Prepare strategic plans, including plans which conform with resource levels projected by the Secretary of Defense to be available for the period of time for which the plans are to be effective [Key National Security Process Relation: Strategy Development; Planning];

**(5)** Prepare joint logistic and mobility plans to support those strategic plans and recommend the assignment of logistics and mobility responsibilities to the Armed Forces in

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<sup>7</sup> The United States Code, Title 10, Section 181, Joint Requirements Oversight Council.

<sup>8</sup> DODD 5101.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components, "Paragraph 4.0, "Functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff," September 25, 1987.

accordance with those logistic and mobility plans [Key National Security Process Relation: Planning];

**(6)** Prepare military strategy and assessments of the associated risks [Key National Security Process Relation: Strategy Development];

**(7)** Provide for the preparation and review of contingency plans that conform to policy guidance from the President and the Secretary of Defense [Key National Security Process: Planning];

**(8)** Prepare joint logistics and mobility plans to support those contingency plans and recommend the assignment of logistic and mobility responsibilities to the Armed Forces in accordance with those logistic and mobility plans [Key National Security Process Relation: Planning; Observation, Orientation, Oversight];

**(9)** Advise the Secretary of Defense on critical deficiencies and strengths in force capabilities (including manpower, logistic, and mobility support) identified during the preparation and review of contingency plans, and assess the effect of such deficiencies and strengths on meeting national security objectives and policy and on strategic plans. [Key National Security Process Relation: Observation, Orientation, Oversight];

**(10)** After consultation with the Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands, establish and maintain a uniform system for evaluating the preparedness of each Unified and Specified Combatant Command to carry out missions assigned to the command [Key National Security Process Relation: Observation, Orientation, Oversight];

**(11)** Advise the Secretary of Defense on the priorities of the requirements, especially operational requirements, identified by the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands [Key National Security Process Relation: Preparation; Resourcing];

**(12)** Advise the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which the program recommendations and budget proposals of the Military Departments and other components of the Department of Defense conform with the priorities established in strategic plans and with the priorities established for requirements of the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands [Key National Security Process Relation: Preparation; Resourcing];

**(13)** If deemed necessary, submit to the Secretary of Defense alternative program recommendations and budget proposals within projected resource levels and guidance provided by the Secretary of Defense, to achieve greater conformance with the priorities established in strategic plans and with the priorities for the requirements of the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands [Key National Security Process Relation: Preparation, Resourcing];

**(14)** In accordance with guidance of the Secretary of Defense, recommend budget proposals for activities of each Unified and Specified Combatant Command, as appropriate [Key National Security Process Relation: Resourcing];

**(15)** Advise the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which the major programs and policies of the Armed Forces in the area of manpower conform with strategic plans [Key National Security Process Relation: Observation, Orientation, Oversight];

**(16)** Assess military requirements for defense acquisition programs [Key National Security Process Relation: Preparation];

**(17)** Develop and establish doctrine for all aspects of the joint employment of the Armed Forces [Key National Security Processes: Policy, Guidance, Regulation; Preparation];

**(18)** Formulate policies for coordinating the military education and training of members of the Armed Forces [Key National Security Process Relation: Preparation];

**(19)** Provide for representation of the United States on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations [Key National Security Process Relation: Planning; Mission Execution];

**(20)** Submit to the Secretary of Defense, not less than once every 3 years, a report containing such recommendations for changes in the assignment of functions (roles and missions) to the Armed Forces as the Chairman considers necessary to achieve maximum effectiveness of the Armed Forces [Key National Security Process Relation: Policy, Guidance, Regulation; Observation, Orientation, Oversight];

**(21)** Prescribe the duties and functions of the Vice Chairman, JCS, subject to approval of the Secretary of Defense [Key National Security Process Relation: All];

**(22)** Exercise exclusive direction of the Joint Staff [Key National Security Process Relation: All];

**(23)** Subject to the direction of the President, attend and participate in meetings of the National Security Council [Key National Security Process Relation: Strategy Development; Policy, Guidance, Regulation];

**(24)** Advise and assist the President and the Secretary of Defense on establishing Unified and Specified Combatant Commands to perform military missions and on prescribing the force structure of those commands [Key National Security Process Relation: Policy, Guidance, Regulation; Planning; Mission Execution];

**(25)** Periodically, not less than every two years, review the missions, responsibilities (including geographic boundaries), and force structure of each Unified and Specified Combatant Command; and recommend to the President through the Secretary of Defense, any changes to missions, responsibilities, and force structure, as may be necessary [Key National Security Process Relation: Policy, Guidance, Regulation; Observation, Orientation, Oversight];

**(26)** Transmit communications between the President or the Secretary of Defense and the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands, as directed by the President [Key National Security Process Relation: Policy, Guidance Regulation; Planning; Mission Execution];

**(27)** Perform duties, as assigned by the President or the Secretary of Defense, to assist the President and the Secretary of Defense in performing their command function [Key National Security Process Relation: Policy, Guidance, Regulation];

**(28)** Oversee the activities of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands [Key National Security Process Relation: Observation, Orientation, Oversight];

**(29)** Advise the Secretary of Defense on whether a Commander of a Unified or Specified Combatant Command has sufficient authority, direction, and control over the commands and forces assigned to the command to exercise effective command of those commands and forces [Key National Security Process Relation: Observation, Orientation, Oversight];

**(30)** Advise and assist the Secretary of Defense on measures to provide for the administration and support of forces assigned to each Unified and Specified Combatant Command [Key National Security Process Relation: Resourcing];

**(31)** Advise the Secretary of Defense on whether aspects of the administration and support necessary for the accomplishment of missions should be assigned to the Commander of a Unified or Specified Combatant Command [Key National Security Process Relation: Resourcing];

**(32)** Serve as the spokesman for Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands, especially on the operational requirements of their commands [Key National Security Process Relation: Preparation, Resourcing];

**(33)** Provide overall supervision of those Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities for which the Chairman, JCS, has been designated by the Secretary of Defense to oversee. Perform such other functions with respect to the Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities as may be assigned by the Secretary of Defense [Key National Security Process Relation: Observation, Orientation, Oversight];

**(34)** Periodically, not less than every 2 years, report to the Secretary of Defense on the responsiveness and readiness of designated combat-support agencies [Key National Security Process Relation: Observation, Orientation, Oversight];

**(35)** Provide for the participation of combat-support agencies in joint training exercises, assess their performance, and take steps to provide for changes to improve their performance [Key National Security Process Relation: Preparation; Observation, Orientation, Oversight];

**(36)** Develop, in consultation with the director of each combat-support agency, and maintain a uniform readiness reporting system for combat support agencies [Key National Security Process Relation: Observation, Orientation, Oversight];

**(37)** Advise and assist the Secretary of Defense on the periodic review and revision of the curriculum of each professional military education school to enhance the education and training of officers in joint matters [Key National Security Process Relation: Preparation; Observation, Orientation, Oversight];

**(38)** Review the reports of selection boards that consider for promotion officers serving, or having served, in joint duty assignments in accordance with guidelines furnished by the Secretary of Defense and return the reports with determinations and comments to the Secretary of the appropriate Military Department [Key National Security Process Relation: Observation, Orientation, Oversight];

**(39)** Advise the Secretary of Defense on the establishment of career guidelines for officers with the joint specialty [Key National Security Process Relation: Resourcing];

**(40)** Submit to the Secretary of Defense an evaluation of the joint duty performance of officers recommended for an initial appointment to the grade of lieutenant general or vice admiral, or initial appointment as general or admiral [Key National Security Process Relation: Observation, Orientation, Oversight];

**(41)** Promulgate Joint Chiefs of Staff publications (JCS Pubs) to provide military guidance for joint activities of the Armed Forces [Key National Security Process Relation: Policy, Guidance, Regulation];

**(42)** Review the plans and programs of the Commanders of Unified and Specified Combatant Commands to determine their adequacy and feasibility for the performance of assigned missions [Key National Security Process Relation: Planning; Observation, Orientation, Oversight];

**(43)** Provide military guidance for use by the Military Departments, the Military Services, and the Defense Agencies in the preparation of their respective detailed plans [Key National Security Process Relation: Planning; Observation, Orientation, Oversight];

**(44)** Participate, as directed, in the preparation of combined plans for military action in conjunction with the Armed Forces of other nations [Key National Security Process: Planning];

**(45)** Determine the headquarters support, such as facilities, personnel, and communications, required by Unified and Specified Combatant Commands, and recommend the assignment to the Military Departments of the responsibilities for providing such support [Key National Security Process Relation: Resourcing];

**(46)** Prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense, for information and consideration, general strategic guidance for the development of industrial and manpower mobilization programs [Key National Security Process Relation: Strategy Development];

**(47)** Prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense military guidance for use in the development of military aid programs and other actions relating to foreign military forces [Key National Security Process Relation: Policy, Guidance, Regulation];

**(48)** Formulate policies for the joint training of the Armed Forces [Key National Security Processes: Policy, Guidance, Regulation; Preparation];

**(49)** Assess joint military requirements for command, control, and communications; recommend improvements; and provide guidance on aspects that relate to the

conduct of joint operations [Key National Security Process Relation: Policy, Guidance, Regulation; Preparation; Resourcing];

(50) Prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense, for information and consideration in connection with the preparation of budgets, statements of military requirements based upon U.S. strategic war plans [Key National Security Process Relation: Preparation, Resourcing];

(51) In carrying out his functions, duties, and responsibilities, the Chairman, JCS, shall, as he considers appropriate, consult with and seek the advice of the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands [Key National Security Process Relation: All].

**B. Subordinate Agencies and Activities:** The 1997 Defense Reform Initiative (DRI) review discovered that since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Joint Staff had taken on many additional responsibilities and corresponding staff increases for joint functions. Some of the additional responsibilities had been accomplished by the creation and assignment of Chairman-controlled activities, which are separate organizations reporting directly to the Joint Staff.<sup>9</sup> As a result of the DRI review, oversight for five of these organizations (Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Warfighting Analysis Center, Joint Command and Control Warfare Center, Joint Battle Center, Joint Communications Support Element) was transferred to the Unified Commands or other Defense organizations. The remaining Joint Staff subordinate organizations are:

- (1) National Defense University;
- (2) Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization;
- (3) Joint Combat Identification Office;
- (4) All Service Combat Identification and Evaluation Team;
- (5) Joint Spectrum Center.

The Joint Staff also oversees U.S. military participation with the U.S. Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee and the U.S. Representative to the Military Committee, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as several other multi-national military committees, commissions, and boards.

### **C. Major Joint Staff Products:**

- (1) Inputs to key national and departmental documents (e.g., the National Security Strategy (NSS), the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG));
- (2) The National Military Strategy (NMS);
- (3) The Joint Vision document;

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<sup>9</sup> Department of Defense, Defense Reform Initiative Report, November 1997.

- (4) The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP);
- (5) The Unified Command Plan (UCP);
- (6) The Chairman's Program Recommendation/Assessment (CPR/CPA);
- (7) The Joint Doctrine;
- (8) The Universal Joint Task List (UJTL); and
- (9) The global Status of Resources and Training (SORTs).

### 3. Vision and Core Competencies.

**A. Vision:** The CJCS vision is contained in the Joint Staff Strategic Plan.

"America's Military Shaping the Future: Quality people trained, equipped and ready for joint operations, guided by Joint Doctrine, empowered by world class leadership schooled in joint military operations, advantaged by America's revolutionary technology, rapidly deployable worldwide and tactically mobile as never before, enabled through dominant battlefield awareness. Persuasive in peace—Decisive in War: Preeminent in any form of conflict."<sup>10</sup>

The JCS also publishes the Joint Vision Document—JV 20XX—which provides a common vision and direction for the U.S. armed forces as they plan for the future.

**B. Core Competencies:** Although there are no published core competencies for the JCS, the core competencies are generally recognized to be:

- (1) Expertise in all aspects of military operations and planning;
- (2) Effective and efficient staff support (e.g., analysis, coordination) for the Chairman in his role as principal military advisor; and
- (3) Effective and efficient communications to support the National Command Authorities (NCA).<sup>11</sup>

**4. Organizational Culture.** The organizational culture of the JCS, led by the Chairman and supported by the Joint Staff, has been significantly shaped by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. One of the eight stated purposes of Goldwater-Nichols was to improve the military advice provided to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. An unstated driver for the legislation was to create a more appropriate balance between joint and Service interests.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> The Joint Staff, A Strategic Plan for the Joint Staff, undated.

<sup>11</sup> The NCA is defined as the U.S. President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors.

<sup>12</sup> Locher, James R. III. "Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols," Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn 1996, p. 10.

**A. Values:** The Joint Staff values include integrity, dedication to the mission, and loyalty. Although officers assigned to the Joint Staff maintain their Service identity, interviews indicated that the culture is truly focused on jointness and improving joint warfighting capability. The emphasis is in understanding each other's culture and in being able to articulate what capabilities the particular officer's Service brings to joint warfighting. The staff also is concerned about the Chairman's personal legacy. Joint Staff officers are accustomed to long hours and high workloads. The Joint Staff motivation seems to be "how can we make a difference and how can we help this Chairman achieve his goals."

**B. Leadership Traditions:** Goldwater-Nichols focused most of the power of the JCS in the office of the Chairman. CJCS was designated the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. In carrying out his functions, duties, and responsibilities, the Chairman was directed to consult with and seek the advice of the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands, as he considers appropriate. If another member of the JCS submits to the Chairman advice or an opinion in disagreement with, or advice or an opinion in addition to the advice presented by the Chairman to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense, it is the Chairman who presents the advice or opinion of the other JCS member at the same time he presents his own advice.<sup>13</sup> The Chairman is also the conduit for communications between the NCA and the Unified Commanders. Such communications are directed to be transmitted through CJCS by DODD 5100.1. Goldwater-Nichols created the position of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, named VCJCS as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and gave CJCS authority to prescribe VCJCS duties with the approval of the Secretary of Defense.<sup>14</sup> Goldwater-Nichols also gave CJCS authority over the Joint Staff. The Joint Staff assists other members of the JCS subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Chairman.<sup>15</sup>

The relationship between the Chairman and the Vice Chairman is extremely important. Interviews with key Joint Staff leaders indicated that the current occupants get along extremely well. We were told that there is no rivalry and that total trust exists between them. When the Chairman is out of the country, the Vice Chairman speaks for him in the interagency with the Chairman's complete confidence. CJCS gives the VCJCS great latitude in this respect.

Interviews with key Joint Staff leaders also indicate that the current Chairman integrates the Unified CINCs very well. CINCs are strong-willed and most have good political connections in Washington. However, CJCS almost always resolves disagreements with the CINCs before it becomes necessary to take the matter to the Secretary.

The relationship between the Joint Staff and the OSD staff has been rocky at times, although the current staffs interact very well. DoD guidance on the relationships between the two staffs directs that the Joint Staff cooperate fully and effectively with appropriate OSD offices. It goes on to state that in all stages of important staff studies, the Joint Staff shall avail itself of the views and special skills in OSD. The various directors of the Joint Staff are directed to maintain active liaison with appropriate OSD offices. The heads of OSD offices are

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<sup>13</sup> The United States Code, Title 10, Section 151, Joint Chiefs of Staff: Composition; Functions.

<sup>14</sup> The United States Code, Title 10, Section 154, Vice Chairman.


<sup>15</sup> The United States Code, Title 10, Section 155, Joint Staff.

directed to maintain similar liaison and make representatives available to meet formally or informally with appropriate members of the Joint Staff.<sup>16</sup>

**C. Staff Attributes:** The Joint Staff culture has evolved to the point where it is now considered to be a first-rate military staff. This evolution can be attributed to two factors: (1) the increased responsibility given to the Chairman by Goldwater-Nichols, and (2) the quality improvement in Joint Staff manning which was driven in large part by the joint officer management provisions of Goldwater-Nichols. Goldwater-Nichols mandates that officers submitted by the Services for consideration for Joint Staff positions must be among those officers considered the most outstanding officers of the Armed Forces. Interviews with key Joint Staff leaders highlighted that the younger officers (O-4s and O-5s) are particularly outstanding. One area to note is staff turnover. Many officers only stay the minimum time (22 months) before they are sent back to their Service, often for a command position. CJCS has flexibility in how he uses the Joint Staff and each CJCS has used the staff a little differently. Joint Staff Action Officers react very quickly—much faster than those of allied nations. This helps in making sound, timely decisions during crises.

**D. Strategy:** The JCS has a strategic plan that describes how the Joint Staff plans to realize the CJCS vision. It lists specific goals and objectives for each Joint Staff Directorate.

**E. Organizational Structure:** The following figure shows the JCS structure.



**Figure 1. Organizational Structure**

<sup>16</sup> DODD 5158.1, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Relationships with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 1, 1985, p. 2.

## **Notes on Organizational Chart:**

**(1) The Chairman and Vice Chairman:** The collective body of the JCS is headed by the Chairman (or the Vice Chairman in the Chairman's absence), who sets the agenda and presides over JCS meetings. Responsibilities as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff take precedence over duties as the Chiefs of Military Services.

**(2) The Assistant to the Chairman (ACJCS)** oversees matters requiring close personal control by the Chairman with particular focus on international relations and politico-military concerns.

**(3) The Director:** The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after consultation with other JCS members and with the approval of the Secretary of Defense, selects the Director, Joint Staff (DJS), to assist in managing the Joint Staff. The director orchestrates the staff's actions by assigning tasks to the various directorates. All official Joint Staff correspondence to other organizations is released through the Director's office.

**(4) The Directorate of Personnel (J1)** provides personnel and manpower support to the Chairman.

**(5) The Directorate for Intelligence (J2)** provides all-source intelligence to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, and unified commands. J2 is unique on the Joint Staff in that it is also part of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). J2 draws deeply on the DIA's broad range of capabilities to accomplish its mission and functions.

**(6) The Operations Directorate (J3)** develops and provides guidance to the combatant commands and relays communications between the NCA and the unified commanders regarding current operations and plans. J3 is involved in every aspect of the planning, deployment, execution and redeployment of U.S. strategic and conventional forces in response to worldwide crises. J3 is responsible for the operation of the National Military Command Center. J3 is also responsible for the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and the Current Readiness System (CRS).

**(7) The Logistics Directorate (J4)** is charged with establishing joint logistics doctrine and developing logistics, environmental, mobility and mobilization annexes in support of strategic and contingency plans; maximizing the logistics capabilities of the combatant commands, to include developing strategic mobility, mobilization, medical readiness, civil engineering, and sustainment policies and procedures to support combat forces; and maintaining a logistics and mobility asset prioritization capability for contingency operations.

**(8) The Directorate for Strategic Plans and Policy (J5)** is the focal point for assisting the Chairman in four major areas: current and future military strategy, planning guidance, and policy; politico-military advice and policies; military positions on projected and ongoing international negotiations; and interagency coordination. J5 is responsible for the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS)

**(9) The Directorate for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems (J6)** provides CJCS advice and recommendations on C4 matters and oversees support for the National Military Command System.

**(10) The Directorate for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J7)** assists CJCS, CINCs, and Service Chiefs in their preparation for joint and multinational operations in the conceptualization, development, and assessment of current and future joint doctrine and in the accomplishment of joint and multinational training and exercises. J7 is responsible for the Joint Training System (JTS). J7 is also responsible for the deliberate planning process, including operational plan development and review.

**(11) The Force Structure, Resources and Assessment Directorate (J8)** was established in response to the increased responsibilities and authority placed on the chairman by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Since then, J8 has provided resource and force structure analysis and advice to CJCS. J8 is responsible for the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) process and Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment (JWCA) integration.

**(12)** The Vice Director of the Joint Staff acts as the director of management.

**5. Formal National Security Process Involvement.** The JCS interacts with all seven of the key national security processes. The matrix on the following page summarizes the participation of the JCS in these processes. The following paragraphs indicate the involvement of the JCS in the key national security processes. Where appropriate the particular individual is identified (e.g., CJCS, VCJCS).

#### **A. Strategy Development:**

##### **(1) Major Activities:**

**(a)** Provides advice to the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council, and the President during the development of the National Security Strategy.

**(b)** Prepares and submits the National Military Strategy to the Secretary of Defense. Through the NMS, the JCS provides a significant military input to national security strategy development. The NMS articulates how the United States will employ military elements of power to support the national security objectives found in the President's NSS. The NMS defines the national military objectives, establishes the strategy to accomplish these objectives, and addresses the military capabilities required to execute the strategy.<sup>17</sup> Although both the JSR and NMS are Joint Staff products, the OSD staff, through the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD (P)) participates in their development.

**(c)** Develops a long-range Joint Vision document that provides a common focal point for future military planning. This document is also an important Joint Staff input to the Strategy Development process. The Chairman's vision, referred to as Joint Vision 20XX, provides a conceptual template for the conduct of future military operations and establishes a common direction for the Services, combatant commands, Defense Agencies, and Joint Staff as they develop plans and programs to evolve the joint force to meet future warfighting requirements.<sup>18</sup> JV2010, the current and first vision document, played an important role in the subsequent development of the each of the Service's visions leading up to the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).

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<sup>17</sup> DODD 5158, p. B-3.

<sup>18</sup> DODD 5158.1, p. A-2.

(d) Conducts the Joint Strategy Review that provides a basis for changes to the Joint Vision and the NMS, as well as inputs to the National Security Strategy.

		Strategy Development	Policy, Guidance, and Regulations	Planning	Mission Execution	Observation, Orientation, and Oversight	Preparation	Resourcing
Products	Inputs to key national and departmental documents (e.g., the National Security Strategy (NSS), the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG))	✓	✓					
	Joint Vision	✓						
	National Military Strategy (NMS)	✓						
	Joint Planning Document (JPD)	✓						
	Jt Strat Capabilities Plan (JSCP)		✓					
	Unified Command Plan (UCP)		✓					
	CJCS Instructions (CJCSIs)		✓					
	Joint Doctrine		✓					
	CJCS Plan Approval			✓				
	National Command Authority (NCA)-CINC Communications	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR) Reports					✓		
	Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) Reports					✓		
	Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress (QRRC)					✓		
	Joint After Action Reporting System (JAARS) Reports						✓	
	Joint Net Assessment (JNA)					✓		
	Universal Joint Task List (UJTL)						✓	
	Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) Decisions						✓	✓
Chairman's Program Assessment/Recommendations (CPA/CPR)							✓	
Roles	CJCS	Principal Mil Advisor	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
		NSC Attendee	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
		NSC PC Member	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
		DRB Member						✓
	VCJCS	Congressional Testimony	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
		NSC DC Member	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
		DAB Co-chair						✓
		JROC Chair						✓
		SROC Co-chair					✓	
	Congressional Testimony	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
	ACJCS, Joint Staff Directors	NSC IWG Participants	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

(2) Major Stakeholders: USD (P), Unified Commanders, Services.

(3) Key Organizational Processes:

(a) **The Joint Strategic Planning System:** (See Appendix 1 for process map). The JSPS is the primary formal means by which CJCS, in consultation with other members of the Joint Chiefs and the Combatant Commanders, carries out planning and policy responsibilities detailed in Title 10.<sup>19</sup> The products and processes of the JSPS directly contribute to all seven key National Security processes. The JSPS component is directly applicable to strategy development of the JSR. The JSR annual report provides a framework for the Chairman's military advice for national security strategy development. The JSR process continually gathers relevant information to assess U.S. requirements and objectives in the near,

<sup>19</sup> CJCSI 3100.01, The Joint Strategic Planning System, 1 Sep 99, p. A-1.

mid, and long term. JSR working groups are composed of representatives from the Joint Staff, Services, combatant commands, and defense agencies. JSR analysis provides a basis for changes to the Joint Vision and/or the NMS. The JSR also validates a common set of planning assumptions and provides a common reference point used by other Joint Staff processes such as the JROC and Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA).<sup>20, 21</sup>

**(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes:** NSC development of the NSS (See Volume II, Chapter 2, The National Security Council).

**(5) Associated Lower-Level Processes:** Development of Service vision documents (See Volume IV, Chapter 8, The Military Departments and Services).

## **B. Policy, Guidance, and Regulation:**

### **(1) Major Activities:**

**(2)** CJCS participates in the development of guidance as the principal military advisor to the NSC, an attendee at NSC meetings, and as a member of the NSC Principals Committee. VCJCS participates in the development of guidance as a member of the National Security Council Deputies Committee and the Nuclear Weapons Council. The Assistant to the Chairman and/or the Joint Staff Directors participate in the development of guidance as members of NSC Interagency Working Groups (See Volume II, Chapter 2, The National Security Council).

**(a)** Advises the Secretary of Defense during the preparation of the Defense Planning Guidance and Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG). The Joint Planning Document (JPD) is designed to forward the best possible early authoritative planning and programmatic advice of CJCS to the Secretary of Defense as OSD begins developing the DPG—an important DoD component of the Strategy Development as well as Policy, Guidance, and Regulation; and Resourcing national security processes (See Volume IV, Chapter 3, The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy). The JPD:

**(i)** Reflects the Chairman's planning guidance based on the Joint Vision and strategic objectives outlined in the NMS and JSCP;

**(ii)** Highlights shortfalls between CINC requirements and resources previously programmed;

**(iii)** Highlights proposed changes (if any) to overseas presence posture based on globally integrated assessment of CINC requirements;

**(iv)** Develops long-term acquisition policy and intelligence projections for the DPG;

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<sup>20</sup> CJCSI 3100.01, p. E-1.

<sup>21</sup> The Joint Staff J-5 is posturing the next series of JSRs to contribute to the following events: JSR 00 will assess JV2010 and feed the process that is creating JV20XX and JSR 01 will look at future environments in preparation for the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review.

(v) Highlights broad national security interests and selected objectives for priority science and technology (S&T) investments;

(vi) Reflects inputs relative to operational vulnerabilities out to a common planning horizon and investment strategies for new operational concepts;

(vii) Provides focus for S&T programs in developing and demonstrating those technologies that have the highest payoff in addressing military needs; and

(viii) Places emphasis on advanced technology development in order to mitigate against technical risks when new technologies are incorporated in the next generation of systems.<sup>22</sup>

(b) The Chairman also prepares and submits the Chairman's Program Recommendation to the Secretary of Defense that provides CJCS' personal recommendations for consideration in publishing the DPG.

(c) Provides guidance to the CINCs and Services to accomplish tasks and missions based on current military capabilities and the Contingency Planning Guidance through the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. The JSCP is a major JCS input to the Policy, Guidance, and Regulation national security process. The JSCP, which is derived from the Secretary of Defense's Contingency Planning Guidance, provides guidance to the CINCs and the Service Chiefs to accomplish tasks and missions based on current military capabilities. The JSCP serves to integrate the deliberate operation and engagement planning activities of the entire joint planning and execution community with a coherent and focused framework. It provides specific theater planning tasks and objectives, delineates necessary planning assumptions, and apportions resources to CINCs for planning, based on military capabilities resulting from completed program and budget actions.

(d) Develops and establishes doctrine for all aspects of the joint employment of the Armed Forces and provides military guidance for joint activities of the armed forces through the promulgation of JCS Publications. Joint doctrine presents fundamental principles that guide the employment of joint forces. Doctrine is authoritative but not directive—commanders are expected to use their best judgement based on the circumstances. Though neither policy nor strategy, joint doctrine deals with the fundamental issue of how best to employ the national military power to achieve strategic ends. Doctrine is also important in that it allows Services to claim ownership (or shares) of “missions,” which in turn supports requirements, programs, and forces structures. CJCS has overall responsibility for developing joint doctrine, and in coordination with the other members of the JCS and combatant commanders, will approve all joint doctrine and any modifications to joint doctrine development procedures.<sup>23</sup>

(e) Publishes authoritative instruction to military organizations through CJCS Instructions (CJCSIs) and CJCS Memorandums. CJCSIs and CJCSMs contain Chairman

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<sup>22</sup> CJCSI 3100.01, The Joint Strategic Planning System, September 1, 1999, p. D-3. Although the JPD has been a long-time component of the JSPS process, the document was not always produced and did not receive much focus on the Joint Staff or OSD. Recently there had been a concentrated effort to revitalize the JPD. Interviews indicated that the effectiveness of this document in influencing the DPG has yet to be determined.

<sup>23</sup> Joint Publication 1-01, Joint Publication System Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Development Program, September 14, 1993, p. II-1.

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff policy and guidance that does not involve the employment of forces. An instruction or memorandum is of indefinite duration. It remains in effect until superseded, rescinded, or otherwise canceled. CJCS Instructions and Memorandums, unlike joint publications, will not contain joint doctrine and/or joint tactics, techniques, and procedures.

**(f)** Submits to the Secretary of Defense recommendations on the roles and missions of the Armed Forces.

**(g)** Submits to the Secretary of Defense recommendations on the missions, responsibilities and force structure of the Unified and Specified Commands. Provides basic guidance to the combatant commanders through the Unified Command Plan. The UCP, which is approved by the President, sets forth basic guidance to all unified combatant commanders; establishes their missions, responsibilities, and force structure; delineates the general geographical area of responsibility for geographic combatant commanders; and specifies functional responsibilities for functional combatant commanders. In UCP 99 the Chairman has an annex for the first time that lays out his vision of where the UCP should evolve over its next several iterations.

**(3) Major Stakeholders:** USD (P), Unified Commands, Services, Defense Agencies.

**(4) Key Organizational Processes:** (See Appendix 2 for process map).

**(a)** JSPS through CJCS recommendations on the DPG and CPG; and the development of the UCP.

**(b)** Formulation of Joint Doctrine

**(5) Associated Higher-Level Processes:** USD (P) development of the DPG and CPG (See Volume IV, Chapter 3, The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy).

**(6) Associated Lower-Level Processes:** Unified Command development of deliberate and crisis action plans. Service development of Program Objective Memoranda (POM) and budgets (See Volume IV: Chapter 7, The Unified Commands, and Chapter 8, The Military Departments and Services).

### **C. Planning:**

#### **(1) Major Activities:**

**(a)** CJCS reviews and approves the Operations Plans, Concept Plans (OPLANS/CONPLANS) of the combatant commands.

**(b)** Reviews bilateral plans to provide recommendations to U.S. negotiating authorities.

(c) Establishes deliberate and crisis planning policies and procedures through the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System.<sup>24</sup>

**(2) Major Stakeholders:** USD (P), CINCs, Services.

**(3) Key Organizational Processes:** (See Appendix 3 for process map).

**(a) The Joint Operational Planning and Execution System:** JOPES supports the JCS in the Planning and Mission Execution of national security processes. Joint operational planning is a coordinated process used by a commander to determine the best method of accomplishing the mission. In peacetime, the process is called deliberate planning. In crisis situations, it is called crisis action planning. Joint planning is conducted under JOPES policy, procedures, and automated data processing support. JOPES is the approved system for conventional operation planning and execution. JOPES includes policies, procedures, reporting structures, and personnel supported by C4 systems. JOPES supports and integrates joint operation planning activities at the national, theater, and supporting command levels. JOPES is the principal system within the Department of Defense for translating policy decisions into OPLANs and Operations Orders (OPORDs) in support of national security objectives. It also provides joint operation requirements for use in making national resource decisions that affect DoD's Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) and the JSPS. JOPES consists of the following seven interrelated functions that provide a framework for joint military planning and execution.

**(i) Threat Identification and Assessment:** This function addresses procedures for describing threats to national security, continuously monitoring the international political and military environment so threats to national security can be detected and analyzed, alerting decision makers, and determining the specific nature of the threat. Defining enemy capabilities and intentions is emphasized using this function. All organizational levels are supported by this function during crisis action planning and execution.

**(ii) Strategy Determination:** Using this function, the NCA, CJCS, and Joint Staff formulate suitable and feasible military objectives to counter the threats. This function is used in formulating politico-military assessments, developing and evaluating military strategy and objectives, apportioning forces and other resources, formulating concepts and military options, and developing planning guidance leading to the preparation of Courses of Action (COAs), OPLANs, and OPORDs. This process begins with an analysis of existing strategy guidance in light of the intelligence estimate, and ends with issuance of either the JSCP in peacetime or a CJCS Warning or Planning Order during crisis action planning situations.

**(iii) Course of Action (COA) Development:** In COA development during peacetime, the supported command develops the CINC's Strategic Concept based on Joint Staff and Service planning guidance and resource apportionment provided in the JSCP and Service documents. In crisis situations, the supported command develops COAs based on CJCS planning guidance and resource allocation from approved OPLANs and CJCS Warning or Alert Orders. Using this JOPES function coupled with the JOPES support function

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<sup>24</sup> During interviews, it was discovered that although the crisis planning process works well among the Joint Staff, the CINCs, and USD(P), it is not as fast as it should. JOPES works best for peacetime deliberate planning. In the crunch of a crisis, the steps outlined in JOPES are never applied sequentially . . . many steps are done in parallel. The system is still effective due to the experience of the people and the fact that there are adequate resources to make up for decreased planning time.

simulation and analysis, force, sustainment, and transportation feasibility are analyzed. The Services, through Service component commands, and supporting commands provide supportability estimates of the CINC's Strategic Concept or COAs to the supported command. Products from COA development include CINC's Strategic Concept; CJCS-approved Concepts of Operations (CONOPS); the Commander's Estimate, including COAs; supportability estimates; and, time permitting, an integrated time-phased data base of notional combat, combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) force requirements, with an estimate of required sustainment.

**(iv) Detailed Planning:** This function is used in developing a CONPLAN, OPLAN, or OPORD with supporting annexes and in determining preliminary movement feasibility. This function provides a detailed, fully integrated schedule of deployment, employment, mobilization, and sustainment activities based on the CJCS-approved CONOPS or COA. Detailed planning begins with CJCS guidance in the form of an approval for further planning in a peacetime environment or a CJCS Alert or Planning Order in a crisis action planning situation and ends with a CJCS-approved OPLAN or NCA-approved OPORD. PDD 56 requires that a political-military (pol-mil) plan be developed for all complex contingency operations. Annex V contains the pol-mil considerations for CINC OPLANS and CONPLANS.<sup>25</sup>

**(v) Implementation:** This function provides decision makers the tools to monitor, analyze, and control events during the conduct of military operations. It encompasses the execution of military operations and provides procedures to issue OPORDs; conduct mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment activities; and adjust operations where required. The ability to monitor and compare actual with scheduled events is crucial to assessing mission accomplishment; controlling, directing, replanning, redirecting, or terminating operations; and conducting redeployment. Planning is a cyclic process that continues throughout implementation. Implementation begins with the CJCS Execute Order and usually ends with some type of replanning effort, such as redeployment or redirection of operations.

**(vi) Monitoring:** This supporting function supports each of the other JOPES functions by obtaining current accurate information concerning the status of friendly, enemy, and neutral forces and resources in accomplishing mission tasks. Examples of information processed are objective accomplishment; consumption data; and the status of deployment, procurement, mobilization, forces, and facilities.

**(vii) Simulation and Analysis:** This supporting function offers various automated techniques that enhance each of the other JOPES functions. Examples of simulation and analysis applications, when feasible, are force-on-force assessments (suitability); generation of force requirements; comparison of requirements to capabilities, such as consumption data; closure profiles (feasibility); and generation of mobilization and sustainment requirements based on need.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> The Joint Staff is currently soliciting NSC support and sponsorship to vet the various Annex Vs through the interagency process so each agency can see how their part in the CINCs plan interrelates with all of the other agencies.

<sup>26</sup> Joint Publication 5-03.1, Joint Operation Planning And Execution System Volume I (Planning Policies And Procedures), August 4, 1993, pp. II-6 - II-8.

**(b) Deliberate Plans Review Process:** There are currently four OPLANs for large scale operations that pertain to compelling national interests and require detailed planning. There are 40 CONPLANs that pertain to less compelling national interests or smaller-scale contingencies. There are also 15 functional plans in areas such as Humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, peacekeeping, and counter drugs. In addition, each CINC prepares a Theater Engagement Plan (TEP) that describes peacetime theater engagement activities. The Joint Staff J7 conducts the deliberate plans review process for CJCS. OPLANs, CONPLANs, and Functional Plans are reviewed individually on an 18 to 24-month cycle. TEPs are reviewed as a family of plans on a 12-month cycle. CJCS reviews and approves the CINCs' strategic concepts as well as the various plans based on adequacy, feasibility, acceptability, and joint doctrine. USD (P) also reviews certain plans for compliance with policy and the Secretary of Defense may be briefed on individual plans before they are approved.

**(i) Crisis Action Planning (CAP):** Deliberate plans are based on the best available intelligence, but are still hypothetical to the extent that not all conditions can be predicted, and even if all variations of a future situation could be anticipated, they could not all be planned for. Usually, the time available to plan responses to real-time events is short. In as little as a few days, a feasible course of action must be developed and approved, and timely identification of resources accomplished to ready forces, schedule transportation, and prepare supplies for movement and employment of U.S. military force. The procedures are similar to the deliberate process; however, the process is flexible. It permits the steps to be done sequentially or concurrently, or skipped altogether. The exact flow of the procedures is largely determined by the time available to complete the planning and by the significance of the crisis.<sup>27</sup> For example, in some situations, no formal JCS Warning Order is issued, and the first record communication that the supported commander receives is a CJCS Planning Order or Alert Order containing the COA to be used for execution planning. It is equally possible that an NCA decision to commit forces may be made shortly after an event occurs, thereby compressing greatly Phases II through V. To appreciate fully the usefulness of CAP, it is important to recognize that no definitive length of time can be associated with any particular phase. Note also that severe time constraints may require crisis participants to pass information orally, including the decision to commit forces. In actual practice, much coordination is done over secure telephone during the entire crisis action planning process.

**(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes:** Development of Pol-Mil plans (See Volume II, Chapter 2, The National Security Council).

**(5) Associated Lower-Level Processes:** Unified Command development of deliberate (i.e., OPLANs, CONPLANs, Functional Plans, TEPs) and crisis action plans (See Volume IV, Chapter 7, The Unified Commands).

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<sup>27</sup> Joint Publication 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, and Joint Publication 5-03.1 (to be published as CJCSM 3122.01), JOPES Volume I, define a crisis within the context of joint operation planning and execution as “an incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, and possessions or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of U.S. military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives.” The information on Crisis Action Planning is derived from AFSC Publication 1, The Joint Staff Officer's Guide, Chapter 7, 1997.

**D. Mission Execution:** (See Appendix 4 for process map).

**(1) Major Activities:**

(a) Provides advice, options, and recommendations to the NCA; and conveys NCA decisions to the CINCs.

(b) Issues Warning Orders, Planning Orders, Alert Orders, Deployment Preparation Orders, Deployment Orders and Execute Orders through JOPES to carry out the intentions of the NCA.

(c) Resolves conflicts and shortfalls and adjudicates conflicting demands for forces, resources, and strategic lift during multiple contingencies or seeks resolution from the NCA.

(d) Receives and analyzes reports from the theaters. Monitors the deployment and employment of forces for the NCA.

(e) CJCS transmits communications from the President or the Secretary of Defense to the Commanders of the Combatant Commands. Communications from the Commanders of the Combatant Commands to the President and/or the Secretary of Defense are transmitted through CJCS.

**(2) Major Stakeholders:** the Secretary of Defense, CINCs.

**(3) Key Organizational Processes:** JOPES, as described above.

**(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes:** Execution of military operations in support of U.S. national security objectives (See Volume II, Chapter 2, The National Security Council).

**(5) Associated Lower-Level Processes:** Conduct of military operations by the Unified Commands (See Volume IV, Chapter 7, The Unified Commands).

**E. Observation, Orientation, and Oversight:**

**(1) Major Activities:**

(a) Oversees the activities of combatant commands, including recommending changes in assignment of functions, roles, and missions to achieve maximum effectiveness of the armed forces;

(b) Oversees the activities of the Defense Information Systems Agency, Defense Logistics Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and the National Security Agency;

(c) Performs net assessments to determine the capabilities of the armed forces of the United States and its allies as compared with those of its potential adversaries through the Joint Net Assessment (JNA) process;

(d) Assesses the readiness of the Combatant Commands, Services, and Combat Support Agencies through the Current Readiness System (CRS), composed of the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) and the Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR);

(e) Reports results of readiness assessments to the Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC). VCJCS co-chairs the SROC with the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Prepares the Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress for the Secretary of Defense;

(f) Manages the Joint After Action Reporting System (JAARS); and oversees the Joint Reporting System (JRS).

**(2) Major Stakeholders:** OSD/Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate (PA&E), the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD (P&R)), CINCs, Services, Applicable DoD Agencies.

**F. Key Organizational Processes:** (See Appendix 5 for process map).

**(a) The Joint Net Assessment:** The JNA process supports JCS input to the Observation, Orientation, and Oversight national security process. The JNA process collects and synthesizes data from ongoing assessment processes, war games, simulations, and studies. Current and future capabilities are assessed based on projected and prioritized future national military objectives out to the end of DoD's Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP). The JNA process uses the concept of a risk evaluation force which is a force structure built on the recommendations of the combatant commands and Services designed to have a reasonable assurance of success in accomplishing the full range of military operations that support NMS objectives. As a minimum, the JNA process develops a net assessment every four years. This quadrennial assessment is provided to the Secretary of Defense and supports the assessment of current strategy and the development of alternative force structures and strategies.<sup>28</sup>

**(b) The Current Readiness System:** The CRS supports JCS input to the Observation, Orientation, and Oversight national security process. The CRS is designed to provide the DoD leadership a current, high-level assessment of the military's readiness to fight and meet the demands of the NMS. The focus is on near-term operational issues.<sup>29</sup>

**(i) The Joint Monthly Readiness Review:** The JMRR is the central component of the CRS. During the JMRR, the combatant commanders, Services, and DoD Combat Support Agencies provide a current assessment of military readiness. The JMRR assessments provide the basis for the monthly DoD Senior Readiness Oversight Council

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<sup>28</sup> CJCSI 3100.01, The Joint Strategic Planning System, September 1, 1999, p. E-6.

<sup>29</sup> Readiness assessment continues to be an area of intense interest in both the military and political arenas. Prior to 1994, readiness assessment was primarily left to the Services. The development of the CRS in 1994 provided the first formal process to assess readiness from a joint perspective that included assessments from both the Services and the Unified Commands. Although this system appears to meet the needs of the military, recent congressional interest indicates that DoD readiness assessment methods will continue to be a challenge that will require improved measurement processes and mutual understanding of what readiness assessments show. The Joint Staff is currently pursuing combining the readiness system with the deployment system, to obtain a better understand the impact of sending forces to a developing contingency.

briefings by the VCJCS and the Service Chiefs on joint warfighting readiness. The JMRR also provides the basis for DoD's Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress (QRRR).<sup>30</sup>

**(ii) The Status of Resources and Training System:** SORTS is an internal management tool for use by the JCS, Services, unified commands, and DoD Combat Support Agencies. As a resource and unit monitoring system, SORTS indicates the level of selected resources and training status required to undertake the wartime missions for which a unit was organized or designed. This information supports, in priority order, crisis response planning; deliberate or peacetime planning; and management responsibilities to organize, train, and equip combat-ready forces for the unified commands. SORTS provides CJCS with the necessary unit information to achieve adequate and feasible military responses to crisis situations. SORTS also provides information to participate in the joint planning and execution process associated with deliberate planning. SORTS provides broad bands of information on selected unit status indicators and includes a commander's subjective assessment on the unit's ability to execute the missions for which a unit was organized or designed.<sup>31</sup>

**(c) Joint After Action Reporting System:** JAARS is the formal process for the collection and dissemination of observations, lessons learned, and issues generated from joint operations and exercises. Lessons learned are sent by the combatant commanders, Services, DoD Combat Support Agencies (CSAs), and Defense agencies responsive to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, OSD, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to the Joint Center for Lessons Learned (JCLL) in joint after-action reports. These joint after action reports provide: (1) the official description of the operation or exercise; (2) all significant lessons learned before, during, and after the event; and (3) any significant issues and observations encountered during the exercise or operation.<sup>32</sup>

**(d) The Joint Reporting System:** The JRS reports are a major information source for the National Military Command System. They provide information to the command centers of the NCA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINCs and the subordinate joint force commanders, DoD agencies, and the Services. The JRS provides for standardization in reporting systems of the Joint Staff, Combatant Commands and subordinate joint forces, Services, and DoD agencies. The JRS covers numerous functional areas, such as personnel, materiel and equipment status, operational and logistical planning, situation monitoring, and intelligence, as well as actual military operations and exercises. JRS reports required by the Unified Commands include: the Joint After-Action Reporting System Reports, the Weekly Deployment Status Report, the Weekly Deployment Status Report, the Communications Status Report, the Daily Intelligence Summary, the Military Intelligence Digest, Enemy Prisoner of War and Internee Status, the Joint Resource Assessment Data Base Report, the Joint Personnel Status Report, the Logistic Factors Report, the Munitions Status Report, Operations Event/Incident Report, Operations Summary Report, various reconnaissance reports, and the Commander's Situation Report.<sup>33</sup>

**(2) Associated Higher-Level Processes:** Senior Readiness Oversight Council, Development of the Secretary of Defense Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress.

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<sup>30</sup> CJCSI 3401.01, Current Readiness System, October 15, 1996, p. A-1.

<sup>31</sup> CJCSI 3401.02, Global Status of Resources and Training System, March 19, 1999, p. B-1.

<sup>32</sup> CJCSI 3150.25, Joint After Action Reporting System, August 25, 1997.

<sup>33</sup> CJCSM 3150.01, Joint Reporting Structure General Instructions, June 30, 1999.

**(3) Associated Lower-Level Processes:** Preparation of reports by Unified Commands, Combat Support Agencies, and Military Departments and Services (See Volume IV: Chapter 7, The Unified Commands, Chapter 8, the Military Departments and Services, and Chapter 9, The Defense Logistics Agency, and Volume VI: Chapter 4, The Defense Intelligence Agency, and Chapter 5, The National Security Agency).

## **G. Preparation:**

### **(1) Major Activities:**

**(a)** VCJCS insures acquisition programs conform to guidance and strategy by advising the Defense Acquisition Executive at critical acquisition points for major programs as vice chairman of the Defense Acquisition Board.

**(b)** VCJCS oversees the Requirements Generation System through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. The JROC validates formal documents for certain requirements, including:

**(i) JROC-Approved Mission Needs Statements (MNS):** A MNS is a non-system-specific statement containing operational capability needs and written in broad operational terms.

**(ii) JROC-Approved Capstone Requirements Documents (CRD):** A CRD is a document that contains performance-based requirements to facilitate development of individual Operational Requirements Documents (ORDs) by providing a common framework and operational concept to guide their development.

**(iii) JROC-Approved ORDs:** An ORD is a statement containing performance and related operational parameters for the proposed concept or system.

**(c)** Formulates policies for the Joint Training of the Armed Forces through the Joint Training System. Publishes the Universal Joint Task List, which contains a comprehensive hierarchical listing of the tasks that can be performed by a joint military force. The UJTL also contains a common language of conditions that is used to describe the operational context in which tasks are performed. Finally, the UJTL contains a menu of measures of performance for each UJTL task. These measures are used to develop standards of performance consistent with mission requirements. The UJTL does not address how a task is performed (found in Joint doctrine), or "who performs the task" (found in the concept of operations). The UJTL does identify "what" is to be performed in terms common to multiple combatant commands and joint force components.<sup>34</sup>

**(2) Major Stakeholders:** The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (USD (A&T)), USD (P&R), CINCs, Services.

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<sup>34</sup> CJCSM 3500.04A, The Universal Joint Task List, September 13, 1996.

**H. Key Organizational Processes:** (See Appendices 6, 7, and 8 for process maps).

**(a) Requirements Generation System:** The requirements generation process is uniform throughout the Department of Defense. The generation of requirements consists of four distinct phases: definition, documentation, validation, and approval.

**(i) Definition Phase:** During the definition phase, a mission need is defined, described, and justified to satisfy a capability deficiency or exploit a technological opportunity. Mission needs are identified as a direct result of continuing assessments (Mission Area Analysis or equivalent Service or DoD component procedure) of current and projected capabilities in the context of changing military threats and national defense policy. Mission needs are assessed to determine if they can be satisfied through nonmateriel solutions such as changes in doctrine, operational concepts, tactics, training, or organization. If this is not feasible, then a new acquisition program may be considered.

**(ii) Documentation Phase:** During the documentation phase, standardized documents in support of the defined mission need are prepared and reviewed.

**(iii) Validation Phase:** During the validation phase, a formal review of the requirements documents is conducted by an operational authority other than the user, to confirm the identified need and operational requirement.

**(iv) Approval Phase:** Approval is a formal sanction that the validation process is complete and the identified need or operational capabilities described in the documentation are valid. Approval also warrants concept definition studies for a possible new acquisition program and certifies that the requirements documentation has been subject to the uniform process of the DoD 5000 series directives.<sup>35</sup>

**(b) The Joint Requirements Oversight Council:** The JROC supports the JCS in providing inputs to the Preparation and Resourcing national security processes. CJCS employs the JROC process and inputs from the CINCs and Service Chiefs to help fulfill statutory responsibilities to influence programming and budget guidance and to develop joint resource recommendations. The JROC is composed of CJCS, an Army officer in the grade of general, a Navy officer in the grade of admiral, an Air force officer in the grade of general, and a Marine Corps officer in the grade of general.<sup>36</sup> In practice, VCJCS chairs JROC as the Chairman's representative. The Service positions are filled by the Service Vice Chiefs. The JROC functions include:<sup>37</sup>

**(i)** Assist the Chairman in identifying and assessing the priority of joint military requirements (including existing systems and equipment) and acquisition programs to meet the NMS.

**(ii)** Assist the Chairman in carrying out the duties of spokesman for the CINCs on operational requirements.

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<sup>35</sup> CJCSI 3170.01, Requirements Generation System, June 13, 1997.

<sup>36</sup> CJCSI 5123.01, Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, May 2, 1997, p. A-2.

<sup>37</sup> The Joint Requirements Oversight Council is mandated by Title 10, U.S.C., Sec. 181.

(iii) Assist the Chairman in carrying out the responsibilities of assessing warfighting capabilities.

(iv) Assist the Chairman in considering alternatives to any acquisition program that has been identified to meet military requirements by evaluating the cost, schedule, and performance criteria of the program and identified alternatives.

(v) Assist the Chairman in assigning joint priority among existing and future major programs meeting valid requirements identified by the combatant commands, Services, and other DoD agencies. It will also ensure that the assignment of such priorities conforms to and reflects resource levels as projected by the Secretary of Defense through the DPG.

(vi) Assist VCJCS in carrying out the responsibilities of Vice Chairman of the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB).

(vii) Review all warfighting deficiencies that may necessitate major defense acquisition programs and validate that such deficiencies cannot be satisfied by nonmaterial means (changes in doctrine, tactics, training, or organization).

(viii) Review and approve the military need for all potential major defense acquisition programs and validate performance objectives and thresholds in the acquisition program baseline for all such programs prior to any milestone consideration by the DAB.

(ix) Identify, evaluate, and designate potential candidates for joint acquisition programs.

(x) Resolve cross-Service requirements issues.

(xi) In each of its reviews of military needs and acquisition programs, place emphasis on ensuring interoperability, pursuing opportunities for joint or multi-Service applications, eliminating unnecessary duplication in programs, and promoting economies of scale.<sup>38</sup>

(c) The JROC is supported by the JROC Review Board (JRB), which was established in April 1996 to frame issues, evaluate options, and propose recommendations for JROC consideration. The JRB is comprised of flag officers from each of the Services, designated by the JROC member of the Service concerned. The Joint Staff J8 chairs the JRB.

**(d) Joint Training System:** The JTS supports the JCS in the Preparation national security process. The JTS provides an integrated, requirements-based methodology for aligning training programs with assigned missions consistent with command priorities and available resources. This system emphasizes the direct linkage among the NMS, combatant command mission requirements, and training. The JTS is a four-phase cyclical process. The process starts with identification of capability requirements and proceeds through planning, execution, and assessment. Imbedded in the execution and assessment phases is the Joint After-Action Reporting System. At combatant command level, initial theater planning guidance and

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<sup>38</sup>CJCSI 5123.01, pp. A-1, A-2.

priorities are found in the NSS, NMS, JSCP, DPG, CPG, theater contingency plans, and applicable treaties. Combatant commanders translate guidance into theater specific strategies and plans and generate task lists based on the identification of specified and implied tasks. These specified and implied tasks identified during mission analysis are then related to the Universal Joint Task List. In joint training, those collective tasks that are identified as mission essential (i.e., mission has a high probability of failure should this task not be performed effectively) are termed Joint Mission Essential Tasks (JMETs).<sup>39</sup>

**(i)** CJCS requires that Combatant Commanders develop and submit Joint Training Plans (JTPs) annually to reflect the CINC's scheduled exercises and training events. These JTPs identify the training audience; list training objectives; select the training method (academic, command post exercise, or field training exercise); and outline a summary of the events and resources required to accomplish the training objectives. JFCOM's JTP also focuses on common operational joint tasks by training commanders and joint staffs to operate as within a joint task force structure.<sup>40</sup>

**(ii)** CINC-sponsored exercises and training events are scheduled and executed by the respective Unified Command. The Unified Command Exercise and Training Scheduling Conference is the formal coordination vehicle for developing the command's training program. These conferences have attendees from component commands, supporting joint commands, the Joint Staff, Services, and other agencies. Conferees discuss the overall direction of training programs, resolve conflicts (such as transportation and supportability), eliminate redundancy, and plan within the existing and forecast resource constraints. After the Exercise and Training Scheduling Conference, the command's Joint Exercise Schedule is forwarded to the Joint Staff J7 for review. This submission covers the POM years and forms the basis for deconfliction within the Worldwide Joint Training Conference, which sets the stage for all joint training planning throughout the upcoming year. The Joint Staff J7 hosts the Worldwide Joint Training Conference, updates training guidance and resource allocation, resolves training issues, and identifies potential scheduling problems. Attendees come from Unified Commands, Services, Defense agencies, and other activities.

**(iii)** The Unified Command staff coordinates directly with other supporting commands, Services, and agencies on all relevant matters pertaining to the planning and execution of its joint exercises. The Joint Staff is kept informed and will resolve conflicts upon request. Transportation, personnel, and equipment are critical issues that must be coordinated throughout the training process. Initially, each command receives estimates of resource availability from the Joint Staff and the United States Transportation Command during the Worldwide Training Conference. These estimates will allow the command to conduct initial planning for the outyears and to continue to refine near-term years in final coordination. The resources required for real-world events, however, can have drastic effects on the worldwide exercise picture. CJCS determines the priority of support in the event of resource conflicts.

**(iv)** Exercise funding is programmed and managed by several headquarters activities. The Joint Staff is responsible for exercise transportation funding to include airlift, sealift, port handling, and inland transportation. This "funding" is actually

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<sup>39</sup> CJCSI 3500.01, Joint Training Policy for the Armed Forces Of The United States, July 1, 1997, pp. 4, 16-20.

<sup>40</sup> Information on Joint Training was primarily derived from CJCSM 3500.03, Joint Training Manual for the Armed Forces of the United States, September 18, 1998 and CJCSI 3500.02B, Joint Training Master Plan 2000 for the Armed Forces of the United States, May 1, 1998.

allocated to the CINCs in the form of "chits" that they redeem. The Joint Staff also centrally manages exercise related construction. The Services are responsible for funding all other exercise expenses, known as incremental expenses, such as consumable supplies, per diem, non-aviation fuel, and communications. Incremental funding does not include those outputs funded in other Service accounts such as flying hours, steaming days, or tank miles. CINCs play an important role in the exercise funding process. Transportation requirements are based on Combatant Command and Service estimates. The accuracy of Unified Command estimates and the viability of the command training programs contribute to the Joint Staff's ability to successfully describe and defend the worldwide joint exercise program. CINCs may also verbalize the importance of exercise funding via other avenues such as Integrated Priority Lists and direct input to the Secretary of Defense or Congress.

**(2) Associated Higher-Level Processes:** Defense Acquisition Board (See Volume IV, Chapter 2, The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology).

**(3) Associated Lower-Level Processes:** Unified Command and Service development of MNS, CRDs, and ORDs. Unified Command development of joint exercises / training events and Joint Mission Essential Task Lists. Service development of Service-specific task lists (See Volume IV: Chapter 7, The Unified Commands, and Chapter 8, The Military Departments and Services).

## **I. Resourcing:**

### **(1) Major Activities:**

**(a)** CJCS helps set DoD resourcing priorities as a member of the Defense Resources Board.

**(b)** Advises the Secretary of Defense during program and budget reviews, on the extent to which program recommendations and budget proposals of the Military Departments and other DoD components conform with the priorities established in strategic plans and with the priorities established for the requirements of the combatant commands. Analyzes Presidential Budget Decisions (PBDs) for warfighting impact. Advises the Secretary of Defense on Major Budget Issues (MBIs).

**(c)** CJCS provides Congress an annual Posture Statement and delivers congressional testimony on the status and joint requirements of the armed forces.

**(d)** Prepares and submits advice and recommendations for consideration in early development of the DPG to the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Planning Document.

**(e)** CJCS acts as spokesman for the CINCs on operational and logistics requirements of their commands.

**(f)** Employs the JROC/JWCA process and inputs from the CINCs and Service Chiefs to highlight CINC concerns, analyze common concerns across commands, influence programming and budget guidance, and develop joint resource recommendations.

(g) CJCS prepares and submits the Chairman's Program Recommendation to the Secretary of Defense that provides CJCS' personal recommendations for consideration in publishing the DPG. The CPR focuses on enhancing joint readiness and warfighting requirements, and provides CJCS' personal programming and budget recommendations to the Secretary of Defense for consideration as he finalizes the DPG.<sup>41</sup> The CPR development process considers the initial input provided in the JPD and may expand, refine, or modify programming priorities provided in the JPD, focusing on recommendations that will enhance joint readiness, promote joint doctrine and training, and better satisfy joint warfighting requirements.<sup>42</sup>

(h) CJCS prepares and submits to the Secretary of Defense the Chairman's Program Assessment that provides CJCS' personal appraisal on alternate program recommendations and budget proposals for consideration in refining the defense program and budget. The CPA provides CJCS' personal advice to the Secretary of Defense on the balance and capabilities of the composite Service programs to achieve the NMS and outlines the risks inherent in those force capabilities. It is submitted in order to impact Program Decision Memorandums and the budget review. The CPA development process considers the broad programmatic direction of the draft JPD.<sup>43</sup>

**(2) Major Stakeholders:** OSD Comptroller, OSD PA&E, CINCs, Services.

**J. Key Organizational Processes:** (See Appendix 9 for process map). JROC, supported by the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment process. JROC oversees the JWCA process and its teams of warfighting and functional area experts from the Joint Staff, combatant commands, services, OSD, Defense agencies, and others as required to conduct JWCA assessments. JWCA teams identify deficiencies and strengths in joint warfighting capabilities and make programmatic recommendations for more effective resource allocations. Once vetted through the JROC Review Board and approved by the JROC, JWCA assessments are used to assist CJCS in development of the CPR and CPA. The JROC and JRB, accompanied by JWCA team representatives, visit the CINC staffs twice each year to discuss JWCA study results that ultimately lead to proposed CPR/CPA language. After the JROC's semi-annual CINC trips, the JROC CPR and CPA recommendations to the Chairman are finalized.<sup>44</sup> Current JWCA areas and their Joint Staff sponsors are listed in the following table.

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<sup>41</sup> CJCSI 8501.01, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commander in Chiefs of the Combatant Commands, and Joint Staff Participation in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, April 1, 1999, pg. B-3.

<sup>42</sup> CJCSI 3100.01, The Joint Strategic Planning System, 1 Sep 99, pg. D-6.

<sup>43</sup> CJCSI 3100.01, pg. D-6. There has been some criticism that both the CPA and CPR are produced too late in the PPBS cycle to have much impact. Interviews indicate that over the past few programming and budget cycles, the documents have influenced the DoD program and budget (see observations section).

<sup>44</sup> CJCSI 8501.01, pg. B-2.

JWCA Area	Sponsor
Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance	J2
Combating Terrorism	J3
Information Operations	J3
Joint Readiness	J3
Strategic Mobility & Sustainability	J4
Deterrence / Counterproliferation of WMD	J5
Command & Control	J6
Land & Littoral Warfare	J8
Reform Initiative	J8
Regional Engagement / Presence	J8
Sea, Air, & Space Superiority	J8
Strike	J8

**(1) Associated Higher-Level Processes:** OSD PPBS activities (See Volume IV, Chapter 1, Office of the Secretary of Defense).

**(2) Associated Lower-Level Processes:** Development of Service Program Objective Memoranda (POMs) and budgets. Development of Unified Command Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs).

**K. Other Joint Staff Processes that Relate to National Security:** JCS matters of joint interest are generally discussed in the JCS conference room, informally known as “the Tank” (See Appendix 10 for process map). Tank meetings are held to address issues best resolved in this forum as opposed to bilateral discussions; review a proposed joint action of major significance; and discuss significant matters with U.S. Government representatives and foreign officials. CJCS, DJS, or Vice DJS provides the agenda for Tank meetings. Services may request an item be put on the agenda. Secretary of Defense and JCS meetings in the Tank are private executive conferences.<sup>45</sup>

Tank Meetings are often held below the JCS level. In the joint arena, a body of senior flag or general officers assists in resolving matters that do not require JCS attention. Each Service Chief appoints an operations deputy who works with the Director of the Joint Staff to form the subsidiary body known as the Operations Deputies or the OPSDEPS. They meet in sessions chaired by the Director to consider issues of lesser importance or to review major issues before they reach the Joint Chiefs of Staff. With the exception of the Director, this body is not part of the Joint Staff. There is also a subsidiary body known as the Deputy Operations Deputies (DEPOPSDEPs), composed of the Vice Director, of the Joint Staff, and a two-star flag or general officer appointed by each Service Chief. Currently, the DEPOPSDEPs are the Service directors for plans. Issues come before the DEPOPSDEPs to be settled at their level or forwarded to the OPSDEPS. Except for the Vice Director, the DEPOPSDEPs are not part of the Joint Staff.

The Director of the Joint Staff, is authorized to review and approve issues when there is no dispute between the Services, when the issue does not warrant JCS attention, when the proposed action is in conformance with CJCS policy, or when the issue has not been raised by a

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<sup>45</sup> CJCSM 5002.01, Meetings in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Conference Room, February 1, 1999.

member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Actions completed by either the OPSDEPs or DEPOPSDEPs will have the same effect as actions by the JCS.<sup>46, 47</sup>

## 6. Informal National Security Process Involvement.

**A. Daily Morning Meetings:** The personal relationship between CJCS, VCJCS, and the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense is very critical to the effectiveness and efficiency of the key national security processes. Each morning when they are in Washington, the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, CJCS, and VCJCS meet. These meetings are informal and deal with present and future problems. On most issues, these key Defense leaders are in complete agreement.

**B. Weekly Foreign Policy Breakfast:** CJCS attends weekly meetings with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the National Security Advisor, and the Director of Central Intelligence. This is an informal meeting with no prepared agenda.

**C. Weekly Deputies Luncheon:** VCJCS attends the weekly Deputies Luncheon.

**D. Staff Meetings:** There is a good process internal to the Joint Staff to plan for and integrate various views on the issues of the day, at least at the senior levels. On Monday and Friday mornings there is a full-up staff meeting. On Wednesday, representatives of the Defense Combat Support Agencies attend. On other days, the attendees vary depending on the issues that need to be worked. In the evening, there is another meeting between the Chairman, Vice Chairman, the Assistant to the Chairman, and the Director of the Joint Staff to discuss what actions were taken during the day.

## 7. Funding and Personnel.

**A. Authorizations and Appropriations:** Funds for the JCS are appropriated under the category of Operation & Maintenance, Defense-Wide appropriation, which provides funds for the overall management of the Department of Defense, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff.<sup>48</sup>

**B. Budget:** The JCS budget is aggregated under the Defense-Wide category in the DoD budget. The following table shows the JCS budget for FY 97– FY 00.

**JCS Budget**<sup>49</sup>

Fiscal Year	Total Budget (in \$ thousands)
FY 1997	\$553,861
FY 1998	\$553,418
FY 1999	\$515,667
FY 2000	\$540,916

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<sup>46</sup> JCS Link, [www.dtic.mil/jcs](http://www.dtic.mil/jcs).

<sup>47</sup> Those interviewed think that the "Tank Process" is very effective in resolving issues among the Services. DEPOPSDEPs meetings are the most parochial, but as the discussions move up to the OPSDEPs and the Chiefs, parochialism often gives way to the best joint solution. The interviewees stated that the process insures that all sides of an issue get aired and assessed and that when you get a decision it sends a very powerful message—to both the Administration and the CINCs.

<sup>48</sup> Office of the Secretary of Defense. FY 2000/2001. Biennial Budget Estimate, pp 36-46. February 1999.

<sup>49</sup> Source: FY 99 and FY 00 President's Budget.

**C. Manpower:** The Joint Staff has 1,403 manpower positions authorized. All are involved in national security processes.

## **8. Observations.**

**A.** The senior Joint Staff leadership was unanimous in describing the relationship between the Joint Staff and the OSD staff as "the best it has ever been." The staffs work together very closely on most issues and sometimes the line between the two staffs blurs to the point that they appear to share responsibilities. There are three probable reasons for this close relationship: (1) many members of the senior OSD staff have been in position throughout both Clinton administrations and have a great deal of corporate memory, (2) the very close personal relationship between the Chairman, Vice Chairman, the Secretary of Defense, and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and (3) the fact that both staffs have been impacted by staff reductions. Some of the senior leaders commented that the relationship is on the verge of becoming too close. These interviewees felt that the competition that often results from the division of responsibilities between OSD, the Joint Staffs, and the Services was a strength of the U.S. defense structure.

**B.** The senior Joint Staff leaders were also unanimous in describing the evolution of Joint Staff activity in the resource allocation arena as "successful." One example given was the five-year, \$112B plus-up DoD was able to effect recently. They gave three reasons for this observation: (1) the current outstanding relationship among the key players (Joint Staff, OSD, Services, and CINCs), (2) the effectiveness of the JROC/JRB/JWCA process, and (3) the political environment. When asked specifically about the JROC, they commented that the JROC is a forcing function--it gets the issues on the table. Although the JROC has not eliminated cross-Service rivalry for programs, they believe it has made progress in addressing future warfighting requirements from a joint perspective. After going through the JWCA/JRB/JROC process the leadership doesn't have to argue about the facts--they can concentrate on options. There was general consensus that, although the process may not have tackled tough inter-Service issues initially, it continues to mature as a valuable joint decision mechanism. One of the most significant enhancements to the JROC process was the formation of the JRB, which allows the Services to frame the issues below the 4-star level, similar to the Tank. The senior leadership also felt that the JWCA teams had matured to the point where they were making value-added inputs to the process, although the effectiveness of the individual JWCA teams was said to vary. One capability that the JWCA teams do provide is the ability to conduct short-notice, focused assessments very quickly. It should be noted that, because the JWCA teams are matrixed organizations, JWCA participation can tax staff members who have other assigned duties. To alleviate this, the amount of contractor support for the JWCA teams has grown since their inception.

**C.** The senior Joint Staff leadership stated that the CPA was "the most important military document in the resource allocation process." The JROC, supported by the JWCA teams, works on the CPA very hard. After JROC deliberations, the VCJCS works on the document personally with the Chairman. If there are points of contention between the CINCs and/or Services, the Vice Chairman presents the positions to the Chairman, and the Chairman makes the decision. We were told that the Joint Staff had not lost an issue on the CPA and that the latest CPA resulted in the reallocation of \$4.5B across a \$300B POM. However, at least one leader conceded that the Joint Staff tends not to take on issues it feels it can not win. There was

a general consensus that the system was starting to take on more difficult problems in the resource allocation arena. The next step in the evolution of the JROC process will be to define the interface with U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) as JFCOM takes on an enhanced role in resource allocation.


**D.** There are two observations that can be made regarding the impact of emerging information technologies on planning and mission execution processes. Both observations were made by senior Joint Staff leaders while referring to the Kosovo operation. Both also related to the fact that video teleconferences and the quick access to theater information facilitated civilian decision making during crisis planning and ongoing operations. The first observation was that major exercises (e.g., Ulchi Focus Lens) should include civilian leadership participation to ensure CINC staffs and the civilian leadership become more comfortable with the technology and better understand each other's roles. The second observation was that the quick access to theater information allowed the NSC staff to work issues before they had the benefit of military advice and recommendations. Although those we interviewed stated that rapid NSC access to theater information was not an issue during Kosovo operations, the implication was that such access could result in improperly formed decisions during future crises.

**E.** Interviews indicated that the relationship between the Joint Staff and NSC is good at the working level. There was general consensus that the interagency process works well in developing courses of action, but does not sufficiently involve other Departments and agencies in implementation. There was an acknowledgement that the other Departments may not be equipped or funded to respond at the level that they should. The general feeling was that PDD 56 is a significant document but it is not yet a cohesive process. Those interviewed related that parts of PDD 56 work well. For example, there is good information flow and direction through the Deputies Committee. However, interviewees stated that there is little to no pol-mil planning conducted. Some participants felt that pol-mil planning may be unrealistic, because the situations are too dynamic. The consensus among the Joint Staff leadership appeared to be that DoD is the best organized and resourced to act and that the military culture drives DoD into a leadership position. In order to do interagency deliberate pol-mil planning, most interviewees thought that the culture in the other Departments would have to change.


Although DoD's deliberate planning process accounts for interagency roles (Annex V of the CINCs' Operation Plans contains the pol-mil considerations), the process appears to be DoD-centric, with not much dedicated interagency participation in the planning process. The Annex V concept should be more fully explored as a conceptual framework for pol-mil planning as prescribed in PDD 56.

**APPENDICES**


## Joint Staff - Key Process – (Formal) - Strategy Development




## Joint Staff- Key Process - (Formal) - Policy, Guidance, and Regulation



### Joint Staff- Key Process - (Formal) - Planning




### Joint Staff- Key Process - (Formal) – Mission Execution




COA - Course of Action  
 NCA - National Command Authorities  
 NMCC - National Military Command Center  
 OPORD - Operation Order

Joint Staff- Key Process - (Formal) – Mission Execution (continued)




### Joint Staff- Key Process - (Formal) - Observation, Orientation, and Oversight



CRS - Current Readiness System  
 JMRR - Joint Monthly Readiness Review  
 JNA - Joint Net Assessment  
 JSR - Joint Strategic Review  
 JWCA - Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment  
 QRRC - Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress  
 SROC - Senior Readiness Oversight Council


Joint Staff - Key Process - (Formal) - Preparation - Requirements Generation Process (MNS)




Definition

Validation

Joint Staff - Key Process - (Formal) - Preparation - Requirements Generation Process (MNS) (continued)




Joint Staff- Supporting Process - (Formal) - JWCA, JRB, & JROC



IPL - Integrated Priority List  
 JRB - Joint Review Board  
 JROC - Joint Requirements Oversight Council  
 JWCA - Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment


Joint Staff- Key Process - (Formal) - Preparation - Joint Training System



CCTI - Chairman's Commended Training Issues  
 JCLL - Joint Center for Lessons Learned  
 JMETL - Joint Mission Essential Task List  
 JMRR - Joint Monthly Readiness Review  
 JTP - Joint Training Plan  
 JWCA - Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment  
 NMS - National Military Strategy  
 UJTL - Universal Joint Task List



Joint Staff- Key Process - (Formal) - Tank Process



## **ORGANIZATIONAL DESCRIPTION**

### **U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND**



*Prepared for the U.S. Commission on National Security/21<sup>st</sup> Century*

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

### **U.S. Joint Forces Command**

#### **Overview**

The United States Atlantic Command (ACOM) was redesigned on October 1, 1999 as United States Joint Forces Command (JFCOM). The transitional history of this Combatant Command, with both geographic and functional responsibilities, indicates its growing role in the U.S. Defense structure. The Commander-in Chief (CINC) of JFCOM exercises Combatant Command over more than 80 percent of all of the operational forces in the U.S. military. The impact of this responsibility is an expanded focus of JFCOM beyond its traditional geographic area of responsibility (AOR). Over the past few years, JFCOM's AOR has been significantly reduced in recognition of the fact that its role as integrator, trainer, and provider is now its central responsibility.

#### **Organization**

The evolving nature of JFCOM's responsibilities as Joint Force Integrator, Joint Force Trainer, and Joint Force Provider in that order, has driven a restructuring of its headquarters staff and subordinate organizations. As an indication of how it sees its role, in recent reorganizations of the ACOM/JFCOM staff, the command:

- Created a Joint Experimentation Directorate (J9), headed by a two-star officer;
- Downgraded the Operations Directorate (J3) two-star position to a one-star billet;
- Eliminated the Plans Directorate (J5) two-star position and incorporated its functions into the J3 and J8 directorates;
- Created a new two-star Chief of Staff position; and
- Upgraded the Requirements Interoperability & Strategy Directorate (J8) position to two-stars in anticipation of the additional requirements focus of the command.

The primary drivers for the headquarters restructuring were 21 new or expanded mission areas, a scarcity of joint billets, no funding growth, and a desire to improve efficiency. Interviews with the JFCOM staff indicate that the emphasis within the command is shifting from the J3/J5 to the Joint Training and Exercises Directorate (J7), the J8, and the J9.

JFCOM's Service component commands include the Navy's U.S. Atlantic Fleet, the Army's Forces Command, the Air Force's Air Combat Command, and the Marine Corps Forces, Atlantic. Sub-Unified Commands and joint task forces subordinate to CINC JFCOM include Special Operations Command Atlantic Command, U.S. Forces Azores, and the Iceland Defense Force. In December 1997, the Secretary of Defense issued the Defense Reform Initiative Report, which transferred five activities formerly controlled by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to then CINC ACOM as joint force commands. The current joint force commands subordinate to JFCOM include the Joint Warfighting Center, the Joint C4ISR Battle Center, the Joint Warfare Analysis Center, the Joint Communications Support Element, the

Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, the All Service Combat Identification and Evaluation Team, Joint Task Force (JTF) Six, which supports counterdrug operations, and JTF Civil Support.

### Role in Formal and Informal National Security Processes

The following matrix summarizes JCS products and roles in relation to the seven key national security processes.

		Strategy Development	Policy, Guidance, and Regulations	Planning	Mission Execution	Observation, Orientation, and Oversight	Preparation	Resourcing
<b>Products</b>	Inputs to key NSC, OSD, and JCS national security documents (e.g., NSS, NMS, DPG, JSCP)	✓	✓					
	JFCOM Command Strategy	✓						
	CINC JFCOM Instructions		✓					
	JFWC development of Joint Publications (Joint Doctrine)		✓					
	Direction for Operational Missions		✓		✓			
	Operational Plans, Concept Plans, Functional Plans, Theater Engagement Plans			✓				
	Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR) Reports					✓		
	Joint After Action Reporting System (JAARS) Reports					✓		
	Interoperability Input on DoD Requirements Documents (e.g., MNS, ORDs, CRDs)						✓	
	JFCOM Generated Mission Needs Statements						✓	
	Joint Experimentation Campaign Plan						✓	
	JFCOM Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL)						✓	
	JFCOM Joint Training Plan (JTP)						✓	
	Joint Training through JWFC						✓	
	Joint Training Requirements Analysis						✓	
	CINC's Integrated Priority List							✓
	Quarterly Report to SECDEF	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	JFCOM input to CJCS and SECDEF throughout the PPBS Process	✓	✓	✓				✓
	<b>Roles</b>	Joint Force Trainer						✓
Joint Force Integrator		Concept Development	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
		Joint Experimentation						✓
Joint Force Provider				✓	✓		✓	
Geographic CINC	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	

**Strategy Development.** JFCOM provides input through the Joint Staff on key strategy documents, including the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Military Strategy (NMS), the Joint Strategy Review (JSR), the Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG), and the Joint Planning Document (JPD).

**Policy, Guidance, and Regulation.** JFCOM provides input to key documents, including the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), the Unified Command Plan (UCP), and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) through the Joint Staff. The command also assists the Joint Staff in the development of Joint Doctrine through the Joint Warfighting Center and develops CINC JFCOM Instructions that relate to the administration and operating procedures of the command.

**Planning.** JFCOM develops plans in accordance with DoD's deliberate planning process. Combatant Commanders also formulate theater engagement plans (TEPs) for peacetime engagement in support of the NSS within the command's AOR. During crises, CINCs expand and refine existing plans or develop new plans, and recommend courses of action. CINC JFCOM performs two primary roles in the planning process.

- As a supported commander within the JFCOM AOR, CINC JFCOM has primary responsibility for all aspects of any task assigned by the JSCP or other joint operation planning authority.
- As a supporting commander to other CINCs, CINC JFCOM develops supporting plans and provides augmentation forces to a designated supported commander.

**Mission Execution.** CINC JFCOM is the highest-ranking military officer in the chain of command for the conduct of military operations within JFCOM's area of responsibility. During mission execution as a supported CINC, CINC JFCOM refines plans, directs operations, and reports to the National Command Authority. As a supporting CINC, CINC JFCOM refines supporting plans, directs supporting activities, and reports to the National Command Authority. Recently JFCOM was assigned new mission execution responsibilities for domestic weapons of mass destruction (WMD) contingency response. The command is establishing a JTF Civil Support for this mission.

**Observation, Orientation, and Oversight.** JFCOM provides Training and Readiness Oversight (TRO) for assigned forces and prepares Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR) reports for submission to the Joint Staff. The Secretary of Defense has given CINC JFCOM and other Combatant Commanders Training and Readiness Oversight over assigned forces, including reserve component forces when not on active duty and when on active duty for training. Although the command processes for exercising TRO are still evolving, JFCOM is designing processes to monitor readiness status of assigned forces; identify reserve component issues in JFCOM products (e.g., Integrated Priority List (IPL), JMRR inputs); and provide guidance to Service component commanders on operational requirements and priorities for their training programs, to include reserve component forces.

**Preparation.** JFCOM's role in preparation processes has expanded in recent years. Currently, the command develops DoD's Joint Experimentation program; provides reviews and inputs on interoperability of new capabilities throughout the requirements generation process; and develops and maintains joint force capabilities that meet the specified requirements of the supported Combatant Commander.

- CINC JFCOM is designated as DoD's Executive Agent for conducting joint warfighting experimentation to explore, demonstrate, and evaluate joint warfighting concepts. Recommendations from joint experimentation having potential materiel solutions are forwarded by CINC JFCOM to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) for review. These recommendations could be the basis to conduct a joint mission need analysis.

- In the requirements generation process, CINC JFCOM serves as the Chairman's advocate for joint warfighting interoperability. In this role, JFCOM provides the warfighter perspective during the development of joint operational concepts to ensure that joint forces have interoperable systems. JFCOM provides comments during the staffing process for various requirements documents and may comment on interoperability issues that are forwarded to the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) by the JROC.

- CINC JFCOM develops and submits Joint Training Plans (JTP) annually to reflect the CINC's scheduled exercises and training events. JFCOM's JTP also focuses on common operational joint tasks across all of the Unified Commands by training commanders and joint staffs to operate within a joint task force structure. The recent merger of the JFCOM J7, the Joint Training Analysis and Simulation Center (JTASC), and the Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) was designed to enhance JFCOM's Joint Training role. The JWFC's role is to develop joint doctrine and assist the Combatant Commanders in training their forces in approved joint doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures, making appropriate use of the best technical tools available. The Combatant CINCs view this role as a mixed blessing. While they rely on the JTASC for exercise simulation, several believe it is their own responsibility—not JFCOM's—to train forces within their theaters.

**Resourcing.** CINC JFCOM prepares and submits an Integrated Priority List (IPL) to CJCS and the Secretary of Defense that identifies JFCOM high-priority needs. The CINC also prepares and submits CINC Quarterly Reports to the Secretary of Defense and CJCS. The command provides input to the Joint Staff at various stages in the Planning Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) process and submits input to CJCS through the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment (JWCA) process to assist in development of the Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA). CINC JFCOM may meet with the Defense Resources Board during the formulation of the Defense Planning Guidance and during the annual program and budget review processes. JFCOM provides input to its Service components for developing JFCOM contributions to each respective Military Department Program Objective Memorandum (POM).

## **Observations**

JFCOM is still reorganizing around its expanded missions and inherited Chairman Controlled Activities. The command recognizes that CINC JFCOM will need support, or at least acquiescence, from the Services and the other CINCs to fully develop the integrator role, particularly as it applies to training, resource allocation, and acquisition of interoperable systems. The eventual working relationship between JFCOM and the Services is yet to be determined.

- During interviews, the JFCOM staff indicated that while the general responsibilities and potential of JFCOM to improve joint capability seem to be recognized, the authority, power and processes to actually effect the resourcing to accomplish true integration and interoperability will take a long time to mature.

- JFCOM's expanding role in Joint Experimentation and Joint requirements has caused concern in the Services as well as in the other Unified Commands. There remains an undercurrent among the Unified Command staffs that JFCOM's responsibilities, especially as the integrator, somehow invade the command prerogatives of the functional and geographic CINCs. In a similar manner, the Services see the expansion of JFCOM's responsibilities as a threat to their Title 10 responsibilities. In recognition of these perceptions, JFCOM has started visiting each Service Chief and Unified Command staff to maintain an open and candid dialogue on JFCOM's new responsibilities.

During interviews, the JFCOM staff acknowledged that for new or emerging systems, the Joint Staff retains the lead in defining requirements. However, although JFCOM remains in a support role, it can be a powerful ally from the field. The JFCOM staff promotes the need for a stronger bridge between JFCOM's authority as the joint requirements champion for legacy capability and the DoD acquisition system, where the authority to engineer and build new material solutions resides.

The JFCOM staff stated that the largest problem with existing requirements and acquisition systems is they are not being monitored and disciplined. JFCOM is currently developing a concept called Joint Warfare C4 Systems Integrator (JWC4SI) as a way to establish the bridge between its role in the requirements process and DoD's acquisition process. The JWC4SI is designed to include dual reporting responsibility—to JFCOM for requirements definition and prioritization, and to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (ASD (C3I)) or the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (USD (A&T)) for acquisition directives.

During interviews with senior leaders at JFCOM and the Joint Staff, the JFCOM role in the requirements process was an item of high interest. CINC JFCOM is evolving as a spokesperson for all the Combatant Commanders in the joint requirements process. JFCOM views this role as more than an amalgamator of the other CINCs' inputs. JFCOM staff members foresee a JFCOM role in the common definition of requirements and acquisition terminology as well as in the development of a common priority listing. The role of JFCOM in the JROC and DAB processes will be critical.

In the near term, JFCOM is seeking to rebalance or influence the requirements process by acting as a forcing function for the integration of capabilities and Service acquisition to support joint interoperability. The JFCOM staff held the position that CINC JFCOM should attend selected JROC and DAB sessions, and that JFCOM should participate in the formal meetings that lead up to these sessions. The JFCOM staff feels it is necessary for CINC JFCOM to have a vote on the JROC. Joint Staff interviews indicated that, although CINC JFCOM is invited to attend JROC sessions, there is no need for the CINC to have a vote.

## ORGANIZATIONAL DESCRIPTION

### UNITED STATES JOINT FORCES COMMAND

#### 1. Legal Specifications, Authorizations and Responsibilities.

**A. Authorizing Statute:** The United States Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) is a Unified Command, established in 1993 as the United States Atlantic Command (ACOM)<sup>1</sup> under the provisions of Title 10, U.S.C., Section 161. The law states that "With the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President, through the Secretary of Defense, shall (1) establish Unified Combatant Commands and Specified Combatant Commands to perform military missions; and (2) prescribe the force structure of those commands. A Unified Combatant command is defined as a military command that has broad, continuing missions and which is composed of forces from two or more military departments. The law stipulates that unless otherwise directed by the President, the chain of command to a Unified or Specified Combatant Command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense, and from the Secretary of Defense to the Commander of the Combatant Command."<sup>2</sup>

#### **B. Department Directives:**

**(1) Department of Defense (DoD) Directive (DODD) 5100.1** describes the functions of the Unified Commands and the Combatant Commanders.<sup>3</sup>

**(2) Unified Command Plan (UCP):** The UCP is the document that establishes the Combatant Commands. It is developed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), approved by the President, and addressed to the Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) of Combatant Commands. The UCP identifies geographic areas of responsibility, assigns primary tasks, defines authority of the commanders, establishes command relationships, and gives guidance on the exercise of Combatant Command. The Unified Command structure is flexible, and can be changed as required to accommodate evolving U.S. national security needs.<sup>4</sup>

**(3) Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF):** This is the authoritative document that contains the doctrine, principles, and policy to govern joint activities of the Armed Forces of the United States. Chapter one contains specific guidance for the Combatant Commands and defines the relationship between the Combatant Commands and the military departments.

**(4) Forces for Unified Command Memorandum:** This document, prepared by the Joint Staff and signed by the Secretary of Defense, assigns all forces of the Armed Services (except as noted in title 10, US Code, section 162)<sup>5</sup> to the various Combatant Commands. A

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<sup>1</sup> The command was renamed the United States Joint Forces Command on October 1, 1999.

<sup>2</sup> Title 10, United States Code, Sections 161-167.

<sup>3</sup> DODD 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components, September 25, 1987.

<sup>4</sup> The UCP has been changed 17 times since 1946.

<sup>5</sup> Title 10 United States Code, Section 162 states that except as otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, forces to be assigned by the Secretaries of the military departments to the Combatant Commands or to the United States element of the North American Aerospace Defense Command do not include forces assigned to carry out functions of the Secretary of a military department listed in sections 3013(b), 5013(b), and 8013(b) of this title or forces assigned to multinational peacekeeping organizations.

force assigned or attached to a Combatant Command may be transferred from that command only as directed by the Secretary of Defense and under procedures prescribed by the Secretary of Defense and approved by the President. Forces assigned by the "Forces for" memorandum are available for normal peacetime operations of the respective command.

**(5) Joint Experimentation:** On 15 May 1998, the Secretary of Defense signed a charter assigning CINC JFCOM as the Executive Agent for conducting joint experimentation within DoD. The charter directs JFCOM to develop and implement an aggressive program of experimentation to foster innovative thinking and rapid fielding of new concepts and capabilities for joint operations.<sup>6</sup>

**C. Interagency Directives:** JFCOM requirements to support interagency matters are communicated through the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

**2. Missions/Functions/Purposes.** The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 defined the command authority of the Combatant Commander as the authority to give direction to subordinate commands, including all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics; prescribe the chain of command within the command; organize commands and forces to carry out assigned missions; employ forces necessary to carry out assigned missions; assign command functions to subordinate commanders; coordinate and approve administration, support, and discipline; and exercise authority to select subordinate commanders and Combatant Command staff. This authority is termed "Combatant Command," and subject to the direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense, resides only in the CINC. Combatant Command is not transferable.<sup>7</sup>

The JFCOM Mission Statement is: "JFCOM maximizes America's present and future military capabilities through joint training, total force integration, and providing ready CONUS-based forces to support other CINCs, the Atlantic Theater, and domestic requirements."<sup>8</sup>

#### **A. Major Responsibilities:**

**(1) DODD 5100.1** lists seven functions of the unified combatant CINCs, such as CINC JFCOM. These include:

**(a)** Giving authoritative direction to subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command, including authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics [Key National Security Process Relationship: Policy, Guidance, and Regulation; Planning; Mission Execution; Preparation];

**(b)** Prescribing the chain of command to the commands and forces within the command [Key National Security Process Relationship: Policy, Guidance, and Regulation; Observation, Orientation and Oversight];

**(c)** Organizing commands and forces within that command as considered necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command [Key National Security Process Relationship: Policy, Guidance, and Regulation; Observation, Orientation and Oversight];

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<sup>6</sup> USACOM Joint Experimentation Implementation Plan, Appendix C, I-Plan Executive Summary.

<sup>7</sup> AFSC Publication 1, Joint Staff Officer's Guide, 1997.

<sup>8</sup> [http://www.acom.mil/acomweb.nsf\\*/AboutJFCOM](http://www.acom.mil/acomweb.nsf*/AboutJFCOM).

(d) Employing forces within that command as considered necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command [Key National Security Process Relationship: Mission Execution];

(e) Assigning command functions to subordinate commanders [Key National Security Process Relationship: Policy, Guidance, and Regulation; Observation, Orientation and Oversight];

(f) Coordinating and approving those aspects of administration, support (including control of resources and equipment, internal organization, and training), and discipline necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command [Key National Security Process Relationship: Policy, Guidance, and Regulation; Observation, Orientation and Oversight; Preparation; Resourcing];

(g) Exercising the authority with respect to selecting subordinate commanders, selecting Combatant Command staff, suspending subordinates, and convening courts-martial<sup>9</sup> [Key National Security Process Relationship: Policy, Guidance, and Regulations; Observation, Orientation, and Oversight].

**(2) Geographic Responsibilities:** CINC JFCOM is one of five Combatant Commanders who have geographic area responsibilities.<sup>10</sup> The UCP states that JFCOM's general geographic area of responsibility for conducting normal operations includes the majority of the Atlantic Ocean excluding the waters around Europe and Africa, South and Central America, and the Gulf of Mexico. It also excludes the Caribbean Sea, its island nations and European possessions, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. The area includes part of the Arctic Ocean and Greenland and other islands (except the United Kingdom and Ireland) in all assigned water areas. The figure to the right shows JFCOM's Area of Responsibility (AOR) As of October 1, 2000.<sup>11</sup>



**Figure 1: JFCOM AOR**

(a) CINCs with geographic areas of responsibility are the highest-ranking military officers in the chain of command for the conduct of military operations and report directly to the National Command Authority, which consists of the Secretary of Defense and the

<sup>9</sup> DODD 5100.1.

<sup>10</sup> During the 1995 UCP review, ACOM opposed realigning responsibility for the Caribbean Basin under SOUTHCOM, viewing the reduction of its geographic area as diminishing its credibility as a joint force trainer. ACOM also believed that this change would prevent it from fully developing its functional role of joint force trainer, integrator, and provider as envisioned in the 1993 UCP review. (See Unified Command Plan: Atlantic and Southern Command Participation in 1995 Review, Briefing Report, 12/05/96, GAO/NSIAD-97-41BR). Today the reduced geographic responsibilities are viewed in the command as facilitating JFCOM's functional roles. The AOR change was followed by the name change from USACOM to JFCOM. "The purpose of this [name] change is to call attention to a much more significant change that underlies it: that is a change in operations from being one of the five major warfighting CINCs to a more functional role of leading the transformation of the joint community into the future." CINC JFCOM quoted in Defense Daily on October 1, 1999.

<sup>11</sup> This map was downloaded from <http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/unified>.

President. The commander of JFCOM also serves as the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) command structure.<sup>12</sup> Within its geographic region, JFCOM has responsibilities that include:

- (i) Combatant Command (as described above);
- (ii) Crisis Response;
- (iii) Regional Engagement and Presence;
- (iv) Nation Assistance;
- (v) Coalition Building;
- (vi) Counterdrug Operations;
- (vii) Peace Operations;
- (viii) Humanitarian Assistance;
- (ix) Military Support to Civilian Authorities; and
- (x) Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances.<sup>13</sup>

**(3) Functional Responsibilities:** JFCOM also has functional responsibilities as a force provider to other Unified Commands, as a joint force integrator, and as a joint trainer.<sup>14</sup>

**(a) Joint Force Provider:** [Key National Security Process Relationship: All]. JFCOM responsibilities include:

(i) Serving as the Joint Deployment Process Owner for the Department of Defense. Maintaining the capability for rapid and decisive military force power projection from the continental United States (CONUS).

(ii) Providing technical advice and assistance to supported CINCs conducting consequence management operations in response to incidents outside CONUS involving weapons of mass destruction.

(iii) Providing, within CONUS, military assistance to civil authorities (including consequence management operations in response to weapons of mass destruction incidents), military support to U.S. civil authorities, and military assistance for civil disturbances, subject to Secretary of Defense approval.

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<sup>12</sup> Although CINC JFCOM is "dual-hatted" as Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT), the Deputy SACLANT, a Royal Navy VADM, oversees SACLANT responsibilities on a day-to-day basis.

<sup>13</sup> These last two responsibilities are unique to JFCOM. Examples of include support for Hurricane Andrew, and Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances as provided during the Los Angeles riots. JFCOM also actively supports counterdrug operations along the southwest border. Although JFCOM does not normally have the lead in these operations, it works in direct support of the non-military agencies involved.—[http://www.acom.mil/acomweb.nsf\\*/AboutJFCOM](http://www.acom.mil/acomweb.nsf*/AboutJFCOM)

<sup>14</sup> The information in this section was derived from [http://www.acom.mil/acomweb.nsf\\*/AboutJFCOM](http://www.acom.mil/acomweb.nsf*/AboutJFCOM) and Unclassified sections of the draft 1999 UCP.

**(b) Joint Force Trainer:** [Key National Security Process Relationship: Preparation]. JFCOM responsibilities include:

- (i) Responsible to CJCS for managing the CINCs' portion of the CJCS exercise program;
- (ii) Conducting and assessing joint and multinational training and exercises for assigned forces;
- (iii) Providing assistance and joint training for CINC battlestaffs and Joint Task Force headquarters staffs;
- (iv) Conducting joint and interoperability training of assigned forces that are to operate as part of joint/combined task forces;
- (v) Coordinating and scheduling joint exercises for assigned forces, as well as deconflicting the participation of forces in support of CINC requirements;
- (vi) Providing Joint Training System expertise to support the development of joint training requirements and methods, joint training plans, and execution of joint exercises;
- (vii) Leading the development and operation of systems and architectures that directly support the distributed joint training requirements of other CINCs, JTFs, and defense agencies; and
- (viii) Providing expertise, advisory support, and strategic planning support within the joint training community on joint training related modeling and simulation issues.

**(c) Joint Force Integrator:** [Key National Security Process Relationship: All]. JFCOM responsibilities include:

- (i) Blending technology, systems, and doctrine to improve interoperability and enhance joint force capabilities.
- (ii) Serving as the DoD executive agent, and being functionally responsible to CJCS for joint warfighting experimentation; and
- (iii) Creating and exploring new joint warfighting concepts as well as planning, designing, preparing, and assessing a program of joint warfighting experimentation.

## **B. Subordinate Agencies and Activities:**

**(1) Military Forces:** JFCOM is assigned those forces attached to its Service component commands. These forces represent nearly 80% of the entire Armed Forces of the United States, or approximately 1.2 million military personnel. JFCOM's component commands include:

- (a) The Navy's U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Norfolk, VA;

(b) The Army's Forces Command, Fort McPherson, GA;

(c) The Air Force's Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, VA;

and

(d) The U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Atlantic, Norfolk, VA.

**(2) Sub-Unified Commands:** The Sub-Unified Commands and joint task forces subordinate to CINC JFCOM are:

(a) Special Operations Command, Atlantic Command, Norfolk, VA;

(b) U.S. Forces Azores, Lajes Field, Azores; and

(c) Iceland Defense Force, Keflavik, Iceland.

**(3) Joint Force Commands:** In December 1997, the Secretary of Defense issued the Defense Reform Initiative Report, which transferred five activities formerly controlled by CJCS to then CINC ACOM as joint force commands. The current joint force commands subordinate to JFCOM are:

(a) **Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC)**, located at Fort Monroe, Virginia, develops and assesses current and future joint doctrine and concepts. This activity, with the Army as Executive Agent, also designs joint and multinational training and exercises.

(b) **Joint Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Battle Center**, located in Suffolk, Virginia, provides assessments of C4ISR and Experimentation capabilities. The Navy is the Executive Agent.

(c) **Joint Warfare Analysis Center** located in Dahlgren, Virginia, assesses effects of targeting, and provides planning support to the Joint Staff and the CINCs. The Navy is the Executive Agent for this activity.

(d) **Joint Communications Support Element**, located at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, is a rapidly deployable, tactical communications unit in support of joint operations. The Air Force is the Executive Agent.

(e) **Joint Personnel Recovery Agency:** The Air Force, as Executive Agent, is merging the Joint Services Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape Agency; the Joint Combat Rescue Agency; and the Joint Combat Search and Rescue Joint Test and Evaluation Center into a single agency, the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency under JFCOM.

(f) **All Service Combat Identification and Evaluation Team:** This team, located at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, is designed to improve combat identification and minimize fratricide among the Armed Services while maintaining or increasing the lethality of weapons employment. The Air Force is the Executive Agent.

**(g) Joint Task Force (JTF) Six:** JTF Six, located at Fort Bliss, Texas, supports counterdrug operations by providing support to domestic law enforcement agencies in five categories: operational, general support, rapid support, intelligence, and engineer.

**(h) JTF Civil Support:** JFCOM has responsibility for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) contingency response, and is establishing a JTF Civil Support for this mission.

**(i) Other organizations reporting to JFCOM include Atlantic Intelligence Command and Cruise Missile Support Activity.<sup>15</sup>**

### **C. Major Products:**

**(1)** Inputs to key National Security Council (NSC), Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) national security documents;

**(2)** JFCOM Command Strategy;

**(3)** CINC JFCOM Instructions;

**(4)** JFWC development of Joint Publications (Joint Doctrine);

**(5)** Direction for Operational Missions;

**(6)** Operational Plans, Concept Plans, Functional Plans, Theater Engagement Plans;

**(7)** Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR) Reports;

**(8)** Joint After Action Reporting System (JAARS) Reports;

**(9)** Interoperability Input on DoD Requirements Documents;

**(10)** JFCOM Generated Mission Needs Statements;

**(11)** Joint Experimentation Campaign Plan;

**(12)** JFCOM Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL);

**(13)** JFCOM Joint Training Plan (JTP);

**(14)** Joint Training through JWFC;

**(15)** Joint Training Requirements Analysis;

**(16)** CINC's Integrated Priority List;

**(17)** Quarterly Report to Secretary of Defense; and

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<sup>15</sup> [http://www.acom.mil/acomweb.nsf\\*/AboutJFCOM](http://www.acom.mil/acomweb.nsf*/AboutJFCOM).

(18) JFCOM input to CJCS and Secretary of Defense throughout the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) process.

### 3. Vision and Core Competencies.

**A. Vision:** JFCOM's published vision is: "United States Joint Forces Command, a Knowledge Based Organization, leads the transformation of U.S. Armed Forces to the capabilities envisioned in JV 2010."<sup>16</sup>

**B. Core Competencies:** Although JFCOM does not have any published core competencies, its core competencies are generally recognized to be expertise in all aspects of military operations and planning.

### 4. Organizational Culture.

**A. Values:** JFCOM values include integrity, dedication to the mission, and loyalty. Although officers assigned to the JFCOM staff maintain their Service identity, interviews indicated that the culture is truly focused on jointness, interoperability, and improving joint warfighting capability. To this end, innovation is highly valued on the staff. The JFCOM staff has fully embraced its vision to "lead the transformation of U.S. Armed Forces. . ."

**B. Leadership Traditions:** All CINC positions are nominative (i.e., they can be held by an officer from any Service), although most have been traditionally affiliated with one or two Services. Since its establishment in 1993, the CINC ACOM and now CINC JFCOM position has been held by a four-star flag officer from the Department of the Navy (USN admiral or USMC general). Based on ACOM/JFCOM's functional responsibilities, each of the ACOM/JFCOM CINCs has been a strong advocate for enhancing the joint nature of the U.S. Armed Forces. These CINCs have all been visionaries and tend to be future-focused to a much greater degree than the other unified CINCs.

**C. Staff Attributes:** The quality of officers assigned to the JFCOM staff is very high. This can be attributed to two factors: first, the increased responsibility given to JFCOM in areas such as Joint Force Integration, Joint Training, and Joint Experimentation; and second the quality improvement in overall joint officer manning, which was driven by the joint officer management provisions of Goldwater-Nichols. JFCOM staff action officers react very quickly. This helps in making sound, timely decisions during crises. Like their CINCs, officers assigned to the JFCOM staff quickly develop a strong advocacy for "jointness" and tend to be visionary.<sup>17</sup>

**D. Strategy:** CINC JFCOM's strategy is built on a foundation of Major Focus Areas (MFAs).<sup>18</sup> The command has established goals for each MFA These include:

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<sup>16</sup> [http://www.acom.mil/acomweb.nsf\\*/AboutJFCOM](http://www.acom.mil/acomweb.nsf*/AboutJFCOM).

<sup>17</sup> Personal staff interviews.

<sup>18</sup> [http://www.acom.mil/acomweb.nsf\\*/AboutJFCOM](http://www.acom.mil/acomweb.nsf*/AboutJFCOM).

**(1) Joint Force Integrator MFA Goals:**

(a) Develop joint, combined and interagency capabilities to improve interoperability and enhance current operational capabilities;

(b) Identify and assess future joint warfare concepts and the required operational capabilities to support them; and

(c) Coordinate and synchronize current integration activities with the development of future operational capabilities.

**(2) Joint Force Trainer MFA Goals:**

(a) Sustain and improve a worldwide, high quality CINC Battle Staff and JTF training program in support of CJCS and CINCs to produce trained Joint commanders and staff members;

(b) Develop and implement a training program for JFCOM CONUS-based forces (active and reserve) focused on current required operational capabilities of the combatant CINCs in order to produce improved joint combat capabilities, certify forces for joint operations and identify operational deficiencies for correction;

(c) Maintain leading-edge capabilities and infrastructure to support all aspects of deployable and distributed joint training event design, planning, execution, and analysis;

(d) Sustain and improve management of the joint training system for CJCS; and

(e) Sustain and improve a coordinated NATO and Partnership for Peace exercise program to meet regional engagement objectives and enhance interoperability.

**(3) Joint Force Provider MFA Goals:**

(a) Improve our ability to assess and predict readiness in a continuing effort to provide combat ready forces to meet worldwide commitments;

(b) Maintain current deployment effectiveness and improve deployment process efficiency; and

(c) Execute responsibilities as a geographic CINC, including improving military support to civil authorities.

**(4) MFA Enabler - Recognition Goal:** JFCOM, as the lead advocate for "jointness," is recognized as America's joint force integrator, trainer and provider; guardian of the home front; and architect for the future of America's military, by the Congress, OSD, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.


**(5) MFA Enabler - Knowledge-Based Organization Goals:**

(a) Make JFCOM a more agile and effective command by empowering key middle-management personnel to make better and faster decisions;

(b) Develop and establish (utilize) knowledge management processes and procedures across JFCOM; and

(c) Establish a system to expand "user" acceptance of the principles of knowledge management and knowledge-based organizations throughout JFCOM.

**E. Organizational Structure:**



**Figure 2: Organizational Structure**

**Notes on Organizational Chart:**<sup>19,20</sup>

(1) The CINC is a unified Combatant Commander-in-chief, supported by a deputy, normal overhead activities including a Chief of Staff and a political advisor (POLAD). Most unified Combatant Commanders with a geographic area of responsibility have a POLAD as a member of their personal staffs. The POLAD is a representative from the Department of State experienced in the political and diplomatic situation in the theater. The POLAD is helpful in advising the CINC and staff on political or diplomatic issues crucial to the planning process, such as overflight and transit rights for deploying forces, basing and servicing agreements.

(2) The Manpower and Personnel Directorate (J1) has overall responsibility to the CINC for all manpower and personnel matters, and for the administration of all military and

<sup>19</sup> [http://www.acom.mil/acomweb.nsf\\*/AboutJFCOM](http://www.acom.mil/acomweb.nsf*/AboutJFCOM).

<sup>20</sup> As an indication of how it sees its role, in the recent reorganization of the JFCOM staff, the J3 two-star position was downgraded to one-star, the J5 two-star position was incorporated into J3, a new two-star Chief of Staff position was created and the J8 position was upgraded to two-stars in anticipation of the additional requirements focus of the command. The primary drivers for the reorganization were 21 new or expanded mission areas, a scarcity of joint billets, no funding growth, and a desire to improve efficiency. Interviews with the JFCOM staff indicate that the emphasis of the organization is shifting to the J9, J7, and J8.

civilian manpower (Active and Reserve Components) from all services for JFCOM and subordinate activities.

**(3) The Intelligence Directorate (J2)** is responsible for ensuring that all-source intelligence is disseminated to subordinate operational commands and manages intelligence collection, processing, production, and dissemination activities within the Atlantic Command intelligence organization. The director serves as the advisor to the CINC for intelligence regarding potential threats to operating forces and national security.

**(4) The Operations Directorate (J3/5)** directs, plans, coordinates, schedules and controls the joint operations and intertheater deployments of all JFCOM forces. The director of Operations serves as principle advisor to the CINC on all operational matters that affect JFCOM, including command and control of assigned U.S. military forces within the CONUS and the JFCOM area of responsibility.

**(5) The Logistics Directorate (J4)** integrates logistics concepts, processes, and plans; conducts joint training; and provides ready CONUS-based support forces to other CINCs, the Atlantic Theater, and domestic requirements. J4 also supports JFCOM headquarters with facilities and logistics management.

**(6) The Command, Control, Communications and Computer Systems (C4) Directorate (J6)** oversees the acquisition and operation of all C4 issues. It also is responsible for the development of policy, plans, resource allocation, and programs for the command to ensure the systems fully meet the needs of the CINC in carrying out his mission.

**(7) The Joint Training and Exercises Directorate (J7)** reviews, coordinates, develops, promulgates, and applies joint doctrine, joint universal lessons learned, and joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTPS) to ensure maximum value to contingency readiness from joint force integration. J7 also conducts joint operations readiness assessments of assigned forces. The Director for Joint Training is responsible for joint force exercise and training development, resource allocation, management, and assessment.

**(8) The Requirements Interoperability and Strategy Directorate (J8)** provides the CINC with the best mix of forces, equipment, and support attainable within fiscal constraints.

**(9) The Joint Experimentation Directorate (J9)** is JFCOM's newest directorate. It manages JFCOM's responsibilities as DoD's Executive Agent for Joint Experimentation, which is one of the primary methods for exploring, testing, and validating or modifying future joint operational concepts to enhance joint doctrine, organization, training and education, material, and leadership.

**5. Formal National Security Process Involvement.** The table on the following page indicates JFCOM's major products and roles in the seven key national security processes.

		Strategy Development	Policy, Guidance, and Regulations	Planning	Mission Execution	Observation, Orientation, and Oversight	Preparation	Resourcing
Products	Inputs to key NSC, OSD, and JCS national security documents (e.g., NSS, NMS, DPG, JSCP)	✓	✓					
	JFCOM Command Strategy	✓						
	CINC JFCOM Instructions		✓					
	JFWC development of Joint Publications (Joint Doctrine)		✓					
	Direction for Operational Missions		✓		✓			
	Operational Plans, Concept Plans, Functional Plans, Theater Engagement Plans			✓				
	Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR) Reports					✓		
	Joint After Action Reporting System (JAARS) Reports					✓		
	Interoperability Input on DoD Requirements Documents (e.g., MNS, ORDs, CRDs)						✓	
	JFCOM Generated Mission Needs Statements						✓	
	Joint Experimentation Campaign Plan						✓	
	JFCOM Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL)						✓	
	JFCOM Joint Training Plan (JTP)						✓	
	Joint Training through JWFC						✓	
	Joint Training Requirements Analysis						✓	
	CINC's Integrated Priority List							✓
	Quarterly Report to SECDEF	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
JFCOM input to CJCS and SECDEF throughout the PPBS Process	✓	✓	✓				✓	
Roles	Joint Force Trainer						✓	
	Joint Force Integrator	Concept Development	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
		Joint Experimentation						✓
	Joint Force Provider			✓	✓		✓	
Geographic CINC	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	

## A. Strategy Development:

### (1) Major Activities:

(a) Provide input to key strategy documents, including the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Military Strategy (NMS), the Joint Strategy Review (JSR), the Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG), and the Joint Planning Document (JPD).

(b) Develop the CINC's Strategy for JFCOM.

**(2) Major Stakeholders:** Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of Defense, JFCOM component commands and subordinate units.

**(3) Key Organizational Processes:** (See Appendix 1 for process map).

**(a)** The JFCOM Strategy, Requirements, and Integration Directorate (J8) is responsible to formulate JFCOM's input to the key national security strategy documents, including the NSS, NMS, JSR, CPG, and JPD. Information for these inputs is gathered from the various directorates of the JFCOM staff, as well as from JFCOM's component commands. The resulting JFCOM input is forwarded to the Joint Staff for inclusion in Joint Staff documents (e.g., NMS, JSR, JPD) and for inclusion in the JCS input to higher order documents (e.g., NSS, CPG).<sup>21</sup>

**(b)** The JFCOM command strategy is also orchestrated by the JFCOM J8. The JFCOM strategic planning system includes a Strategic Planning Group made up of the JFCOM Directors, a Special Studies Group, and an Interoperability Council. The system is facilitated by a JFCOM Strategic Planning Information Network (SPIN) that is maintained by J8. The system develops the command vision, strategic goals, and major focus area goals. Those interviewed stressed that the key to the JFCOM strategic planning process is engagement by the CINC.

**(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes:** Joint Staff input to the NSS and CPG. Joint Staff development of the NMS, JSR, and JPD (See Volume II, Chapter 2, The National Security Council, and Volume IV, Chapter 5, The Joint Chiefs of Staff).

**(5) Associated Lower-Level Processes:** None.

## **B. Policy, Guidance, and Regulation:**

**(1) Major Activities:**

**(a)** Provide input to key documents, including the Defense Planning Guidance, the Unified Command Plan, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), and Joint Doctrine.

**(b)** Develop CINC JFCOM Instructions that relate to the administration and operating procedures of the command.

**(2) Major Stakeholders:** JCS, JFCOM component commands and subordinate units, other Unified Commands.

**(3) Key Organizational Processes:** (See Appendix 2 for process map).

**(a)** The JFCOM Strategy, Requirements, and Integration Directorate (J8) is responsible to formulate JFCOM's input to the key documents, including the DPG, UCP, and JSCP. Information for these inputs is gathered from the various directorates of the JFCOM

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<sup>21</sup> JFCOM's primary role in the NSS is execution and enabling the NSS. The command charter falls primarily in the planning, mission execution, preparation and resourcing. The most effective JFCOM involvement in strategy development and policy would come through the CINC's personal and informal influence in developing the NSS and NMS. However, interviews with the senior JFCOM leadership indicated that JFCOM's influence on the NSS, and even the NMS, is currently not large.

staff, as well as from JFCOM's component commands. The resulting JFCOM input is forwarded to the Joint Staff.

**(b) Joint Doctrine:** Joint Training and Exercises directorate (J7) is the JFCOM point of contact for joint doctrine. All Unified Commands, as well as Services and the Joint Staff, can submit proposals for new Joint Doctrine to fill operational voids. The Joint Staff J7 will validate the requirement with Services and CINCs, and initiate a Program Directive. J7 formally staffs the Program Directive with Services and CINCs. The Program Directive includes scope of project, references, milestones, and who will develop drafts. The approved Program Directive is released to Lead Agent, which can be a Service, CINC, or Joint Staff Directorate. The Lead Agent selects a Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the new Joint Publication. The PRA develops two drafts, each of which is staffed with the CINCs, Services, and Joint Staff. The Lead Agent forwards proposed publication to Joint Staff, which takes responsibility for the document, makes required changes, and prepares publication for formal coordination with the Services and CINCs. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff approves the publication. Once the CINCs receive the publication, they assess it during their day-to-day operations. Eighteen to twenty-four months following publication, the Joint Staff J7 will solicit a written report from the Combatant Commands and Services on the utility and quality of each publication and the need for any urgent changes or earlier-than-scheduled revisions. No later than five years after development, each publication is revised. The Joint Warfighting Center, which was recently assigned to JFCOM from the Joint Staff, assists the Chairman, CINCs, and Service Chiefs in their preparation for joint and multinational operations through the conceptualization, analysis, development, dissemination, assessment, and revision of current and future joint doctrine. The Center oversees the development of Joint Doctrine Publications for the Joint Staff J7, including assessment and distribution of the documents.<sup>22, 23</sup>

**(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes:** Joint Doctrine development process orchestrated by Joint Staff J7. Joint Staff development of the UCP and JSCP. OSD development of the DPG (See Volume IV, Chapter 5, The Joint Chiefs of Staff).

**(5) Associated Lower-Level Processes:** JFCOM Service component command and subordinate command development of command-specific policy, guidance, and regulation (See Volume IV, Chapter 8, The Military Departments and Services).

### **C. Planning:**

**(1) Major Activities:** The Combatant Commanders, including CINC JFCOM, are principally responsible for the preparation and implementation of joint operation plans.

**(a)** During peacetime, CINCs develop operation plans (OPLANs) through DoD's deliberate planning process. The JSCP tasks the Combatant Commanders to prepare joint operation plans that may be OPLANs, including time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD), OPLANs in concept format (CONPLANs) with or without time-TPFDDs, or functional plans. Combatant Commanders also formulate theater engagement plans (TEPs).

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<sup>22</sup> <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/docinfo/process/procchart.htm>

<sup>23</sup> Interviews with Joint Staff personnel indicated that JFCOM may play an even greater role in the doctrine process in the future. The governing directive, JP 1-01 c1, Joint Publication System, Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Development Program, is currently under revision.

(b) During crises, CINCs expand and refine existing plans or develop new plans, and recommend courses of action. Campaigns are planned and conducted when the contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major joint operation or battle.<sup>24</sup>

(c) CINCs JFCOM may perform two primary roles in the planning process.<sup>25</sup>

(i) As a supported commander, CINC JFCOM has primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the JSCP or other joint operation planning authority.

(ii) As a supporting commander, CINC JFCOM develops supporting plans and provides augmentation forces or other support to a designated supported commander.

**(2) Major Stakeholders:** The Joint Staff, the National Command Authority, other Supported CINCs, JFCOM component commands and subordinate units.

**(3) Key Organizational Processes:** (See Appendix 3 for process map). The Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES) is the principal system within DoD for translating policy decisions into OPLANS and Operation Orders (OPORDs) in support of national security objectives. As a Combatant Commander, CINC JFCOM has a significant responsibility within JOPES. JFCOM currently is responsible for five CONPLANS and three Functional Plans. In addition, CINC JFCOM prepares a Theater Engagement Plan that describes peacetime theater engagement activities.

**(a) Deliberate Planning:**<sup>26</sup> The process of joint deliberate planning is cyclic and continuous. It begins when a task is assigned and is almost identical whether the resulting operation plan is a fully developed OPLAN, CONPLAN, or Functional Plan. These plans remain in effect until canceled or superseded by another approved plan. While in effect, they are continuously maintained and updated.

**(i) Task Assignment:** CJCS is responsible for preparing strategic plans and providing for the preparation of joint contingency plans. The contingency planning responsibility of CJCS is performed through the CINCs, including CINC JFCOM. CJCS publishes the JSCP, which apportions major combat forces available for planning, and specifies the product document, i.e., an OPLAN, CONPLAN, or Functional Plan, and the review and approval authority for the plan. With this, the CINC has the scope of the plan, its format, and the amount of detail that must go into its preparation.

**(ii) Developing the Concept:** In response to the task assignment, the supported CINC first determines a mission statement and then develops a fully staffed concept of envisioned operations, documented in the CINC's Strategic Concept. The CINC's Strategic Concept is submitted to CJCS for review, and when approved, becomes the concept of

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<sup>24</sup> JP 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, April 13, 1995.

<sup>25</sup> JP 5-0.

<sup>26</sup> The information on Deliberate Planning is derived from AFSC Publication 1, The Joint Staff Officer's Guide, Chapter 6, 1997 and Joint Publication 5-03.1, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume I (Planning Policies And Procedures), August 4, 1993, pp. II-6 - II-8.

operations on which further plan development is based. The concept is also sent to subordinate and supporting commanders, who can then begin the detailed planning associated with plan development. As a geographic CINC, CINC JFCOM develops Strategic Concepts for his AOR. As a joint force provider, CINC JFCOM is generally a supporting CINC for others' deliberate plans.

**(iii) Developing the Detailed Plan:** Subordinate commanders use the CINC's concept and the apportioned major combat forces as the basis to determine the necessary support, including forces and sustaining supplies for the operation. The CINC consolidates the subordinates' recommended phasing of forces and support, and performs a transportation analysis of their movement to destination to ensure that the entire plan can feasibly be executed. Next, the Services identify real-world units to take part in the plan, and the sustainment requirements are identified as much as possible. U.S. Transportation Command, a supporting command, analyzes strategic sea and air transportation. This planning phase is over when documentation is prepared for final review.

**(iv) Review of the Plan:** The Joint Staff J7 conducts the deliberate plans review process for CJCS. OPLANs, CONPLANs, and Functional Plans are reviewed individually on an 18 to 24-month cycle. TEPs are reviewed as a family of plans on a 12-month cycle. CJCS reviews and approves the CINCs' strategic concepts as well as the various plans based on adequacy, feasibility, acceptability, and joint doctrine. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD (P)) also reviews certain plans for compliance with policy and Secretary of Defense may be briefed on individual plans before they are approved (See Volume IV, Chapter 3, The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy).

**(v) Preparation of the Supporting Plans:** The emphasis here shifts to the subordinate and supporting commanders, who respond to the tasks identified in the approved operation plan by preparing supporting plans that outline the actions of assigned and augmenting forces.

**(b) Crisis Action Planning:** Deliberate plans are based on the best available intelligence, but are still hypothetical to the extent that not all conditions can be predicted, and, even if all variations of a future situation could be anticipated, they could not all be planned for. Usually, the time available to plan responses to real-time events is short. In as little as a few days, a feasible course of action must be developed and approved, and timely identification of resources accomplished to ready forces, schedule transportation, and prepare supplies for movement and employment of U.S. military force. The procedures are categorized into six phases, however the process is flexible; it permits the steps to be done sequentially or concurrently, or skipped altogether. The exact flow of the procedures is largely determined by the time available to complete the planning and by the significance of the crisis.<sup>27, 28</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> Joint Publication 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, and Joint Publication 5-03.1 (to be published as CJCSM 3122.01), JOPES Volume I, define a crisis within the context of joint operation planning and execution as "an incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, and possessions or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of U.S. military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives."

<sup>28</sup> The information on Crisis Action Planning is derived from AFSC Publication 1, The Joint Staff Officer's Guide, Chapter 7, 1997.

**(i) Phase I - Situation Development:** In the course of routine monitoring of the world situation, an event may occur that has possible security implications for the United States or its interests. Monitoring organizations recognize the event, analyze it to determine whether U.S. interests are threatened, and report it to the National Military Command Center (NMCC). Crisis Action Planning procedures generally begin once the event is reported to the NMCC. Joint Publication 1-03 series, *Joint Reporting Structure*, is the source of detailed instructions for reporting an event through military channels. Events may be reported initially to the NMCC by any means available, but the two most common means are the Critical Intelligence Report and the OPREP-3 PINNACLE. Receipt of an OPREP-3 PINNACLE at the NMCC from a CINC is a likely way for crisis action procedures to be initiated. However, in this day of instant worldwide communications, it is realistic that the theater may learn of a crisis by means of a phone call from Washington. During the Situation Development Phase the Supported Command reports significant event to NMCC and publishes the CINC's assessment, which includes the nature of the crisis, the forces available, major constraints, action being taken, and courses of action (COAs) being considered. Supporting CINCs gather intelligence information and furnish information and support as required. The Situation Development phase ends when the event is reported and the CINC's assessment is submitted to CJCS and National Command Authority (NCA) through the NMCC.<sup>29</sup>

**(ii) Phase II - Crisis Assessment:** In this phase, the NCA and Joint Chiefs of Staff analyze the situation to determine whether a military option should be prepared to deal with the evolving problem. The phase is characterized by increased information gathering and review of available options by the NCA. The focus of Phase II is on the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the NCA. During this phase, the supported command continues to report status of situation, evaluates the event, reviews existing OPLANS and CONPLANS for applicability, evaluates disposition of assigned and available forces, and evaluates status of theater transportation assets. Deployment Preparation Orders and Deployment Orders, issued by CJCS and specifically authorized by the Secretary of Defense, are used to increase or decrease deployability posture, deploy or redeploy forces, establish or disestablish joint task forces and their headquarters, or signal U.S. intent to undertake or terminate action. The crisis assessment phase ends with the decision by the NCA to have military options developed for their consideration. These are added to the full spectrum of possible U.S. responses. The NCA decision may also include specific guidance on COAs to be developed. For this reason, the CINC's initial assessment has great influence. That assessment is an early, professional recommendation from the scene; lack of time may make the CINC's assessment the only alternative considered.

**(iii) Phase III - Course of Action Development:** Following the decision of the NCA to develop military options, CJCS publishes a Warning Order directing the development of COAs in response to the situation. The COA development phase shifts emphasis to the CINC, who develops and submits recommended COAs to CJCS and the NCA. Following the decision of the NCA to plan a military response, CJCS normally authorizes the release of a Warning Order. If it contains force deployment preparation or deployment orders, Secretary of Defense approval is required. The order will definitely request that the CINC develop COAs for review and approval by the NCA. In a fast-breaking crisis, the initial Warning Order could be communicated by a telephone conference with a follow-on record copy. The CINC includes the COAs in the Commander's Estimate, an abbreviated version of the type of information in the

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<sup>29</sup> The NCA is defined as the U.S. President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors.

Commander's Estimate, prepared during the concept development phase of deliberate planning. During this phase the supported commander responds to the Warning Order, develops and evaluates COAs, coordinates involvement of subordinates, releases an Evaluation Request Message to supporting and subordinate commands, reviews existing OPLANs for applicability, and prepares and submits a Commander's Estimate to CJCS. Supporting commands respond to Evaluation Request Message, analyze COAs, identify forces and generate movement requirement estimates, create deployment database in JOPES for each COA, and coordinate sustainment calculations and movement requirements. The final product of Phase III is the Commander's Estimate prepared by the CINC. Its purpose is to give the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff information for the NCA to consider in their selection of a military COA. It is the CINC's analysis of the COAs.

**(iv) Phase IV - Course of Action Selection:** In this phase, CJCS in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reviews and analyzes the Commander's Estimate and deployment estimates, and ultimately presents COAs in order of priority to the NCA for their decision. During this phase, supported CINCs initiate execution planning on receipt of JCS direction, refines estimates, and resolve identified shortfalls. Supporting CINCs continue planning and monitor the situation. This phase ends with the NCA selection of a COA and the decision to begin execution planning. CJCS issues an Alert Order to publish that decision.

**(v) Phase V - Execution Planning:** In the execution planning phase, the supported commander transforms the NCA-selected COA into an OPORD. The OPORD is the product of the execution planning phase. Joint Publication 1-02 defines it as "a directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for effecting coordinated execution of an operation." In this phase the necessary detailed planning is performed to execute the approved COA when directed by the NCA. The actual forces, sustainment, and strategic transportation resources are identified, and the concept of operations is described in OPORD format. Execution planning begins when the CINC receives the Planning Order or the Alert Order from CJCS. The execution planning stage encompasses three major tasks: execution planning, force preparation, and deployability posture reporting. During this phase the supported CINC converts the approved COA into an OPORD, reviews force and unit-related support requirements, confirms the first increment of movement requirements, resolves shortfalls and limitations, notifies the Joint Staff that force requirements are ready for sourcing, and publishes the TPFDD Letter of Instruction. The supporting CINCs identify early-deploying forces, assign tasks, generate movement requirements, develop supporting OPORDs, identify forces, schedule movement for self-deploying forces, and identify shortfalls. The phase ends when the NCA decides to execute the OPORD, place it on hold, or cancel it, pending resolution by some other means.

**(vi)** During a crisis, the above phases may be conducted concurrently or even eliminated, depending on the situation. In some situations, no formal JCS Warning Order is issued, and the first record communication that the supported commander receives is a CJCS Planning Order or Alert Order containing the COA to be used for execution planning. It is equally possible that an NCA decision to commit forces may be made shortly after an event occurs, thereby compressing greatly Phases II through V. To appreciate fully the usefulness of DoD's crisis action planning process, it is important to recognize that no definitive length of time can be associated with any particular phase. Note also that severe time constraints may require crisis participants to pass information orally, including the decision to commit

forces. In actual practice, much coordination is done over secure telephone during the entire crisis action planning process.

**(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes:** JCS and NSC participation in the planning process (See Volume II, Chapter 2, The National Security Council, and Volume IV, Chapter 5, The Joint Chiefs of Staff).

**(5) Associated Lower-Level Processes:** Development of supporting plans and orders by subordinate commands (See Volume IV: Chapter 7, The Unified Commands, and Chapter 8, The Military Departments and Services).

#### **D. Mission Execution:**

**(1) Major Activities:** As a CINC with geographic responsibilities, CINC JFCOM is the highest-ranking military officer in the chain of command for the conduct of military operations within JFCOM's area of responsibility. During mission execution, CINC JFCOM will continue to refine plans, direct operations and support activities, and report to the National Command Authority.

**(2) Major Stakeholders:** NCA, CJCS, Joint Staff, JFCOM component commands and subordinate units.

**(3) Key Organizational Processes:**<sup>30</sup> (See Appendix 4 for process map). The execution phase of a crisis starts with the NCA decision to choose the military option to deal with the crisis and execute the OPOD. The Secretary of Defense will authorize CJCS to issue an Execute Order that defines D-day and the resource allocation and directs execution of the OPOD. The CINC then executes the OPOD and directs subordinate and supporting commanders to execute their supporting OPODs. The Execute Order may include further guidance, instructions, or amplifying orders. During execution, the supported and supporting commanders, Services, and defense agencies update information in the JOPES deployment database. During the execution phase, changes to the original plan may be necessary because of tactical and intelligence considerations, force and cargo availability, availability of strategic lift assets, and transportation infrastructure capabilities. Therefore, ongoing refinement and adjustment of deployment requirements and schedules, and close coordination and monitoring of deployment activities, are required.

**(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes:** Joint Staff, OSD, and NSC monitoring of the operation (See Volume II, Chapter 2, The National Security Council, and Volume IV: Chapter 3, The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and Chapter 5, The Joint Chiefs of Staff).

**(5) Associated Lower-Level Processes:** Subordinate commands' execution of the mission (See Volume IV, Chapter 8, The Military Departments and Services).

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<sup>30</sup> This information on Mission Execution is derived from AFSC Publication 1, The Joint Staff Officer's Guide, Chapter 7, 1997.

## **E. Observation, Orientation, and Oversight:**

### **(1) Major Activities:**

- (a)** Provide Training and Readiness Oversight (TRO) for assigned forces.
- (b)** Prepare Joint Monthly Readiness Review reports.

**(2) Major Stakeholders:** JCS, other Supported CINCs, JFCOM component commands and subordinate units.

### **(3) Key Organizational Processes:** (See Appendix 5 for process map).

**(a) Training and Readiness Oversight:** The Secretary of Defense has given Combatant Commanders Training and Readiness Oversight over assigned forces, including reserve component forces when not on active duty and when on active duty for training.<sup>31</sup> JFCOM policy guidance on TRO is contained in Joint Forces Command Instruction 3500.3A, although the command processes for accomplishing TRO responsibilities are still evolving. This instruction specifies that JFCOM will:

- (i)** Monitor readiness status of assigned forces;
- (ii)** Ensure that reserve component issues are identified in JFCOM Integrated Priority List (IPL) and other PPBS products;
- (iii)** Ensure reserve component readiness deficiencies are reflected in JFCOM input to the Joint Monthly Readiness Review;
- (iv)** Coordinate and review mobilization plans for assigned reserve component forces;
- (v)** Ensure specific reserve component joint operational requirements are included in the JFCOM Joint Mission Essential Task List development process;
- (vi)** Ensure that reserve component forces are included in JFCOM's annual Joint Training Plan;
- (vii)** Provide guidance to Service component commanders on operational requirements and priorities for their training programs, to include reserve component forces; and
- (viii)** Approve Service component command recommendations for reserve component participation in joint training and exercises.

**(ix) JMRR Reporting:** The JMRR is the central component of the CJCS Readiness System. During the JMRR, the Combatant Commanders, Services, and DoD Combat Support Agencies provide a current assessment of military readiness. The JMRR assessments provide the basis for the monthly DoD Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC)

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<sup>31</sup> SECDEF Memorandum, Assignment of Forces, September 8, 1996.

briefings by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) and the Service Chiefs on joint warfighting readiness. The JMRR also provides the basis for the Secretary of Defense's Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress (QRRRC). As part of the JMRR process, CINC JFCOM assesses and reports joint readiness to the Joint Staff in eight functional areas, including Joint Personnel; Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; Special Operations; Logistics and Sustainment; Infrastructure; Command, Control, Communications, and Computers; Joint War Planning; and Training. The JFCOM staff assesses the command's ability, by functional area, to execute current missions and forecasted (plus 12 months) engagement missions and support execution of a warfighting scenario that is provided by the Joint Staff. The assessments are based on approved national objectives, military objectives, military requirements, and operational requirements derived from DPG, JSCP, PLANS/ CONPLANS, and JCS-directed taskings. CINCs are directed to report against current operational requirements, not desired capabilities. The JMRR is a tool for assessing current readiness, not a vehicle for validating desired force enhancements or capabilities. In addition to the eight functional area assessments, CINCs and DoD Combat Support Agencies assign an overall capability rating to their ability to execute the current, plus 12 months, and major theater war scenarios. Additionally, CINCs indicate their top two readiness concerns.<sup>32</sup>

**(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes:** JCS orchestration of the JMRR; OSD Senior Readiness Oversight Council meetings; development of DoD's Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress (See Volume IV, Chapter 5, The Joint Chiefs of Staff).

**(5) Associated Lower-Level Processes:** JFCOM assigned units reporting through the Status of Resources and Training System. JFCOM component command inputs to the JFCOM JMRR report (See Volume IV, Chapter 8, The Military Departments and Services).

#### **F. Preparation:**<sup>33</sup>

**(1) Major Activities:** JFCOM's role in preparation processes has expanded in recent years. Currently, the command:

- (a)** Sponsors Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations;
- (b)** Develops DoD's Joint Experimentation program;
- (c)** Provides reviews and inputs on interoperability of new capabilities throughout the requirements generation process;
- (d)** Participates in Senior Warfighting Forums (SWARFs);
- (e)** Identifies CINC and Service component joint interoperability training requirements;
- (f)** Develops and maintains joint force capabilities that meet the specified requirements of the supported Combatant Commander;

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<sup>32</sup> CJCSI 3401.01B, Chairman's Readiness System, July 1, 1999.

<sup>33</sup> CJFCOM Instruction 7100.xx will formalize the requirements process as it relates to JFCOM. This document is in development with an anticipated implementation date of January 2000.

(g) Develops the JFCOM Mission Essential Task List (METL); and

(h) Provides direction and guidance to the Joint Warfighting Center, a subordinate activity to JFCOM, which supports joint and multi-national training and exercises focused on commanders, staffs, and component forces.

**(2) Major Stakeholders:** USD (A&T), the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction (ASD (S&TR)), JCS, other CINCs, JFCOM component commands and subordinate units.

**(3) Key Organizational Processes:**

**(a) Joint Experimentation:**<sup>34</sup> (See Appendix 6 for process map). CINC JFCOM is designated as DoD's Executive Agent for conducting joint warfighting experimentation to explore, demonstrate, and evaluate joint warfighting concepts. Joint Experimentation is an iterative process for developing and assessing concept-based hypotheses to identify and recommend the best value-added solutions for changes to Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership, and People (DOTMLP) required to achieve significant advances in future joint operational capabilities. JFCOM began implementing its role in Joint Experimentation on October 1, 1999.<sup>35</sup> Recommendations from joint experimentation having potential materiel solutions are forwarded by CINC JFCOM to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) for review. These recommendations could be the basis to conduct a joint mission need analysis that could lead to the development of a formal requirements document.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction monitors JFCOM's exploration of joint concepts and capabilities on behalf of the Secretary of Defense and arranges for periodic reviews of selected activities by the Defense Resources Board (DRB). JFCOM plans to work closely with the other CINCs in the Joint Experimentation process and identifying concepts for exploration. The Services will be the primary source for force concepts within their core competencies. JFCOM will offer the Services opportunities to explore their concepts in a joint environment JFCOM also will work closely with various coalition organizations and U.S. treaty organizations, such as NATO, Partnership for Peace, and international organizations including the United Nations. The Joint Experimentation Directorate will experiment using concepts with non-military DOTMPL implications. As such, JFCOM plans to work closely with various non-DoD organizations, such as State, Commerce, Justice, and Treasury Departments, as well as non-government organizations. JFCOM intends to institute and maintain a dynamic liaison program with CINC, Service, and Agency counterparts. JFCOM component commanders will be the primary source of fulfilling Joint Experimentation force requirements. As members of the Joint Experimentation Directorate "Board of Directors," the component commanders will provide Service perspectives on program development, concept and hypothesis formulation, prioritization of efforts and resources, process refinement, and conclusions drawn from experimentation results. The Joint Experimentation Process, as developed by JFCOM, will consist of eight elements:

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<sup>34</sup> The information on Joint Experimentation was derived from CJCSI 3170.01A, Requirements Generation System, August 10, 1999; the USACOM Joint Experimentation Implementation Plan, Chapter 3, Joint Experimentation Organizational Relationship; and Appendix C: I-Plan Executive Summary.

<sup>35</sup> During interviews, the JFCOM staff indicated that JFCOM sees its advantage in Joint Experimentation as being able to look ahead without being encumbered by Service bureaucracies.

**(i) Concept Development:** JFCOM will assimilate information from a variety of government and private sources to develop and refine concepts for Joint Experimentation.

**(ii) Campaign Planning:** JFCOM develops the Joint Experimentation Campaign Plan, which provides a high-level description of a multi-year process of experimentation designed to assess the operational utility of concepts. In developing the Campaign Plan, specific concepts are selected for Joint Experimentation. CJCS approves the Joint Experimentation Campaign Plan.

**(iii) Experimentation Plan Development:** Each concept approved for experimentation is fully developed in a White Paper that describes the concept and the desired capabilities associated with the concept. An Experiment Management Plan identifies the experimentation events required to assess the concept.

**(iv) Experiment Design:** Experiment Management Plans are developed for the experiment events. Experiment objectives are defined and the experiments, demonstrations, and exercises being planned for by the CINCs, Services, and Agencies, are examined to determine the extent to which they can be leveraged to support the objectives.<sup>36</sup>

**(v) Experiment Preparation:** An Experiment Control Cell is formed and Experiment Training, Support, and Technical Support Plans are developed.

**(vi) Conduct Experiment:** During the experiment, hypotheses are tested and data is collected.

**(vii) Assessment:** A "quick look" and final assessment report are produced which provide conclusions and recommendations.

**(viii) Integration:** All of the results of the experiments pertaining to a given concept are examined. Conclusions are drawn about the utility of the concept to joint operations. These conclusions become recommendations for new DOTMLP actions required to implement the concept. The recommendations may be in the form of formal requirements documents (e.g., Capstone Requirements Documents (CRDs) and Operational Requirements Documents (ORDs)), or presented in briefing format to CJCS and the JROC. The JROC is the senior recipient of Joint Experimentation material recommendations.

**(b) Requirements Generation:** <sup>37</sup> (See Appendix 7 for process map). CINC JFCOM serves as the Chairman's advocate for joint warfighting interoperability. In this role, JFCOM provides the warfighter perspective during the development of joint operational concepts to ensure that joint forces have interoperable systems. JFCOM supports the Chairman in the following areas:

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<sup>36</sup> Services, Defense agencies, or other Combatant Commands other than JFCOM may be designated the sponsor and lead for some assessment events. JFCOM or Joint Staff CAs in coordination with each assessment event sponsor will determine responsibility for conducting the assessment and reporting the results. JFCOM is responsible for providing collective assessment of multiple events and the continual refinement of operational concepts.

<sup>37</sup> The information on Requirements Generation is derived from CJCSI 3170.01A, pages B-5 to B-7.

(i) JFCOM coordinates with the co-chairs of the Joint Operational Architecture Working Group (Joint Staff J6 and ASD (C3I)), along with the other CINCs to continue development of the C4ISR Joint Operational Architecture (JOA). The objective of the C4ISR JOA is to enable joint force commanders and forces to achieve interoperable, integrated joint military operations employing the operational concepts of Joint Vision 2010.

(ii) JFCOM comments during the requirements staffing process on the adequacy Interoperability Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) for major acquisition programs. The comments provide the warfighter perspective on the adequacy of interoperability as addressed in the CRD or ORD. For major acquisitions and JROC special interest ORDS and CRDs, JFCOM has the opportunity to comment on unresolved interoperability issues at the JROC. JFCOM may comment on interoperability issues that are forwarded to the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) by the JROC (See Volume IV, Chapter 2, The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology).

(iii) JFCOM participates in Senior Warfighting Forums. The SWARF is a JROC-directed forum used to organize, analyze, prioritize, and build joint consensus on a complex resource and requirements issue for JROC approval. The JROC tasking memorandum will identify the SWARF lead, specific issue to be addressed, fiscal guidelines, assignment of the appropriate acquisition and technical expertise to frame issue, and timeline to report recommendations. The JROC will assign CINCs to lead SWARFs according to their missions and responsibilities. The SWARF lead will brief the recommendations to the JROC.

(iv) As a unified CINC, CINC JFCOM can also generate Mission Needs Statements (MNS) and forward them to the JROC for approval. However, the preferred method for CINC MNS generation is for the CINCs to identify their mission needs to the responsible Service component commander or appropriate DoD agency. Joint Staff assistance may be needed to support a CINC in the development of a mission need or in determining if a CINC-generated MNS is redundant to a validated MNS or one under development.

**(c) Joint Training:**<sup>38</sup> (See Appendix 8 for process map). CJCS requires that Combatant Commanders, including CINC JFCOM, develop and submit Joint Training Plans annually to reflect the CINC's scheduled exercises and training events. These JTPs identify the training audience; list training objectives; select the training method (academic, command post exercise, or field training exercise); and outline a summary of the events and resources required to accomplish the training objectives.<sup>39</sup> JFCOM's JTP also focuses on common operational joint tasks by training commanders and joint staffs to operate within a joint task force structure.

(i) JFCOM-sponsored exercises and training events are scheduled and executed by the JFCOM. The JFCOM Exercise and Training Scheduling Conference is the formal coordination vehicle for developing the command's training program. These conferences have attendees from component commands, supporting joint commands, the Joint Staff, Services, and other agencies. Conferees discuss the overall direction of training programs, resolve conflicts such as transportation and supportability, eliminate redundancy, and plan within the existing and forecast resource constraints. After the Exercise and Training Scheduling

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<sup>38</sup> Information on Joint Training was primarily derived from CJCSM 3500.03, Joint Training Manual for the Armed Forces of the United States, September 18, 1998.

<sup>39</sup> CJCSI 3500.02B, Joint Training Master Plan 2000 for the Armed Forces of the United States, May 1, 1998.

Conference, JFCOM's Joint Exercise Schedule is forwarded to the Joint Staff J7 for review. This submission covers the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) years and forms the basis for deconfliction within the Worldwide Joint Training Conference, which sets the stage for all joint training planning throughout the upcoming year. The Joint Staff J7 hosts the Worldwide Joint Training Conference, updates training guidance and resource allocation, resolves training issues, and identifies potential scheduling problems. Attendees come from Unified Commands, Services, Defense agencies, and other activities.

**(ii)** JFCOM coordinates directly with other supporting commands, Services, and agencies on all relevant matters pertaining to the planning and execution of its joint exercises. The Joint Staff is kept informed and will resolve conflicts, upon request.<sup>40</sup> Transportation, personnel, and equipment are critical issues that must be coordinated throughout the training process. Initially, JFCOM receives estimates of resource availability from the Joint Staff and U.S. Transportation Command during the Worldwide Training Conference. These estimates will allow the command to conduct initial planning for the outyears and to continue to refine near-term years in final coordination. The resources required for real-world events, however, can have drastic effects on the worldwide exercise picture. CJCS determines the priority of support in the event of resource conflicts.

**(d)** Exercise funding is programmed and managed by several headquarters activities. The Joint Staff is responsible for exercise transportation funding to include airlift, sealift, port handling, and inland transportation. Exercise related construction is also centrally managed by the Joint Staff. The Services are responsible for funding all other exercise expenses, known as incremental expenses, such as consumable supplies, per diem, non-aviation fuel, and communications. Incremental funding does not include those outputs funded in other Service accounts such as flying hours, steaming days, or tank miles. JFCOM has an important role in the exercise funding process. Transportation requirements are based on Combatant Command and Service estimates. The accuracy of JFCOM's estimates and the viability of the JFCOM training program contribute to the Joint Staff's ability to successfully describe and defend the worldwide joint exercise program. CINC JFCOM may also verbalize the importance of exercise funding via other avenues such as Integrated Priority Lists and direct input to the Secretary of Defense or Congress.

**(i)** The recent merger of the JFCOM J7, the Joint Training Analysis and Simulation Center (JTASC) and the Joint Warfighting Center was designed to enhance JFCOM's Joint Training role. The JWFC is the centerpiece of the command's joint training mission. The JWFC's role is to develop joint doctrine and assist the Combatant Commanders in training their forces in approved joint doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures, making appropriate use of the best technical tools available. JWFC Command battle staff training is designed to meet the training requirements of the supported commander. A pool of Military Observer Trainers facilitate the training seminars and advise staffs on joint operational techniques and procedures during exercises. The technical capacity of the JTASC facilitates the storage, for archival purposes, of exercise simulation data, imagery, and video footage. The capability also facilitates worldwide distribution of simulation, interagency and media replication, and outside access for distance learning.

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<sup>40</sup> Normally, JFCOM also performs direct liaison with other NATO commanders for all aspects of U.S. participation in NATO SACLANT exercises.

(ii) To increase joint training support efficiency and reduce personnel tempo, JFCOM is sponsoring technological development, making process improvements, and linking exercises through common scenarios, C4I architectures and planning processes. In conjunction with the Joint Staff and other CINCs, JFCOM is also beginning to develop a requirements-based Universal Joint Task List joint training program to meet Joint Staff and CINC requirements. The next step will be to address the collective joint training requirements of the Combatant Commands using a standardized worldwide exercise scheduling process to ensure best allocation of scarce resources.<sup>41</sup>

(iii) JFCOM has established a Joint Training Requirements Analysis Project to identify combatant CINC and Service component joint interoperability training requirements. The project is designed to identify and publish guidance for JFCOM Service component commanders on joint training requirements to be addressed in component training programs.<sup>42</sup>

**(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes:** The DoD Requirements Generation Process and the JCS Joint Training System (See Volume IV: Chapter 2, The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, and Chapter 5, The Joint Chiefs of Staff).

**(5) Associated Lower-Level Processes:** Development of training plans by component commanders, which align each Service METL with JFCOM's METL (See Volume IV, Chapter 8, The Military Departments and Services).

## **G. Resourcing:**

### **(1) Major Activities:**<sup>43</sup>

(a) Prepare and submit an Integrated Priority List (IPL) that identifies high priority needs that require attention by DoD in developing and programming for solutions.

(b) Prepare and submit CINC quarterly reports to the Secretary of Defense and CJCS. This direct, formal communications vehicle allows CINC JFCOM to focus on the key issues being faced by the command.<sup>44</sup>

(c) CINC JFCOM may meet with the Defense Resources Board (as the board deems necessary) during the formulation of the Defense Planning Guidance and during the annual program and budget review processes.

(d) Provide warfighting requirements to JFCOM service components for developing JFCOM contributions to each respective Military Department Program.

(e) Provide comments to the Secretary of Defense, CJCS, and the Defense Resources Board (DRB) on the impact of each respective Military Department, Defense agency,

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<sup>41</sup> [http://www.acom.mil/acomweb.nsf\\*/AboutUSACOM](http://www.acom.mil/acomweb.nsf*/AboutUSACOM) and <http://www.jwfc.acom.mil/mission.html>.

<sup>42</sup> CINCUSACOM msg, Establishment of USACOM's Joint Training Requirements Project.

<sup>43</sup> Information in this section was derived from CJCSI 8501.01, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commander in Chiefs of the Combatant Commands, and Joint Staff Participation in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, April 1, 1999, pp. A2-A4.

<sup>44</sup> CJCSI 3001.01A, CINC Quarterly Reports to the Secretary of Defense, November 17, 1977.

and U.S. Special Operations Command Program on the JFCOM's ability to carry out the command's responsibilities.

(f) Submit input to CJCS through the JWCA process to assist in development of the Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA).

(g) Submit issue outlines to CJCS during the annual program and budget review processes.

(h) Submit to the components, responsible commands, and Military Departments a budget proposal for activities of each of the Combatant Commands for which funding may be requested in the President's budget. These may include joint exercises, force training, contingencies, and other selected operations.

(i) Assess and provide to Secretary of Defense and CJCS the warfighting impact of Program Budget Decisions (PBDs).

**(2) Major Stakeholders:** Secretary of Defense, CJCS, Military Departments, and JFCOM Service component commands.

**(3) Key Organizational Processes:** (See Appendix 9 for process map). The JFCOM J8 orchestrates the vast majority of JFCOM's participation in the resourcing process. The process for providing JFCOM inputs at various stages in the PPBS process is illustrated by the process described below for formulating the JFCOM IPL.

(a) The JFCOM staff requests IPL issues from the JFCOM components, and integrates the components' inputs. Documentation for IPL issues can originate from issues surfaced in the JMRR, the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments (JWCAs), or other areas. (See Volume IV, Chapter 5, The Joint Chiefs of Staff).

(b) The JFCOM J8 staff distributes IPL issues to the subject matter experts throughout the various directorates on the JFCOM staff.

(c) The JFCOM Directors respond to J8 by refining or adding issues and recommending priorities.

(d) JFCOM J8 drafts the IPL message, which includes CINC JFCOM's vision and operational capabilities required for JFCOM's mission, as well as CINC priority items listed as programmatic concerns in priority order.

(e) The draft IPL message is distributed to the JFCOM Directors for coordination.

(f) J8 manages the coordination process and forwards the IPL to CINC JFCOM for approval.

**(4)** The approved IPL is sent to the Joint Staff and OSD.

**(5) Associated Higher-Level Processes:** CJCS input to the PPBS process.

**(6) Associated Lower-Level Processes:** Service development of Programs and budgets.

#### **H. Other Formal Processes:**

**(1) CJCS CINCs Conferences:** CJCS normally holds three of these conferences each year to discuss pressing warfighting issues. Participants include the Combatant Commanders, the Joint Chiefs, the Secretary of Defense, and key members of the Joint Staff. The President has attended portions of the conferences. Although these conferences are not decision-making forums, they can result in staff taskings to address specific issues.

**(2) Component Commanders Conferences:** CINC JFCOM holds a similar conference with JFCOM Service component commanders twice a year. The formats vary. Some conferences are attended by staff members from JFCOM and the components. Some conferences are restricted to the highest levels with no staff officer participation. Although these conferences are not decision-making forums, they can result in staff taskings to address specific issues.

**(3) JFCOM Washington Liaison Office:** JFCOM maintains a liaison office in Washington DC to facilitate command interaction with OSD, the Joint Staff, the Services, and the interagency. The office also serves as JFCOM's congressional liaison office.

**(4) CINC Testimony:** CINC JFCOM presents testimony to Congress when requested regarding JFCOM responsibilities and requirements.

**6. Informal National Security Process Involvement.** JFCOM action officers and senior leaders frequently hold informal discussions in a number of different venues to discuss substantive issues. Sometimes these discussions occur as action officers prepare JFCOM inputs to the Joint Staff in support of formal processes. Sometimes they occur as action officers try to build consensus for proposals or recommendations. Sometimes they occur as sidebars at conferences, meetings, or seminars. Most members of the JFCOM staff are networked to a broader functional community, both within their respective Service (e.g., aviators, infantry, submariners) and within their functional specialty (e.g., logistics, personnel, communications). These networks are an important lubricant for the national security process at large. In addition to these networks, CINC JFCOM and his deputy are in frequent contact with other senior military leaders from the Joint Staff, Services, and other Unified Commands. JFCOM's location, in the Tidewater area of Virginia, facilitates face to face networking because of the concentration of military organizations (e.g., the Navy's Atlantic Fleet, the Air Force's Air Combat Command, and the Army's Training and Doctrine Command).

#### **7. Funding and Personnel.**

**A. Authorizations and Appropriations:** DoD Directive 5100.3 requires the Secretaries of the Military Departments to provide administrative and logistics support for the headquarters of the Unified Commands, as well as the headquarters of all subordinate joint commands. Support to JFCOM is assigned to the Department of the Navy and JFCOM headquarters funding is contained within Navy authorizations and appropriations.<sup>45, 46</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> DODD 5100.3, Support of the Headquarters of the Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands, October 21, 1993.

## B. Budget Sources:

(1) JFCOM Management Headquarters funding is contained in the Department of the Navy budget.

(2) **CINC Initiative Fund:** DoD also budgets for a "CINC Initiative Fund," from which CJCS may provide funds to a Combatant Command, upon the request of the CINC. The CINC Initiative Fund is contained within DoD's Defense-wide operations and Maintenance account, and was limited to \$25 million in the DoD FY 98 budget.<sup>47</sup>

### JFCOM Management Headquarters Budget in \$ Thousands<sup>48,49</sup>

	FY 98	FY 99 (est)	FY 00 (est)
JFCOM	20,824	17,875	21,675
U.S. Forces Azores	195	201	207
Iceland Defense Force	402	413	424
Total	21,421	18,489	22,306

**C. Manpower:** The JFCOM Headquarters is authorized a total of 481 command and staff personnel. The total includes 20 full-time-support Reservists who provide their components' perspective to the staff in the integration of reserves into both exercises and mobilization plans.

Also supporting the headquarters staff is the Atlantic Command Joint Reserve Unit. With 466 positions, this unit is tasked to augment the JFCOM staff during wartime conditions.<sup>50, 51</sup>

## 8. Observations.

JFCOM is still reorganizing around its expanded missions and inherited Chairman Controlled Activities. There is recognition within the command that CINC JFCOM will need support, or at least acquiescence, from the Services and the other CINCs to fully develop the integrator role, particularly as it applies to resource allocation and acquisition of interoperable systems. The eventual working relationship between JFCOM and the Services is yet to be determined.

(1) During interviews, the JFCOM staff indicated that while the general responsibilities and potential of JFCOM to improve joint capability seem to be recognized, the authority, power and processes to actually effect the resourcing to accomplish true integration and interoperability will take a long time to mature.

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<sup>46</sup> Interviews with the JFCOM staff indicated that the command is not entirely satisfied with the way it receives its funding. Navy funding leaves JFCOM subject to being "taxed" for Service requirements. There was also a strong feeling that JFCOM will need a separate OSD or JCS funding line for joint experimentation.

<sup>47</sup> Appendix, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1998, pp. 305-326.

<sup>48</sup> U.S. Navy O&M,N Justification Book, [http://navweb.secnav.navy.mil/pubbud/00pres/omn/omndata\\_u.pdf](http://navweb.secnav.navy.mil/pubbud/00pres/omn/omndata_u.pdf), posted March 1, 1999.

<sup>49</sup> These estimates do not include Joint Experimentation, which should be \$26-50M, currently planned to be funded through the Navy. The figures also do not account for JFCOM subordinate activities, such as JWFC. The additional funding for all such activities is estimated to be approximately \$300M.

<sup>50</sup> About JFCOM, These figures do not include subordinate JFCOM activities, such as JWFC. Manpower for all of these activities is about 2000.

<sup>51</sup> Interviews with the JFCOM staff indicated that as JFCOM's role in the joint requirements process evolves additional manpower will most likely be required.

(2) JFCOM's expanding role in Joint Experimentation and Joint requirements has caused some concern in the Services as well as in the other Unified Commands. There remains an undercurrent among the Unified Command staffs that JFCOM's responsibilities, especially as the integrator, somehow invade the command prerogatives of the functional and geographic CINCs. In a similar manner, the Services see the expansion of JFCOM's responsibilities as a threat to their Title 10 responsibilities. In recognition of these perceptions, JFCOM has started visiting each Service Chief and unified Command staff to maintain an open and candid dialogue on JFCOM's new responsibilities.


**B.** During interviews, the JFCOM staff acknowledged that for new or emerging systems, the Joint Staff retains the lead in defining requirements. However, although JFCOM remains in a support role, it can be a powerful ally from the field. The JFCOM staff promotes the need for a stronger bridge between JFCOM's authority as the joint requirements champion for legacy capability and the DoD acquisition system, where the authority to engineer and build new material solutions resides. The JFCOM staff stated that the largest problem with existing requirements and acquisition systems is that they are not being adequately monitored and disciplined. JFCOM is currently developing a concept called Joint Warfare C4 Systems Integrator (JWC4SI) as way to establish the bridge between its role in the requirements process and DoD's acquisition process. The JWC4SI is designed to include dual reporting responsibility—to JFCOM for requirements definition and prioritization, and ASD (C3I) or USD (A&T) for acquisition directives.

**C.** During interviews with senior leaders at JFCOM and the Joint Staff, the JFCOM role in the requirements process was an item of high interest. CINC JFCOM is evolving as a spokesperson for all the Combatant Commanders in the joint requirements process. JFCOM views this role as more than an amalgamator of the other CINCs' inputs. JFCOM staff members foresee a JFCOM role in the common definition of requirements and acquisition terminology as well as in the development of a common priority listing. The staff stated that CINC JFCOM should attend selected JROC and DAB sessions, and that JFCOM should participate in the formal meetings that lead up to these sessions. The JFCOM staff feels it is necessary for CINC JFCOM to have a vote on the JROC. Joint Staff interviews indicated that, although CINC JFCOM is invited to attend JROC sessions, there is no need for the CINC to have a vote. An expanded role for JFCOM in the JROC and/or DAB processes will most likely be interpreted as a further eroding of Service influence in DoD resource allocation processes.


**D.** The expansion of CINC JFCOM's roles raise questions regarding the amount of responsibility that one Unified Command can handle, as well as questions regarding potential conflict of interest among JFCOM's roles. CINC JFCOM is designated the Joint Force Provider, Joint Force Integrator, and the Joint Force Trainer. The CINC is also tasked with supporting the United Nations for U.S. peacekeeping activities and for establishing a Joint Task Force for Civil Support, for domestic support missions. At the same time, the CINC still retains his U.S. and alliance operational responsibilities for the JFCOM AOR. Recently, JFCOM has absorbed the various activities and agencies that used to report to the Chairman while and taking on a new Joint Experimentation role. It is apparent from the interviews that the JFCOM staff there would like to do even more with respect to requirements and resource allocation decisions. These many responsibilities raise several questions including: How much can one CINC do? To what degree does the scale of the mission and workload begin to overcome the Commander and his staff? To what degree is there a conflict of interest among the CINCs roles?

**APPENDICES**

## Joint Forces Command – Key Process – (Formal) – Strategy Development




## Joint Forces Command - Key Process - (Formal) – Policy, Guidance, and Regulation




### Appendix 2

CPG - Contingency Planning Guidance  
 CPR - Chairman's Program Recommendation  
 DPG - Defense Planning Guidance  
 DRB - Defense Resources Board  
 JPD - Joint Planning Document  
 JSCP - Joint Strategic Capability Plan  
 JWCA - Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment  
 JWFC - Joint Warfighting Center  
 UICP - Unified Command Plan


### Joint Forces Command - Key Process - (Formal) - Planning




### Joint Forces Command - Key Process - (Formal) – Mission Execution



Joint Forces Command - Key Process - (Formal) – Mission Execution (continued)




## Joint Forces Command - Key Process - (Formal) – Observation, Orientation, and Oversight




CRS - Current Readiness System  
 JMRR - Joint Monthly Readiness Review  
 JNA - Joint Net Assessment  
 JSR - Joint Strategic Review  
 JWCA - Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment  
 QRRC - Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress  
 SROC - Senior Readiness Oversight Council

## Joint Forces Command - Key Process - (Formal) – Preparation – Joint Experimentation



JROC - Joint Requirements Oversight Council


Joint Forces Command - Key Process - (Formal) – Preparation – Requirements Generation



Definition


Validation

Joint Forces Command - Key Process - (Formal) – Preparation – Requirements Generation (continued)




ACAT 1 - Acquisition Category 1  
 CRD - Capstone Requirements Document  
 DAB - Defense Acquisition Board  
 JROC - Joint Requirements Oversight Council  
 MNS - Mission Needs Statement  
 ORD - Operational Requirements Document  
 POM - Program Objective Memorandum

Joint Forces Command - Key Process - (Formal) – Preparation – Joint Training



CCTI - Chairman's Commended Training Issues  
 JCLL - Joint Center for Lessons Learned  
 JMETL - Joint Mission Essential Task List  
 JMRR - Joint Monthly Readiness Review  
 JTP - Joint Training Plan  
 JWCA - Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment  
 JWFC - Joint Warfighting Center  
 NMS - National Military Strategy  
 UJTL - Universal Joint Task List

## Joint Forces Command - Key Process - (Formal) - Resourcing



### Appendix 9

- CPA - Chairman's Program Assessment
- BES - Budget Estimate Submission
- DPG - Defense Planning Guidance
- IPL - Integrated Priority List
- JRB - Joint Review Board
- JROC - Joint Requirements Oversight Council
- JWCA - Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment
- PDM - Program Decision Memorandum
- PRG - Program Review Group

# ORGANIZATIONAL DESCRIPTION

## THE UNIFIED COMMANDS



*Prepared for the U.S. Commission on National Security/21<sup>st</sup> Century*

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## The Unified Commands

### Overview

The Unified Commands were established by the National Security Act of 1947. Since then, their responsibilities and numbers have changed several times. The most significant changes were made by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, which greatly expanded the responsibilities of the Combatant Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) of the Unified Commands and strengthened their supporting staff functions. Unified Commands, are joint military commands that have broad continuing missions and are composed of forces from at least two or more Military Departments.<sup>1</sup> Each is led by a four-star general or admiral. The CINCs are the highest-ranking military officers in the chain of command for the conduct of military operations within their geographic areas of responsibility (AORs) or functional areas. They report directly to the National Command Authorities (NCA), which consists of the Secretary of Defense and the President.

### Organization

There are currently nine Unified Commands as shown in the following table.

The Unified Commands		
Geographic Responsibilities	U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) U.S. European Command (EUCOM) U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)	U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) <sup>2</sup>
Worldwide Functional Responsibilities	U.S. Space Command (SPACECOM) U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM)	

As shown in the Table, the five Unified CINCs assigned geographic area responsibilities are U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), U.S. European Command (EUCOM), U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM),<sup>3</sup> U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), and U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). The five assigned worldwide functional responsibilities are U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), U.S. Space Command (SPACECOM), U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), and U.S. Transportation Command

<sup>1</sup> The term "Combatant Command" means a Unified Combatant Command or a Specified Combatant Command. The term "Specified Combatant Command" means a military command that has broad, continuing missions and which is normally composed of forces from a single military department. There are currently no Specified Commands.

<sup>2</sup> The United States Atlantic Command (ACOM) was renamed as United States Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) on 1 October 1999. CINC Joint Forces Command is the only CINC with both geographic and functional responsibilities. (see preceding chapter in this volume on JFCOM.)

(TRANSCOM). Each CINC has selected a slightly different command structure, based on mission needs. The command structures may incorporate one or a combination of several options, including Subordinate Unified Commands, Joint Task Forces, Functional Component Commands, and Service Component Commands. Similarly, the headquarters structure of each Unified Command varies. Unified Command headquarters staffs are generally organized under a directorate system. Each directorate is responsible for a specific functional area. The 1997 Defense Reform Initiative Review examined all components of these staffs, including: common functions, unique functions, and offices funded from outside agencies. The review concluded that a number of unique functions then reporting to CINC headquarters should be reduced, competed with the private sector, or transferred to lower echelon organizations. By 2003, the headquarters staffs of the Combatant Commands will be reduced 10 percent from fiscal year 1998 levels. Taken together with reductions begun in the early 1990s, the headquarters components of the Combatant Commands will reduce their headquarters staffs by a total of 22 percent.<sup>4</sup>

### Role in Formal and Informal National Security Processes

The following matrix summarizes the key products and roles of the Unified Commands.

		Strategy Development	Policy, Guidance, and Regulations	Planning	Mission Execution	Observation, Orientation, and Oversight	Preparation	Resourcing
Products	Inputs to key NSC, OSD, and JCS national security documents (e.g., NSS, NMS, DPG, JSCP)	✓	✓					
	CINC Command Strategy	✓						
	CINC Instructions		✓					
	Direction for Operational Missions		✓		✓			
	Operational Plans, Concept Plans, Functional Plans, Theater Engagement Plans			✓				
	Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR) Reports					✓		
	Joint After Action Reporting System (JAARS) Reports					✓		
	Input on DoD Requirements Documents (e.g., MNS, ORDs, CRDs)						✓	
	CINC Generated Mission Needs Statements						✓	
	CINC Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETLs)						✓	
	CINC Joint Training Plans (JTP)						✓	
	CINC Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs)							✓
	CINC Quarterly Report to SECDEF	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Input to CJCS and SECDEF throughout the PPBS Process	✓	✓	✓				✓
CINC Congressional Testimony	✓	✓	✓				✓	
Roles	Geographic CINC (JFCOM, EUCOM, CENTCOM, PACOM, SOUTHCOM)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Functional CINC (JFCOM, SPACECOM, SOCOM, TRANSCOM, STRATCOM)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

<sup>4</sup> The Defense Reform Initiative Report, November 1997 and The Defense Reform Initiative Update, 1999.

**Strategy Development.** Unified Commands provide input through the Joint Staff on key strategy documents, including the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Military Strategy (NMS), the Joint Strategy Review (JSR), the Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG), and the Joint Planning Document (JPD). Commands also develop specific strategies for their AORs or functional areas.

**Policy, Guidance, and Regulation.** Unified Commands provide input to key documents, including the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), the Unified Command Plan (UCP), the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), and Joint Doctrine through the Joint Staff. The Unified Commands also develop command-specific instructions that relate to the administration and operating procedures of the command.

**Planning.** Unified Commands develop plans in accordance with the Department of Defense's (DoD's) deliberate planning process. Combatant Commanders also formulate theater engagement plans (TEPs) for peacetime engagement in support of the NSS within the command's AOR. During crises, CINCs recommend courses of action, expand and refine existing plans, or develop new plans. CINCs perform two primary roles in the planning process.

- As supported commanders within their respective AORs, CINCs with geographic responsibilities have primary responsibility for all aspects of any task assigned by the JSCP or other joint operation planning authority.
- As supporting commanders to other Unified Commands, CINCs develop supporting plans and provide augmentation forces to a designated supported commander.

**Mission Execution.** The Combatant CINCs are the highest-ranking military officers in the chain of command for the conduct of military operations within their AORs or functional areas. During mission execution as a supported CINC, the Unified Commands refine plans, direct operations, and report to the National Command Authority. When acting as a supporting CINC, Unified Commands refine supporting plans, direct supporting activities, and report to the National Command Authority.

**Observation, Orientation, and Oversight.** The Unified Commands prepare Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR) reports for submission to the Joint Staff. The Secretary of Defense has given Combatant Commanders Training and Readiness Oversight (TRO) over assigned forces, including reserve component forces when not on active duty and when on active duty for training. To fulfill these responsibilities, Unified Commands monitor readiness status of assigned forces; identify relevant issues in command products (e.g., Integrated Priority Lists, JMRR inputs); and provide guidance to Service component commanders on operational requirements and priorities for their training programs, to include reserve component forces.

**Preparation.** All Unified Commands develop and submit Joint Training Plans (JTP) annually to reflect the CINCs' scheduled exercises and training events. In addition, CINCs identify mission needs and provide input to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) in DoD's requirements generation process. JFCOM's role in preparation processes, including training and requirements generation, has expanded in recent years (See Volume IV, Chapter 6, The United States Joint Forces Command).

**Resourcing.** The Combatant CINCs prepare and submit Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Secretary of Defense that identify high priority needs. The CINCs also prepare and submit CINC Quarterly Reports to the Secretary of Defense and CJCS. The CINCs provide input to the Joint Staff at various stages in the Planning Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) process and submit input to CJCS through the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment (JWCA) process to assist in development of the Chairman's Program Assessment and Recommendation (CPA/CPR). CINCs may meet with the Defense Resources Board during the formulation of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) and during the annual program and budget review processes. CINCs also provide input to their Service components for developing the respective command contributions to each Military Department Program Objective Memorandum (POM).

## Observations

There have been some significant changes in the nature of the various CINCs' day-to-day responsibilities over the past ten years, as illustrated in the following table.

Command	Recent Changes
EUCOM	A shift in focus from planning for the Warsaw Pact to the execution of operational missions within alliance and coalition structures (e.g., Bosnia, Kosovo, Northern Watch) as well as an increased focus on humanitarian operations in both Europe and Africa
CENTCOM	A long-term, sustained operation and rotational presence in the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula and a withering of international support in areas such as United Nations sanctions and weapons inspections in Iraq
PACOM	Uncertainty in three major areas: Korea, China, India/ Pakistan
SOUTHCOM	New responsibilities for the Caribbean Basin and a relocation of headquarters from Panama to Florida
JFCOM	A reduction in geographic responsibilities, an increased role in Joint Training and requirements generation, and the establishment of JTF Civil Support
SPACECOM	Additional responsibilities for DoD's Information Operations and the establishment of JTF Computer Network Defense
STRATCOM	A greater focus on conventional operations for the nuclear bomber leg of the Triad
SOCOM, TRANSOM	No major recent changes

Although there have been some significant changes to the Unified Command Structure over the past ten years, the framework still reflects the Cold War structure. This structure does have the potential for conflict at the current "seams" in the geographic CINCs' AOR boundaries, as indicated below:

- India (EUCOM) / Pakistan (CENTCOM);
- Israel, Lebanon, Syria (EUCOM) / Egypt, Jordan (CENTCOM);

- Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan (CENTCOM/ EUCOM);<sup>5</sup>
- Homeland Defense (JFCOM, SPACECOM, North American Air Defense Command (NORAD); and
- Russia (Not within a Unified Command's AOR).

In addition, there is not a common focus between the Unified Command structure, where CINCs have a regional focus, and the Department of State structure, where Ambassadors have great authority but are focused at the country level.

Goldwater-Nichols readjusted the balance of power between the Services and the Joint warfighting structure. As a result, the CINCs find themselves with a greater influence in DoD decision making. The establishment of SOCOM and SPACECOM has eroded Service influence in these functional areas. Although they still maintain a near-term focus, CINCs have a much greater say in the shape of future capabilities through their interaction with the Joint Requirements Oversight Council process. The emerging role of United States Joint Forces Command as the Joint Force Trainer, Integrator, and Provider is seen by many as a challenge to traditional Service Title 10 roles. At the same time, the Joint Officer management provisions of Goldwater-Nichols have resulted in a migration of talent from the Service staffs to the Joint Staff and Unified Command Staffs.

There appears to be a growing parochialism among the Unified Commands and the potential for future bureaucratic conflict among the CINCs is likely for several reasons:

- JFCOM's expanding role in Joint Experimentation and Joint requirements has caused some concern in the other unified commands as well as in the Services. There remains an undercurrent among the Unified Command staffs that JFCOM's responsibilities, especially as the integrator, invade the command prerogatives of the functional and geographic CINCs, who believe it is their responsibility to conduct training within their own commands.
- Peacetime engagement activities and smaller-scale contingencies are causing competition among the CINCs for low density / high demand assets.
- With a greater percentage of the force stationed in the continental United States and a move to use emerging information technologies to reduce the "forward-footprint" during overseas operations, the Geographic CINCs will have to rely more and more on JFCOM and SPACECOM for regional operations.

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<sup>5</sup> On 1 October 1999, CENTCOM assumed responsibility for all U.S. military engagement activities, planning, and operations within these Central Asian states. At the same time, EUCOM lists these states within the command's area of interest because of the possibility of current or planned operations.

# ORGANIZATIONAL DESCRIPTION

## THE UNIFIED COMMANDS

### 1. Legal Specifications, Authorizations and Responsibilities.

**A. Authorizing Statute:** Title 10 U.S.C., Section 161 states that "With the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President, through the Secretary of Defense, shall (1) establish Unified Combatant Commands and Specified Combatant Commands to perform military missions; and (2) prescribe the force structure of those commands."<sup>6</sup> A Unified Combatant Command is defined as a military command that has broad, continuing missions and is composed of forces from two or more military departments.<sup>7</sup> The law stipulates that unless otherwise directed by the President, the chain of command to a Unified or Specified Combatant Command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense, and from the Secretary of Defense to the commander of the Combatant Command.<sup>8</sup>

#### **B. Department Directives:**

**(1) Department of Defense (DoD) Directive (DODD) 5100.1** describes the functions of the Unified Commands and the Combatant Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs).<sup>9</sup>

**(2) Unified Command Plan (UCP):** The UCP is the document that establishes the Combatant Commands. It is developed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), approved by the President, and addressed to CINCs of Combatant Commands. The UCP identifies geographic areas of responsibility, assigns primary tasks, defines authority of the commanders, establishes command relationships, and gives guidance on the exercise of Combatant Command. The Unified Command structure is flexible, and can be changed as required to accommodate evolving U.S. national security needs.<sup>10</sup> The current Unified Command structure includes:

**(a)** U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM);<sup>11</sup>

**(b)** U.S. European Command (EUCOM);

**(c)** U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM);<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Special Operations Command is the only command specifically established by the law (Title 10 U.S.C., Section 167). The Combatant Commands were established by the National Security Act of 1947; since then Congress has modified their responsibilities and numbers several times by changes to Title 10. The most significant changes were made by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, which greatly expanded the responsibilities of the Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) of the Combatant Commands and strengthened their supporting staff functions.

<sup>7</sup> The term "Specified Combatant Command" means a military command that has broad, continuing missions and which is normally composed of forces from a single military department. There are currently no Specified Commands. The term "Combatant Command" means a Unified Combatant Command or a Specified Combatant Command.

<sup>8</sup> Title 10 U.S.C., Secs 161-167.

<sup>9</sup> DODD 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components, September 25, 1987.

<sup>10</sup> The UCP has been changed 17 times since 1946.

<sup>11</sup> Two types of acronyms are used to refer to the Unified Commands. For example, the United States Central Command may be referred to as USCENCOM or CENTCOM. Similarly the commander-in-chief (CINC) of CENTCOM may be referred to as USCINCENT or CINCCENT. This paper uses the shorter acronyms throughout (e.g., CENTCOM, CINCCENT).

- (d) U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM);
- (e) U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM);
- (f) U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM);
- (g) U.S. Space Command (SPACECOM);
- (h) U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM); and
- (i) U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM).<sup>13</sup>

**(3) Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF):** This is the authoritative document that contains the doctrine, principles, and policy to govern joint activities of the Armed Forces of the United States. It contains specific guidance for the Combatant Commands and defines the relationship between the Combatant Commands and the military departments.

**(4) Forces for Unified Command Memorandum:** This document, prepared by the Joint Staff and signed by the Secretary of Defense, assigns all forces of the Armed Services (except as noted in title 10, U.S. Code, section 162) to the various Combatant Commands.<sup>14</sup> A force assigned or attached to a Combatant Command may be transferred from that command only as directed by the Secretary of Defense, under procedures prescribed by the Secretary of Defense and approved by the President. Forces assigned by the "Forces for" memorandum are available for normal peacetime operations of the respective command.

**C. Interagency Directives:** Unified Command requirements to support interagency matters are communicated through the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

**2. Missions/Functions/Purposes.** The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 defined the command authority of the Combatant Commander as the authority to give direction to subordinate commands, including all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics; prescribe the chain of command within the command; organize commands and forces to carry out assigned missions; employ forces necessary to carry out assigned missions; assign command functions to subordinate commanders; coordinate and approve administration, support, and discipline; and exercise authority to select subordinate commanders and Combatant Command staff. This authority is termed "Combatant Command," and subject to the direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense, resides only in the CINC. Combatant Command

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<sup>12</sup> The United States Atlantic Command (ACOM) was renamed as United States Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) on 1 October 1999.

<sup>13</sup> TRANSCOM is the only Unified Command that is specifically described in a DoD Directive, DODD 5158.4, United States Transportation Command, 8 January 1993.

<sup>14</sup> Title 10 U.S.C., Sec. 162, states that except as otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, forces to be assigned by the Secretaries of the military departments to the Combatant Commands or to the United States element of the North American Aerospace Defense Command do not include forces assigned to carry out functions of the Secretary of a Military Department or forces assigned to multinational peacekeeping organizations.

is not transferable.<sup>15</sup> The following table contains the Mission Statements of the current Unified Combatant Commands.

<b>Command</b>	<b>Mission Statement<sup>16</sup></b>
CENTCOM	To promote and protect U.S. interests, ensure uninterrupted access to regional resources, assist friendly states in providing for their own security and contributing to the collective defense, deter attempts by hostile regional states to achieve geopolitical gains by threat or use of force, and fight and win.
EUCOM	To maintain ready forces to conduct the full spectrum of military operations unilaterally or in concert with coalition partners; to enhance transatlantic security through support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); to promote regional stability; and to advance U.S. interests in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East.
JFCOM	To maximize America's present and future military capabilities through joint training, total force integration, and providing ready Continental United States (CONUS) based forces to support other CINCs, the Atlantic Theater, and domestic requirements.
PACOM	To promote peace, deter conflict, respond to crises and if necessary, fight and win to advance U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region.
SOCOM	To provide Special Operations Forces to the National Command Authorities, Regional Combatant Commanders, and American Ambassadors and their country teams for successful conduct of worldwide special operations, civil affairs, and psychological operations during both peace and war.
SOUTHCOM	To provide strategic and operational command control of assigned U.S. land, sea and air forces within its area of responsibility. It also defends U.S. interests within its assigned area of responsibility and assists the development of modern militaries within friendly nations throughout its area of responsibility.
SPACECOM	To coordinate the use of Army, Naval, and Air Force space forces to perform the following missions: Space Forces Support, Space Force Application, and Space Force Control.
STRATCOM	To deter military attack on the United States and its allies, and should deterrence fail, employ forces so as to achieve national objectives.
TRANSCOM	To provide air, land, and sea transportation for the Department of Defense both in time of peace and time of war.

### **A. Major Responsibilities:**

(1) **DODD 5100.1** lists seven functions that apply to all of the Unified Combatant CINCs. These include:

(a) Giving authoritative direction to subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry our missions assigned to the command, including authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics [Key National Security Process Relationship: Policy, Guidance, and Regulation; Planning; Mission Execution; Preparation];

(b) Prescribing the chain of command to the commands and forces within the command [Key National Security Process Relationship: Policy, Guidance, and Regulation; Observation, Orientation and Oversight];

<sup>15</sup> AFSC Publication 1, Joint Staff Officer's Guide, 1997.

<sup>16</sup> Mission Statements were derived from the Unified Command web pages or from survey responses.

(c) Organizing commands and forces within that command as considered necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command [Key National Security Process Relationship: Policy, Guidance, and Regulation; Observation, Orientation and Oversight];


(d) Employing forces within that command as considered necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command [Key National Security Process Relationship: Mission Execution];

(e) Assigning command functions to subordinate commanders [Key National Security Process Relationship: Policy, Guidance, and Regulation; Observation, Orientation and Oversight];

(f) Coordinating and approving those aspects of administration, support (including control of resources and equipment, internal organization, and training), and discipline necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command [Key National Security Process Relationship: Policy, Guidance, and Regulation; Observation, Orientation and Oversight; Preparation; Resourcing]; and

(g) Exercising the authority with respect to selecting subordinate commanders, selecting Combatant Command staff, suspending subordinates, and convening courts-martial [Key National Security Process Relationship: Policy, Guidance, and Regulations; Observation, Orientation, and Oversight].<sup>17</sup>

**(2) Geographic Responsibilities:** Five Combatant Commanders are assigned geographic area responsibilities in the UCP. Figure 1 shows the various Areas of Responsibility (AORs) [Key National Security Process Relationship: All].<sup>18</sup>



**Figure 1: Unified Command Boundaries Effective 1 Oct 2000.**

CINCs with Geographic Areas of Responsibility are the highest-ranking military officers in the chain of command for the conduct of military operations and report directly to the National Command Authorities, which consists of the Secretary of Defense and the President. Some CINCs also hold command responsibilities in regional alliances within their AORs. For

<sup>17</sup> DODD 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components, September 25, 1987.

<sup>18</sup> This map was downloaded from <http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/Unified>.

example, The CINC JFCOM also serves as the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) and the CINCEUR serves as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) command structure. Within their geographic region, CINCs have responsibilities that include:

- (a) Combatant Command (as described above);
- (b) Crisis Response;
- (c) Regional Engagement and Presence;
- (d) Nation Assistance;
- (e) Coalition Building;
- (f) Counterdrug Operations;
- (g) Peace Operations;
- (h) Humanitarian Assistance;
- (i) Military Support to Civilian Authorities;
- (j) Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances.<sup>19</sup>

**(3) Functional Responsibilities:** Five Combatant Commanders are assigned worldwide functional responsibilities in the UCP. JFCOM is currently the only Unified Command with both functional and geographic responsibilities (See Volume VI, Chapter 6, The United States Joint Forces Command). The following table contains the functional responsibilities of the Unified Commands.

Command	Functional Responsibility <sup>20</sup>
JFCOM	Joint Force Provider to other Unified Commands; Joint Force Integrator; and Joint Force Trainer
SOCOM	Provides direct action in special operations missions such as special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, combating terrorism, counterproliferation, civil affairs, psychological operations, and information warfare. Collateral activities include: coalition support, combat search and rescue, counterdrug and countermine activities, and humanitarian and security assistance.

<sup>19</sup> These last two responsibilities are unique to JFCOM. Examples include support for Hurricane Andrew, and Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances as provided during the Los Angeles riots. JFCOM also actively supports counterdrug operations along the southwest border. Although JFCOM does not normally have the lead in these operations, it works in direct support of the non-military agencies involved. See [http://www.acom.mil/acomweb.nsf\\*/AboutJFCOM](http://www.acom.mil/acomweb.nsf*/AboutJFCOM).

<sup>20</sup> Functional responsibilities were derived from the Unified Command web pages or from survey responses.

<b>Command</b>	<b>Functional Responsibility<sup>21</sup></b>
SPACECOM	Launches, operates, and monitors satellites; Detects, validates, and warns of attack by aircraft, missiles or space vehicles against North America; Assures U.S. access to, and operation in, space and denying enemies that freedom; Helps develop and plan for the operation of a system that someday will defend the U.S. from ballistic missiles; Advocates the space requirements of all nine Unified Commands; Defends DoD computer networks from cyber attacks, and coordinates efforts to stop or contain damage and restore network operations in event of an attack; Provides support to planning coordination, and execution of DoD Information Operations worldwide, and assists with the development of Information Operations doctrine, tactics, and procedures. <sup>22</sup>
STRATCOM	Provides intelligence on countries and other entities possessing or seeking weapons of mass destruction; Provides support to other Combatant Command commanders; Develops a Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) that fully satisfies national guidance; and commands, controls and employs assigned forces.
TRANSCOM	Provides strategic air and sea lift; Manages military traffic; Provides aerial refueling for the armed forces.

**B. Subordinate Agencies and Activities:** The Unified CINC can adapt a command structure using one or a combination of several options, including Subordinate Unified Commands, Joint Task Forces, Functional Component Commands, and Service Component Commands.

**(1) Service Component Commands:** The following table contains the Service component commands of the Unified Commands

<b>Command</b>	<b>Service Components<sup>23</sup></b>
CENTCOM	U.S. Army Forces Central Command U.S. Naval Forces Central Command U.S. Air Forces Central Command U.S. Marine Forces Central Command
EUCOM	U.S. Army Europe U.S. Navy Europe U.S. Air Forces Europe U.S. Marine Corps Europe
JFCOM	U.S. Army Forces Command U.S. Atlantic Fleet Air Combat Command Marine Corps Forces, Atlantic

<sup>21</sup> Functional responsibilities were derived from the Unified Command web pages or from survey responses.

<sup>22</sup> CINCSTRAT works closely with the Offices of the Secretaries of Defense and Energy in ensuring a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile, and provides weapons of mass destruction planning expertise to U.S. agencies engaged in developing strategic arms control positions with other nuclear nations.

<sup>23</sup> Service components are derived from Unified Command web sites and survey responses.

<b>Command</b>	<b>Service Components<sup>24</sup></b>
PACOM	U.S. Army Pacific U.S. Pacific Fleet Pacific Air Forces U.S. Marine Forces Pacific
SOCOM	U.S. Army Special Operations Command Navy: Navy Special Warfare Command Air Force Special Operations Command
SOUTHCOM	U.S. Army South U.S. Atlantic Fleet 12 <sup>th</sup> Air Force U.S. Marine Corps Forces Atlantic
SPACECOM	Army Space Command Navy Space Command Air Force Space Command
STRATCOM	Air Force Space Command (ICBMs) Atlantic and Pacific Fleets (ballistic missile submarines)
TRANSCOM	Air Mobility Command Military Sealift Command Military Traffic Management Command

**(2) Subordinate Commands and Organizations:** The Sub-Unified Commands, Joint Task Forces, and various other joint organizations are subordinate to the Unified Commands. The following table depicts these command relationships.

<b>Command</b>	<b>Subordinate Commands and Organizations<sup>25</sup></b>
CENTCOM	Special Operations Command Central
EUCOM	Special Operations Command Europe George C. Marshall Center for European Security Studies Joint Analysis Center

<sup>24</sup> Service components are derived from Unified Command web sites and survey responses.

<sup>25</sup> Subordinate commands, task forces and organizations are derived from Unified Command web sites and survey responses.

<b>Command</b>	<b>Subordinate Commands and Organizations<sup>26</sup></b>
JFCOM	Special Operations Command, Atlantic U.S. Forces Azores Iceland Defense Force Joint Warfighting Center Joint Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Battle Center Joint Warfare Analysis Center Joint Communications Support Element Joint Personnel Recovery Agency Joint Combat Search & Rescue Agency Joint Test and Evaluation Center Joint Personnel Recovery Agency All Service Combat Identification and Evaluation Team Joint Task Force Six JTF Civil Support Atlantic Intelligence Command Cruise Missile Support Activity
PACOM <sup>27</sup>	U.S. Forces Japan U.S. Forces Korea Alaskan Command Eighth U.S. Army Special Operations Command Pacific Joint Task Force – Full Accounting Joint Task Force West Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies Joint Intelligence Center Pacific Center of Excellence
SOCOM	Joint Special Operations Command
SOUTHCOM	Special Operations Command South Joint Task Force Bravo 17 Security Assistance Organizations, which serve as the U.S. military representatives to the U.S. embassies throughout SOUTHCOM’s AOR
SPACECOM	Joint Information Operations Center Joint Task Force – Computer Network Defense
STRATCOM	None

<sup>26</sup> Subordinate commands, task forces and organizations are derived from Unified Command web sites and survey responses.

<sup>27</sup> PACOM also has “designated” vs. “standing” JTF’s centered on 3MEF, 7<sup>th</sup> Fleet, and I Corps.

Command	Subordinate Commands and Organizations <sup>28</sup>
TRANSCOM	Defense Courier Service Global Patient Movement Requirements Center Joint Operational Support Airlift Center Joint Mobility Control Group Business Center Joint Transportation Corporate Information Management Center

**C. Major Products:**

- (1) Inputs to key National Security Council (NSC) and DoD national security documents;
- (2) Command Strategies;
- (3) CINC Instructions;
- (4) Direction for Operational Missions;
- (5) Operational Plans, Concept Plans, Functional Plans, Theater Engagement Plans;
- (6) Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR) Reports;
- (7) Joint After Action Reporting System (JAARS) Reports;
- (8) Input on DoD Requirements Documents;
- (9) CINC-Generated Mission Needs Statements;
- (10) Joint Mission Essential Task Lists (JMETL);
- (11) Joint Training Plans (JTP);
- (12) Integrated Priority Lists;
- (13) CINC Quarterly Reports to Secretary of Defense; and
- (14) Input to CJCS and Secretary of Defense throughout the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) Process.

**3. Vision and Core Competencies.**

**A. Vision:** The published vision statements of the Unified Commands have several similarities. The commands with geographic responsibilities tend to note the goal of creating a

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<sup>28</sup> Subordinate commands, task forces and organizations are derived from Unified Command web sites and survey responses.

prosperous, democratic, and peaceful community, and the ability to fight and win within the respective AOR, if necessary. The commands with functional responsibilities tend to stress the contributions they will make to the warfighter and to the preservation of U.S. interests. The table below contains the published vision statements of each Unified Command.

Command	Vision Statement <sup>29</sup>
CENTCOM	A flexible and versatile command into the twenty-first century . . . trained, positioned, and ready to defend the nation's vital interests, promote peace and stability, deter conflict in the central region; and, if necessary, be prepared to wage unrelenting, simultaneous joint and combined operations to achieve victory in war.
EUCOM	A community of free, stable, and prosperous nations acting together while respecting the dignity and rights of the individual and adhering to the principles of national sovereignty and international law.
JFCOM	United States Joint Forces Command, a Knowledge Based Organization, leads the transformation of U.S. Armed Forces to the capabilities envisioned in JV 2010.
PACOM	A Joint Command directing and coordinating the employment of U.S. Forces in peace, crisis or war to advance U.S. interests as active player, partner, and beneficiary in pursuit of a secure, prosperous, and democratic Asia-Pacific community.
SOCOM	Tomorrow's special operations forces – building on today's successes with: quality people who are experienced; self-reliant warrior diplomats; versatile and responsive units that are regionally and culturally oriented; specialized state-of-the-art equipment and training; and organizational innovation. Operating in a volatile and uncertain world while providing unique capabilities across the continuum of conflict.
SOUTHCOM	A community of democratic, stable, and prosperous nations successfully countering illicit drug activities and other transnational threats; served by professional, modernized, interoperable security forces that embrace democratic principles, demonstrate respect for human rights, are subordinate to civil authority, and are capable and supportive of multilateral responses and challenges.
SPACECOM	Space Command—dominating the space dimension of military operations to protect U.S. interests and investment. Integrating Space Forces into warfighting capabilities across the full spectrum of conflict.
STRATCOM	No vision statement published.
TRANSCOM	Providing timely, customer-focused global mobility in peace and war through efficient, effective, and integrated transportation from origin to destination.

**B. Core Competencies:** The Unified Commands' core competencies also exhibit many similarities. The core competencies of commands with geographic responsibility tend to be expertise in military operations and planning, readiness for the full spectrum of operations, crisis management, intelligence gathering, developing relationships with political and military leaders in their areas of responsibility, support of collective security efforts, and humanitarian relief. Core competencies of commands with functional responsibilities consist of expertise in "operationalizing" their functional responsibility (i.e., knowing what capabilities are available, understanding how to access their services, and being able to effectively apply them to the warfighter), planning for current and future requirements, intelligence gathering, and mission planning and execution.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>29</sup> Vision statements were derived from the Unified Commands' web sites.

<sup>30</sup> Core competencies are derived from Unified Commands' web sites and survey responses.

#### 4. Organizational Culture.

**A. Values:** The Unified Commands value dedication, loyalty, integrity, service, respect, competence, candor, courage, and jointness.<sup>31</sup>

**B. Leadership Traditions:** All CINC positions are nominative (i.e., they can be held by a four-star general or flag officer from any Service), although most have been traditionally affiliated with one or two Services. The table below shows the traditional affiliations between the Unified Commands and the Services.

Command	Traditional Service Occupant
CENTCOM	Army, Marine Corps
EUCOM	Army <sup>32</sup>
JFCOM	Navy, Marine Corps
PACOM	Navy
SOCOM	Army
SOUTHCOM	Army
SPACECOM	Air Force
STRATCOM	Air Force, Navy
TRANSCOM	Air Force

Because the CINCs are charged with responsibility for current operations, their focus tends to be near-term, and their influence in DoD preparation and resourcing processes also tends to highlight near-term issues and requirements. The major exception is CINC JFCOM, who has significant responsibilities in the training and requirements arenas that transcend a near-term focus (See Volume IV, Chapter 6, The United States Joint Forces Command).

**C. Staff Attributes:** The quality of officers assigned to the Unified Command staffs is high. This can be attributed to the joint officer management provisions of Goldwater-Nichols. Unified Command staff action officers react very quickly. This helps in making sound, timely decisions during crises. The Unified Commands consider an innovative spirit, visionary outlook, breadth of overall knowledge and experience, depth of technical skills in certain specialties, the willingness to learn new skills, the ability to apply knowledge and skills to traditional warfighting challenges, true commitment to Joint culture, analytical skills, communication skills, and leadership skills to be the critical attributes of staff. Officers on the Unified Command staffs are expected to bring a solid understanding of the capabilities of their individual Services and to have the ability to integrate the strengths of each Service into effective joint operations.<sup>33</sup>

**D. Strategy:** Unified Command strategies flow from the National Military Strategy and Joint Vision 2010. Common themes among the Unified Command strategies include ensuring

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<sup>31</sup> Values are derived from Unified Commands' web sites and survey responses.

<sup>32</sup> The Army has dominated the EUCOM CINC position for the past four decades. However, the next CINCEUR will be an Air Force General.

<sup>33</sup> Staff attributes are derived from survey responses.

jointness, preventing conflict, protecting forces, and preparing for a future with threats that may be very different from those of the past.

**(1) CENTCOM:** CENTCOM's goals are grouped into three areas:

**(a) CENTCOM Warfighting Goals:**

**(i)** Protect, promote and preserve U.S. interests in the Central Region to include the free flow of energy resources, access to regional states, freedom of navigation, and maintenance of regional stability;

**(ii)** Develop and maintain the forces and infrastructure needed to respond to the full spectrum of military operations;

**(iii)** Deter conflict through demonstrated resolve in such efforts as forward presence, prepositioning, exercises, and confidence building measures;

**(iv)** Maintain command readiness to fight and win decisively at all levels of conflict;

**(v)** Protect the force by providing an appropriate level of security and safety.

**(b) CENTCOM Engagement Goals:**

**(i)** Maintain, support and contribute to coalitions and other collective security efforts that support U.S. and mutual interests in the region;

**(ii)** Promote and support responsible and capable regional militaries;

**(iii)** Promote efforts in the region to counter threats from weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, information warfare, and drug trafficking;

**(iv)** Establish and maintain close relationships with regional political and military leaders;

**(v)** Develop integrated regional engagement approaches through cooperation with counterparts in the interagency, other Unified Commands, and key non-governmental and private volunteer organizations.

**(c) CENTCOM Development Goals:**

**(i)** Promote and support environmental and humanitarian efforts and provide prompt response to humanitarian and environmental crises;

**(ii)** Educate key leaders and the American public on the mission of CENTCOM, the importance of the Central Region and the contributions made by our friends in the region in supporting vital U.S. interests;

(iii) Develop a positive command climate that encourages innovation, develops tomorrow's leaders, provides for a high quality of life, promotes respect of others, and increases appreciation of regional cultures;

(iv) Participate in concept and doctrine development, assessment of desired operational capabilities and integration of validated capabilities;

(v) Maintain regional awareness of security, political, social and economic trends.

**(2) EUCOM:** The EUCOM strategy includes:

(a) Shaping the international environment by fostering the development of individuals, institutions, nations, and relationships to reduce the likelihood of conflict, and to deter aggression and coercion;

(b) Responding to the full spectrum of crises to frustrate coercion and defeat aggression at any intensity of conflict;

(c) Preparing for an uncertain future by identifying additional capabilities that would contribute most to mission accomplishment, and by developing and implementing *Joint Vision 2010* concepts.

**(3) JFCOM:** JFCOM's strategy is built on a foundation of Major Focus Areas (MFAs). These include Joint Force Integrator, Joint Force Trainer, and Joint Force Provider (See Volume IV, Chapter 6, The United States Joint Forces Command).

**(4) PACOM:**

(a) PACOM's strategy is designed to accomplish three major goals:

(i) In peacetime, make conflicts and crises less likely;

(ii) In times of crisis, resolve specific situations on terms that advance U.S. interests;

(iii) In war, win quickly and decisively, with minimum loss of life and resources.

(b) The PACOM strategy centers on six elements for ensuring regional security U.S. military forces;

(i) Forward stationing of critical capabilities;

(ii) Positive security relationships with all nations in the region;

(iii) Long-term commitment and long-haul solutions;

(iv) Teamwork with the State and Commerce Departments, and other U.S. government agencies; and

(v) Measured responses to regional events.

**(5) SOCOM:** The SOCOM strategy focuses on expanded options, strategic economy of force, and tailor-to-task capabilities. Mobility is SOCOM's modernization priority. Other priorities include enhancements to Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Systems, Counterproliferation Capabilities, and Ground Combat Systems.

**(6) SOUTHCOM:** SOUTHCOM's strategy is derived from national objectives and interests and embodies the concepts of shape, respond, and prepare now. SOUTHCOM aims to shape cooperative opportunities with other countries, respond to hemispheric or regional challenges, and prepare for the future.

**(7) SPACECOM:** The SPACECOM strategy focuses on key capabilities or thrusts that will keep the United States the world's preeminent space power. They include:


- (a) Control of space capabilities;
- (b) Global engagement capabilities;
- (c) Full Force Integration Thrusts; and
- (d) Global Partnership Opportunities.

**(8) STRATCOM:** The Triad continues to be the foundation of STRATCOM's national strategy of deterrence. The Triad consists of ballistic missile submarines, land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, and long-range bombers. Each component, or leg, of the Triad provides a different capability and strength, presenting any enemy with three unique threats to oppose. Ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) are the most survivable leg of the Triad. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) are a cost-effective, continuous alert capable force. The bomber fleet is a visible, flexible, and recallable strategic asset.

**(9) TRANSCOM:** The TRANSCOM Strategy focuses on three goals:

- (a) A trained, ready, top-quality force;
- (b) Equipment and infrastructure that support current and future Defense Transportation System requirements in an international environment; and
- (c) A Defense Transportation System that is fully integrated, efficient, effective and customer-focused.

**E. Organizational Structure:** Unified Command headquarters staffs are generally organized under a directorate system. Each directorate is responsible for a specific functional area. However, CINCs organize their staffs as necessary to accomplish duties and responsibilities. The following figure illustrates a typical Unified Command headquarters organization structure.



**Figure 2: Unified Command Organizational Structure (Typical)**

**Notes On Organizational Chart:**<sup>34</sup>

(1) **The CINC** is a Unified Combatant Commander-in-chief, supported by a deputy.

(2) **The Political Advisor (POLAD):** Unified Combatant Commanders with a geographic area of responsibility have a POLAD as a member of their personal staffs.<sup>35</sup> The POLAD is a representative from the Department of State, experienced in the political and diplomatic situation in the theater. The POLAD is helpful in advising the CINC and staff on political or diplomatic issues crucial to the planning process, such as overflight and transit rights for deploying forces, basing and servicing agreements.

(3) **The Manpower and Personnel Directorate (J1)** manages manpower, formulates personnel policies, and supervises administration of personnel, including civilians and prisoners of war.

(4) **The Intelligence Directorate (J2)** ensures availability of sound intelligence on area and enemy locations, activities, and capabilities; directs intelligence efforts on proper

<sup>34</sup> Notes on organizational are derived from [The Joint Officers Guide](#), Unified Commands' web sites and survey responses.

<sup>35</sup> It appears a POLAD would be advisable on all Unified CINC staffs. For example, although CINCs such as USCINCSpace have no geographic responsibilities, they do have global responsibilities that could benefit from a political advisor.

enemy items of interest; ensures adequate intelligence coverage and response; and discloses enemy capabilities and intentions.

**(5) The Operations Directorate (J3)** assists in direction and control of operations; the J3 also plans, coordinates, and integrates operations.

**(6) The Logistics Directorate (J4)** formulates logistics plans; coordinates and supervises supply, maintenance, repair, evacuation, transportation, construction, and related logistics matters; coordinates security assistance programs in theater and with the State Department; and ensures effective logistics support for all forces in the command.

**(7) The Plans and Policy Directorate (J5)** assists the CINC in long-range or future planning; prepares campaign and operation plans, and prepares estimates of the situation.

**(8) The Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C<sup>4</sup>) Directorate (J6)** assists the CINC with responsibilities for communications-electronics and automated data systems; prepares communications and data systems plans to support operational and strategic concepts; and furnishes communications to exercise command in mission execution.

**(9) Exceptions to the Typical Structure:**

**(a)** EUCCOM's J4 is the Logistics and Security Assistance Directorate;

**(b)** JFCOM has combined the J3 and J5 into one directorate. JFCOM also has organized three additional directorates: a Joint Training and Exercises Directorate (J7); a Requirements Interoperability & Strategy Directorate (J8); and a Joint Experimentation Directorate (J9) (See Volume IV, Chapter 6, The United States Joint Forces Command);

**(c)** PACOM's J4 is the Logistics, Engineering, & Security Assistance Directorate;

**(d)** SOCOM's directorates are not organized as described above. Its directorates are: Command Support (SOCS), Intelligence and Information Operations (SOIO), Operations, Plans and Policy (SOOP), Requirements and Resources (SORR), and Acquisition and Logistics (SOAL);

**(e)** SOUTHCOM has an additional directorate, Programs and Resource Directorate (J8). The SOUTHCOM J5 is titled the Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate;

**(f)** STRATCOM combines the functions of J3 and J4 into one directorate, the Operations and Logistics Directorate (J3/4);

**(g)** TRANSCOM integrates the operations and logistics directorates in to one directorate, known as Operations and Logistics Directorate (TCJ3/J4). TRANSCOM also titles J1 the Manpower, Personnel, Quality and Information Management. TRANSCOM also has a J8 called the Program Analysis and Financial Management Directorate.

**5. Formal National Security Process Involvement.** The following table indicates the Unified Commands' major products and roles in the seven key national security processes.

		Strategy Development	Policy, Guidance, and Regulations	Planning	Mission Execution	Observation, Orientation, and Oversight	Preparation	Resourcing
<b>Products</b>	Inputs to key NSC, OSD, and JCS national security documents (e.g., NSS, NMS, DPG, JSCP)	✓	✓					
	CINC Command Strategy	✓						
	CINC Instructions		✓					
	Direction for Operational Missions		✓		✓			
	Operational Plans, Concept Plans, Functional Plans, Theater Engagement Plans			✓				
	Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR) Reports					✓		
	Joint After Action Reporting System (JAARS) Reports					✓		
	Input on DoD Requirements Documents (e.g., MNS, ORDs, CRDs)						✓	
	CINC Generated Mission Needs Statements						✓	
	CINC Joint Mission Essential Task Lists (JMETLs)						✓	
	CINC Joint Training Plans (JTP)						✓	
	CINC Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs)							✓
	CINC Quarterly Report to SECDEF	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Input to CJCS and SECDEF throughout the PPBS Process	✓	✓	✓				✓
CINC Congressional Testimony	✓	✓	✓				✓	
<b>Roles</b>	Geographic CINC (JFCOM, EUCOM, CENTCOM, PACOM, SOUTHCOM)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Functional CINC (JFCOM, SPACECOM, SOCOM, TRANSCOM, STRATCOM)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

**A. Strategy Development:**

**(1) Major Activities:**

(a) Provide input to key strategy documents, including the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Military Strategy (NMS), the Joint Strategy Review (JSR), the Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG), and the Joint Planning Document (JPD).

(b) Develop the individual CINC's Strategies.

**(2) Major Stakeholders:** Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of Defense, Service component commands and subordinate units.

### **(3) Key Organizational Processes:**

**(a)** Unified Command staffs formulate input to the key national security strategy documents, including the NSS, NMS, JSR, CPG, and JPD. Information for these inputs is gathered from the various command directorates, as well as from the Service component commands. The resulting input is forwarded to the Joint Staff for inclusion in Joint Staff documents (e.g., NMS, JSR, JPD), and for inclusion in the JCS input to higher order documents (e.g., NSS, CPG).<sup>36</sup>

**(b)** Each CINC also formulates a strategy for the respective Unified Command. In general, these strategies are collaboratively developed with participation and input from the various command directorates, as well as from the Service component commands. Those interviewed stressed that the key to the effectiveness of Unified Command strategic planning is engagement by the CINC.

**(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes:** Joint Staff input to the NSS and CPG. Joint Staff development of the NMS, JSR, and JPD (See Volume II, Chapter 2, The National Security Council, and Volume IV, Chapter 5, The Joint Chiefs of Staff).

**(5) Associated Lower-Level Processes:** None.

### **B. Policy, Guidance, and Regulation:**

#### **(1) Major Activities:**

**(a)** Provide input to key documents, including the Defense Planning Guidance, the Unified Command Plan, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), and Joint Doctrine.

**(b)** Develop CINC Instructions that relate to the administration and operating procedures of the command.

**(2) Major Stakeholders:** JCS, Service component commands and subordinate units, other Unified Commands.

#### **(a) Key Organizational Processes:**

**(i)** Unified Command staffs formulate input to key policy and direction documents, including the DPG, UCP, and JSCP. Information for these inputs is gathered from the various directorates of the command staffs, as well as from the respective Service component commands. The resulting input is forwarded to the Joint Staff (See Volume IV, Chapter 5, The Joint Chiefs of Staff).

**(ii) Joint Doctrine:** All Unified Commands, as well as Services and the Joint Staff, can submit proposals for new Joint Doctrine to fill operational void. The Joint Staff J7 validates the requirement with Services and CINCs, and initiates a Program Directive. J7 formally staffs the Program Directive with Services and CINCs. It includes scope

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<sup>36</sup> The Unified Commands' primary role in the NSS is execution and enabling the NSS. The command charter falls primarily in the planning, mission execution, preparation and resourcing. The most effective involvement in strategy development and policy would come through the CINC's personal and informal influence in developing the NSS and NMS.

of project, references, milestones, and who will develop drafts. The approved Program Directive is released to a Lead Agent, which can be a Service, CINC, or Joint Staff Directorate. The Lead Agent selects a Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the new Joint Publication. The PRA develops two drafts, each of which is staffed with the CINCs, Services, and Joint Staff. The Lead Agent forwards the staffed publication to Joint Staff, which takes responsibility for the document, makes required changes, and prepares the publication for formal coordination with the Services and CINCs. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff approves the publication. Once the CINCs receive the approved doctrine publication, they assess it during their day-to-day operations. Eighteen to twenty-four months following publication, the Joint Staff J7 will solicit a written report from the Combatant Commands and Services on the utility and quality of each publication and the need for any urgent changes or earlier-than-scheduled revisions. No later than five years after development, each publication is revised.<sup>37</sup>

**(3) Associated Higher-Level Processes:** Joint Doctrine development process orchestrated by Joint Staff J7 and supported by JFCOM's Joint Warfighting Center. Joint Staff development of the UCP and JSCP. OSD development of the DPG (See Volume IV: Chapter 5, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Chapter 6, U.S. Joint Forces Command).

**(4) Associated Lower-Level Processes:** Service component command and subordinate command development of command-specific policy, guidance, and regulation (See Volume IV, Chapter 8, The Military Departments and Services).

### **C. Planning:**

**(1) Major Activities:** The Combatant Commanders are principally responsible for the preparation and implementation of joint operations plans.

**(a)** During peacetime, CINCs develop operations plans (OPLANs) through DoD's deliberate planning process. The JSCP tasks the Combatant Commanders to prepare joint operations plans that may be OPLANs, OPLANs in concept format (CONPLANs), or functional plans. OPLANs always include Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD). Combatant Commanders with geographic responsibilities also formulate theater engagement plans (TEPs) (See Volume IV, Chapter 5, The Joint Chiefs of Staff).<sup>38</sup>

**(b)** During crises, CINCs recommend courses of action, expand and refine existing plans, or develop new plans. Campaigns are planned and conducted when the contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major joint operation or battle.<sup>39</sup>

**(c)** CINCs may perform two primary roles in the planning process.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/docinfo/process/procchart.htm>.

<sup>38</sup> OPLANs are plans for larger scale operations that have a compelling national interest and require detailed planning, such as major theater wars with specific threats and the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP). CONPLANs generally pertain to smaller scale operations with less compelling national interest. Functional Plans generally pertain to peacetime or permissive environments and cover areas such as humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, peacekeeping, and counterdrugs.

<sup>39</sup> JP 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, 13 April 1995.

<sup>40</sup> JP 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, 13 April 1995.

(i) As a supported commander, the CINC has primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the JSCP or other joint operation planning authority.

(ii) As a supporting commander, the CINC develops supporting plans and provides augmentation forces or other support to a designated supported commander.

**(2) Major Stakeholders:** The Joint Staff, the National Command Authorities, other supported CINCs, Service component commands, and subordinate units.

**(3) Key Organizational Processes:** The Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES) is the principal system within DoD for translating policy decisions into OPLANs and Operation Orders (OPORDs) in support of national security objectives. Combatant Commanders have a significant responsibility within JOPES. The following table contains the current planning responsibilities for each Unified Command.<sup>41</sup>

Command	Planning Responsibilities
CENTCOM	1 OPLAN 1 CONPLAN w/ TPFDD 9 CONPLANS 3 Functional Plans 1 TEP
EUCOM	1 CONPLAN w/TPFDD 7 CONPLANS 3 Functional Plans 1 TEP
JFCOM	5 CONPLANS 3 Functional Plans 1 TEP
PACOM	1 OPLAN 1 CONPLAN w/TPFDD 9 CONPLANS 3 Functional Plans 1 TEP
SOCOM	Supporting Plans Only
SOUTHCOM	7 CONPLANS 4 Functional Plans 1 TEP
SPACECOM	Supporting Plans Only
STRATCOM	1 OPLAN
TRANSCOM	Supporting Plans Only

<sup>41</sup> In addition to the planning responsibilities listed in the table, CINC United Nations Command/Combined Forces Korea is responsible for one OPLAN.

**(a) Deliberate Planning:** The process of joint deliberate planning is cyclic and continuous. It begins when a task is assigned and is almost identical whether the resulting operation plan is a fully developed OPLAN, CONPLAN, or Functional Plan. These plans remain in effect until canceled or superseded by another approved plan. While in effect, they are continuously maintained and updated.<sup>42</sup>

**(i) Task Assignment:** CJCS is responsible for preparing strategic plans and providing for the preparation of joint contingency plans. The contingency planning responsibility of CJCS is performed through the CINCs. CJCS publishes the JSCP, which apportions major combat forces available for planning, and specifies the product document (i.e., an OPLAN, CONPLAN, or Functional Plan), and the review and approval authority for the plan. With this, the CINC has the scope of the plan, its format, and the amount of detail that must go into its preparation.

**(ii) Developing the Concept:** In response to the task assignment, the supported CINC first determines a mission statement and then develops a fully staffed concept of envisioned operations documented in the CINC's Strategic Concept. The CINC's Strategic Concept is submitted to CJCS for review and, when approved, becomes the concept of operations on which further plan development is based. The concept is also sent to subordinate and supporting commanders, who can then begin the detailed planning associated with plan development. Geographic CINCs develop Strategic Concepts for their AORs. All CINCs may be required to support other CINCs' deliberate plans.

**(iii) Developing the Detailed Plan:** Subordinate commanders use the CINC's concept and the apportioned major combat forces as the basis to determine the necessary support, including forces and sustaining supplies for the operation. The CINC consolidates the subordinates' recommended phasing of forces and support and performs a transportation analysis of their movement to destination to ensure that the entire plan can feasibly be executed as envisioned. Next, the Services identify real-world units to take part in the plan, and the sustainment requirements are identified as much as possible. U.S. Transportation Command, a supporting command, analyzes strategic sea and air transportation requirements and capabilities. Together the CINC and USTRANSCOM develop a Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) list. This planning phase is over when documentation is prepared for final review.

**(iv) Review of the Plan:** The Joint Staff J7 conducts the deliberate plans review process for CJCS. OPLANs, CONPLANs, and Functional Plans are reviewed individually on an 18 to 24-month cycle. TEPs are reviewed as a family of plans on a 12-month cycle. CJCS reviews and approves the CINCs' strategic concepts as well as the various plans based on adequacy, feasibility, acceptability, and joint doctrine. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD (P)) also reviews certain plans for compliance with policy and Secretary of Defense may be briefed on individual plans before they are approved.

**(v) Preparation of the Supporting Plans:** The emphasis here shifts to the subordinate and supporting commanders, who respond to the tasks identified in the

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<sup>42</sup> The information on Deliberate Planning is derived from AFSC Publication 1, *The Joint Staff Officer's Guide*, Chapter 6, 1997 and Joint Publication 5-03.1, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume I (Planning Policies And Procedures)*, 4 Aug 93, pp. II-6 to II-8.

approved operation plan by preparing supporting plans that outline the actions of assigned and augmenting forces.

**(b) Crisis Action Planning (CAP):** Deliberate plans are based on the best available intelligence, but are still hypothetical to the extent that not all conditions can be predicted, and even if all variations of a future situation could be anticipated, they could not all be planned for. Usually, the time available to plan responses to real-time events is short. In as little as a few days, a feasible course of action must be developed and approved, and timely identification of resources accomplished to ready forces, schedule transportation, and prepare supplies for movement and employment of U.S. military force. The procedures are categorized into six phases; however, the process is flexible. It permits the steps to be done sequentially or concurrently, or skipped altogether. The exact flow of the procedures is largely determined by the time available to complete the planning and by the significance of the crisis.<sup>43</sup>

**(i) Phase I - Situation Development:** In the course of routine monitoring of the world situation, an event may occur that has possible security implications for the United States or its interests. Monitoring organizations recognize the event, analyze it to determine whether U.S. interests are threatened, and report it to the National Military Command Center (NMCC). Crisis Action Planning procedures generally begin once the event is reported to the NMCC. Joint Publication 1-03 series, *Joint Reporting Structure*, is the source of detailed instructions for reporting an event through military channels. Events may be reported initially to the NMCC by any means available, but the two most common means are the Critical Intelligence Report and the OPREP-3 PINNACLE. Receipt of an OPREP-3 PINNACLE at the NMCC from a CINC is a likely way for crisis action procedures to be initiated. However, in this day of instant worldwide communications, it is realistic that the theater may learn of a crisis by means of a phone call from Washington. During the Situation Development Phase, the Supported Command reports significant events to the NMCC and publishes the CINC's assessment, which includes the nature of the crisis, the forces available, major constraints, action being taken, and courses of action (COAs) being considered. Supporting CINCs gather intelligence information and furnish information and support as required. The Situation Development phase ends when the event is reported and the CINC's assessment is submitted to CJCS and the National Command Authorities (NCA) through the NMCC.<sup>44</sup>

**(ii) Phase II - Crisis Assessment:** In this phase, the NCA and Joint Chiefs of Staff analyze the situation to determine whether a military option should be prepared to deal with the evolving problem. The phase is characterized by increased information gathering and review of available options by the NCA. The focus of Phase II is on the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the NCA. During this phase, the supported command continues to report status of the situation, evaluates the event, reviews existing OPLANs and CONPLANS for applicability, evaluates disposition of assigned and available forces, and evaluates status of theater transportation assets. Deployment Preparation Orders and Deployment Orders, issued

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<sup>43</sup> Joint Publication 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, and Joint Publication 5-03.1 (to be published as CJCSM 3122.01), JOPES Volume I, define a crisis within the context of joint operation planning and execution as “an incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, and possessions or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of U.S. military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives.” The information on Crisis Action Planning is derived from AFSC Publication 1, The Joint Staff Officer's Guide, Chapter 7, 1997.

<sup>44</sup> The NCA is defined as the U.S. President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors.

by CJCS and specifically authorized by the Secretary of Defense, are used to increase or decrease deployability posture, deploy or redeploy forces, establish or disestablish joint task forces and their headquarters, or signal U.S. intent to undertake or terminate action. The crisis assessment phase ends with the decision by the NCA to have military options developed for their consideration. These are added to the full spectrum of possible U.S. responses. The NCA decision may also include specific guidance on COAs to be developed. For this reason, the CINC's initial assessment has great influence. That assessment is an early, professional recommendation from the scene; lack of time may make the CINC's assessment the only alternative considered.

**(iii) Phase III - Course of Action Development:** Following the decision of the NCA to develop military options, CJCS publishes a Warning Order directing the development of COAs in response to the situation. The COA development phase shifts emphasis to the CINC, who develops and submits recommended COAs to CJCS and the NCA. Following the decision of the NCA to plan a military response, CJCS normally authorizes the release of a Warning Order. If it contains force deployment preparation or deployment orders, Secretary of Defense approval is required. The order will definitely request that the CINC develop COAs for review and approval by the NCA. In a fast-breaking crisis, the initial Warning Order could be communicated by a telephone conference with a follow-on record copy. The CINC includes the COAs in the Commander's Estimate, an abbreviated version of the type of information in the Commander's Estimate prepared during the concept development phase of deliberate planning. During this phase the supported commander responds to the Warning Order, develops and evaluates COAs, coordinates involvement of subordinates, releases an Evaluation Request Message to supporting and subordinate commands, reviews existing OPLANs for applicability, and prepares and submits a Commander's Estimate to CJCS. Supporting commands respond to Evaluation Request Message, analyze COAs, identify forces and generate movement requirement estimates, create a deployment database in JOPES for each COA, and coordinate sustainment calculations and movement requirements. The final product of Phase III is the Commander's Estimate prepared by the CINC. Its purpose is to give the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff information for the NCA to consider in their selection of a military COA. It is the CINC's analysis of the COAs.

**(iv) Phase IV - Course of Action Selection:** In this phase, CJCS in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviews and analyzes the Commander's Estimate and deployment estimates, and ultimately presents COAs in order of priority to the NCA for their decision. During this phase, supported CINCs initiate execution planning on receipt of JCS direction, refine estimates, and resolve identified shortfalls. Supporting CINCs continue planning and monitor the situation. This phase ends with the NCA selection of a COA and the decision to begin execution planning. CJCS issues an Alert Order to publish that decision.

**(v) Phase V - Execution Planning:** In the execution planning phase, the supported commander transforms the NCA-selected COA into an operation order (OPORD). The OPORD is the product of the execution planning phase. Joint Publication 1-02 defines it as "a directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for effecting coordinated execution of an operation." In this phase the necessary detailed planning is performed to execute the approved COA when directed by the NCA. The actual forces, sustainment, and strategic transportation resources are identified, and the concept of operations is described in OPORD format. Execution planning begins when the CINC receives the

Planning Order or the Alert Order from CJCS. The execution planning stage encompasses three major tasks: execution planning, force preparation, and deployability posture reporting. During this phase the supported CINC converts the approved COA into an OPORD, reviews force and unit-related support requirements, confirms the first increment of movement requirements, resolves shortfalls and limitations, notifies the Joint Staff that force requirements are ready for sourcing, and publishes the TPFDD Letter of Instruction. The supporting CINCs identify early-deploying forces, assign tasks, generate movement requirements, develop supporting OPORDs, identify forces, schedule movement for self-deploying forces, and identify shortfalls. The phase ends when the NCA decide to execute the OPORD, place it on hold, or cancel it pending resolution by some other means. Phase VI is described in the following section on mission execution.

(vi) During a crisis, the above phases may be conducted concurrently or even eliminated, depending on the situation. In some situations, no formal JCS Warning Order is issued, and the first record communication that the supported commander receives is CJCS Planning Order or Alert Order containing the COA to be used for execution planning. It is equally possible that an NCA decision to commit forces may be made shortly after an event occurs, thereby compressing greatly Phases II through V. To appreciate fully the usefulness of CAP, it is important to recognize that no definitive length of time can be associated with any particular phase. Note also that severe time constraints may require crisis participants to pass information orally, including the decision to commit forces. In actual practice, much coordination is done over secure telephone during the entire crisis action planning process.

**(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes:** JCS and NSC participation in the planning process (See Volume II, Chapter 2, The National Security Council, and Volume IV, Chapter 5, The Joint Chiefs of Staff).

**(5) Associated Lower-Level Processes:** Development of supporting plans and orders by subordinate commands (See Volume IV Chapter 8, The Military Departments and Services).

#### **D. Mission Execution:**

**(1) Major Activities:** CINCs with geographic responsibilities are the highest-ranking military officers in the chain of command for the conduct of military operations within their respective AORs. During mission execution, both supported and supporting CINCs refine plans, direct operations and/or support activities, and report to the National Command Authorities.

**(2) Major Stakeholders:** NCA, CJCS, the Joint Staff, Service component commands and subordinate units.

**(3) Key Organizational Processes:** The execution phase of a crisis starts with the NCA decision to choose the military option to deal with the crisis and execute the OPORD. The Secretary of Defense will authorize CJCS to issue an Execute Order that defines D-day, the resource allocation, and directs execution of the OPORD. The CINC then executes the OPORD and directs subordinate and supporting commanders to execute their supporting OPORDs. The Execute Order may include further guidance, instructions, or amplifying orders. During execution, the supported and supporting commanders, Services, and defense agencies update

information in the JOPES deployment database. During the execution phase, changes to the original plan may be necessary because of tactical and intelligence considerations, force and cargo availability, availability of strategic lift assets, and transportation infrastructure capabilities. Therefore, ongoing refinement and adjustment of deployment requirements and schedules, and close coordination and monitoring of deployment activities, are required.<sup>45</sup>

**(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes:** Joint Staff, OSD, and NSC monitoring of the operation (See Volume II, Chapter 2, The National Security Council; and Volume IV: Chapter 3, The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and Chapter 5, The Joint Chiefs of Staff).

**(5) Associated Lower-Level Processes:** Subordinate commands execution of the mission (See Volume IV, Chapter 8, The Military Departments and Services).

### **E. Observation, Orientation, and Oversight:**

#### **(1) Major Activities:**

- (a)** Provide Training and Readiness Oversight (TRO) for assigned forces.
- (b)** Prepare Joint Monthly Readiness Review reports.
- (c)** Report emerging events in accordance with the Joint Reporting System (JRS).

**(2) Major Stakeholders:** JCS, other Supported CINCs, Service component commands, and subordinate units.

#### **(3) Key Organizational Processes:**

**(a) Training and Readiness Oversight:** The Secretary of Defense has given Combatant Commanders Training and Readiness Oversight over assigned forces, including reserve component forces when not on active duty and when on active duty for training.<sup>46</sup> TRO actions may include:

- (i)** Monitoring the readiness status of assigned forces;
- (ii)** Ensuring that component forces' readiness issues are identified in CINC IPL and command PPBS inputs;
- (iii)** Ensuring that component forces' readiness deficiencies are reflected in command input to the Joint Monthly Readiness Review; and
- (iv)** Providing guidance to Service component commanders on operational requirements and priorities for their training programs.

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<sup>45</sup> This information on Mission Execution is derived from AFSC Publication 1, The Joint Staff Officer's Guide, Chapter 7, 1997.

<sup>46</sup> SECDEF Memorandum, Assignment of Forces, September 8, 1996.

**(b) JMRR Reporting:** The JMRR is the central component of the CJCS Readiness System. During the JMRR, the Combatant Commanders, Services, and DoD Combat Support Agencies provide a current assessment of military readiness. The JMRR assessments provide the basis for the monthly DoD Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC) briefings by the VCJCS and the Service Chiefs on joint warfighting readiness. The JMRR also provides the basis for the Secretary of Defense's Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress (QRRC). As part of the JMRR process, the Unified Commands assess and report joint readiness to the Joint Staff in eight functional areas, including Joint Personnel; Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; Special Operations; Logistics and Sustainment; Infrastructure; Command, Control, Communications, and Computers; Joint War Planning; and Training. The Unified Command staffs assess their command's ability, by functional area, to execute current missions and forecasted (plus 12 months) engagement missions and support execution of a warfighting scenario that is provided by the Joint Staff. The assessments are based on approved national objectives, military objectives, military requirements, and operational requirements derived from DPG, JSCP, PLANS/ CONPLANS, and JCS-directed taskings. CINCs are directed to report against current operational requirements, not desired capabilities. The JMRR is a tool for assessing current readiness, not a vehicle for validating desired force enhancements or capabilities. In addition to the eight functional area assessments, CINCs and DoD Combat Support Agencies assign an overall capability rating to their ability to execute the current commitments, projected commitments in 12 months, and major theater war scenarios. Additionally, CINCs indicate their top two readiness concerns.<sup>47</sup>

**(c) JRS Reports:** The JRS reports are a major information source for the National Military Command System. They provide information to the command centers of the NCA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINCs and the subordinate joint force commanders, DoD agencies, and the Services. The JRS provides for standardization in reporting systems of the Joint Staff, Combatant Commands and subordinate joint forces, Services, and DoD agencies. The JRS covers numerous functional areas, such as personnel, materiel and equipment status, operational and logistical planning, situation monitoring, and intelligence, as well as actual military operations and exercises. JRS reports required by the Unified Commands include: the Joint After-Action Reporting System Reports, the Weekly Deployment Status Report, the Weekly Deployment Status Report, the Communications Status Report, the Daily Intelligence Summary, the Military Intelligence Digest, Enemy Prisoner of War and Internee Status, the Joint Resource Assessment Data Base Report, the Joint Personnel Status Report, the Logistic Factors Report, the Munitions Status Report, Operations Event/Incident Report, Operations Summary Report, various reconnaissance reports, and the Commander's Situation Report.<sup>48</sup>

**(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes:** JCS orchestration of the JMRR; OSD Senior Readiness Oversight Council meetings; development of DoD's Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress (See Volume IV, Chapter 5, The Joint Chiefs of Staff).

**(5) Associated Lower-Level Processes:** Assigned Service component units reporting through the Status of Resources and Training System. Service component command

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<sup>47</sup> CJCSI 3401.01B, Chairman's Readiness System, 1 July 1999. Because of SOCOM's unique resourcing responsibilities, CINCSOC has additional responsibilities in the JMRR process and reports special operations unit readiness in the same manner as the Services.

<sup>48</sup> CJCSM 3150.01, Joint Reporting Structure General Instructions, 30 June 1999.

inputs to the CINC's JMRR report (See Volume IV, Chapter 8, The Military Departments and Services).

## **F. Preparation:**

**(1) Major Activities:** CINC JFCOM has a significant, unique role in preparation processes including Joint Experimentation, requirements generation, and joint training (See Volume IV, Chapter 6, U.S. Joint Forces Command). In addition to these JFCOM-specific activities, all Unified Commands:

**(a)** Review and comment on all major acquisitions and JROC special interest requirements documents;

**(b)** Participate in Senior Warfighting Forums (SWARFs);

**(c)** Develop Joint Mission Essential Task Lists;

**(d)** Develop command Joint Training Plans; and

**(e)** Plan and execute Joint training exercises.

**(2) Major Stakeholders:** JCS, Service component commands and subordinate units.

### **(3) Key Organizational Processes:**

#### **(a) Requirements Generation:** <sup>49</sup>

**(i) CINC-Generated Mission Need Statements (MNS):** The CINC may forward a CINC-generated MNS to the Joint Staff through the JROC process.<sup>50</sup> However, the preferred method for CINC MNS generation is for the CINC to identify their mission needs to the responsible Service component commander or appropriate DoD agency. The component or agency will then coordinate the definition and documentation activities through their sponsoring Services or agency requirements system and keep the CINC apprised of the status of the MNS. Joint Staff assistance may be needed to support a CINC in the development of a mission need or in determining if a CINC-generated MNS is redundant to a validated MNS or one under development.

**(ii) CINC Field Assessments (CFA):** The purpose of a CFA is to provide a deployed/employed CINC a rapid, tailored analysis in response to an emergent threat capability and to meet urgent priority information needs about fielded U.S. force or system capabilities and/or vulnerabilities involving more than one Service.

**(iii) Senior Warfighting Forums:** The SWARF is a JROC-directed forum used to organize, analyze, prioritize, and build joint consensus on a complex

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<sup>49</sup> The information on Requirements Generation is derived from CJCSI 3170.01A, Requirements Generation System, 10 August 1999, pp. B-5 to B-7.

<sup>50</sup> Congress has given CINCSOC specific title 10 authority with a unique major force appropriation category (Title 10 U.S.C., Sec. 167). Therefore, CINCSOC can establish, validate, and approve SOCOM requirements and budget for ACAT II and below programs.

resource and requirements issue for JROC approval. The JROC tasking memorandum will identify the SWARF lead, specific issue to be addressed, fiscal guidelines, assignment of the appropriate acquisition and technical expertise to frame the issue, and timeline to report recommendations. The JROC will assign CINCs to lead SWARFs according to their missions and responsibilities. The SWARF lead will brief the recommendations to the JROC.

**(b) Joint Training:** CJCS requires that Combatant Commanders develop and submit Joint Training Plans annually to reflect the CINC's scheduled exercises and training events. These JTPs identify the training audience; list training objectives; select the training method (academic, command post exercise, or field training exercise); and outline a summary of the events and resources required to accomplish the training objectives. JFCOM's JTP also focuses on common operational joint tasks by training commanders and joint staffs to operate within a joint task force structure.<sup>51</sup>

**(i)** CINC-sponsored exercises and training events are scheduled and executed by the respective Unified Command. The Unified Command Exercise and Training Scheduling Conference is the formal coordination vehicle for developing the command's training program. These conferences have attendees from component commands, supporting joint commands, the Joint Staff, Services, and other agencies. Conferees discuss the overall direction of training programs, resolve conflicts (such as transportation and supportability), eliminate redundancy, and plan within the existing and forecast resource constraints. After the Exercise and Training Scheduling Conference, the command's Joint Exercise Schedule is forwarded to the Joint Staff J7 for review. This submission covers the POM years and forms the basis for deconfliction within the Worldwide Joint Training Conference, which sets the stage for all joint training planning throughout the upcoming year. The Joint Staff J7 hosts the Worldwide Joint Training Conference, updates training guidance and resource allocation, resolves training issues, and identifies potential scheduling problems. Attendees come from Unified Commands, Services, Defense agencies, and other activities.

**(ii)** The Unified Command staff coordinates directly with other supporting commands, Services, and agencies on all relevant matters pertaining to the planning and execution of its joint exercises. The Joint Staff is kept informed and will resolve conflicts upon request. Transportation, personnel, and equipment are critical issues that must be coordinated throughout the training process. Initially, each command receives estimates of resource availability from the Joint Staff and TRANSCOM during the Worldwide Training Conference. These estimates will allow the command to conduct initial planning for the outyears and to continue to refine near-term years in final coordination. The resources required for real-world events, however, can have drastic effects on the worldwide exercise picture. CJCS determines the priority of support in the event of resource conflicts.

**(c)** Exercise funding is programmed and managed by several headquarters activities. The Joint Staff is responsible for exercise transportation funding to include airlift, sealift, port handling, and inland transportation. Exercise related construction is also centrally managed by the Joint Staff. The Services are responsible for funding all other exercise expenses, known as incremental expenses, such as consumable supplies, per diem, non-aviation fuel, and communications. Incremental funding does not include those outputs funded

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<sup>51</sup> Information on Joint Training was primarily derived from CJCSM 3500.03, Joint Training Manual for the Armed Forces of the United States, 18 Sep 98 and CJCSI 3500.02B, Joint Training Master Plan 2000 for the Armed Forces of the United States, 1 May 1998.

in other Service accounts such as flying hours, steaming days, or tank miles. CINCs play an important role in the exercise funding process. Transportation requirements are based on Combatant Command and Service estimates. CINCs are allocated transportation funding "chits" by the Joint Staff. In turn, the CINCs reimburse the Services for transportation costs. The accuracy of Unified Command estimates and the viability of the command training programs contribute to the Joint Staff's ability to successfully describe and defend the worldwide joint exercise program. CINCs may also verbalize the importance of exercise funding via other avenues such as Integrated Priority Lists and direct input to the Secretary of Defense or Congress.

**(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes:** The DoD Requirements Generation Process and the JCS Joint Training System (See Volume IV: Chapter 2, The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, Chapter 5, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Chapter 6, U.S. Joint Forces Command).

**(5) Associated Lower-Level Processes:** Development of training plans by component commanders, which align each Service METL with the CINC's METL (See Volume IV, Chapter 8, The Military Departments and Services).

## **G. Resourcing:**

### **(1) Major Activities:<sup>52</sup>**

**(a)** Prepare and submit an Integrated Priority List to the Secretary of Defense and CJCS, which identifies high priority needs, prioritized across Service and functional lines with consideration of reasonable fiscal constraints, that require attention by DoD in developing and programming for solutions. In addition, within each problem area, CINCs identify suggested programs and cost estimates, within reasonable and realistic fiscal constraints, needed to solve the problem areas.

**(b)** Prepare and submit CINC Quarterly Reports to the Secretary of Defense and CJCS. This direct, formal communications vehicle allows the CINCs to focus on the key issues being faced by their commands.<sup>53</sup>

**(c)** Provide warfighting requirements to Service components for developing Unified Command contributions to each respective Military Department POM. CINCs receive feedback from the components or responsible commands on the status of warfighting priorities throughout the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) development process and discuss the degree to which the developing POMs are meeting the CINC's needs with the components, responsible commands, and Military Departments.

**(d)** CINCs may meet with the Defense Resources Board (as the board deems necessary) during the formulation of the DPG and during the annual program and budget review processes. CINCs also provide comments to the Secretary of Defense, CJCS, and the

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<sup>52</sup> Information in this section was derived from CJCSI 8501.01, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commander in Chiefs of the Combatant Commands, and Joint Staff Participation in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, 1 April 1999, pgs. A2-A4.

<sup>53</sup> CJCSI 3001.01A, CINC Quarterly Reports to the Secretary of Defense, November 17, 1977.

Defense Resource Board on the impact of each respective Military Department, Defense agency, and SOCOM POM on the CINCs' ability to carry out their responsibilities.

(e) Submit to the Service components, responsible commands, and Military Departments a budget proposal for activities of each of the Combatant Commands for which funding may be requested in the President's budget. These may include joint exercises, force training, ongoing contingencies, and other selected operations.<sup>54</sup>

(f) Assess and provide to the Secretary of Defense and CJCS the warfighting impact of Program Budget Decisions (PBDs). CINCs submit issue outlines to CJCS during the annual program and budget review processes.

(g) Submit input to CJCS through the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment (JWCA) process to assist in development of the Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA) and Chairman's Program Recommendation.

(h) CINCTRANS is delegated authority to procure commercial transportation services as necessary to carry out the TRANSCOM mission. CINCTRANS is also delegated control of the transportation accounts of the Defense Business Operations Fund.<sup>55</sup>

**(2) Major Stakeholders:** Secretary of Defense, CJCS, Military Departments, and Service component commands.

**(3) Key Organizational Processes:** The staff process for providing CINC inputs at various stages in the PPBS process varies slightly by command. In general, however, Unified Command staffs:

(a) Request input throughout the PPBS process from the Service component commands and then integrate the components' inputs;

(b) Distribute the integrated component inputs to the subject matter experts throughout the various directorates on the Unified Command staff to refine or add issues and recommend priorities;

(c) Draft the outgoing correspondence to the Joint Staff and/or the Office of the Secretary of Defense;

(d) Coordinate the draft correspondence among the Unified Command staff directorates; and

(e) Forward the coordinated package to the command section for approval and submission.

**(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes:** CJCS input to the PPBS process (See Volume IV: Chapter 4, Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate, and Chapter 5, The Joint Chiefs of Staff).

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<sup>54</sup> The budget proposal of SOCOM includes requests for funding for development and acquisition of special operations-peculiar equipment; and acquisition of other material, supplies, or services that are peculiar to special operations activities.

<sup>55</sup> DODD 5158.4, United States Transportation Command, 8 January 1993

**(5) Associated Lower-Level Processes:** Service development of POMs and budgets (See Volume IV, Chapter 8, The Military Departments and Services).

#### **H. Other Formal Processes:**

**(1) CJCS CINC's Conferences:** CJCS normally holds three conferences each year to discuss pressing warfighting issues. Participants include the Combatant Commanders, the Joint Chiefs, the Secretary of Defense, and key members of the Joint Staff. The President has attended portions of the conferences. Although these conferences are not decision-making forums, they can result in staff taskings to address specific issues.

**(2) Component Commanders Conferences:** CINC's hold similar conferences for their Service component commanders. The formats vary by command. Although these conferences are not decision-making forums, they can result in staff taskings to address specific issues.

**(3) Washington Liaison Offices:** Each Unified Command maintains a liaison office in Washington, D.C. to facilitate command interaction with OSD, the Joint Staff, the Services, and the interagency. The office also serves as the command's congressional liaison office.

**(4) CINC Testimony:** CINC's present testimony to Congress when requested regarding their command's responsibilities and requirements.

**6. Informal National Security Process Involvement.** Unified Command action officers and senior leaders frequently hold informal discussions in a number of different venues to discuss substantive issues. Sometimes these discussions occur as action officers prepare command inputs to the Joint Staff in support of formal processes. Sometimes they occur as action officers try to build consensus for proposals or recommendations. Sometimes they occur as sidebars at conferences, meetings, or seminars. Most members of the Unified Command staffs are networked to a broader functional community, both within their respective Service (e.g., pilots, infantry, submariners) and within their functional specialty (e.g., logistics, personnel, communications). These networks are an important lubricant for the national security process at large. In addition to these networks, CINC's and their deputies are in frequent contact with other senior military leaders from the Joint Staff, Services, and other Unified Commands.

#### **7. Funding and Personnel.**

**A. Authorizations and Appropriations:** DoD Directive 5100.3 requires the Secretaries of the Military Departments to provide administrative and logistics support for the headquarters of the Unified Commands, as well as the headquarters of all subordinate joint commands.

**B. Budget Sources:**

(1) The following table illustrates which Military Department is responsible for providing support to each Unified Command.

<b>Command</b>	<b>Support Responsibility<sup>56</sup></b>
CENTCOM	Air Force
EUCOM	Army
JFCOM	Navy
PACOM	Navy
SOCOM	Air Force
SOUTHCOM	Army
SPACECOM	Air Force
STRATCOM	Air Force
TRANSCOM	Air Force

The following table displays the various Unified Command management headquarters budgets.

**Command Management Headquarters Budget in \$ Thousands<sup>57</sup>**

<b>Command</b>	<b>FY 98</b>	<b>FY 99 (est)</b>	<b>FY 00 (est)</b>
CENTCOM	2,296	2,367	2,444
EUCOM	12,356	11,740	11,134
JFCOM <sup>58</sup>	21,421	18,489	22,306
PACOM <sup>59</sup>	32,539	23,557	26,300
SOCOM <sup>60</sup>	38,700	46,600	40,300
SOUTHCOM	8,364	8,014	8,629
SPACECOM	9,454	7,806	9,204
STRATCOM	14,538	13,263	14,640
TRANSCOM <sup>61</sup>	13,960	12,960	12,993

<sup>56</sup> DODD 5100.3, Support of the Headquarters of the Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands, 21 Oct 1993.

<sup>57</sup> U.S. Navy O&M, Navy Data Book, February 1999, [http://navweb.secnav.navy.mil/pubbud/00pres/omn/omndata\\_u.pdf](http://navweb.secnav.navy.mil/pubbud/00pres/omn/omndata_u.pdf), U.S. Army O&M, Army Data Book, February 1999, <http://www.asafm.army.mil/budget/0001pb/electrons/vol2/vol2.pdf>, U.S. Air Force, O&M Air Force Data Book, February 1999, <http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/>, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Operations and Maintenance Overview, February 1999, [http://www.dtic.mil/comptroller/FY2000budget/FY00PB\\_OM\\_Overview.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/comptroller/FY2000budget/FY00PB_OM_Overview.pdf).

<sup>58</sup> Includes U.S. Forces Azores and the Iceland Defense Force.

<sup>59</sup> Includes U.S. Forces Japan and Alaskan Command.

<sup>60</sup> SOCOM headquarters budget falls under O&M, Defense-Wide.

<sup>61</sup> TRANSCOM is funded through a Working Capital Fund (WCF). Funds distributed to the WCF are reimbursable.

**(2) CINC Initiative Fund:** DoD also budgets for a "CINC Initiative Fund," from which CJCS may provide funds to a Combatant Command, upon the request of the CINC. The CINC Initiative Fund is contained within DoD's Defense-wide operations and Maintenance account, and was limited to \$25 million in the DoD FY 98 budget.<sup>62</sup>

**C. Manpower:** The combined manpower for the Combatant Command headquarters staffs was approximately 15,500 personnel in 1997. The 1997 Defense Reform Initiative Review examined all components of these staffs, including common functions, unique functions, and offices funded from outside agencies. The review concluded that a number of unique functions then reporting to CINC headquarters should be reduced, competed with the private sector, or transferred to lower echelon organizations. By 2003, the Headquarters staffs of the Combatant Commands will be reduced 10 percent from fiscal year 1998 levels. Taken together with reductions begun in the early 1990s, the Combatant Commands will reduce their headquarters staffs by a total of 22 percent.<sup>63</sup>

## **8. Observations.**

**A.** There have been some significant changes in the nature of the various CINCs' day-to-day responsibilities over the past ten years. These include:

**(1) EUCOM:** A shift in focus from planning for the Warsaw Pact to the execution of operational missions within alliance and coalition structures (e.g., Bosnia, Kosovo, Northern Watch), as well as an increased focus on humanitarian operations in both Europe and Africa;

**(2) CENTCOM:** A long-term, sustained operation and rotational presence in the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula and a withering of international support in areas such as U.N. sanctions and weapons inspections in Iraq;

**(3) PACOM:** Uncertainty in three major areas: Korea, China, India/Pakistan;

**(4) SOUTHCOM:** New responsibilities for the Caribbean Basin and the relocation of headquarters from Panama to Florida;

**(5) JFCOM:** A reduction in geographic responsibilities, an increased role in Joint Training and requirements generation, and the establishment of Joint Task Force Civil Support;

**(6) SPACECOM:** Additional responsibilities for DoD's Information Operations and the establishment of Joint Task Force Computer Network Defense;

**(7) STRATCOM:** An greater focus on conventional operations for the nuclear bomber leg of the Triad;

**(8) SOCOM, TRANSOM:** No recent changes.

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<sup>62</sup> Appendix, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1998, Page 305-326.

<sup>63</sup> The Defense Reform Initiative Report, November 1997 and The Defense Reform Initiative Update, 1999.

**B.** Although there has been some significant changes to the Unified Command Structure over the past ten years, the framework still reflects the Cold War structure. This structure does have the potential for conflict at the current "seams" in the geographic CINCs' AOR boundaries, as indicated below:

- (1) India (EUCOM) / Pakistan (CENTCOM);
- (2) Israel, Lebanon, Syria (EUCOM) / Egypt, Jordan (CENTCOM);
- (3) Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan (CENTCOM/  
EUCOM);<sup>64</sup>
- (4) Homeland Defense (JFCOM, SPACECOM, North American Air Defense Command (NORAD)); and
- (5) Russia (Not within a Unified Command's AOR).

In addition, there is not a common focus between the Unified Command structure, where CINCs have a regional focus, and the Department of State structure, where Ambassadors have great authority, but are focused at the country level.

**C.** Goldwater-Nichols readjusted the balance of power between the Services and the Joint warfighting structure. As a result, the CINCs find themselves with a greater influence in DoD decision making. Although they still maintain a near-term focus, CINCs have a much greater say in the shape of future capabilities through their interaction with the Joint Requirements Oversight Council process. The establishment of United States Special Operations Command and United States Space Command have eroded Service influence in these functional areas. The emerging role of United States Joint Forces Command as the Joint Force Trainer, Integrator, and Provider is seen by many as a challenge to traditional Service Title 10 roles. At the same time, the Joint Officer management provisions Goldwater-Nichols have resulted in a migration of talent from the Service staffs to the Joint Staff and Unified Command Staffs.

**D.** The potential for future bureaucratic conflict among the CINCs is likely for several reasons.

(1) JFCOM's expanding role in Joint Experimentation and Joint requirements has caused some concern in the other Unified Commands as well as in the Services. There remains an undercurrent among the Unified Command staffs that JFCOM's responsibilities, especially as the trainer and integrator, somehow invade the command prerogatives of the functional and geographic CINCs who see training as their own responsibility.

(2) Peacetime engagement activities and smaller-scale contingencies are causing competition among the CINCs for low density / high demand assets.

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<sup>64</sup> On 1 October 1999, CENTCOM assumed responsibility for all U.S. military engagement activities, planning, and operations within these Central Asian states. At the same time, EUCOM lists these states within the command's area of interest because of the possibility of current or planned operations.

(3) With a greater percentage of the force stationed in the continental United States and a move to use emerging information technologies to reduce the "forward-footprint" during overseas operations, the geographic CINCs will have to rely more and more on JFCOM and SPACECOM for regional operations.

## **ORGANIZATIONAL DESCRIPTION**

### **THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS AND SERVICES**



*Prepared for the U.S. Commission on National Security/21<sup>st</sup> Century*

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### The Military Departments and Services

#### Overview

The Department of the Army, Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force function under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. Each Department is separately organized under its own civilian Secretary. The Military Departments are responsible for organizing, training, supplying, and equipping forces for assignment to the Unified Combatant Commands. The Armed Services, including the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps,<sup>1</sup> reside within the Military Departments. Both the Navy and Marine Corps are Services under the Department of the Navy. Each Service has its own distinct history, lineage, traditions, and organizational structure. Prior to 1986, the Services had an extremely influential role within the Department of Defense. An unstated goal of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was to create a suitable balance between the Services and the joint combatant commands. Today the Services still occupy a powerful—although more balanced—position within the Defense establishment. However, the impacts of Goldwater-Nichols, post-Cold War defense restructuring, and emerging missions on the Services have yet to be fully played out.

#### Organization

The Secretaries of the Military Departments exercise authority over their departments through civilian assistants and the respective Service Chief, but retain immediate supervision of activities involving vital relationships with Congress, the Secretary of Defense, other government officials, and the public. The Secretaries are assisted by Under Secretaries, Assistant Secretaries, numerous Deputy Assistant Secretaries, and a Secretariat staff. They are also assisted by the Service Chiefs of Staff (i.e., Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of Naval Operations, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and Commandant of the Marine Corps). The Service Chiefs are members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and serve as military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.<sup>2</sup> The Chiefs are directly responsible to the departmental Secretary for the efficiency of the Service and its preparedness for military operations. The Chiefs advise their respective Secretaries on the plans and recommendations of the Service staffs and act as the Secretaries' agents in carrying them out. Each Service Chief is supported by a military headquarters staff. The composition of the staff varies by Service although each staff is divided into several common functions, including operations; plans; programs; requirements; personnel; command, control, communications, and computers; logistics; and intelligence. The Departments exercise Administrative Control—as opposed to Combatant Control—over their assigned active and reserve component forces. The reserve component includes the Army National Guard, the Army Reserve, the Naval Reserve, the Marine

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<sup>1</sup> The Coast Guard is a military service within the Department of Transportation. When directed by the President or upon a formal declaration of war by Congress, the Coast Guard becomes a Service in the Department of the Navy. The Coast Guard is covered in a separate section titled "The United States Coast Guard" (See Volume VII, Chapter 15, The United States Coast Guard).

<sup>2</sup> The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 names the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the principal military advisor.

Corps Reserve, the Air National Guard, and the Air Force Reserve.<sup>3</sup> The "administrative" chain of command (for purposes other than the operational direction of Unified Combatant Commands) runs from the President, to the Secretary of Defense, to the Secretaries of the Military Departments, to the commanders of Military Service forces.

### Role in Formal and Informal National Security Processes

The following matrix summarizes key products and roles of the Military Departments and Services.

		Strategy Development	Policy, Guidance, and Regulations	Planning	Mission Execution	Observation, Orientation, and Oversight	Preparation	Resourcing	
<b>Products</b>	Organized, trained, and equipped military forces for the CINCs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
	Inputs to the National Security Strategy and key OSD, Joint Staff documents	✓	✓						
	Departmental and Service Visions and Strategies	✓							
	Department and Service policy, directives, and doctrine		✓						
	Service Supporting Plans for DoD's deliberate and crisis action planning processes			✓					
	Service Readiness Reports					✓			
	After Action Reports					✓			
	Service-specific task lists						✓		
	Requirements documents						✓		
	Acquisition Programs						✓		
	Service Program Objective Memoranda and Budgets							✓	
<b>Roles</b>	Service Chiefs	Military Advisor to SECDEF, NSC, President	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
		Member, JCS	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
		Member, Defense Resources Board							✓
		Congressional Testimony	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Service Vice	JROC Member						✓	
Service Acquisition Executive	Member, Defense Acquisition Board						✓		

<sup>3</sup> The reserve component also includes the Coast Guard Reserve under the Department of Transportation. (See Volume VII, Chapter 15, The United States Coast Guard). The Army National Guard of the United States and the Air National Guard of the United States are Reserve components of the Army and the Air Force, respectively. Members of the Army National Guard of the United States and of the Air National Guard of the United States are not in active Federal service except when ordered thereto in accordance with law, or called to active Federal service in their status as members of the National Guard. When not in active Federal service such members are administered, armed, equipped, and trained in their status as members of the Army National Guard and Air National Guard of the several States (Title 10, United States Code, Sections 3079 and 8079).

**Strategy Development.** Military Departments and Services provide input to key strategy documents, including the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Military Strategy (NMS), the Joint Strategy Review (JSR), the Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG), and the Joint Planning Document (JPD). Generally the Military Departments provide input through the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The Services provide input through the Joint Staff. Departments and Service also develop internal visions and strategies.

**Policy, Guidance, and Regulation.** Military Departments and Services provide input to key documents, including the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), the Unified Command Plan (UCP), the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), and Joint Doctrine. They also develop Department-specific policy, guidance, and regulations that relate to the administration and operating procedures of the command.

**Planning.** The Military Departments are principally responsible for the preparation and implementation of supporting plans, including logistics plans, to joint operation plans developed by the Unified Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) (See Volume IV, Chapter 7, The Unified Commands).

**Mission Execution.** For deployment and redeployment operations, each Service is responsible for administrative support and performance of transportation operations assigned by combatant commanders at either their local shipping installations or throughout the theater. During mission execution the Services provide logistics and administrative support for forces assigned to the Unified Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) and maintain 24-hour command centers at Service headquarters and subordinate units to monitor the situation and transmit administrative guidance to their respective units.

**Observation, Orientation, and Oversight.** The Services maintain a network of 24-hour command centers to report on emerging events in accordance with the Joint Reporting System. They also provide readiness reports through the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) and the Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR).

**Preparation.** The Military Departments play a key preparation role, based on their Title 10 responsibilities for organizing, training, supplying, and equipping forces for assignment to the Unified Commands. Major activities include identifying requirements through the Department of Defense's (DoD's) requirements generation process; acquiring new systems to meet the capabilities required by the CINCs; and developing Service Training Programs and Service Task Lists.

**Resourcing.** The Military Departments prepare and submit Department Budget Estimates and Department Programs through the DoD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) process. They also execute their respective programs, provide the day-to-day management of the resources under their control, and audit and evaluate program execution.

## **Observations**

Over the past several years, the turmoil surrounding the Military Departments and Services has been very high. This is the result of four primary factors: Changes in mission/threat, changes in technology, budget pressures, and changes in bureaucratic role within

the Department of Defense. Taken together, these factors are likely to raise a new roles and missions debate.

**Changes in the Mission/Threat.** Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has faced a dynamic and uncertain security environment. The collapse of the Soviet Union has resulted in a smaller U.S. defense force and a significant reduction in overseas basing. At the same time, the demands of peacetime engagement and smaller scale contingencies have stretched the capabilities of U.S. forces engaged in such operations while trying to maintain readiness across the full range of the National Military Strategy (particularly the specter of two major theater wars). Today, the sustained warmaking capabilities of traditional regional foes is questionable. At the same time, the U.S. is faced with a wide range of emerging asymmetrical threats that have resulted in new mission emphasis in areas including combating terrorism, force protection, counter proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, information operations, and homeland security. During the Cold War, the role of each of the Services was fairly well defined. However, changing threats and emerging missions are causing each Service to internally reexamine its strategy, and they are likely to raise new questions in future administrations and within the Congress about the nature of the Military Services and Departments in the future national security arena.

**Changes in Technology.** The foundation of Joint Vision 2010 and the Revolution in Military Affairs rests on new—and expensive—technologies. In some ways, the new technologies are driving the Services to better integrate new weapons systems due to a common reliance on communications, intelligence, targeting, and positioning technologies. At the same time, technology has produced systems such as Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) and the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM), which allow individual Services to extend their combat influence beyond their traditional geographic scope. In some areas, such as Theater Missile Defense, each Service has proposed competing concepts and systems. In the past, such competition was viewed as beneficial to the overall defense posture because it resulted in stronger solutions and some beneficial redundancy. Today, however, the cost of such competition is becoming prohibitive.

**Budget Pressures.** Each of the Services is under significant fiscal pressure due to several factors, including balanced budget demands, the high cost of maintaining readiness in the face of a high peacetime operating tempo (OPTEMPO), and the projected costs to overcome the modernization "bow waves" that exist in each Service. Infrastructure drawdowns have not kept pace with force structure drawdowns, creating additional monetary pressures on the Services.

**Changes in Bureaucratic Roles.** Goldwater-Nichols readjusted the balance of power between the Services and the Joint warfighting structure. As a result, the Services find themselves with less influence in DoD decision making. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is now the principal military advisor to the Secretary of Defense, National Security Council, and the President. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council has matured into a significant player in the resourcing and acquisition processes. The establishment of the United States Special Operations Command and the United States Space Command have eroded Service influence in these functional areas. The emerging role of the United States Joint Forces Command as the Joint Force Trainer, Integrator, and Provider is seen by many as a challenge to traditional Service Title 10 roles. At the same time, the Joint Officer management provisions of Goldwater-Nichols, have resulted in a migration of talent from the Service staffs to the Joint Staff and Unified Command Staffs.

## ORGANIZATIONAL DESCRIPTION

### THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS AND SERVICES<sup>4</sup>

#### 1. Legal Specifications, Authorizations and Responsibilities.

##### A. Authorizing Statute:

(1) The Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force are authorized by Subtitles B, C, D of Title 10, U.S. Code. Title 10 stipulates that the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force will be organized under a Secretary. The Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force are appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, and operate under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense.<sup>5</sup>

(2) Additional legislation regarding the Reserve Components of the Armed Forces is contained in Subtitle E of Title 10, which defines the reserve components to include the Army National Guard, the Army Reserve, the Naval Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air National Guard, the Air Force Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve.<sup>6, 7</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Title 10 United States Code, Section 101 defines the term "uniformed services" as the armed forces (defined as the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard), the commissioned corps of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; and the commissioned corps of the Public Health Service. This paper will focus on the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. A separate section covers the United States Coast Guard. Title 10 also defines the term "department," when used with respect to a military department, to mean the executive part of the department and all field headquarters, forces, reserve components, installations, activities, and functions under the control or supervision of the Secretary of the department.

<sup>5</sup> The American Continental Army, now called the U.S. Army, was established by the Continental Congress on June 14, 1775. The Department of War was established as an executive department by act approved August 7, 1789 (1 Stat. 49). The Secretary of War was established as its head.

From 1789 until 1798 the conduct of naval affairs fell under the Secretary of War (1 Stat. 49). In 1798, the Department of the Navy and the Office of the Secretary of the Navy were established (Title 10, United States Code, Section 5011).

The United States Marine Corps was established in 1775 by resolution of the Continental Congress. Marine Corps (which is part of the Department of the Navy) composition and functions are detailed in Section 5063 of Title 10 of the U.S. Code.

The National Security Act of 1947 (Section 401 of Title 50 of the U.S. Code) created the National Military Establishment, and the Department of War became the Department of the Army. The title of its Secretary became Secretary of the Army (Section 171 of Title 5 of the U.S. Code). The Department of the Air Force was also established by the National Security Act of 1947 (61 Stat. 502).

The National Security Act Amendments of 1949 (63 Stat 578) renamed the National Military Establishment as the Department of Defense and provided that the Department of the Army, Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force be Military Departments within the Department of Defense. The Secretaries of the Military Departments were no longer cabinet positions.

<sup>6</sup> The United States Coast Guard is authorized by Title 14 of the U.S. Code. It is defined as a military service within the Department of Transportation. The Coast Guard may be transferred as a specialized military Service to the Department of the Navy when directed by the President or upon formal declaration of war by the Congress (See Volume VII, Chapter 15, The United States Coast Guard).

<sup>7</sup> The Army National Guard of the United States and the Air National Guard of the United States are Reserve components of the Army and the Air Force, respectively. Members of the Army National Guard of the United States and of the Air National Guard of the United States are not in active Federal service except when ordered thereto in accordance with law, or called to active Federal service in their status as members of the National Guard. When not in active Federal service such members are administered, armed, equipped, and trained in their status as members of the Army National Guard and Air National Guard of the several States (Title 10 United States Code, Sections 3079 and 8079).

## B. Department Directives:<sup>8</sup>

(1) **Department of Defense (DoD) Directive (DODD) 5100.1:** This document defines the functions of the Department of Defense and its major components, including the Military Services.<sup>9</sup>

(2) **Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF):** This is the authoritative document that contains the doctrine, principles, and policy to govern joint activities of the Armed Forces of the United States. UNAAF contains specific guidance for the combatant commands and defines the relationship between the combatant commands and the military Departments (See Volume IV, Chapter 7, The Unified Commands).<sup>10</sup>

**C. Interagency Directives:** Military Department requirements to support interagency matters are communicated through the Secretary of Defense.

**2. Missions/Functions/Purposes.** The Military Departments are responsible for organizing, training, supplying, and equipping forces for assignment to Unified Combatant Commands. The mission statements of the Military Departments are contained in the following table.

Department	Mission Statements <sup>11</sup>
Army	To organize, train, and equip active duty and reserve forces for the preservation of peace, security, and the defense of our Nation. As part of our national military team, the Army focuses on land operations; its soldiers must be trained with modern arms and equipment and be ready to respond quickly. The Army also administers programs aimed at protecting the environment, improving waterway navigation, flood and beach erosion control, and water resource development. It provides military assistance to Federal, State, and local government agencies, including natural disaster relief assistance.
Navy	To protect the United States, as directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, by the effective prosecution of war at sea including, with its Marine Corps component, the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases; to support, as required, the forces of all Military Departments of the United States; and to maintain freedom of the seas.
Air Force	To defend the United States through control and exploration of air and space.

**A. Major Responsibilities:** DoD Directive 5100.1 outlines the principal functions and responsibilities of the Military Departments.<sup>12</sup>

(1) Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the following activities of their respective Departments

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<sup>8</sup> DoD issues numerous directives that provide direction to the military departments. The directives that follow include those that provide high-level guidance on roles and responsibilities.

<sup>9</sup> DODD 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components, September 25, 1987.

<sup>10</sup> The administrative chain of command for purposes other than the operational direction of Unified Combatant Commands runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the Military Departments to the commanders of Military Service forces.

<sup>11</sup> These mission statements are found in The United States Government Manual, 1999-00, published by the Government Printing Office (GPO).

<sup>12</sup> Department of Defense Directive 5100.1.

(a) The functioning and efficiency of their Departments [Key National Security Process Relationship: All];

(b) The formulation of policies and programs that are fully consistent with national security objectives and policies established by the President and the Secretary of Defense [Key National Security Process Relationship: Policy, Guidance, and Regulations];

(c) The effective and timely implementation of policy, program, and budget decisions and instructions of the President or Secretary of Defense relating to the functions of each Military Department [Key National Security Process Relationship: Mission Execution, Resourcing];

(d) Carrying out the functions of the Military Departments so as to fulfill (to the maximum extent practicable) the current and future operational requirements of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands [Key National Security Process Relationship: Planning; Preparation; Resourcing];

(e) Effective cooperation and coordination between the Military Departments and agencies of the Department of Defense to provide for more effective, efficient, and economical administration and to eliminate duplication [Key National Security Process Relationship: Resourcing];

(f) The presentation and justification of the positions of their respective Departments on the plans, programs, and policies of the Department of Defense [Key National Security Process Relationship: Planning; Preparation; Resourcing];

(g) The effective supervision and control of Military Department intelligence activities [Key National Security Process Relationship: Observation, Orientation, and Oversight]; and

(h) Such other activities as may be prescribed by law or by the President or Secretary of Defense [Key National Security Process Relationship: All].

## **(2) Common Responsibilities of the Military Departments:**

(a) To prepare forces and establish reserves of manpower, equipment, and supplies for the effective prosecution of war and military operations short of war and plan for the expansion of peacetime components to meet the needs of war [Key National Security Process Relationship: Preparation; Resourcing];

(b) To maintain in readiness mobile reserve forces, properly organized, trained, and equipped for employment in emergency [Key National Security Process Relationship: Preparation; Resourcing];

(c) To provide adequate, timely, and reliable intelligence and counter-intelligence for the Military Department and other agencies as directed by competent authority [Key National Security Process Relationship: Mission Execution];

(d) To recruit, organize, train, and equip interoperable forces for assignment to Unified and Specified Combatant Commands [Key National Security Process Relationship: Preparation; Resourcing];

(e) To prepare and submit budgets for their respective departments; justify before the Congress budget requests as approved by the President; and administer the funds made available for maintaining, equipping, and training the forces of their respective departments, including those assigned to Unified and Specified Combatant Commands. The budget submissions to the Secretary of Defense by the Military Departments shall be prepared on the basis, among other things, of the recommendations of Unified Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) and of Service component commanders of forces assigned to Unified and Specified Combatant Commands [Key National Security Process Relationship: Resourcing];

(f) To conduct research; develop tactics, techniques, and organization; and develop and procure weapons, equipment, and supplies essential to the fulfillment of the functions assigned in this Directive [Key National Security Process Relationship: Preparation; Resourcing];

(g) To develop, garrison, supply, equip, and maintain bases and other installations, including lines of communication, and to provide administrative and logistics support for all forces and bases, unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense [Key National Security Process Relationship: Mission Execution; Preparation; Resourcing];

(h) To provide, as directed, such forces, military missions, and detachments for service in foreign countries as may be required to support the national interests of the United States [Key National Security Process Relationship: Mission Execution];

(i) To assist in training and equipping the military forces of foreign nations [Key National Security Process Relationship: Preparation];

(j) To provide, as directed, administrative and logistic support to the headquarters of Unified and Specified Combatant Commands, to include direct support of the development and acquisition of the command and control systems of such headquarters [Key National Security Process Relationship: Mission Execution; Preparation; Resourcing];

(k) To assist each other in the accomplishment of their respective functions, including the provisions of personnel, intelligence, training, facilities, equipment, supplies, and services [Key National Security Process Relationship: All]; and

(l) To prepare and submit, in coordination with other Military Departments, mobilization information to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) [Key National Security Process Relationship: Preparation].

**(3) Common Service Responsibilities:** The Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps are responsible for the following functions:

(a) Determining Service force requirements and making recommendations concerning force requirements to support national security objectives and strategy and to meet the operational requirements of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands [Key National Security Process Relationship: Preparation];

**(b)** Planning for the use of the intrinsic capabilities of resources of the other Services that may be made available [Key National Security Process Relationship: Planning];

**(c)** Recommending to the JCS the assignment and deployment of forces to Unified and Specified Combatant Commands established by the President through the Secretary of Defense [Key National Security Process Relationship: Mission Execution];

**(d)** Administering Service forces [Key National Security Process Relationship: Mission Execution];

**(e)** Providing logistic support for Service forces, including procurement, distribution, supply, equipment, and maintenance, unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense [Key National Security Process Relationship: Mission Execution; Preparation; Resourcing];

**(f)** Developing doctrines, procedures, tactics, and techniques employed by Service forces [Key National Security Process Relationship: Policy, Guidance, and Regulations; Preparation];

**(g)** Conducting operational testing and evaluation [Key National Security Process Relationship: Preparation];

**(h)** Operating organic land vehicles, aircraft, and ships or craft [Key National Security Process Relationship: Mission Execution];

**(i)** Consulting and coordinating with the other Services on all matters of joint concern [Key National Security Process Relationship: All].

**(j)** Participating with the other Services in the development of the doctrines, procedures, tactics, techniques, training, publications, and equipment for such joint operations as are the primary responsibility of one of the Services;

**(k)** Providing for training for joint operations and joint exercises in support of Unified and Specified Combatant Command operational requirements, including the following:

**(i)** Development of Service training, doctrines, procedures, tactics, techniques, and methods of organization in accordance with policies and procedures established in Service publications [Key National Security Process Relationship: Policy, Guidance, and Regulations; Preparation];

**(ii)** Development and preparation of Service publications to support the conduct of joint training [Key National Security Process Relationship: Policy, Guidance, and Regulations; Preparation];

**(iii)** Determination of Service requirements to enhance the effectiveness of joint training [Key National Security Process Relationship: Preparation];

(iv) Support of that joint training directed by the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands and conduct of such additional joint training as is mutually agreed upon by the Services concerned [Key National Security Process Relationship: Preparation; Resourcing].

**(4) Specific Responsibilities:<sup>13</sup>**

(a) **The Army** includes land combat and support forces and any organic aviation and water transport assigned. The Army is responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war and military operations short of war, except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war [Key National Security Process Relationship: All].<sup>14</sup>

(b) **The Navy** includes naval combat and support forces and organic aviation. The active duty Marine Corps, within the Department of Navy, includes not less than three combat divisions and three air wings. The Navy and Marine Corps, under the Secretary of the Navy, are responsible for the preparation of Navy and Marine Corps forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war and military operations short of war, except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with the integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Navy and Marine Corps to meet the needs of war [Key National Security Process Relationship: All].

(c) **The Air Force** includes both combat and support aviation forces. The Air Force is responsible for the preparation of the air forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war and military operations short of war, except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Air Force to meet the needs of war [Key National Security Process Relationship: All].

**(5) Specific Responsibilities of the Reserve Component:** Title 10 states that the purpose of each reserve component is to provide trained units and qualified personnel available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency to fill the needs of the armed forces whenever more units and personnel are needed than are in the regular components [Key National Security Process Relationship: All].<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> DODD 5100.1 contains 20-30 specific functions for each Military Department beyond these broad responsibilities.

<sup>14</sup> The Secretary of the Army also serves as the DoD executive agent for military support to civil authorities (MSCA). As executive agent for MSCA, the Secretary of the Army exercises OPCON over all DoD component forces provided for MSCA, including the Services and Defense agencies. Specific responsibilities include developing planning guidance, plans, and procedures for military support; tasking components to plan for and commit resources in response to requests from civil authorities; and developing (and tasking DoD components to develop) generic and incident-specific support plans. The Director of Military Support (DOMS) is the DoD action agent for planning and coordinating this support on behalf of the Secretary of the Army. (JP 3-35, Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations, September 7, 1999).

<sup>15</sup> A comprehensive description of the reserve component can be found in DoD Publication 1215.15-H, Reserve Components of the United States Armed Forces, June 1996.

## **B. Subordinate Agencies and Activities:**

**(1) Department of the Army Operating Commands and Agencies:** Most Army forces are assigned to Major Commands (MACOMs) and Field Operating Agencies (FOAs) for administrative control.

**(a)** The Army MACOMs include:

- (i)** Military Traffic Management Command;
- (ii)** U.S. Army Corps of Engineers;
- (iii)** U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command;
- (iv)** Forces Command;
- (v)** U.S. Army Health Services Command;
- (vi)** U.S. Army Information Systems Command;
- (vii)** U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command;
- (viii)** U.S. Army Materiel Command;
- (ix)** U.S. Army Special Operations Command;
- (x)** U.S. Army Europe;
- (xi)** U.S. Army Pacific;
- (xii)** U.S. Army South;
- (xiii)** Eighth U.S. Army;
- (xiv)** U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC);
- (xv)** U.S. Army Military District of Washington; and
- (xvi)** United States Army Reserve Command.

Army include: **(b)** The Army FOAs, which report to the Office of the Chief of Staff,

- (i)** U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency;
- (ii)** U.S. Army Organizational Efficiency Review Agency;
- (iii)** U.S. Army Operational Test and Evaluation Agency;
- (iv)** U.S. Army Strategic Defense Command;
- (v)** U.S. Army Decision Systems Management Agency; and

**(vi) U.S. Army Safety Center.**

**(c)** The major warfighting elements of the operational Army are its corps, divisions, and separate brigades. These combat units and their supporting elements are the deployable forces that execute the full spectrum of military operations. Combat support units add specific functional capabilities, such as engineer support or air defense, to combined arms organizations. Combat service support, or logistics, units are normally grouped under a support command.

**(d)** There are four Army Corps. Their size and function vary according to their assigned missions, but they can be as large as 100,000 soldiers and contain thousands of vehicles.

**(e)** There are eighteen Army divisions, ten in the active component and eight in the National Guard. They range in size from 10,000 to 18,000 soldiers. An armored division, for example contains almost 800 major combat systems.

**(f)** There are more than 27 separate combat brigades in the Army, the majority of which are in the Army National Guard. Each brigade is uniquely organized for its warfighting mission. They range in size from 1,000 to almost 6,000 soldiers.

**(g)** The Army also provides Special Operations capabilities through the Special Forces, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, and other Special Operations units of both the active and reserve components.<sup>16</sup>

**(2) Department of the Navy Operating Commands and Agencies:**

**(a)** The Navy operating forces are assigned to the following headquarters for administrative control:<sup>17</sup>

**(i)** U.S. Naval Forces Europe, including the 6<sup>th</sup> Fleet;

**(ii)** U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, including the 5<sup>th</sup> Fleet;

**(iii)** The Atlantic Fleet, including Type Commands<sup>18</sup> and the 2<sup>nd</sup> Fleet;

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<sup>16</sup> Information on Army subordinate agencies and activities was derived from the Army Posture Statement FY99, Army Regulation AR 10-87, Major Army Commands in the Continental United States, October 30, 1992, and Army Regulation AR 10-88, Field Operating Agencies, Office of the Chief of Staff, Army, March 5, 1990.

<sup>17</sup> During routine operations, US Navy forces operate as part of a numbered fleet, that is permanently associated with a geographic region. Within each fleet, naval forces organize for combat as task forces, task groups, task units, and task elements. The use of a carrier battle group (CVBG) in a power projection role is the centerpiece of the Navy's operational philosophy (Joint Publication 3-33, Joint Force Capabilities, October 13, 1999).

<sup>18</sup> All Navy units also have an administrative chain of command with the various ships reporting to the appropriate Type Commander. All ships are organized into categories by type. Aircraft carriers, aircraft squadrons, and air stations are under the administrative control of the appropriate Commander Naval Air Force. Submarines come under the Commander Submarine Force. All other ships fall under Commander Naval Surface Force. Normally, the type command controls the ship during its primary and intermediate training cycles and then it moves under the operational control of a fleet commander.

7<sup>th</sup> Fleets;

- (iv) The Pacific Fleet, including Type Commands and the 3<sup>rd</sup> and
- (v) Naval Reserve Forces;
- (vi) Operational Test and Evaluation Forces;
- (vii) Naval Special Warfare Command; and
- (viii) Military Sealift Command.

(b) The Navy shore establishment provides support to the operating forces (known as "the fleet") in the form of facilities for the repair of machinery and electronics; communications centers; training areas and simulators; ship and aircraft repair; intelligence and meteorological support; storage areas for repair parts, fuel, and munitions; medical and dental facilities; and air bases. Shore establishment organizations include:

- (i) The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO);
- (ii) Naval Sea Systems Command;
- (iii) Naval Air Systems Command;
- (iv) Naval Supply Systems Command;
- (v) Naval Facilities Engineering Command;
- (vi) Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command;
- (vii) Strategic Systems Command;
- (viii) Naval Warfare Development Command; and
- (ix) Naval Space Command.<sup>19</sup>

(c) All Marine Corps combat, combat support, and combat service support units are assigned to either Marine Corps Forces Atlantic (MARFORLANT) or Marine Corps Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC) for administrative control.<sup>20</sup> The Commander, MARFORLANT, or Commander, MARFORPAC, directs and coordinates the supporting establishment in contributing to the readiness of Marine forces. The supporting establishment assists in the training, sustainment, and embarkation of deploying forces. The supporting establishment includes:

- (i) Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic;

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<sup>19</sup> The naval shore establishment includes several other commands and bureaus.

<sup>20</sup> Marine Corps operating forces are organized into Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs). MAGTFs possess organic Combat Service Support and are self-sustaining. MAGTFs range in size from Marine expeditionary force (MEF) through Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable) (MEU[SOC]) to the special purpose MAGTF. (Joint Publication 3-33).

- (ii) Fleet Marine Force, Pacific;
- (iii) Marine Corps Development Command;
- (iv) Marine Corps Systems Command;
- (v) I Marine Expeditionary Force;
- (vi) II Marine Expeditionary Force;
- (vii) III Marine Expeditionary Force;
- (viii) Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center; and
- (ix) Marine Reserve Forces.<sup>21</sup>

**(3) Department of the Air Force Operating Commands and Agencies:** Air Force forces are assigned to Major Commands (MAJCOMs), Field Operating Agencies (FOAs), or Direct Reporting Units (DRUs) to Headquarters US Air Force for administrative control.

**(a) Air Force MAJCOMs include:**

- (i) Air Combat Command;
- (ii) Air Education and Training Command;
- (iii) Air Force Materiel Command;
- (iv) Air Force Reserve Command;
- (v) Air Force Space Command;
- (vi) Air Force Special Operations Command;
- (vii) Air Mobility Command;
- (viii) Pacific Air Forces; and
- (ix) United States Air Forces in Europe.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> MCWP 0-1, Marine Corps Operations, DRAFT, 22 September 1998.

<sup>22</sup> Below the MAJCOM-level the operational Air Force is generally organized into Numbered Air Forces (NAFs) and Wings. NAFs are tactical echelons that are responsible for MAJCOM operations in a specific geographic region or theater of operations. The NAF is the senior warfighting echelon of the Air Force. A NAF conducts operations with assigned and attached forces under a command element. When participating in a joint operation, the tasked NAF will provide Air Force forces to the Joint Forces Commander within the framework of an air and space expeditionary task force (ASETf). Air Expeditionary Forces (AEFs) are wings, groups, or squadrons attached to an ASETf or in-place NAF. Air Force deployable units are organized into packages composed of active component, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve units that comprise a mixture of weapon systems and capabilities. A wing has a distinct mission with significant scope. It is responsible for maintaining an installation or has several squadrons in more than one dependent group. A wing has approximately 1,000 to 5,000 persons. A wing may be an operational wing, an air base wing, or a specialized mission wing (Joint Publication 3-33).

(b) Air Force DRUs perform missions that do not fit into any of the MAJCOMs. A DRU has many of the same administrative and organizational responsibilities as a MAJCOM. Examples of Air Force DRUs include the Air Force Doctrine Center, the Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center, and the Air Force Academy.

(c) Air Force FOAs are directly subordinate to Headquarters U.S. Air Force functional managers. An FOA performs field activities beyond the scope of any of the MAJCOMs. The activities are specialized or associated with an Air Force-wide mission, and do not include functions performed in management headquarters, unless specifically directed by a DoD authority. Examples of Air Force FOAs include the Air Intelligence Agency, the Air Force Personnel Center, and the Air Force Safety Center.

**(4) The National Guard Bureau (NGB):** The NGB is a joint bureau of the Department of the Army and the Department of the Air Force, whose purpose is to channel communications on all matters pertaining to the National Guard, the Army National Guard of the United States, and the Air National Guard of the United States between the Departments of the Army and Air Force and the State governments. The Chief of the Bureau is a general officer serving jointly on the Air Staff and the Army Staff.<sup>23</sup> The organization of the National Guard Bureau includes the offices of the Director, Army National Guard and the Director, Air National Guard.

### **C. Major Products:**

- (1) Organized, trained, and equipped military forces for the CINCs;
- (2) Inputs to the National Security Strategy and key Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Joint Staff documents;
- (3) Departmental and Service visions and strategies;
- (4) Department and Service policy, directives, and doctrine;
- (5) Service Supporting Plans for DoD's deliberate and crisis action planning processes;
- (6) Service Readiness Reports;
- (7) After Action Reports;
- (8) Service-specific task lists;
- (9) Requirements documents;
- (10) Acquisition Programs;
- (11) Service Program Objective Memoranda (POMs) and Budgets.

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<sup>23</sup> The National Guard Bureau is established by Title 10, United States Code, Section 10501.

### 3. Vision and Core Competencies.

**A. Vision:** The Army and the Air Force have published formal vision statements and vision documents. The Navy and Marine Corps visions can be derived from their major concept and strategy documents. Each of the Services is in the process of reevaluating the respective vision and conceptual documents in the period leading up to the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The following table contains the vision information derived from current Service documents.

Service	Document	Vision Statement
Army	Army Vision 2010	Soldiers On Point for the Nation ... Persuasive in Peace, Invincible in War <sup>24</sup>
Navy	Steer by the Stars: CNO's Statement of Principles	As a vision for the future, let me just say that we will steer by the stars and not the wake. And I see four stars of equal magnitude in the constellation that will guide us: operational primacy, leadership, teamwork and pride. <sup>25</sup>
	Forward... From the Sea	... to carry out swiftly and effectively any naval, joint or coalition mission and to prevail decisively over any foe that may oppose us. <sup>26</sup>
Air Force	Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21 <sup>st</sup> Century Air Force	Air Force people building the world's most respected air and space force...global power and reach for America. <sup>27</sup>
Marine Corps	The Commandant's Direction	Winning Battles is our fundamental purpose and our reason for being. For 223 years we have faced our adversaries across the spectrum of conflict . . . and we have prevailed time and again. This is what America expects of its Marine Corps, and it is what we will continue to deliver. <sup>28</sup>

**B. Core Competencies:** In general, the core competencies of the individual Services are shaped by the ability to organize, train, and equip military forces in order to respond across the spectrum of operations outlined in the National Military Strategy. The Army and Air Force have published core competencies. The Navy and Marine Corps core competencies were derived from respective Service documents.

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<sup>24</sup> Shinseki, Eric, General, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, "The Army Vision: Soldiers On Point for the Nation ... Persuasive in Peace, Invincible in War," Army Vision Statement, October 12, 1999 at <http://www.army.mil/CSAVision/default.html>.

<sup>25</sup> Johnson, Jay L, Admiral, Chief of Naval Operations at [http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/people/flags/johnson\\_j/cnosteer.html](http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/people/flags/johnson_j/cnosteer.html).

<sup>26</sup> Johnson at <http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/policy/fromsea/ffseanoc.html>.

<sup>27</sup> Widnall, Sheila, Secretary of the Air Force and General Ronald Fogleman, Air Force Chief of Staff at <http://www.xp.hq.af.mil/xpx/21/final.htm>.

<sup>28</sup> Krulak, Charles C., General, The Commandant's Planning Guidance, Marine Corps Order P3900.15, at <http://www.usmc.mil/cmc.nsf/CPG>.

Service	Core Competency
Army	The Army's core competency remains fighting and winning our Nation's wars. <sup>29</sup>
Navy	Naval expeditionary forces provide essential capabilities to the joint commander. These capabilities fall into four categories: network-centric warfare, sea and area control, power projection, and force deployment and sustainment. <sup>30</sup>
Air Force	<p>Rapid Global Mobility – the ability to move rapidly to any place in the world ensuring quick and decisive responses to any challenges that may arise.</p> <p>Precision Engagement – the ability to apply selective force against specific targets and achieve discrete and discriminant effects.</p> <p>Global Attack – the ability to attack anywhere on the globe at any time.</p> <p>Air and Space Superiority – the ability to control what moves through air and space. It allows U.S. forces freedom from attack and freedom to attack.</p> <p>Information Superiority – the ability to achieve dominant battlefield and global awareness, intelligence, communications, weather and navigation support.</p> <p>Agile Combat Support – enables air and space power to contribute to the objectives of a joint force commander. It improves responsiveness, deployability, and sustainability of forces.<sup>31</sup></p>
Marine Corps	<p>Expeditionary readiness</p> <p>Combined-arms operations</p> <p>Expeditionary operations</p> <p>Sea-based operations</p> <p>Forcible entry</p> <p>Reserve integration<sup>32</sup></p>

**4. Organizational Culture.** Each of the four Services has a very unique culture that is derived from their respective histories, lineages, traditions, organizational structures, and combat arenas. Joint Staff leaders interviewed for this project reported that Service cultures were so strong that they caused individuals from the four Services to interpret the same discussion or deliberations in the Joint Chiefs of Staff conference room—commonly called the Tank—very differently. This is one reason why the formal coordination process for Tank meetings is so detailed (See Volume IV, Chapter 5, The Joint Chiefs of Staff). The cultures have been described as:<sup>33</sup>

<sup>29</sup> Shinseki, Eric, General, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, Intent of the Chief of Staff, Army, June 23, 1999.

<sup>30</sup> Vision...Presence...Power: A Program Guide to the U.S. Navy – 1999 Edition, <http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/policy/vision/vis99/v99-ch1b.html>.

<sup>31</sup> Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century Air Force, <http://www.xp.hq.af.mil/xpx/21/competencies.htm>.

<sup>32</sup> Department of the Navy 1999 Posture Statement, America's 21<sup>st</sup> Century Force.

<sup>33</sup> Builder, Carl H., "Roles and Missions: Back to the Future," Joint Forces Quarterly, Spring 1994, p. 34.

Service	Culture
Army	The Army defines itself as Nation's obedient and loyal military servant. It prides itself on being the keeper of an essential skill set – the skills of war. These skills must be used to forge the citizenry of the United States into an expeditionary force to be used overseas against the Nation's enemies. The Army sees itself as "the essential artisans of war...forged by history and the nature of war into a mutually supportive brotherhood of guilds." Thus, the Army is made up of associations of craftsmen who take the greatest pride in their skills, not in their technological possessions. These associations are held together by a common, familial bond – namely The Army – and a recognition of their dependence on each other in battle.
Navy	The Navy views itself first and foremost as an institution. Its base is in its independence and stature. The institution and its traditions are considered the means to preserving America's power and status as a maritime nation. They provide permanence beyond the individuals who serve in the organization.
Air Force	The Air Force defines itself as "the keeper and wielder of the decisive instruments of war – the technological marvels of flight that have been adapted to war." The Air Force is the embodiment of a concept of warfare – that of air power as an independent and decisive instrument of warfare. Thus the Air Force is sustained by modern technology. "The bond is not an institution, but the love of flying machines and flight."
Marine Corps	The Marine Corps values self-reliance. To the Marines, self-reliance means retention of all that they need to operate independently in combat – most importantly air support. The Marine Corps will not give up any critical functions and rely on another Service to provide them, even if they are assured that the operations are joint.

**A. Values:** Each of the Services has published values, as depicted in the following table.

Service	Values
Army	Loyalty Duty Respect Selfless Service Honor Integrity Personal Courage <sup>34</sup>
Navy	Honor Courage Commitment <sup>35</sup>
Air Force	Integrity First Service Before Self Excellence in All We Do <sup>36</sup>
Marine Corps	Honor Courage, Commitment <sup>37</sup>

**B. Leadership Traditions:** The four Services value warfighting experience in their senior leaders. The most senior of the leaders are also generally adept at working within the DoD bureaucracy. The most senior leadership positions within the Services tend to gravitate to particular communities. For the Army and Marines it is the combat arms. For the Navy it is

<sup>34</sup> Army Values, <http://www.hqda.armymil/ocsa/values.htm>.

<sup>35</sup> Core Values of the United States Navy, <http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/traditions/html/corvalu.html>.

<sup>36</sup> Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century Air Force, <http://www.xp.hq.af.mil/xpx/21/final.htm>.

<sup>37</sup> Marine Corps Values Program, Marine Corps Order 1500.56, December 15, 1996.

naval aviators. The Air Force fighter pilot community has dominated its leadership in the recent past. Each Service places great emphasis on leadership development and Professional Military Education.

**C. Staff Attributes:** The Military Departmental and Service staffs are still adjusting to the effects of recent management headquarters reductions. In general, the staff officers and civil servants are professional and dedicated. Although the staffs are organized according to a military hierarchy, staff officers are encouraged to display innovation and creativity. Decision making authority for many issues rests at the division chief (O-6) or Directorate (1- or 2-star level). The Deputy Chiefs of Staff and Assistant Secretaries make major decisions, and the most significant decisions are made by the Chiefs of Staff and Service Secretaries. Official staff coordination across functional lines is standard operating procedure. Most of the staff officers in the O-4 to O-5 rank structure tend to look at a headquarters assignment as a "necessary evil" to fill a career progression requirement between operational tours. From a broader perspective, each Service has major concerns in recruiting and retaining quality people. The demands of a peacetime high operations tempo are causing dissatisfaction in the force, particularly among high demand/low density specialties.

#### **D. Strategy:**

(1) Each Military Department has a strategy designed upon the foundation of the National Military Strategy (NMS) and Joint Vision 2010. However, this should not be interpreted as meaning the different strategies are coordinated or integrated. Rather, each Department has taken the higher-level documents as a starting point, and then built the specific strategies based on Service cultures and core competencies.<sup>38</sup> That being said, there are several common components among the strategies of the three Departments. These include:

(a) Pursuing Defense reform initiatives such as acquisition reform, A-76 cost competitions, and infrastructure management initiatives to reduce costs and improve effectiveness;

(b) Balancing resources to modernize or upgrade aging equipment;

(c) Using experimentation programs to fuel the development of innovative equipment and concepts;

(d) Enhancing the integration of active and reserve components;

(e) Supporting compensation, retirement, and quality of life enhancements in order to recruit and retain quality; and

(f) Supporting additional reductions and realignment of infrastructure.

(2) **Army:** The Army's strategy focuses on six imperatives--people, force mix, doctrine, training, modern equipment, and leader development. Within this strategy, the Army seeks to find the optimum balance of available resources applied across the priorities of people, readiness, and modernization. *The Army Modernization Plan* contains five goals. The first,

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<sup>38</sup> Approaching the 2001 QDR, each Department is currently in the process of refining its strategy.

digitization, involves modernizing Army units by equipping them with digital systems to achieve information dominance. The force capable of achieving information dominance is called Army XXI. Army XXI units will have some current systems that have information dominance capabilities added, as well as some new "leap ahead" systems, such as the Comanche helicopter and the Crusader howitzer.<sup>39</sup> The four other goals identified in *The Army Modernization Plan* are maintaining combat overmatch, sustaining essential research and development while focusing science and technology on leap-ahead capabilities, recapitalizing the force, and integrating the active and reserve components.<sup>40</sup>

**(3) Navy:** The Navy's future vision of warfare, delineated in *From the Sea and Forward . . . From the Sea*, and further developed in the *Navy Operational Concept*, identifies five fundamental and enduring roles: sea control and maritime supremacy, power projection from sea to land, strategic deterrence, strategic sealift, and forward naval presence. However, in the future, the Navy plans to fulfill these roles with vastly enhanced capabilities. The Navy has embraced a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) concept called Network-centric Warfare: the ability of widely dispersed but robustly networked sensors, command centers, and forces to possess significantly enhanced massed effects. Combining forward presence with network-centric combat power, the Navy will close timelines, decisively alter initial conditions, and seek to head off undesired events before they start.

The naval contribution to dominant maneuver will use the sea to gain advantage over the enemy, while naval precision engagements will use sensors, information systems, precisely targeted weapons, and agile, lethal forces to attack key targets. Naval full-dimensional protection will address the full spectrum of threats, providing information superiority, air and maritime superiority, theater air and missile defense, and delivery of naval fires. Finally, naval forces will be increasingly called upon to provide sea-based focused logistics for joint operations in the littorals.

The Navy also uses warfighting experiments to integrate technological advances and innovative operational concepts with real-world training. The At-Sea Fleet Battle Experiments overseen by the Maritime Battle Center are designed to explore new concepts and emerging systems like the Maritime Fire Support Demonstrator, Cooperative Engagement Capability, and theater ballistic missile defense to evaluate their effects on fleet capabilities and determine future requirements. These intensive experiments are limited in number to maintain their quality and are combined with other fleet exercises to maximize participation.<sup>41</sup>

**(4) Air Force:** The Air Force's vision of air and space warfare through 2010 calls for maintaining and improving six core competencies built on a foundation of quality personnel and integrated by global battlespace awareness and advanced command and control. The six core competencies are Air and Space Superiority; Global Attack; Rapid Global Mobility; Precision Engagement; Information Superiority; and Agile Combat Support.

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<sup>39</sup> The fate of these two systems is unclear, given current funding constraints.

<sup>40</sup> This information was derived from the [Statement on the Posture of the United States Army Fiscal Year 2000](#), February 1999.

<sup>41</sup> This information was derived from DoD's [Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review](#), May 1997. The Navy is developing a new strategy called "A Maritime Strategy for the 21st Century." This paper will serve as the bedrock strategy for the Navy and Marine Corps in coming years.

The Air Force is revamping its concept of operations transforming how it organizes, trains, and deploys forces into theaters of operation, accomplishes its missions, and then redeploys. The Expeditionary Aerospace Force (EAF) concept represents an evolutionary transition from a threat-based, Cold War garrison force, oriented on containing the Soviet Union, to a capabilities-based force focused on responsiveness and engagement. Under EAF, the Air Force will reorganize its forces by January 2000, operationally linking geographically separated units to form ten Aerospace Expeditionary Forces (AEFs). Each AEF package will consist of a full complement of air and space assets with manpower drawn from the Total Force: Active duty, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve. Fighter, bomber, tanker, airlift, command and control, radar, and electronic warfare aircraft combined with communication, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance air and space systems will provide customized AEF units. The AEF reorganization utilizes new operational concepts and developing information-based technology to create these units without moving significant force structure.<sup>42</sup>


**(5) Marine Corps:** The Marine Corps document, *Operational Maneuver from the Sea*, foresees warfare that requires tactically adaptive, technologically agile, opportunistic, and exploitative forces. Individuals and forces must be able to rapidly reorganize and reorient across a broad range of new tasks and missions in fluid operational environments. The Marines will still need to project power ashore for a variety of potential tasks ranging from disaster relief to high-intensity combat. The focus of Marine Corps efforts is on the enhancement of the individual Marine and his or her ability to win in combat. The Marine Corps Combat Development System focuses on generating the most effective combination of innovative operational concepts, new organizational structures, and emerging technologies. The Commandant's Warfighting Laboratory at Quantico, Virginia, institutionalizes the Marine commitment to innovation. The Marines have developed an extensive experimentation plan divided into three phases, each culminating in an Advanced Warfighting Experiment.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> This information was derived from DoD's Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, May 1997 and The United States Air Force 1999 Posture Statement.

<sup>43</sup> This information was derived from DoD's Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, May 1997. The Navy is developing a new strategy called "A Maritime Strategy for the 21st Century." This paper will serve as the bedrock strategy for the Navy and Marine Corps in coming years.

## E. Organizational Structure:



**Figure 1: Organizational Structure**

**Notes on Organizational Chart:** The administrative organization of the Military Departments begins with the Secretary of Defense and extends through the civilian Department Secretaries.<sup>44</sup>

**(1) The Secretaries of the Military Departments** exercise authority through civilian assistants and the respective Service Chief, but retain immediate supervision of activities involving vital relationships with Congress, the Secretary of Defense, other government officials, and the public. The Secretaries are assisted by the Under Secretaries, Assistant Secretaries, numerous Deputy Assistant Secretaries, and the Service Chiefs of Staff (i.e., Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of Naval Operations, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and Commandant of the Marine Corps).

**(2) The Under Secretaries of the Military Departments,** as the principal assistants to the Secretaries, are authorized to act with full authority of the Secretary on all affairs of the Department. Each Department has one Under Secretary.

**(3) The Assistant Secretaries of the Military Departments** are civilians authorized and directed to act for the Secretary within their assigned areas of responsibility. Within each Departmental staff there are some common functions and unique functions as described below.

<sup>44</sup> The information contained in these notes was derived from the department organization directives including Army Regulation AR 10-5, Headquarters, Department of the Army, March 3, 1997; Navy Regulations, 1990; and Air Force Pamphlet 38-102, Headquarters United States Air Force Organization and Functions, October 1, 1996.

**(a) Assistant Secretaries with Acquisition responsibilities** have as their principal duty the overall supervision of the Department acquisition system and serve as the Department Acquisition and Procurement Executive (See Volume IV, Chapter 2, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology). These Assistant Secretaries ensure the respective Secretaries and the Service Chiefs receive the support required on acquisition matters. General responsibilities include direction, guidance, and supervision over all matters pertaining to the formulation, review, approval and execution of plans, policies, and programs relative to acquisition.

**(b) Assistant Secretaries with Financial Management responsibilities** are responsible for all comptroller and financial management functions, activities, and operations of the Department. They serve as the Department chief financial officers and are responsible for providing financial management and analytical services necessary for the effective and efficient use and management of Department resources.

**(c) Assistant Secretaries with Manpower and Reserve Affairs responsibilities** serve as the Departments' chief Human Resource Management (HRM) officials. They are responsible for the overall supervision of manpower and reserve component affairs of the Department, including policy and administration of affairs related to military (active and inactive) and civilian personnel.

**(d) Assistant Secretaries with Installation and Environment responsibilities** are responsible for policy relating to Department installations, facilities management and engineering, safety, military construction, housing, utilities, base utilization issues, and occupational health. Environmental responsibilities include environmental protection, restoration, compliance, natural resource programs, hazardous material/waste minimization, federal agency and environmental organization coordination, and the National Environmental Policy Act.<sup>45</sup>

**(e) The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space** reviews and coordinates all Air Force space and space-related matters, with principal emphasis on policy, strategy, and planning. This Assistant Secretary ensures comprehensive, integrated planning of Air Force space and space-related activities, to include consideration of their relationships to the activities of other organizations with space responsibilities. The civilian in the position also reports to the Secretary of Defense while serving as the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office.

**(f) The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works** has responsibility for conservation and development of the national water resources including planning, engineering, construction, operation and maintenance, and certain real estate activities necessary for navigation; flood control; hydroelectric power production; municipal and industrial water supply; public recreation; and shore and hurricane protection. These responsibilities include policy development for Department of the Army emergency assistance to state and local governments in case of flooding, drought, and other natural disasters.

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<sup>45</sup> The Air Force combines Manpower, Reserve Affairs, Installations, and Environment under one Assistant Secretary.

**(4) The Service Chiefs** are members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and serve as military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.<sup>46</sup> The Chiefs supervise members and organizations of the Services as the Departmental Secretaries determine, consistent with full operational command assigned to the Unified CINCs. They are directly responsible to their Departmental Secretaries for the efficiency of the Services and Service preparedness for military operations. The Chiefs advise their respective Secretaries on the plans and recommendations of the Service staffs and act as the Secretaries' agents in carrying them out.

**(5) Service Headquarters Staffs** support each Service Chief. The composition of the staff varies by Service although each staff is divided into several common functional areas, including operations; plans; programs; requirements; personnel; command, control, communications, and computers; logistics, and intelligence.

**5. Formal National Security Process Involvement.** The following table indicates the Military Departments' and Services' major products and roles in the seven key national security processes.

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<sup>46</sup> The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 names the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the principal military advisor [See Section on the Joint Chiefs of Staff].

		Strategy Development	Policy Guidance, and Regulations	Planning	Mission Execution	Observation, Orientation, and Oversight	Preparation	Resourcing	
Products	Organized, trained, and equipped military forces for the CINCs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
	Inputs to the National Security Strategy and key OSD, Joint Staff documents	✓	✓						
	Departmental and Service Visions and Strategies	✓							
	Department and Service policy, directives, and doctrine		✓						
	Service Supporting Plans for DoD's deliberate and crisis action planning processes			✓					
	Service Readiness Reports					✓			
	After Action Reports					✓			
	Service-specific task lists						✓		
	Requirements documents						✓		
	Acquisition Programs						✓		
	Service Program Objective Memoranda and Budgets							✓	
Roles	Service Chiefs	Military Advisor to SECDEF, NSC, President	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
		Member, JCS	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
		Member, Defense Resources Board							✓
		Congressional Testimony	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Service Vice	JROC Member						✓	
Service Acquisition Executive	Member, Defense Acquisition Board						✓		

**A. Strategy Development:**

**(1) Major Activities:**

(a) Provide input to key strategy documents, including the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Military Strategy (NMS), the Joint Strategy Review (JSR), the Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG), and the Joint Planning Document (JPD).

(b) Develop individual Departmental visions and strategies.

**(2) Major Stakeholders:** Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of Defense, Service subordinate operating commands and agencies.

**(3) Key Organizational Processes:**

(a) The Service and Departmental staffs formulate input to the key national security strategy documents, including the NSS, NMS, JSR, CPG, and JPD.

Information for these inputs is gathered from the various directorates of the Secretariat and Service staffs, as well as from the Services' operating commands and agencies. The resulting input is consolidated into a Service position and forwarded to the Joint Staff for inclusion in Joint Staff documents (e.g., NMS, JSR, JPD) and for inclusion in the JCS input to higher order documents (e.g., NSS, CPG). In addition, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) will coordinate key documents directly with the Departmental Secretariats. In effect, there can be two simultaneous coordination processes for the same document. Service operating commands can also provide input into these documents in their role as components of the unified commands through the following chain: Service component – unified command – Joint Staff – OSD (See Volume IV, Chapter 7, The Unified Commands).

**(b)** The individual Department strategies can be expressed in a variety of different documents, including strategic plans, long-range plans, vision documents, and operational concept white papers. Each Service staff has a directorate responsible for strategy development. The processes are generally similar among the Services. Input is sought from the various Secretariat and Service staffs, as well as from the Services' operating commands and agencies. Each Service has a "corporate structure" or "board of directors" that will recommend approval of the strategy to the Service Chief and Department Secretary.

**(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes:** Joint Staff input to the NSS and CPG. Joint Staff development of the NMS, JSR, and JPD (See Volume II, Chapter 2, The National Security Council, and Volume IV, Chapter 5, The Joint Chiefs of Staff).

**(5) Associated Lower-Level Processes:** Subordinate operating command and agency development of individual organizational strategies.

## **B. Policy, Guidance, and Regulation:**

### **(1) Major Activities:**

**(a)** Provide input to key documents, including the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), the Unified Command Plan (UCP), the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), and Joint Doctrine.

**(b)** Develop Department-specific policy, guidance, and regulations that relate to the administration and operating procedures of the command.

### **(2) Major Stakeholders:** Subordinate operating commands and agencies

### **(3) Key Organizational Processes:**

**(a)** The Service and Departmental staffs formulate input to the key national policy and guidance documents using the same process described above for strategy documents.

**(b)** Each Department states its key internal direction in slightly different formats.

**(i)** The Secretary of the Army approves and authenticates Departmental policy. Only a Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) agency will be the

proponent for a publication that establishes Army-wide policy, including Army regulations, Department of the Army circulars and memoranda, Numbered Headquarters Department of the Army letters, and Department of the Army General Orders.<sup>47</sup> A field operating agency or MACOM may be the proponent for non-policy publications, including instructional or informational publications; doctrinal, training, or organizational publications; or technical or equipment publications.<sup>48</sup>

**(ii)** *United States Navy Regulations* is the principal regulatory document of the Department of the Navy. Other directives issued within the Department of the Navy (e.g., OPNAV Directives, Secretary of the Navy Directives) must not conflict with, alter or amend any provision of Navy Regulations. The CNO is responsible for maintaining *Navy Regulations*, and for ensuring that *Navy Regulations* conforms to the current needs of the Department or the Navy. When developing changes to the document, the CNO is directed to endeavor to obtain the concurrence of the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the Judge Advocate General, and other appropriate offices and commands. Unresolved issues are forwarded to the Secretary of the Navy for appropriate action. Any additions, changes or deletions to the *Navy Regulations* must be approved by the Secretary of the Navy.<sup>49</sup>

**(iii)** The Air Force issues its key policies in Air Force policy directives (AFPD). These directives are approved and authenticated by the Secretary of the Air Force. Air Force policies are supported by Air Force Instructions (AFIs) when specific procedural guidance is essential to comply with legal or higher level guidance, to achieve Air Force-wide standardization, or to ensure the safety of personnel or property. AFIs are normally drafted by a designated lead organization (MAJCOM, FOA, or DRU). Headquarters U.S. Air Force approves and issues all AFIs.<sup>50</sup>

**(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes:** Joint Staff development of the UCP and JSCP. OSD development of the DPG. Joint Doctrine development process orchestrated by Joint Staff J7 (See Volume IV, Chapter 5, The Joint Chiefs of Staff).

**(5) Associated Lower-Level Processes:** Subordinate command development of command-specific policy, guidance, and regulations.

### **C. Planning:**

**(1) Major Activities:** The Military Departments are principally responsible for the preparation and implementation of supporting plans, including logistics plans, to joint operation plans developed by the Unified CINCs (See Volume IV, Chapter 7, The Unified Commands).

**(2) Major Stakeholders:** The Joint Staff, the National Command Authority, and the Unified Commands, Service component commands and subordinate units.

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<sup>47</sup> These agencies include the Office of the Secretary of the Army, Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, and the principal HQDA officials.

<sup>48</sup> Army Regulation AR 25-30, The Army Publishing and Printing Program, June 21, 1999.

<sup>49</sup> Navy Regulations, 1990.

<sup>50</sup> Secretary of the Air Force Air Force Policy Directive 90-1, Policy Formulation, September 1, 1998.

**(3) Key Organizational Processes:** The Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES) is the principal system within DoD for translating policy decisions into Operation Plans and Orders (OPLANs and OPORDs) in support of national security objectives. The Military Departments have a significant responsibility within JOPES, because the Military Services are charged with supplying ready forces to the CINCs. The Service headquarters are responsible for policy, guidance, procedures, and oversight affecting the Service planning process. Each Service establishes requirements for developing mobilization and planning programs to support and sustain contingency operations.

**(a) Deliberate Planning:** The DoD process of deliberate planning is cyclic and continuous. It begins when a task is assigned and is almost identical whether the resulting operation plan is a fully developed OPLAN, Concept Plan (CONPLAN), or Functional Plan. These plans remain in effect until canceled or superseded by another approved plan. While in effect they are continuously maintained and updated.<sup>51</sup>

**(i) Task Assignment:** The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) is responsible for preparing strategic plans and providing for the preparation of joint contingency plans. The contingency planning responsibility of CJCS is performed through the CINCs. CJCS publishes the JSCP, which apportions major combat forces available for planning, and specifies the product document (i.e., an OPLAN, CONPLAN, or Functional Plan) and the review and approval authority for the plan. With this the CINC has the scope of the plan, its format, and the amount of detail that must go into its preparation.

**(ii) Developing the Concept:** In response to the task assignment, the supported CINC first determines a mission statement and then develops a fully staffed concept of envisioned operations documented in the CINC's Strategic Concept. The CINC's Strategic Concept is submitted to CJCS for review and, when approved, becomes the concept of operations on which further plan development is based. Prior to CJCS approval, the Joint Staff requests the Services to conduct independent reviews of the CINC's strategic concept. The concept is also sent to subordinate and supporting commanders, who can then begin the detailed planning associated with plan development. Most of this detailed planning is generally conducted within the Service component commands.

**(iii) Developing the Detailed Plan:** Subordinate commanders use the CINC's concept and the apportioned major combat forces as the basis to determine the necessary support, including forces and sustaining supplies for the operation. The CINC consolidates the subordinates' recommended phasing of forces and support and performs a transportation analysis of their movement to destination to ensure that the entire plan can feasibly be executed as envisioned. Next, the Services identify real-world units to take part in the plan, and the sustainment requirements are identified as much as possible. All OPLANs and some CONPLANs require a detailed Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD). Effective Service TPFDD development by the Service component commands requires extensive coordination and data exchange within the Service structure (and with USTRANSCOM) before the TPFDD is submitted to, and approved by, the Unified Command. In addition, functional

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<sup>51</sup> The information on Deliberate Planning is derived from AFSC Pub 1, The Joint Staff Officer's Guide, Chapter 6, 1997 and Joint Pub 5-03.1, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume I (Planning Policies And Procedures), August 4, 1993, pgs. II-6 to II-8. Each Service also publishes specific planning guidance, for example see Air Force Manual 10-401, Volume I, Operation Plan and Concept Plan Development and Implementation, May 1, 1998.

planners at both major subordinate commands and unit-levels must ensure adequate coordination is achieved in situations where the requirements of one function impact on the requirements of another. To ensure the proposed TPFDD for a developing OPLAN is complete and provides a viable base for execution planning, Service headquarters review force requirements for unified command OPLANs before they are submitted to the supported CINC.

**(iv) Review of the Plan:** The Joint Staff J7 conducts the deliberate plans review process for CJCS. OPLANs, CONPLANs, and Functional Plans are reviewed individually on an 18 to 24-month cycle. Theater Engagement Plans (TEPs) are reviewed as a family of plans on a 12-month cycle. The Joint Staff requests the Services to conduct independent reviews of the Unified Command plans prior to CJCS review. CJCS reviews and approves the CINCs' plans based on adequacy, feasibility, acceptability, and joint doctrine. USD (P) also reviews certain plans for compliance with policy and the Secretary of Defense may be briefed on individual plans before they are approved.

**(v) Preparation of the Supporting Plans:** The emphasis here shifts to the subordinate and supporting commanders, who respond to the tasks identified in the approved operation plan by preparing supporting plans that outline the actions of assigned and augmenting forces. Service headquarters, or Major Commands, or subordinate units develop supporting plans, mobilization plans, base support plans, or deployment/redeployment plans to the unified command plans. This planning phase is over when documentation is prepared for final review.

**(b) Crisis Action Planning (CAP):** Deliberate plans are based on the best available intelligence, but are still hypothetical to the extent that not all conditions can be predicted, and, even if all variations of a future situation could be anticipated, they could not all be planned for. Usually, the time available to plan responses to real-time events is short. In as little as a few days, a feasible course of action must be developed and approved, and timely identification of resources accomplished to ready forces, schedule transportation, and prepare supplies for movement and employment of U.S. military force. The procedures are categorized into six phases, however the process is flexible; it permits the steps to be done sequentially or concurrently, or skipped altogether. The exact flow of the procedures is largely determined by the time available to complete the planning and by the significance of the crisis. A complete explanation of DoD's Crisis Action Planning process, including Service involvement can be found in Volume IV, Chapters 5, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Chapter 7, The Unified Commands.<sup>52</sup>

**(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes:** Unified Command, JCS and NSC participation in the planning process (See Volume II, Chapter 2, The National Security Council, and Volume IV: Chapter 5, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Chapter 7, The Unified Commands).

**(5) Associated Lower-Level Processes:** Development of supporting plans by Service component commands and subordinate units.

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<sup>52</sup> Joint Pub 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, and Joint Pub 5-03.1 (to be published as CJCSM 3122.01), JOPES Volume I, define a crisis within the context of joint operation planning and execution as “an incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, and possessions or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of U.S. military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives.” The information on Crisis Action Planning is derived from AFSC Pub 1, The Joint Staff Officer's Guide, Chapter 7, 1997.

## **D. Mission Execution:**

### **(1) Major Activities:**

(a) For deployment and redeployment operations, each Service is responsible for administrative support and performance of transportation operations assigned by Combatant Commanders at either their local shipping installations or throughout the theater. The Services are also responsible for maintaining personnel trained in JOPES. Services provide JOPES inputs throughout the deployment and redeployment phases of an operation.<sup>53</sup>

(b) Provide logistics and administrative support for forces assigned to the unified commanders;<sup>54</sup>

(c) Maintain 24-hour command centers at Service headquarters and subordinate units to monitor the situation and transmit guidance;

(d) Service component commanders:

(i) Make recommendations to the joint force commander on the proper employment of the forces of the Service component;

(ii) Select and nominate specific units of the parent Service component for assignment to subordinate forces;

(iii) Accomplish such operational missions as may be assigned.<sup>55</sup>

**(2) Major Stakeholders:** National Command Authorities (NCA), CJCS, Joint Staff, Unified Commands.<sup>56</sup>

**(3) Key Organizational Processes:**<sup>57</sup> The execution phase of a crisis starts with the NCA decision to choose the military option to deal with the crisis and execute the OPORD. The Secretary of Defense will authorize CJCS to issue an Execute Order that defines D-day and the resource allocation and directs execution of the OPORD. The CINC then executes the OPORD and directs subordinate and supporting commanders to execute their supporting OPORDs. The Execute Order may include further guidance, instructions, or amplifying orders. During execution, the supported and supporting commanders, Services, and defense agencies update information in the JOPES deployment database. During the execution phase, changes to the original plan may be necessary because of tactical and intelligence considerations, force and

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<sup>53</sup> JP 3-35, Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations, September 7, 1999.

<sup>54</sup> Administrative Control (ADCON) is the direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, and discipline and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. ADCON is the authority necessary to fulfill Military Department statutory responsibilities for administration and support. ADCON may be delegated to and exercised by commanders of Service forces assigned to a combatant commander at any echelon at or below the level of Service component command. - JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, February 1, 1995.

<sup>55</sup> JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, February 1, 1995.

<sup>56</sup> The NCA is defined as the U.S. President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors.

<sup>57</sup> This information on Mission Execution is derived from the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) Pub 1, The Joint Staff Officer's Guide, Chapter 7, 1997.

cargo availability, availability of strategic lift assets, and transportation infrastructure capabilities. Therefore, ongoing refinement and adjustment of deployment requirements and schedules, and close coordination and monitoring of deployment activities, are required. During mission execution the various echelons of the Military Departments conduct extensive, continuous coordination on movement, logistics, and administrative requirements with the supported joint commander. Most of this coordination is conducted through the Service component commands.

**(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes:** Joint Staff, OSD, and NSC monitoring of the operation. Unified Command conduct of the operation (See Volume II, Chapter 2, The National Security Council, and Volume IV: Chapter 3, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Chapters 5, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Chapter 7, The Unified Commands).

**(5) Associated Lower-Level Processes:** Subordinate commands execution of the mission.

#### **E. Observation, Orientation, and Oversight:**

##### **(1) Major Activities:**

- (a)** Report emerging events in accordance with the Joint Reporting System (JRS);
- (b)** Prepare Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) reports;
- (c)** Prepare Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR) reports;
- (d)** Service Chiefs are members of OSD's Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC).

**(2) Major Stakeholders:** JCS, Unified Commands, Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness); National Command Authority.

##### **(3) Key Organizational Processes:**

**(a) Joint Reporting System:** The JRS reports are a major information source for the National Military Command System (NMCS). They provide information to the command centers of the NCA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINCs and the subordinate joint force commanders, DoD agencies, and the Services. The JRS provides for standardization in reporting systems of the Joint Staff, Combatant Commands and subordinate joint forces, Services, and DoD agencies. The JRS covers numerous functional areas, such as personnel, materiel and equipment status, operational and logistical planning, situation monitoring, and intelligence, as well as actual military operations and exercises. JRS reports required by the Services include: the Joint After-Action Reporting System, the Weekly Deployment Status Report, the Weekly Deployment Status Report, the Communications Status Report, the Daily

Intelligence Summary, the Logistic Factors Report, the Military Manpower Mobilization and Accession Status Report, and the Commander's Situation Report.<sup>58</sup>

**(b) SORTS Reporting:** SORTS is an internal management tool for use by the JCS, Services, Unified Commands, and DoD Combat Support Agencies. As a resource and unit monitoring system, SORTS indicates the level of selected resources and training status required to undertake the wartime missions for which a unit was organized or designed. This information supports, in priority order, crisis response planning; deliberate or peacetime planning; and management responsibilities to organize, train, and equip combat-ready forces for the Unified Commands. SORTS provides CJCS with the necessary unit information to achieve adequate and feasible military responses to crisis situations. SORTS also provides information to participate in the joint planning and execution process associated with deliberate planning. SORTS provides broad bands of information on selected unit status indicators and includes a commander's subjective assessment on the unit's ability to execute the missions for which a unit was organized or designed. Service SORTS responsibilities include:

**(i)** Register all Active and Reserve Component forces required to report within SORTS;

**(ii)** Monitor SORTS data reporting for accuracy, timeliness, and validity within their respective assigned responsibilities and initiate corrective action, as required;

**(iii)** Ensure the SORTS data base contains all Service-unique data elements;

**(iv)** Develop supplemental instructions to ensure applicability and understanding of SORTS policy and procedures among subordinate forces.<sup>59</sup>

**(c) JMRR Reporting:** The JMRR is the central component of the CJCS Readiness System. During the JMRR, the combatant commanders, Services, and DoD Combat Support Agencies provide a current assessment of military readiness. The JMRR assessments provide the basis for the monthly DoD Senior Readiness Oversight Council briefings by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) and the Service Chiefs on joint warfighting readiness. The JMRR also provides the basis for the Secretary of Defense's Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress (QRRC). As part of the JMRR process, the Services report their respective unit readiness. In general, the Services show current force commitments; current and projected unit readiness (combat and support forces); an assessment of Service readiness trends; and force assignments to a notional small-scale contingency and/or Major Theater War scenario selected by the Joint Staff. In addition to operating forces, the Services provide an assessment of support capability in six major areas: theater mobility support, engineers, health services, sustainability, security, and field services. The Services also provide an executive level summary of current tempo and its associated impact on readiness.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> CJCSM 3150.01, Joint Reporting Structure General Instructions, June 30, 1999.

<sup>59</sup> CJCSI 3401.02, Global Status of Resources and Training System, March 19, 1999, p. B-1.

<sup>60</sup> CJCSI 3401.01B, Chairman's Readiness System, July 1, 1999.

**(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes:** JCS orchestration of the JMRR; OSD's Senior Readiness Oversight Council; development of DoD's Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress (See Volume IV, Chapter 5, The Joint Chiefs of Staff).

**(5) Associated Lower-Level Processes:** Service units reporting through the Status of Resources and Training System. Service component command inputs to their respective unified command JMRR report (See Volume IV, Chapter 7, The Unified Commands).

## **F. Preparation:**

**(1) Major Activities:** The Military Departments play a key preparation role, based on their Title 10 responsibilities for organizing, training, supplying, and equipping forces for assignment to the Unified Commands. Activities include:

**(a)** Identifying requirements through the Joint requirements generation process. Service Vice Chiefs validate requirements as members of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC).

**(b)** Acquiring new systems to meet the capabilities required by the unified commanders.

**(c)** Developing Service Training Programs and Service Task Lists.

**(d)** Providing input to Joint Training and Exercise programs.

**(2) Major Stakeholders:** Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology), Assistant Secretary of Defense (Strategy and Threat Reduction), JCS, Unified Commands; Service subordinate units.

### **(3) Key Organizational Processes:**

**(a) Requirements generation:** The requirements generation process is designed to be uniform throughout the Department of Defense. This process consists of the following four distinct phases: definition, documentation, validation, and approval (See Volume IV, Chapter 5, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, for a more detailed discussion of the process). Services define mission needs and operational requirements and develop and coordinate the documentation with the appropriate DoD components. The Service functions as validation and approval authority for Service-generated Mission Needs Statements (MNSs) and Operational Requirements Documents (ORDs) for certain Acquisition Categories (ACATs) unless the issue is considered special interest by the JROC. Each Service generates requirements differently.

**(i)** The Army process appears to be centralized within its Training and Doctrine Command, but is actually decentralized among 17 schools (e.g., armor, infantry).

**(ii)** The Navy process is centralized on the Navy staff. Navy modernization inputs sent in from field require a sponsor within the Navy Staff.

**(iii)** Air Force requirements are primarily generated by the MAJCOMs.

(iv) The Marines use a centralized process called Combat Development System with strong input from field commands.

**(b) Acquisition:**<sup>61</sup> Military Departmental acquisition systems provide for new and improved materiel capabilities in response to validated requirements. The acquisition systems encompass all aspects of acquisition, from new start acquisition programs through modification and upgrade of existing systems. The Departmental acquisition systems operate with centralized policy development and decentralized execution. Authority and decision making is delegated to the lowest appropriate level consistent with the degree of oversight required to maintain the integrity of the process. Each Service has a Systems Acquisition Review Council to advise the Service Acquisition Executive on major system acquisitions.

**(i) Service Acquisition Executives (SAEs):** The Secretary of Defense requires that the Secretaries of the Military Departments designate a single civilian official, at the Assistant Secretary-level within each Military Department, as the Service Acquisition Executive with full-time responsibility for all Service acquisition functions. Service SAEs recommend milestone decisions to the Defense Acquisition Board on major acquisition programs and serve as the program decision authority for other programs. Service SAEs supervise subordinate commanders charged with research, development and acquisition responsibilities (e.g., Army Material Command, Navy Systems Commands, and Air Force Material Command). They also appoint, supervise, and evaluate Program Executive Officers and other officers charged with acquisition responsibilities. The SAEs also co-chair the Service Systems Acquisition Review Council meetings with the respective Service Vice Chiefs.

**(ii) Program Executive Officers (PEOs):** The PEOs are responsible for programmatic and the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution necessary to guide assigned programs through each milestone within approved baselines. They provide the planning guidance, direction, control, oversight, and support necessary to ensure systems are developed in accordance with the Service policies. PEOs also provide technical and functional integration across assigned programs. PEOs supervise and evaluate assigned Program Managers (PMs).

**(iii) Program Managers:** PMs plan and manage acquisition programs consistent with the policies and procedures issued by the SAE and appropriate regulations, policies, procedures, and standards. They provide the planning guidance, direction, control, oversight, and support for their respective programs. PMs formulate and defend program plans and budgets.

**(iv) Integrated Product Teams (IPTs):** IPTs are composed of representatives from all appropriate functional disciplines. IPT participants should be empowered and authorized, to the maximum extent possible, to make commitments for the organization or functional area they represent. Services use IPTs to perform as many acquisition functions as possible, including oversight and review. IPTs are formed as soon as possible at the

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<sup>61</sup> Acquisition information was derived from Army Regulation AR 70-1, Army Acquisition Policy, December 15, 1997; SECRETARY OF THE NAVY Instruction 5400.15A, Dept of the Navy Research, Development and Acquisition, and Associated Life Cycle Management Responsibilities, May 26, 1995; and Air Force Policy Directive 63-1, Acquisition System, August 31, 1993.

beginning of a project or task with the specific purpose of delivering a product to an external or internal customer.

**(c) Training:** Services are responsible to provide trained forces to the Unified CINCs. Services provide initial training for new accessions; weapon system, mission qualification, and recurring training for individuals; and unit training and exercises. In general Service staffs set training policy and broad, Service-wide guidance. Specialized training commands (e.g., The Army's Training and Doctrine Command, Naval Education and Training Command, and Air Education and Training Command) provide initial military and skills training. Major Commands and subordinate units set the requirements and perform individual recurring training and unit training. The Military Departments operate ranges and major training facilities such as the Army's National Training Center and the Air Force's Nellis Air Force Base complex to facilitate larger unit training events. In the Joint Training arena, Services are responsible for providing for Service training of personnel and forces for assignment to combatant commands; supporting combatant commanders and component commanders in training forces assigned to the combatant commands; developing and preparing Service publications to support the conduct of joint training at the Service level; designating an office of primary responsibility for joint training; and depicting Service funding in support of the CJCS Exercise Program (incremental funding) in a separate funding line in their budgets.<sup>62</sup>

**(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes:** The DoD Requirements Generation Process, the JCS Joint Training System, the DoD Acquisition process (See Volume IV: Chapter 2, The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, and Chapter 5, The Joint Chiefs of Staff).

**(5) Associated Lower-Level Processes:** Development of requirements, modernization plans, and training plans by subordinate commanders.

## **G. Resourcing:**

### **(1) Major Activities:**<sup>63</sup>

**(a)** Participate in the planning, programming, budgeting process. Prepare and submit Department Budget Estimates and Department Programs.<sup>64</sup>

**(b)** Develop and execute the necessary programs.

**(c)** Provide the day-to-day management of the resources under their control.

**(d)** Audit and evaluate program execution.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> Army Regulation AR 350-1, Army Training, August 1, 1983 and CJCSI 3500.01A, Joint Training Policy for the Armed Forces of the United States, July 1, 1997.

<sup>63</sup> Information in this section was derived from CJCSI 8501.01, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commander in Chiefs of the Combatant Commands, and Joint Staff Participation in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, April 1, 1999, pgs. A2-A4.

<sup>64</sup> Programming involves the development of the Services' portion of DoD's Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) by defining and examining alternative forces and weapons and support systems. Budgeting involves the formulation, execution, and control of resource requirements, allocation, and use.

**(2) Major Stakeholders:** Secretary of Defense, Unified Commands, Service subordinate commands and units.

**(3) Key Organizational Processes:** Although each Department uses a unique management structure to implement the programming and budgeting portions of DoD's Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), there are many similarities among the Services in their resourcing processes. Each Service headquarters puts out initial programming guidance based on higher-level guidance from OSD and the Joint Staff. As the various Programs are developed, each Service uses a hierarchy of committees to facilitate resource allocation decision making.

**(i) Department of the Army:** The Army uses Management Decision Packages (MDEPs) by appropriation and program element. Taken collectively, MDEPs account for all Army resources. They describe the capability of the Total Army—Active, Guard, and Reserve. Individually, an MDEP describes a particular organization, program, or function. It also records the resources associated with the intended output. The Army resource decision making structure is described in the table at the end of this section.<sup>66</sup>

**(ii) Department of the Navy:** The Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) each develop plans and programs, coordinated as necessary, for submission to the Secretary of the Navy. The Secretary of the Navy submits the Department of the Navy (DoN) program, and eventually the DoN budget, to the Secretary of Defense. The DoN POM submission includes both Navy and Marine Corps programs. There is not a discrete Navy or Marine Corps portion of the DoN POM, but each volume of the DoN POM is divided into a Navy section and a Marine Corps section. As a result of this unique relationship within the DoN, Department of the Navy resourcing includes three types of resources—commonly called "blue," "green," and "blue-in-support-of-green." "Blue dollars" are the parts of DoN appropriations targeted for the Navy, although the Marine Corps could have a substantial interest, but little direct involvement in decisions. "Green dollars" are the resources that the Marine Corps unilaterally programs. "Green Dollars" constitute the sum of the Marine Corps Total Obligational Authority (TOA). A detailed, standing, Navy-Marine Corps agreement, approved by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management, determines the amount of the Department of the Navy's total resources that will be devoted to "green dollars." This agreement is colloquially called the "Blue-Green Split." "Blue-in-support-of-green dollars" are those resources programmed jointly by the Navy and the Marine Corps. The amount of DoN resources in this category is not fixed. It depends on particular circumstances during POM development. These resources primarily support aviation requirements under the broader classification of Naval Aviation. Certain items of communications gear may also fall in this category.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> DoD Instruction 7045.7, Implementation of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), May 23, 1984.

<sup>66</sup> Army Regulation AR 1-1, Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System, January 30, 1994.

<sup>67</sup> MCO P3121.1, Marine Corps Planning and Programming Manual, October 1, 1991.

**(iii) Department of the Air Force:** Air Force resourcing is managed by the Air Force Corporate Structure, which is composed of the Air Force Council, the Air Force Board, the Air Force Group, and Mission and Mission Support Panels.<sup>68</sup>

**(iv)** The table on the following page describes the hierarchy of decision-making bodies within each Service that deal with resourcing issues.

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<sup>68</sup> Air Force Policy Directive 16-5, Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, July 29, 1994 and Air Force Instruction 16-501, Control and Documentation of Air Force Programs, December 1, 1997

<b>Army<sup>69</sup></b>	<b>Navy<sup>70</sup></b>	<b>Marine Corps<sup>71</sup></b>	<b>Air Force<sup>72</sup></b>
<p><b>The Select Committee (SELCOM)</b> is co-chaired by the Vice Chief of Staff, Army (VCSA) and the Under Secretary of the Army. SELCOM membership is at the Assistant Secretary/ three-star level, and covers the major functional areas of the Army Staff. The SELCOM functions as HQDA's senior committee. The forum helps the Army leadership review, coordinate, and integrate PPBS actions. The SELCOM considers and interprets guidance from the SECDEF, SA, and CSA. It reviews Army policy, plans, programs, and budgets. It reviews program performance and budget financial execution. When possible, the SELCOM disposes of actions on its own. It refers issues of major importance or other special management interest to the Secretary of the Army and Army Chief of Staff, presenting, as appropriate, alternatives and recommendations for decision.</p>	<p><b>The DoN Program Strategy Board (DPSB)</b> is composed of the Assistant Secretaries, The CNO, OP-08, the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the DC/S R&amp;P. The DPSB is chaired by the Secretary of the Navy and is the final DoN review and approval agency.</p>		<p><b>The Air Force Council</b> provides Deputy Chief of Staff (three-star) level, corresponding Secretariat level, and selected Directorate (two-star) level review of resource allocation and other issues. It is the final corporate body and makes recommendations to the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Air Force. The Council is chaired by the Vice Chief of Staff.</p>

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<sup>69</sup> Army Regulation AR 1-1, Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System, January 30, 1994.

<sup>70</sup> MCO P3121.1.

<sup>71</sup> MCO P3121.1.

<sup>72</sup> Air Force Policy Directive 16-5, Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, 29 July 1994 and Air Force Instruction 16-501, Control and Documentation of Air Force Programs, 1 December 1997.

Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
<p><b>The Strategy and Planning Committee (SPC)</b> is chaired by the Assistant DCSOPS. Alternate chair for international activities is the ADCSOPS (Joint Affairs). Members consist mainly of officials responsible for planning in the various Army Staff agencies and offices of the Army Secretariat. The SPC provides an integrating forum for Army planning. It considers guidance and analyses related to strategy and planning and makes recommendations to the SELCOM. The SPC recommends force structure guidance to Secretary of the Army and Army Chief of Staff for approval; monitors force development to be sure the program force meets requirements; and serves as coordinating body for "The Army Plan."</p>	<p><b>The CNO Executive Board (CEB)</b> is composed of the DCNO's, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, and chaired by CNO.</p>	<p><b>The Commandant's Committee</b> is the highest level planning, programming, and budgeting forum within the Marine Corps. The Commandant's Committee approves the Marine Corps Program. The Commandant is chairman of this committee.</p>	<p><b>The Air Force Board</b> provides flag-level (two-star and civilian equivalent) review of resource allocation and other issues. The Board reviews issues submitted by the Air Force Group. The Board directs the focus of the Air Force Group in resolving issues. Topics brought before the Board are limited to important matters requiring corporate consideration and resolution. The Board is chaired by the Director of Programs (HQ USAF/XPP) except for purposes of budget formulation and execution to include the Budget Estimate Submission (BES), Budget Review Cycle, and President's Budget (PB) when it is chaired by the Deputy Assistant Secretary (Budget) (SAF/FMB). Air Force Board membership includes General Officer (one- and two-star)/Senior Executive Service level membership from a wide breadth of functional disciplines.</p>
<p><b>The Program and Budget Committee (PBC)</b> is co-chaired by the DPAE and DAB. Either presides, depending on the subject. PBC members consist mainly of officials responsible for programming or budgeting in the various offices and agencies of the Army Secretariat and Staff. The PBC oversees the programming, budgeting, and execution phases of the PPBES, including information feedback among the phases. The PBC serves in both a coordinating and executive-advisory role. It provides a continuing forum in which program and budget managers review, adjust, and decide issues. An aim of the PBC is to make sure of the internal consistency and support of Army policy. The PBC may return the results of committee deliberations to the Army Staff or Secretariat for action. It may pass them to the SELCOM for review or approval and later presentation to the Secretary of the Army or Army Chief of Staff.</p>	<p><b>The Program Review Committee (PRC)</b> is a three-star review board chaired by OP-08, Director, Navy Programming and Planning.</p>	<p><b>The Program Review Group (PRG)</b> is the primary inter-agency and inter-command forum for coordinating Marine Corps participation in Navy and DoN programming developments. The PRG also reviews POM development issues after their identification by the POM Working Group but prior to their presentation to the Commandant's Committee. The PRG resolves all but the major issues and assesses overall program balance. Membership consists of senior representatives of each member of the Commandant's Committee. The Marine Corps Deputy Chief of Staff DC/S R&amp;P is the PRG chairman.</p>	<p><b>The Air Force Group</b> provides senior-level (Colonel and civilian equivalent) resolution of resource allocation and other issues prior to Air Force Board review. The Group reviews issues submitted by the Panels and Integrated Process Teams. The Group is the first level of the corporate structure that integrates Air Force mission and mission support areas into a balanced Air Force program.</p>

Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
<p><b>Standing Committees:</b> The PBC may set up standing committees or working groups to resolve difficulties in managing the program or budget. An example is the Transportation Working Group formed to develop priorities and controls for managing transportation. An example of a standing committee is the PBC Systems Subcommittee. This subcommittee consists of general officers and members of the Senior Executive Service (SES). It is co-chaired by representatives of the DPAA and DAB. It broadly represents the Army Staff and Secretariat and includes appropriate representation from the field. The subcommittee reviews program, budget, and cost estimates for the life cycle of major weapon and information systems. It assigns agency responsibilities for issues needing further review and follows up on the action taken. As appropriate, the subcommittee presents the results of its deliberations to the PBC.</p>	<p><b>The Program Development Review Committee (PDRC)</b> is a two-star review board chaired by OP-80, Director, General Planning and Programming Division;</p>	<p><b>The POM Working Group (PWG)</b> is the forum that coordinates initial staff action for development of the Marine Corps POM. It tracks the POM through the DoN and DoD staffing levels, assisting as requested, until it becomes budget. The PWG also serves as an initial staffing forum to recommend programmatic decrement appointment. The group draws membership from action officers representing each member of the Commandant's Committee and other representatives as desired.</p>	<p><b>Mission/Mission Support Panels.</b> The Air Force reviews and screens resource allocation and other issues through the fourteen Mission and Mission Support Panels (Panel Chairs are Colonel or civilian equivalent). The primary purpose of the Panels is to support the corporate resource allocation process within defined Air Force mission and mission support areas. Each of the Panels is, in and of itself, the HQ USAF "center of expertise" for its particular mission or mission support area. The Panel serves as the initial point for issues requiring corporate review. They review and develop options for presentation to the Group. Membership is approved by the Panel Chair and reviewed by the Air Force Group and includes representation from all appropriate functional staff elements, the Air Force Reserve, and the Air National Guard.</p>

Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
<p><b>The Prioritization Steering Group (PSG)</b> serves as another PPBS deliberating body. The DCSOPS chairs the PSG. Members consist of the Director of the Army Staff and other primary Army Staff principals. Membership includes the DPAA and DAB and, when requested by DCSOPS, extends to selected representatives of the Army Secretariat. The PSG reviews unresourced programs submitted by MACOMs and PEOs and proposed decrements recommended by the PBC; resolves differences involving unresourced requirements or decrements on which the PBC fails to reach agreement during program or budget development; reviews prioritized and integrated lists of unresourced programs and decrements against fiscal and manpower constraints imposed by OSD; and makes recommendations on unresourced programs and proposes off-setting decrements to the SELCOM.</p>			<p><b>Integrated Process Teams.</b> Integrated Process Teams (IPTs) comprise the multifunctional working-level infrastructure and information network that supports both the Air Force corporate process as well as the functional staff, the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard. IPTs serve as the single HQ USAF POCs for major programs or issues. Each IPT will have a designated IPT Chief who will function as the team leader for all Program Element Monitors (PEMs) involved in that IPT. Each Air Force program or issue will be assigned to only one IPT.</p>
			<p><b>Each Program Element (PE)</b> is assigned a single Program Element Monitor (PEM) as the Air Force focal point for that PE. The PEM may be responsible for more than one PE, but each PE has only one PEM. The PEM is usually assigned from within the Secretariat or Air Staff based on the office of primary responsibility (OPR) for that PE as approved by the AFG. The PEM serves as the primary advocate for their PE(s), addressing issues and coordinating functional concerns across various staffs. PEMs prepare and update various planning, programming, and budgeting documents within the PPBS process. They work closely with the Mission or Mission Support Panel to which the PE is assigned to ensure that the program is supported properly. SAF/AQ and the Air Staff provide specialized skills training for the PEMs.</p>

**(4) Associated Higher-Level Processes:** CJCS input to the PPBS process, development of the DoD Program and Budget submissions (See Volume IV: Chapter 3, Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate, Chapter 5, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Chapter 7, The Unified Commands).

**(5) Associated Lower-Level Processes:** Subordinate command participation in Departmental resourcing processes.

#### **H. Other Formal Processes:**

**(1)** As members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Chiefs and their key deputies (including the Vice Chiefs and Operations Deputies) participate in numerous Joint Staff and OSD formal processes (See Volume IV, Chapter 5, The Joint Chiefs of Staff).

**(2) Reserve Forces Policy Boards and Committees:** Each Service is required by law to establish a Reserve Forces Policy Board or Committee which reviews and comments upon major policy matters directly affecting the reserve components and mobilization preparedness.<sup>73</sup>

**(3) Congressional Testimony:** The Secretaries, Chiefs, and key subordinates routinely present testimony to Congress when requested regarding Department and Service responsibilities and requirements.

### **6. Informal National Security Process Involvement.**

**A. Professional Interaction:** Secretariat and Service Staff action officers and senior leaders frequently hold informal discussions in a number of different venues to discuss substantive issues. Sometimes these discussions occur as action officers prepare Service inputs to the Joint Staff in support of formal processes. Sometimes they occur as action officers try to build consensus for proposals or recommendations. Sometimes they occur as sidebars at conferences, meetings, or seminars. The members of these staffs are networked to a broader functional community, both within their respective Service (e.g., pilots, infantry, submariners) and within their functional specialty (e.g., logistics, personnel, communications). These networks are an important lubricant for the national security process at large. In addition to these networks, the Secretaries, Chiefs, and key subordinates are in frequent contact with other senior military leaders from the Joint Staff, other Services and Departments, and the unified commands.

**B. Congressional Influence:** The Services have maintained strong constituencies among members of the House and Senate. Each Service maintains a Congressional Liaison function. In addition, private organizations such as the Association of the United States Army, the Navy League, the Air Force Association, the Marine Corps Association, and the National Guard Association of the United States can exert considerable influence in telling the Service "story" on the Hill.

### **7. Funding and Personnel.**

**A. Authorizations and Appropriations:** Funds for the Military Departments are authorized and appropriated within the overall DoD authorizations and appropriations.

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<sup>73</sup> Title 10 United States Code, Sections 10302, 10303, 10304, 10305.

**B. Budget Sources:** Each Military Department has its own budget. The Marine Corps budget is included within the Department of the Navy budget. The following table shows the Total Obligational Authority of each Service, with a breakout of the reserve component TOA.

Service <sup>74</sup>	TOA FY 99 (\$ millions)	TOA FY 00 (\$ millions)
Total Army <sup>75</sup>	65,519	67,350
Army Reserve	3,472	3,663
Army National Guard	6,386	6,491
Total Navy/ Marine Corps	82,336	83,553
Navy Reserve	2,430	2,369
Marine Corps Reserve	526	533
Total Air Force	77,400	79,600
Air Force Reserve	2,640	2,622
Air National Guard	4,689	4,607

**C. Manpower:** The following table shows the total authorized manpower of the Military Services, with a breakout of the reserve component manpower.

Service <sup>76</sup>	Manpower FY 99	Manpower FY 00
Active component Army	480,000	480,000
Army Reserve	208,000	205,000
Army National Guard	357,000	350,000
Active component Navy	372,355	371,781
Navy Reserve	90,843	90,288
Active component Marine Corps	172,200	172,148
Marine Corps Reserve	39,966	39,624
Active component Air Force	305,267	316,212
Air Force Reserve	73,137	72,714
Air National Guard	106,166	105,853

**8. Observations.** Over the past several years, the turmoil surrounding the Military Departments and Services has been very high. This is the result of four primary factors: changes in mission/threat, changes in technology, budget pressures, and changes in bureaucratic role within

<sup>74</sup> Sources: The Army Budget, FY00/01 President's Budget, February 1999, <http://www.asafm.army.mil/budget/0001pb/Greenbook/GB.pdf>; Air Force FY 00/01 President's Budget Highlights, January 1999, <http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/>; FY 2000 Department of the Navy Budget, February 1999, [http://navweb.SecretaryoftheNavy.navy.mil/pubbud/00pres/highbook\\_frame\\_u.htm](http://navweb.SecretaryoftheNavy.navy.mil/pubbud/00pres/highbook_frame_u.htm).

<sup>75</sup> Service totals include reserve component TOA.

<sup>76</sup> Sources: The Army Budget, FY00/01 President's Budget, February 1999, <http://www.asafm.army.mil/budget/0001pb/Greenbook/GB.pdf>; Air Force FY 00/01 President's Budget Highlights, January 1999, <http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/>; FY 2000 Department of the Navy Budget, February 1999, [http://navweb.SecretaryoftheNavy.navy.mil/pubbud/00pres/highbook\\_frame\\_u.htm](http://navweb.SecretaryoftheNavy.navy.mil/pubbud/00pres/highbook_frame_u.htm).

the Department of Defense. Taken together, these factors are likely to raise a new roles and missions debate.

**A. Changes in the Mission/Threat:** Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has faced a dynamic and uncertain security environment. The collapse of the Soviet Union has resulted in a smaller U.S. defense force and a significant reduction in overseas basing. At the same time, the demands of peacetime engagement and smaller scale contingencies has stretched the capabilities of U.S. forces engaged in such operations while trying to maintain readiness across the full range of the National Military Strategy, particularly the specter of two major theater wars. Today, the sustained warmaking capabilities of traditional regional foes is questionable. At the same time, the U.S. is faced with a wide range of emerging asymmetrical threats that have resulted in new mission emphasis in areas including combating terrorism, force protection, counter proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, information operations, and homeland defense. During the Cold War, the role of each of the Services was fairly well defined. However, changing threats and emerging missions are causing each Service to internally reexamine its strategy and are likely to raise new questions in future administrations and within the Congress about the nature of the Military Services and Departments in the future national security arena.

**B. Changes in Technology:** The foundation of Joint Vision 2010 and the Revolution in Military Affairs rests on new—and expensive—technologies. In some ways, the new technologies are driving the Services to better integrate new weapons systems due to a common reliance on communications, intelligence, targeting, and positioning technologies. At the same time, technology has produced systems such as Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) and the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM), which allow individual Services to extend their combat influence beyond their traditional geographic scope. In some areas, such as Theater Missile Defense, each Service has proposed competing concepts and systems. In the past, such competition was viewed as beneficial to overall defense posture because it resulted in stronger solutions and some redundancy. Today, however, the cost of such competition is becoming prohibitive.

**C. Budget Pressures:** Each of the Services is under significant fiscal pressure due to several factors, including balanced budget demands, the high cost of maintaining readiness in the face of a high peacetime operating tempo (OPTEMPO), and the projected costs to overcome the modernization "bow waves" that exist in each Service. Infrastructure draw downs have not kept pace with force structure draw downs, creating additional monetary pressures on the Services.

**D. Changes in Bureaucratic Roles:** Goldwater-Nichols was successful in readjusting the balance of power between the Services and the Joint warfighting structure. As a result, the Services find themselves with less influence in DoD decision making. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is now the principal military advisor to the Secretary of Defense, National Security Council, and the President. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council has matured into a significant player in the resourcing and acquisition processes. The establishment of United States Special Operations Command and United States Space Command have eroded Service influence in these functional areas. The emerging role of United States Joint Forces Command as the Joint Force Trainer, Integrator, and Provider is seen by many as a challenge to traditional Service Title 10 roles. At the same time, the Joint Officer management provisions Goldwater-Nichols, have resulted in a migration of talent from the Service staffs to the Joint Staff and Unified Command Staffs.

**ORGANIZATIONAL DESCRIPTION**

**DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS**  
**AGENCY (DARPA)**



*Prepared for the U.S. Commission on National Security/21<sup>st</sup> Century*

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

### **Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)**

#### **Overview**

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is a scientific research and technological development agency within the Department of Defense. DARPA was created in 1958 as a response to the Soviet launch of the Sputnik satellite as central coordinator of research and development for the military services. The most important task delegated to DARPA is to be innovative and imaginative in its approach to technological solutions to military challenges. These solutions can be grouped into three general categories: 1) solutions to national level challenges; 2) development of critical enabling technologies for current problems faced by the military services and the warfighter; and 3) long-term technological development looking over the horizon toward future technologies for future warfighters. In carrying out research in these areas, DARPA's constant mandate is to seek out high-risk, high-payoff programs that take new and different approaches to research problems.

The highest value is placed on the freedom to conduct programs in an environment separated from the traditional military and government bureaucracy, with a small, constantly changing staff to ensure an influx of fresh ideas and approaches to research and development.

#### **Organization**

The Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) has oversight of DARPA within the office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (USD(A&T)). The Director, DARPA has direct control and oversight over the Agency and its Program Managers, who oversee and manage various research projects. DARPA is divided into seven technical offices working on a range of projects developing near- and long-term technologies.

DARPA's staff is intentionally small (approximately 240) in order to maintain a close, collegial atmosphere and avoid the encroachment of bureaucracy. Additionally, the technical staff is rotated on a three to five year basis from a variety of scientific backgrounds to ensure fresh and diverse thinking. Staffing procedures of both technical and non-technical staff allow DARPA to tailor its personnel to its specific projects. At the conclusion of a project, only those with specific expertise needed in other planned projects are retained. This is a significant difference from most other organizations in the Department of Defense (DoD). DARPA was intentionally set up with these attributes to try to develop a different kind of military research facility not plagued by the static nature of other government research labs.

#### **Role in Formal and Informal National Security Process**

DARPA has a role in preparation within the national security process. Its function is to research and develop technologies both in support of current military and security policy, and to enable technologies for use in future military capabilities. As a research agency intentionally divorced from the DoD bureaucracy, DARPA is not a formal player in the national security

process, and beyond its contribution in preparation and securing funding for its projects, does not participate in the process.

### **Conclusions and Observations**

DARPA's work is research and development, which is oriented towards solving military challenges, however DARPA does not have any input into the way its technological developments may be utilized in support of national security.

Organizationally, DARPA thrives on its relative independence from the DoD bureaucracy of and other research laboratories in the government, using its unique position to foster original and imaginative research efforts. DARPA's staffing procedures, which allow for project-oriented hiring and high turnover at the conclusion of research projects, is also a rather unique asset within DoD. The independence and the small size of the agency are jealously guarded by DARPA and its Director, and are supported by the DDR&E and USD(A&T) within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Based on these observations, it is unlikely that DARPA would want to increase its a role in the national security process out of fear that such involvement would have negative effects on its independence.

## ORGANIZATIONAL DESCRIPTION

### DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY (DARPA)

#### 1. Legal Specifications, Authorizations, and Responsibilities.

**A. Authorizing Directive:** The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), originally established in 1958, was created within the Department of Defense (DoD) pursuant to Section 113 of Title 10, United States Code.

**B. Department/Agency Directives: Department of Defense Directive 5134.10 (17 February 1995),** which replaced DoD Directive 5105.41 (25 January, 1989), "establishes the DARPA as an agency of the Department of Defense with the responsibilities, functions, relationships, and authorities as prescribed herein."<sup>1</sup> DARPA serves as the main research and development organization within DoD with direct oversight from the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E).

#### 2. Missions/Functions/Purposes.

**A. Mission:** As set out by DoDD 5134.10 (17 Feb 1995), "DARPA shall serve as the central research and development organization of the Department of Defense with a primary responsibility to maintain U.S. technological superiority over potential adversaries."<sup>2</sup>

In DARPA's words, its "primary responsibility is to help maintain U.S. superiority and guard against unforeseen technological advances by potential adversaries."<sup>3</sup>

**B. Major Responsibilities:** As the central organization for research and development within the DoD, DARPA's mission is to "assure that the U.S. maintains a lead in applying state-of-the-art technology for military capabilities and to prevent technological surprises from [U.S.] adversaries."<sup>4</sup> To carry out this mission, DARPA develops and cultivates imaginative and novel ideas for research and technological development. DARPA oversees development from idea, to demonstration of technical feasibility, to prototype development. It strives to go beyond normal approaches to Research and Development (R&D) and take risks in order to achieve high-payoff applications of new technologies.

#### 3. Vision and Core Competencies.

**A. Vision:** DARPA was founded in response to the Soviet launch of Sputnik in 1958. It was envisioned as an agency separated from the DoD bureaucracy and "completely independent of the military research and development establishment."<sup>5</sup> The guiding principles of this vision include:

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<sup>1</sup> Department of Defense Directive 5134.10, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Feb. 17, 1995.

<sup>2</sup> DoDD 5134.10 (17 Feb 1995).

<sup>3</sup> DARPA website, [www.darpa.mil/mission.html](http://www.darpa.mil/mission.html).

<sup>4</sup> DARPA website, [www.darpa.mil/years.html](http://www.darpa.mil/years.html).

<sup>5</sup> DARPA website, [www.darpa.mil/years.html](http://www.darpa.mil/years.html).

(1) A small, flexible, and flat organization free of the bureaucratic constraints of most other government research institutions. This freedom is an essential part of achieving high-risk, high-payoff technological development.

(2) A superior technical staff drawn from the best scientists and engineers representing diverse backgrounds in industry, universities, government laboratories, and other research and development centers.

(3) A rotating technical staff assigned for three to five years to assure a continual influx of new ideas and approaches to research efforts.

(4) Project-based research, typically lasting three to five years with a strong focus on end goals. Major technological challenges may be addressed over longer periods, but only as a series of smaller, focused steps. Upon completion of a project, there is no follow-on work done within DARPA unless the project is reevaluated and selected as a completely fresh decision without respect to previous investment. The majority of projects are transferred to the research and development elements of the various services for continued testing and development.

(5) Necessary support personnel for projects that are hired on a temporary basis to ensure flexibility in project selection without having to sustain the staff.

(6) Program Managers who are at the same time technical experts and entrepreneurial to ensure that they will take novel approaches to achieving their goals.

(7) Management based on good oversight of taxpayer dollars with few other rules to constrain Program Managers and their projects.

(8) A complete acceptance of failure if the payoff of success was high enough.<sup>6</sup>

**B. Core Competencies:** DARPA's research has several focuses based on its core competencies. These core competencies are not specifically outlined by DARPA, but a review of its website highlights the following areas:<sup>7</sup>

(1) High-payoff, high-risk technological research and development. DARPA is unique in its high tolerance of risk in situations where the payoff can be significant. It is also constantly reviewing projects to ensure that the potential payoff continues to be worth the risk.

(2) Technical solutions to national level problems. In the current security environment, the priority of the research effort is directed towards protection from biological attack and information attack.

(3) Technical enablers (basic technologies and developments that enable the development of a wide range of new or more complex technologies) for new military capabilities

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<sup>6</sup> DARPA website, [www.darpa.mil/years.html](http://www.darpa.mil/years.html).

<sup>7</sup> Statement by Larry Lynn, Director, DARPA before the Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Acquisition Technology, United States Senate, March 11, 1997; Statement by Frank Fernandez, Director, DARPA before the Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, United States Senate, April 20, 1999.

and solutions to critical military problems. This includes "operational dominance" technologies such as battlefield preparation; dynamic surveillance and replanning; affordable, mobile, precision target kill; mobile, distributed command, control and communications; and advanced air, land and maritime warfare concepts. Additionally, Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs) bring direct warfighter participation in technology development to more accurately address critical military problems and develop the right solution.

(4) Long-term core technology development with a focus over the horizon to the needs of the future warfighter. Current focuses are on development of advanced information and microsystems technologies, and advanced materials technologies, which will enable a range of new technologies in the future.

#### 4. Organizational Culture.

**A. Values:** DARPA's central value is intellectual and organizational freedom in which to develop new technologies in support of the military services and the warfighter. Intellectually, DARPA seeks out the best scientists from various backgrounds who have new and different approaches to technological development. Organizationally, DARPA seeks to operate within fiscal constraints with a high degree of latitude for new and different approaches to solving research problems.

**B. Leadership Traditions:** DoDD 5134.10 specifies that the Director, DARPA be a "civilian selected by the Secretary of Defense based on recommendations by the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (USD(A&T)) and the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E)."<sup>8</sup> The Director is responsible to the Secretary of Defense, with direct oversight from the DDR&E. Historically, the Director, DARPA has taken a strong stance on maintaining the Agency's freedom and flexibility and defending it from outside influences of bureaucratization. Senior management within the DoD has repeatedly supported the Director in this stance.

Program Managers play an additional role in leadership at DARPA on the project level. Program Managers have a high degree of latitude in the way in which they go about achieving the goals of the project. Program Managers have direct control over the program and its funding.

**C. Staff Attributes:** The DARPA technological staff is made up of scientists with backgrounds in industry, universities, government laboratories, and other federal research and development laboratories. The scientific staff is rotated on a three to five year basis in order to ensure that there is a constant influx of new ideas to the Agency. This cycle requires that DARPA recruit 20% of its technical staff each year—approximately 25 scientists. Filling this requirement has been facilitated by the 1998 Intergovernmental Personnel Act, which gave the DARPA Director the authority to recruit exceptional people.<sup>9</sup> Program Managers are rotated on a similar basis. Support staff are hired temporarily for specific projects, allowing DARPA to change focus from one program to the next without having to carry over personnel longer than needed.


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<sup>8</sup> DoDD 5134.10, 17 Feb, 1995.

<sup>9</sup> Statement of Frank Fernandez.

**D. Strategy:** DARPA's strategy is to support the Military Services, Joint Staff, and individual warfighter through technological development of solutions to critical military problems. In pursuit of this strategy, DARPA's programs range from work on solutions to current challenges, to the development of enabling technologies for the future. To achieve these goals, DARPA does not maintain its own labs but utilizes academic and commercial labs for the bulk of its research, allowing DARPA to leverage existing infrastructure. Essential in carrying out its strategy is a conscious balance between meeting the various needs of the Military Services and the strategic aims of the Joint Staff. Important in DARPA's strategy is the need to maintain a connection between its research work and its customers' needs. To address this need, DARPA brings two senior military officers to the Agency to serve as the chief points of contact between DARPA and the Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs), Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). These officers work in close contact with both Program Managers and the intended end users to ensure both technical and customer needs are met. DARPA is able to ensure that its programs are oriented towards the needs of the military by ongoing consultation with these liaisons and using them as "customer advocates."<sup>10</sup>

**E. Organizational Structure:** DARPA is an independent agency within DoD organized as follows:



**Figure 1: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) <sup>11</sup>**

**(1) The DARPA Director** is a civilian appointed by the Secretary of Defense who oversees the agency's administration and research projects. He is assisted by a Deputy Director.

<sup>10</sup> Statement by Larry Lynn.

<sup>11</sup> F.L. Fernandez, Introduction to DARPA. Found at [www.darpa.mil/DARPAOverview2.ppt](http://www.darpa.mil/DARPAOverview2.ppt).

**(2) The Advanced Technology Office (ATO)** engages in high risk, high payoff, advanced military research projects with significant potential impact on the defense capability of the United States. ATO's two main functions are developing and transitioning revolutionary systems/subsystems to the military user; and the identification and exploitation of new technologies that lead to revolutionary systems development, maintain the necessary margin of technological superiority, and provide the flexibility and options for responding to changing US military needs.

**(3) The Defense Science Office (DSO)** mission is to identify and pursue the most promising technologies within the basic science and engineering research community and develop them into new DoD capabilities.

**(4) The Information Systems Office (ISO)** mission focuses on revolutionizing national security and military operations through the power of information systems technology—to know, to know more, to know faster and be able to act flexibly.

**(5) The Information Technology Office (ITO)** focuses on inventing the networking, computing, and software technologies vital to ensuring DoD military superiority.

**(6) The Microsystems Technology Office (MTO)** mission focuses on the heterogeneous microchip-scale integration of electronics, photonics, and microelectromechanical systems (MEMS). MTO's high risk/high payoff technology is aimed at solving the national level problems of protection from biological, chemical and information attack and to provide operational dominance for mobile distributed command and control, combined manned/unmanned warfare, and dynamic, adaptive military planning and execution.

**(7) The Special Projects Office (SPO)** mission focuses on technologies which counter present and emerging national challenges in the areas of advanced detection and sensor systems, guidance and navigation capabilities, and underground facilities and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).

**(8) The Tactical Technology Office (TTO)** engages in high-payoff advanced military research, emphasizing the "system" and "subsystem" approach to the development of aeronautic, space, and land systems as well as embedded processors and control systems.<sup>12</sup>

**5. Formal National Security Process Involvement.** The way in which DARPA was set up and envisioned—as a semi-independent agency within DoD free from the bureaucratic process to foster research—helps to separate DARPA from the traditional national security processes. The research and development performed by DARPA help to provide key technological capabilities for the military services and the Joint Staff, giving DARPA a greater influence on the planning and preparation processes than on strategy and policy processes.

**A. Strategy Development:** DARPA does not play a role in the strategy development process.

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<sup>12</sup> DARPA website, [www.darpa.mil/organization.html](http://www.darpa.mil/organization.html).

**B. Policy Guidance and Regulation:** DARPA does not help to guide policy, rather the programs it undertakes are selected based on policy needs. Current priorities at DARPA include national protection from biological and information attack, which is reflective of current policy. Future research focuses will be guided by policy also.

**C. Planning:** DARPA does not have a significant role in national security planning, although it can have some input in developing ideas for future military capabilities. As a research organization staffed by technology experts, DARPA has the ability to assess the technological feasibility of potential programs under consideration by DoD or the various military services.

**D. Mission Execution:** As above, DARPA does not play a role in mission execution, except to the extent that its programs may help to facilitate certain missions in the future.

**E. Observation, Orientation, and Oversight:** As above, DARPA does not play a role.

**F. Preparation:** DARPA plays a key role in technological development of military capabilities. These programs are oriented towards both current and long-term solutions to military challenges. With regard to preparation, DARPA's near-term research programs are focused on solutions that could enable the services to better carry out national military and security strategy. In the long term, DARPA's research goals are oriented towards supporting the services in their roles in the anticipated future strategic environment.

**G. Resourcing:** DARPA plays a role in the resourcing of its programs. This involves securing resourcing for its various programs and managing resources over the life of the program. These programs may have an effect on national security decision making in the future, but have little immediate effect on the process.

**6. Informal National Security Process Involvement.** DARPA has no role in informal national security processes.

## **7. Funding and Personnel.**

**A. Authorization and Appropriations:** The Senate Armed Services Committee, and House Armed Services Committee have jurisdiction over DARPA.

**B. Funding Sources:** DARPA funding comes out of the Department of Defense's Defense Agency RDT&E budget.

**C. Budget:** DARPA's budget, outlined on its website, is as follows:<sup>13</sup>

<b>Fiscal Year</b>	<b>Total Budget (\$ in millions)</b>
FY 1998	2,004.033
FY 1999	1,930.255
FY 2000	2,002.684
FY 2001	1,883.858

**Figure 2: DARPA Budget**

**D. Personnel:** Approximately 240 personnel, 140 of which are technical staff.

**8. Conclusions and Observations:** DARPA's work is research and development, which is oriented towards solving military challenges, but it does not have any input into the way its technological developments may be used in support of national security.

Organizationally, DARPA thrives on its relative independence from the bureaucracy of DoD and other research laboratories in the government, using its unique position to foster original and imaginative research efforts. DARPA's staffing procedures, which allow for project-oriented hiring and high turnover at the conclusion of research projects, is also a rather unique asset within DoD. The independence and the small size of the agency are jealously guarded by DARPA and its Director, and are supported by the DDR&E and USD(A&T) within the OSD. Based on these observations, it is unlikely that DARPA would want to increase its role in the national security process out of fear that such involvement would have negative effects on its independence.

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<sup>13</sup> DARPA website, [www.darpa.mil/acrobat/fy2000.pdf](http://www.darpa.mil/acrobat/fy2000.pdf).

**ORGANIZATIONAL DESCRIPTION**  
**DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY (DLA)**



*Prepared for the U.S. Commission on National Security/21<sup>st</sup> Century*

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

### **Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)**

#### **Overview**

The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) is a combat support agency originally created in 1961 within the Department of Defense. Its mission is to provide acquisition and focused logistics support to the military services in peacetime and during contingency operations. In pursuit of this mission, DLA seeks to work with its customers in order to provide logistics and resourcing as needed around the globe to facilitate the mission of the warfighter. Its "published" core competencies include agile combat logistics support, rapid worldwide crisis response, integrated combat logistic solutions, integrated lifecycle support, a single face to industry, and logistics technology generation and application.

#### **Organization**

DLA is an agency within the Department of Defense (DoD) responsible to the Under Secretary of State (Acquisition & Technology) (USD(A&T)). The Director, DLA, presides over an organization that is broken down into two main commands. The Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC) is responsible for contract management throughout the acquisition lifecycle for the diverse array of products needed to support the U.S. military at home and abroad. The Defense Logistics Support Command (DLSC) is responsible for providing the logistics support to warfighters so that they are able to fulfill operational missions whenever they arise.

#### **Role in Formal and Informal National Security Process**

DLA plays a supporting role in the national security process. While it does not have a direct impact on the government-wide national security process, as does the Secretary of Defense, DLA is involved in several of the key processes in support of DoD missions. The primary role DLA plays is in resourcing U.S. armed forces in times of peace and war. As the central supply agency in DoD, DLA supplies everything from repair parts to food and uniforms. To support its resourcing role, DLA is involved in planning with other DoD agencies in order to ensure that needed supplies will reach U.S. troops when they are needed in times of crisis and contingency operations. Additionally, DLA's support work contributes to successful mission execution. DLA also plays smaller parts in preparation and observation, orientation, and oversight processes.

#### **Conclusions and Observations**

DLA plays a supporting role in the national security process as the main centralized logistics and support agency for the various military services, Combatant Commands, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). DLA plays a role in several key processes, most notably in planning, resourcing, and mission execution, with additional preparation and observation, orientation, and oversight roles. DLA takes part in DoD planning for contingency operations in order to prepare for its mission to supply logistics to the warfighter. Resourcing of the military services is central to DLA's mission, and to executing the mission of the armed forces as determined by policy makers through the national security processes. There are,

however, criticisms of DLA's business practices and its ability to meet customer needs. There is a disconnect between DLA's metrics of success, which are based on internal efficiencies and percentages of orders filled, and customer metrics, which are based on support effectiveness and the ability to get critical items.

## ORGANIZATIONAL DESCRIPTION

### DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY (DLA)

#### 1. Legal Specifications, Authorizations, and Responsibilities.

**A. Authorizing Directive:** The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) was created as the Defense Supply Agency within the Department of Defense (DoD) in 1961 by the Secretary of Defense pursuant to his authority under Title 10, United States Code. The name of the agency was changed to DLA in 1977 in recognition of its expanded role in logistics.<sup>1</sup> "The responsibilities, functions, relationships, and authorities of DLA are specified in 32 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 398 as re-designated and amended at 58 FR 39360, July 22, 1993."<sup>2</sup>

**B. Department/Agency Directives: Department of Defense Directive 5105.22 (6 December, 1988),** which replaced DoD Directive 5105.22 (15 August 1986), "update[s] the responsibilities, functions, relationships, and authorities of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)."<sup>3</sup>

#### 2. Missions/Functions/Purposes.

**A. Mission:** As set forth in DoD Directive 5105.22 (6 December, 1988), "The DLA shall function as an integral element of the military logistics system of the Department of Defense to provide effective and efficient worldwide logistics support to the Military Departments and the Unified and Specified Commands under conditions of peace and war, as well as to other DoD Components, federal agencies, foreign governments, or international organizations as assigned. This support shall include:

(1) The provision of materiel commodities and items of supply that have been determined, through the application of approved criteria, to be appropriate for integrated management by a single agency on behalf of all DoD Components, or that have been otherwise specifically assigned by appropriate authority.

(2) The performance of logistics services directly associated with furnishing materiel commodities and items of supply (hereafter referred to as "items").

(3) The administration of Department-wide logistics management systems, programs, and activities, as assigned, including the provision of technical assistance, support services, and information."<sup>4</sup>

According to the DLA website, the mission of the Defense Logistics Agency is "[t]o provide acquisition and focused logistics support to America's Armed Forces in peace and war—around the clock, around the world."<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> [History of DLA](http://www.dla.mil/history.htm), Defense Logistics Agency website, www. dla.mil/history.htm.

<sup>2</sup> [DLA Combat Support Agency Review](#), Booz, Allen & Hamilton, 1998, p. 1.

<sup>3</sup> Department of Defense Directive 5105.22, Defense Logistics Agency, December 6, 1988.

<sup>4</sup> DoDD 5105.22, (6 Dec 1988).

**B. Major Responsibilities:** DLA is a combat support agency within the Department of Defense that provides materiel and supplies to the military services and supports their acquisition of weapons and other equipment. This process involves joint planning with the services for parts for a new weapons system; production; and disposal of obsolete, unused, or worn out materiel. DLA also provides supply support, contract administration services, and technical and logistics services to the various military services.<sup>6</sup>

**C. Subordinate Activities and Agencies:** DLA is divided into two subordinate commands, the Defense Contract Management Command and the Defense Logistics Support Command.

**(1) Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC):** The mission of the DCMC is to "provide customer focused contract management services—throughout the acquisition life cycle—around the clock, around the world."<sup>7</sup>

**(2) Defense Logistics Support Command (DLSC):** The mission of the DLSC is to "provide America's warfighters with the logistics support they need so they can fulfill their operational mission."<sup>8</sup>

### 3. Vision and Core Competencies.

**A. Vision:** "To be America's logistics combat support agency ... the warfighter's choice for integrated life cycle solutions through teamwork and partnership. We are warrior focused professionals, an integral part of the joint warfighting team. We know that victory by America's Armed Forces and the lives of service members depend on us. They can count on us to be there, every time, wherever they are, providing required logistical support ... around the world, around the clock. We make a difference."<sup>9</sup>

**B. Core Competencies:** According to the Defense Logistics Agency website, DLA has the following six core competencies:

**(1) Agile Combat Logistics Support:** DLA's logistics support is tailored to meet the requirements of small, agile fighting units, which are becoming increasingly important in military combat planning. DLA believes that these requirements demand more agile and responsive logistics support, which can reliably reach these forces with precision, on short notice, and in a secure information environment. The marks of such a support structure include high-speed information processing, rapid identification and direction of material and services, and continual movement when material is placed in transit.

**(2) Rapid Worldwide Crisis Response:** DLA aims to be poised to quickly provide increased, specialized logistics services and contract administration as needed to support

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<sup>5</sup> Focusing for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: 1998 Strategic Plan, Defense Logistics Agency website, [www.dla.mil/strategic\\_plan/mission.htm](http://www.dla.mil/strategic_plan/mission.htm).

<sup>6</sup> DLA Fact Sheet, Defense Logistics Agency website, [www.dla.mil/public\\_info/fact\\_sheet.htm](http://www.dla.mil/public_info/fact_sheet.htm).

<sup>7</sup> Defense Logistics Agency website, [www.dla.mil/organization/dcmc.htm](http://www.dla.mil/organization/dcmc.htm).

<sup>8</sup> Defense Logistics Agency website, [www.dla.mil/organization/dlsa.htm](http://www.dla.mil/organization/dlsa.htm).

<sup>9</sup> Defense Logistics Agency website, [www.dla.mil/strategic\\_plan/mission.htm](http://www.dla.mil/strategic_plan/mission.htm).

emergency operations—ranging from war and full scale military engagements to peacekeeping missions, humanitarian assistance, and relief efforts for natural or human caused disasters. DLA maintains contingency response capabilities by engaging in deliberate crisis planning with Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) around the world, matching DLA support with warfighter needs. DLA's Logistics Readiness Center monitors world events and serves as the command and control link to the Joint Staff and DLA components around the world. As world events develop, DLA deploys contingency support teams and other DLA experts—Defense Contract Management Command, Defense Energy Support Center, Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service, and Inventory Control Points—to the scene to concentrate DLA's full resources on supporting the warfighters. DLA's goal is to no longer be a Continental United States (CONUS) wholesale operation, but instead to be a partner with customers to tailor ways to place quality logistics support and services directly in the hands of the warfighters.

**(3) Integrated Combat Logistic Solutions:** DLA is a logistics combat support agency, and as such, it must ensure the solutions it develops are equally applicable in peace and war. Additionally, DLA's customers turn to it for logistics solutions integrated from two standpoints:

**(a)** Integrated throughout the supply chain to represent the best value and performance across all aspects of the supply chain, from industry to the customer, not just across DLA's piece of the supply chain; and

**(b)** Integrated throughout the Agency to represent not just an acquisition, distribution, supply management or disposal solution, but a solution which transcends any single business area and integrates aspects of all business areas and, as appropriate, the commercial sector.

**(4) Integrated Life Cycle Support:** A unified systemic approach is used to combine all activities needed to acquire, produce, deliver, operate, maintain, and dispose of supplies and equipment required by customers. The goals of integrated life cycle support are to optimize performance of customer missions while reducing the total cost of acquisition and operation. Each part of the cycle is treated as a component of a total support system. Decisions and actions in any area are integrated across all activities to produce solutions which transcend the individual function and provide overall best value and performance for DLA customers.

**(5) Single Face to Industry:** DLA provides a single face to industry for administration of DoD contracts through the DCMC. DCMC shares a constancy of purpose with its customers, the DoD program, and buying offices. Its goals are to administer government contracts efficiently and consistently in support of program objectives across the defense industry, protect public interests, encourage contractor self-governance, and stimulate continuous performance improvement.

**(6) Logistics Technology Generation and Application:** Government or commercial off-the-shelf applications provide a broad range of capability, from performing routine business functions to complex situational modeling, and ensure continuity of operations for the warfighters' readiness and sustainability. DLA determines and utilizes the best value approach, striking the correct balance between government and private sources, which provide commercial or government off-the-shelf systems, newly developed, or a combination thereof, to

ensure rapid evolution and integration of new technologies into its business practices and logistics solutions.<sup>10</sup>

#### 4. Organizational Culture.

A. **Values:** DLA's website sets forth the following five values:

**(1) People.** DLA values its people and diversity. DLA recognizes that each individual has a unique contribution to make to the success of the agency and that DLA has an obligation to work to give each individual the opportunity to make a contribution. DLA leaders at all levels of the organization have a commitment to employee growth, and are committed to investing in employee training. DLA sees itself as a community working as a team of many individuals with different backgrounds, different viewpoints, different skills, and different insights. By mutual trust, respect for each individual contribution, support for each member of the team, wide participation and information sharing, and providing a safe workplace for all, DLA grows as an organization.

**(2) Service.** DLA is committed to excellence in customer service. Its goal is to listen to its customers, focus on customer needs, and strive to exceed their expectations. DLA wants to be an integral part of the warfighting team—a world-class logistics provider. DLA actively solicits feedback from customers in order to improve service and its customers' trust.

**(3) Excellence.** DLA values professionalism and quality. DLA seeks to do things right the first time. The agency actively seeks professional and personal growth and certification to meet the highest standards of quality performance and teamwork. DLA strives to deliver quality products and services to its customers. DLA recognizes and rewards its employees for their contributions to customer support, and communicates successes and exceptional achievement throughout the organization. DLA leaders and employees have a commitment to the agency's vision and goals.

**(4) Integrity.** DLA values personal and organizational integrity. The agency operates with the highest standards of ethical conduct. DLA takes accountability for the resources entrusted to it as a top priority. DLA employees carefully evaluate their decisions for ethical implications, including safety, environmental protection, privacy, and human rights considerations.

**(5) Innovation.** DLA values innovation. Good ideas come from every member of the organization and DLA provides an environment in which those ideas can easily surface and be acted upon. The agency constantly seeks improvements that add value for its customers. DLA is flexible in changing its business practices in a desire to improve customer service and to excel.<sup>11</sup>

**B. Leadership Traditions:** Within DoD, DLA is "under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology)"<sup>12</sup> (USD(A&T)). The Director, DLA is required to be an active duty military officer of flag rank appointed by the

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<sup>10</sup> Defense Logistics Agency website, [www.dla.mil/strategic\\_plan/corecomp.htm](http://www.dla.mil/strategic_plan/corecomp.htm).

<sup>11</sup> Defense Logistics Agency website, [www.dla.mil/strategic\\_plan/values.htm](http://www.dla.mil/strategic_plan/values.htm).

<sup>12</sup> DoDD 5105.22, (6 Dec 1988).

Secretary of Defense. The Deputy Director, DLA is also required to be an active military officer of flag rank recommended by the Director and approved by the USD(A&T).

**C. Staff Attributes:** DLA's staff is made up of both civilians and military personnel assigned under DoD joint staffing policies. DLA seeks to develop a workforce that combines experienced employees with new employees equipped with the latest technological knowledge, skills, and techniques.

**D. Strategy:** DLA has developed a strategy, *Focusing on the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, in order to achieve its mission to provide logistical support to U.S. armed forces into the next decade. Within this plan, DLA puts forth five strategic goals, each with specified objectives for its future:

(1) To provide consistent, responsive, best value supplies and services to customers with high standards in areas such as reliability, on-time delivery, and customer satisfaction.

(2) To serve as a catalyst for the revolution in business affairs and acquisition reform. Specific objectives in achieving this goal include reducing overall infrastructure by 40 percent, increased streamlining, a sales to inventory ratio of 1.5 to 1, a reduction in paper-processed transactions, and increased accessibility to credit card ordering.

(3) To ensure DLA's workforce is enabled to deliver and sustain world class performance. Objectives outlined to accomplish this goal include developing individualized training plans for employees, an employee satisfaction index of 90 percent, a benchmark number of training hours per employee, and a future-focused system for continual worker development.

(4) To exploit technology rapidly to provide agile, responsive, interoperable solutions. The first objective of this goal is to implement an Information Technology (IT) Strategic Plan. Other objectives include conducting 40 percent of sales through virtual enterprise arrangements, upgrading technology, establishing a logistics research and development (R&D) program, and utilizing web technologies.

(5) To pursue partnerships with industry and suppliers aggressively. This is to be achieved by increasing the value of long-term contracts, establishing value-added partnerships with principal suppliers, and achieving 95 percent of commercial payments within prompt payment standards.<sup>13</sup>

There have been critiques of DLA's performance in these areas and its ability to improve its services. While DLA strives to provide responsiveness and value to its customer, the agency often falls short of its goals. A recent assessment of DLA revealed that it often fails to communicate these goals to its customers. The result is that customers are not aware of the full spectrum of DLA's capabilities, and customers often have doubts that DLA's business practices are adequately responsive to supported CINC requirements.

These doubts largely arise out of the greater problem of DLA's organization and business practices. DLA looks at its inventory and support to warfighters purely in terms of numbers and quotas, not in terms of a hierarchy of warfighter requirements. As such, because DLA is not 100

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<sup>13</sup> Defense Logistics Agency website, [www.dla.mil/strategic\\_plan/goals.htm](http://www.dla.mil/strategic_plan/goals.htm).

percent funded to meet all warfighter needs, it seeks to carry an inventory capable of filling the great majority, but not 100 percent, of customer needs. Metrics are based on internal efficiencies, not support effectiveness. In DLA's practices, meeting 85 percent of needs is seen as an admirable metric. However, the 15 percent of inventory not stocked is often the most important and critical to customers tasked with achieving a military objective. When the most critical customer needs are not met, the customer will resort to buy arounds and other sources to meet its needs. This method bypasses DLA, which is not able to capture customer demands, and further exacerbates the problem.


Additionally, the DLA field representative program is organized around business areas, not to solve warfighting problems. DLA field representatives tend not to have knowledge of the processes and capabilities of other business areas, nor are they aggressive in solving problems to address the needs of the warfighters in the field.

Both personnel and technology issues make these problems worse. Recently, the number of joint duty billets at DLA was severely reduced. As a result, military staffing will be reduced, and the quality of the staff will decline as top officers will be assigned to joint billets elsewhere. With respect to technology, while DLA seeks to improve its information infrastructure and move to a paperless environment, the reality is that it will not happen as planned. There is no centralized management for DLA's electronic commerce efforts. Additionally, the process is encumbered with legacy systems that are difficult to adapt to a more up-to-date system.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> DLA Combat Support Agency Review, pp. IV-2--IV-13.

**E. Organizational Description:** DLA is a combat support agency within DoD. Its organization is as follows.



**Figure 1: Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)<sup>15</sup>**

**(1) The DLA Director** is a three-star officer appointed by the Secretary of Defense who oversees DLA's two main commands, the DCMC and the DLSC, and DLA's other administrative offices. The Deputy Director is a two-star officer who assists the Director.

**(2) Corporate Administration** is an administrative support element within DLA, which is responsible for areas such as Human Resources, Plans and Operations, Congress and Public Affairs, Command Security, and Environment and Safety.

<sup>15</sup> Defense Logistics Agency website, [www.dla.mil/strategic\\_plan/dlastory.htm](http://www.dla.mil/strategic_plan/dlastory.htm)

**(3) The Defense Automated Printing and Support Center** is the central printing facility for DoD that is responsible for generating all printed DoD materials.

**(4) The DCMC** is responsible for assuring that procured material is of satisfactory quality and is delivered when and where it is needed. DCMC's responsibilities, in part, include:

- (a)** Planning and acquisition;
- (b)** Source selection of contractors;
- (c)** Contractor capability and proposal review;
- (d)** Program and technical support;
- (e)** In-plant production surveillance and quality assurance;
- (f)** Contractor property management surveys;
- (g)** Negotiation of contractor modifications; and
- (h)** Contract closeout.

The DCMC is administered in three Defense Contract Management Districts.

**(5) The DLSC** provides the U.S. military with the logistics support it needs to be able to fulfill its operational missions. The DLSC is composed of six functional centers.

**(a) DLA Europe and DLA Pacific** are the DLA Headquarters' focal points in the European Theater and the Pacific Theater, respectively. DLA Europe provides customer assistance, liaison, services, war planning interfaces, and logistics support to the Commander-in-Chief, European Command and his service components' commands: USAREUR, USAFE, NAVEUR, MARFOREUR and SOCEUR. DLA Europe has its main offices in Wiesbaden, Germany.

DLA Pacific offers the same logistics support to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command, and his service components' commands. In the Pacific Theater, plans exist for the Commander, DLA Pacific, to be moved forward to Taegu, Korea, to better support the combat forces on the ground in Korea. The deputy will remain in Hawaii to represent the Director of DLA to CINCPAC, and coordinate long-range strategic logistics support planning with the Pacific Command logistics plans staff.

**(b) The Defense Distribution Center (DDC)** is principally responsible for distribution of all goods and equipment within DLSC. Its responsibilities include receipt, storage, issue, packing, preservation, worldwide transportation, in-transit visibility, and redirecting enroute, when required, of all items placed under its accountability by DLA and the military services. The DDC oversees 21 Distribution Depots located throughout the United States and Europe.

**(c) The Defense National Stockpile Center (DNSC)** maintains critical and strategic materials to reduce the nation's dependence on foreign sources of supply for such materials during national emergencies. The DNSC is authorized to procure and dispose of material as needed.

**(d) The Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service (DRMS)** provides for the redistribution and disposal of DoD equipment and supplies no longer needed by the original user. DRMS matches equipment against requirements of the military services and federal agencies and transfers it as needed. When equipment becomes surplus, it is offered to the General Services Administration and state agencies, after which it is sold to the public.

**(e) The Defense Logistics Information Service** manages the Federal Supply Catalog System, which lists the National Stock Number and description for all equipment in the federal system. The catalog system is used throughout the federal government.

**(f) The Defense Supply Center** is a network of five inventory control points (ICPs) that manage and purchase items used by all of the military services and some civilian agencies. These items include fuel, food, clothing, medical supplies, construction material, and the hardware and electronic items used in the maintenance and repair of military equipment.

**(6) The Chief Information Officer (CIO)** is an administrative support element who oversees the information infrastructure that allows DLA to track and manage its inventory. The CIO also oversees the DLA Systems Design Center, which designs, develops, and maintains the automated information systems essential to DLA procurement, supply management, contract management, and logistic support operations worldwide.<sup>16</sup>

**5. Formal National Security Process Involvement.** DLA is not a direct player in the national security process. It does, however, take part in several key processes for national security, including planning, mission execution, preparation, and resourcing.

**A. Strategy Development:** DLA is not involved in developing strategy in the national security process.

**B. Policy Guidance and Regulation:** DLA, as above is not involved at the policy guidance level of the national security process.

**C. Planning:** DLA is involved in the planning process for the Department of Defense within the national security process. As a combat support agency, DLA is a primary agency responsible for the planning of resourcing for contingency operations wherever and whenever they occur. The "DLA systematically maintains contingency response capabilities by continuously engaging in deliberate crisis planning with Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) around the world, matching DLA support with warfighter needs."<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Defense Logistics Agency website, [www.dla.mil/organization/DLSC.htm](http://www.dla.mil/organization/DLSC.htm), [www.dla.mil/organization/DCMC.htm](http://www.dla.mil/organization/DCMC.htm), [www.dla.mil/public\\_info/fact\\_sheet.htm](http://www.dla.mil/public_info/fact_sheet.htm).

<sup>17</sup> Defense Logistics Agency website, [www.dla.mil/strategic\\_plan/corecomp.htm](http://www.dla.mil/strategic_plan/corecomp.htm).

**D. Mission Execution:** DLA plays a supporting role in executing military missions. DLA must be responsive to crises and contingencies as they occur in order to carry out its mission to keep U.S. armed forces adequately resourced as the need arises. To do so, DLA's "Logistics Readiness Center monitors world events and serves as the command and control link to the Joint Staff and DLA components around the world. As world events develop, [DLA] deploys contingency support teams and other experts throughout DLA—Defense Contract Management Command, Defense Energy Support Center, Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service, and Inventory Control Points—to the scene to concentrate the Agency's full resources on supporting the warfighters. DLA is ... a partner with customers to tailor ways to place quality logistics support and services directly in the hands of the warfighters."<sup>18</sup>

**E. Observation, Orientation, and Oversight:** DLA does not play a role in observation, orientation, and oversight for the national security process. However, in support of its role within the national security process, in 1998 DLA released a Strategic Plan with the objective of refocusing itself for the coming decade. The Agency involved its customers in the formulation of the plan in order to be responsive to on-going needs as they have developed. The major goals of the plan are discussed above.

**F. Preparation:** DLA is involved in preparation for support to the military in the national security process. DLA supports training for all of its employees to develop and maintain their skill set in support of logistics support to the armed services. Additionally, as part of its strategic plan, DLA is committed to training in new business practices to streamline the resourcing process.

**G. Resourcing:** The primary role of DLA is resourcing for the U.S. military in times of peace and war, a key function in the national security process. According to the DLA Fact Sheet, the DLA buys and manages a vast number and variety of items used by all of the military services and some civilian agencies. Commodities include fuel, food, clothing and medical supplies. The agency also buys and distributes hardware and electronic items used in the maintenance and repair of military equipment. The military services determine their requirements for supplies and materiel and establish their priorities. DLA supply centers consolidate the services' requirements and procure the supplies in sufficient quantities to meet the services' projected needs. This procurement function is a large task and critical to maintaining the readiness of our forces. The supplies DLA procures are stored and distributed through a complex of depots. DLA manages supplies in the following commodity areas:

**(1) Clothing.** DLA provides the services with uniforms, special purpose clothing, and clothing-related items such as helmets, canteens, and shoes.

**(2) Construction material.** DLA manages items ranging from common commercial items, such as lumber and plumbing accessories, to large equipment, such as bulldozers and cranes.

**(3) Electronic supplies.** DLA manages items that are used in maintenance and repair of military equipment. These include microcircuits, resistors, solenoids, transformers, fiber optic assemblies, radar equipment, remote control systems for guided missiles, and electronic countermeasures equipment.

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<sup>18</sup> Defense Logistics Agency website, [www.dla.mil/strategic\\_plan/corecomp.htm](http://www.dla.mil/strategic_plan/corecomp.htm).

**(4) Energy.** DLA is the DoD material manager for bulk petroleum, natural gas, coal and electricity. DLA buys, stores, and distributes fuel via tankers, barge, rail, truck, and pipeline used by the military services, DoD components and federal civil agencies.

**(5) Food.** Subsistence supply requires purchasing food—fresh, canned, frozen or dehydrated—for use in dining halls and field units and for resale in military commissaries. Food must be of the highest quality. Because it may be served in a variety of locations—including overseas bases, in submarines or in the field—the food must be packaged and transported in a manner that retains its attractiveness and nutritional content.

**(6) General supplies.** DLA manages items like material-handling equipment, machine tools, wet-cell batteries, and photographic supplies. Additionally, it furnishes airborne gyro components and automatic pilot mechanisms. Industrial supplies include such items as bearings, fasteners, rings, metal bars, and electrical wire and cable.

**(7) Medical supplies.** DLA supplies virtually all of the thousands of different drugs and medical, dental and surgical materials used by the military services. Medical items range from needles to MASH-type hospital units. DLA provides many aircraft and automotive spare parts and components for the armed forces. Such parts include those for jet engines, rocket engines, and turbosuperchargers.<sup>19</sup>

**6. Informal National Security Process Involvement.** DLA is not involved in any informal national security process.

## 7. Funding and Personnel.

**A. Authorization and Appropriations:** The Senate and House Armed Services and Appropriations Committees are responsible for appropriating funding for DLA.

**B. Funding Sources:** DLA receives funding from two principle sources—appropriations within the DoD Operations and Maintenance (O&M) budget account, and funding from the Defense Working Capital Fund (DWCF). The DWCF provides the bulk of the DLA budget, with a much smaller amount of funding from direct appropriations in the DoD budget.<sup>20</sup>

**C. Budget:** DLA's budget is as follows.

<b>Fiscal Year</b>	<b>Total Budget (\$ in billions)</b>
FY 1997	\$15.1B (\$13.6B DWCF, \$1.5B appropriated)
FY 1998	\$16.2B (\$14.9B DWCF, \$1.4B appropriated)
FY 1999	\$16.6B (\$15.1B DWCF, \$1.5B appropriated)

**Figure 2: DLA Budget<sup>21</sup>**

<sup>19</sup> [DLA Fact Sheet](http://www.dla.mil/public_info/fact_sheet.htm), Defense Logistics Agency website, www.dla.mil/public\_info/fact\_sheet.htm.

<sup>20</sup> [DLA Combat Support Agency Review](#), p. 13.

<sup>21</sup> [DLA Combat Support Agency Review](#), p. 67.

**D. Personnel:** DLA employs 41,900 military and civilian workers to carry out its logistics support mission.<sup>22</sup>

## **8. Conclusions and Observations.**

The Defense Logistics Agency is a combat support agency within the Department of Defense whose mission has expanded greatly from its origin as a supply central management agency. It plays a supporting role in the national security process as the main centralized logistics and support agency for the various military services, Combatant Commands, and OSD.

With respect to the national security process, DLA plays a role in several key processes, most notably in planning, resourcing, and mission execution, with additional preparation and observation, orientation, and oversight roles. DLA takes part in DoD planning for contingency operations in order to prepare for its mission to supply logistics to the warfighter. Resourcing of the military services while conducting operations is central to DLA's mission, and to executing the mission of the armed forces as determined by policy makers through the national security process. There are, however, some criticisms of DLA's business practices and its ability to meet customer needs. There is a disconnect between DLA's metrics of success, which are based on internal efficiencies and percentages of orders filled, and customer metrics, which are based on support effectiveness and the ability to get critical needs filled.

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<sup>22</sup> [DLA Fact Sheet](http://www.dla.mil/public_info/fact_sheet.htm), Defense Logistics Agency website, [www.dla.mil/public\\_info/fact\\_sheet.htm](http://www.dla.mil/public_info/fact_sheet.htm).

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